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Abstract
Although much has been wiitten about the role of rational/analytical ways of 
knowing in decision making and problem solving in management, comparatively 
little is laiown about the way intuitive cognition manifests itself in organisations in 
general and in relation to organisational learning in particular'. Several 
conceptualisations have been offered in respect to the ways in which managers 
perceive, make sense and act in the social settings of business organisations. Intuition 
and organisational learning came together explicitly in the foundational 41 
harnework, which presents a theoretical account of how intuitions are articulated and 
transcend from enterprising individuals to become institutionalised into the wider 
organisational system.
This thesis contributes to the theoretical development of the subject of intuition in 
management by integrating tlnee streams of resear ch -  intuition, collective decision 
making, and organisational learning -  which have not been well-connected 
previously. By adopting a dual-process perspective, this resear'ch is focused on the 
role of intuitive judgement in collective decision making and organisational learning. 
It does so by exploring the ‘intuitive hits’ and ‘intuitive misses’ in tire decision 
making of the senior management teams at tlnee police organisations in the UK.
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the role of intuitive judgement in 
managerial decision making, a pilot study and two main studies were carried out. In 
Study 1, the Rational Experiential Inventory, a self-report inventory for measuring 
rational and experiential thinking styles, has been employed with the aim to explore 
individual differences in the use of intuitive and analytical cognitions in police work, 
using a sample of police staff and police officers. In Study 2, a multi-case study 
approach was adopted. The 41 organisational lear'ning framework was combined with 
the method of Critical Incident Teclmique to gather retrospective accounts from 
senior police officers of instances where intuitive judgement led to both effective and 
ineffective organisational outcomes. Data was collected based on in-depth semi- 
str'uctured focus group interviews with senior police management teams.
The research results are significant in that they provide new understandings and 
insights with a particular emphasis on the ways in which the tacit knowledge that 
forms the basis for intuitions may be institutionalised within organisations, ultimately 
leading to organisational learning. The findings reveal that intuition acts as a catalyst 
for the organisational learning process: it affects both individual and collective 
actions; it therefore has the potential to influence and inform not only individual 
learning but also collective interpretation and the development of shared meaning 
and sense-making within an organisation.
To conclude, it is acknowledged that the generalisation of findings is context-specific 
to the police authority, and therefore it may be restr'icted in its application to other 
domains. The implications of the findings for managers in general are discussed in 
detail, and a niunber of areas for future research are identified to extend the 
boundar ies of our' understanding of the role of intuition in individual and collective 
cognitions.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.0 Background of the Research
Organisational learning has been researched extensively over several decades, and 
multiple conceptualisations and theoretical formulations have been presented (e.g. 
Ai'gyris and Schon, 1978; Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991; Levitt and March, 
1988; Senge, 1990). Organisational learning theory distinguishes between the 
knowledge held subjectively by individuals (which can be tacit) and that held inter- 
subjectively by groups, teams and organisations (which may be presumed to be 
explicit) (see Spender, 1996). Sequential to the developments in the field of 
organisational learning, researchers with an interest in individual learning and 
cognition have begun to conceptualise and theorise several contrasting ways in which 
managers perceive, make sense and act in the social settings of business 
organisations, which often do not conform to the ideal of rationality and which are 
cognisant of its limitations.
Based on a critique of rationality and an acknowledgement of its limits (e.g. Simon, 
1987), researchers have turned their attention to more tacit and implicit ways of 
knowing and learning (e.g. Tsoukas, 2003). In this respect, intuition has received 
increased attention in management research due to its significance for, and potential 
impact on, strategic decision making (Barnard, 1938; Simon, 1978a, 1987, 1997 
Behling and Eckel, 1991; Burke and Miller, 1999; Sadler-Smith and Shefy, 2004 
Miller and Ireland, 2005; Sinclair and Aslikanasy, 2005; Dane and Pratt, 2007 
Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox and Sadler-Smith, 2008). A growing number of 
researchers have argued that intuitive judgement plays an important role in decision 
making and is the key to effective organisational outcomes under particular sets of 
circumstances (Agor, 1984, 1986; Allinson, Chell and Hayes, 2000; Khatri and Ng, 
2000; Sadler-Smith, 2004; Sadler-Smith and SpaiTow, 2008; Shapiro and Spence, 
1997; Hayashi, 2001; Isenberg, 1984; Parikli, Neubauer and Lank, 1994).
A number of these researchers have focused in recent years on the distinction 
between intuitive and analytical modes of information processing (Dane and Pratt, 
2007; Hodgkinson et al, 2008; Sadler-Smith and Shefy, 2004; Sinclair and 
Ashkanasy, 2005). Work in this area is based on a long tradition and has potentially 
strong connections to theories of organisational learning and knowledge (e.g. 
Polanyi, 1966). Only in recent years has it been possible to conceptualise intuitive 
forms of Icnowing within a coherent body of psychological theoiy grounded in dual­
process conceptualisation of cognition (Hodgkinson et al, 2008).
Intuitions are “affectively charged judgements that arise through rapid, 
nonconscious, and holistic associations” (Dane and Pratt, 2007: 40), and this echoes 
Polanyi’s assertion that “we can know more than we can tell” (1966: 4). 
Management researchers have offered explanations for the underlying cognitive and 
affective mechanisms of intuitive judgement (Hodgkinson et al, 2008), suggesting 
different types of intuition (Dane and Pratt, 2009), and exploring its role in 
organisational performance (e.g. Kliatri and Ng, 2000; Sadler-Smith, 2004). Despite 
the recent resuigence of interest in the topic, intuition research has yet to fully 
engage with the notion of collective intuition, correspondingly organisational 
learning research has much to gain from recent developments in intuition research, 
and vice versa.
Intuition and organisational learning came together explicitly in the foundational 41 
model of Crossan, Lane and \Vhite (1999), which presents a theoretical accoimt of 
how intuitions are articulated and transcend from enterprising individuals to become 
institutionalised into the wider organisational system. Along with dual-process 
theory, 41 is the underlying framework in this research given its explicit 
acknowledgement of the role of intuition in collective learning. It is acknowledged in 
the literature that there has been only a small number of empirical studies on the 41 
model and related processes in organisational contexts.
The current research explores this topic in the context of managerial decision making 
in thiee police organisations. There is, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no 
extensive body of theory or empirical work relating to intuitive decision making in
police senior management teams. Whilst there has been a great deal of theoretical 
development with respect to the top management teams (TMT), most of this 
literatuie is concerned in analysing the impact of TMT composition on decision 
outcomes and fiiin performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Bantel and Jackson, 
1989; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Jackson, 1992; 
Keck and Tusliman, 1993; Hambrick, Clio and Chen, 1996; Papadakis and Barwise, 
2002; Caipenter, 2002; Kauer, Prinzessin zu Waldeck and Schaffer, 2007). However, 
in this resear ch the focus of interest is not that of establishing a relationship between 
TMT’s characteristics and firm performance; rather the interest is in developing a 
comprehensive understanding of the role of intuition in decision making and 
organisational learning from an individual as well as an organisational perspective. 
Therefore, the lack of literature on intuition and organisational learning in police 
organisations represents an opportunity for the investigation of these phenomena 
within the context of police senior management teams.
1.1 Research Objectives
This tlresis seeks to integrate thr ee streams of resear ch -  intuition, collective decision 
making, and organisational learning -  that have not been well-connected previously, 
and thereby contributes to the theoretical development of the subject of intuition in 
managerial decision making and organisational learning.
The primary objective of this thesis is to undertake empirical research to explore the 
role of intuitive judgement in cognition and decision making as it pertains to police 
work in general, and organisational learning in the context of police organisations in 
particular from the individual and organisatioiral perspectives. The research will 
attempt to answer the following research questions (RQ).
RQl Are there individual differences in the use of intuitive (experiential) and 
analytical (rational) thinking (cognitive) styles amongst members of police 
organisations;
RQ2 Do senior managers use intuitive judgement in decision making, and under 
what circumstances do they use it;
RQ3 How effective are intuitive judgements perceived to be (for example, when 
does intuition ‘hit’ and when does it ‘miss’?);
RQ4 Do ‘good’ and ‘bad’ intuitions become embedded within the organisation’s 
systems and structures, if so how, and what are the consequences;
RQ5 How does intuiting lead to organisational learning, and how can intuitions be 
capitalised upon as a source of organisational learning?
These questions form the basis of the two main studies in this thesis.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
Following the current introduction chapter, the structure of this thesis is organised as 
follows: Chapter 2 critically reviews the literatuie on intuition reseai'ch in 
management from its conception in the 1930s until today. This chapter traces 
chi'onologically the origins of intuition as studied by researchers in management and 
related fields. Chapter 3 presents the literatuie on decision making in management 
teams. This chapter outlines the development of the decision making research in top 
management teams particulaily focusing on team characteristics, dynamics of 
decision making processes, and collective cognitions of teams. Chapter 4 presents the 
literature on organisational learning with specific focus on the 41 model as the 
underlying framework of this research. Chapter 5 outlines the methodological 
framework of this research and provides the rationale underlying the research 
philosophy adopted and the methodological approach employed in seeking to answer 
the research questions. Chapter 6 reports on Study 1 of this research which evaluates 
the intuitive and analytical thinking styles of police officers and police staff from an 
individual perspective. Chapter 7 documents the findings of the pilot study on senior 
managers’ experiences of intuition in decision making. Chapter 8 and 9 report on 
Study 2 of this research, and critically analyse the ‘intuitive hits’ and ‘intuitive 
misses’ of three police organisations respectively in six case studies of decision 
making and organisational learning processes. Chapter 10 discusses and synthesises 
the findings of Study 2 in light of previous research, and develops a conceptual 
framework based on the findings of the cuiTent research. Finally, Chapter 11
concludes the thesis. This chapter highlights the theoretical contributions and 
managerial implications of this research, discusses limitations of the studies 
undertaken, and provides directions for future research.
Chapter 2 Overview of Intuition Research in Management
2.0 Introduction
Intuition has received attention in management research due to its significance for 
and potential impact on strategic decision making (Bamaid, 1938; Simon, 1978b, 
1987, 1997; Behling and Eckel, 1991; Bui’ke and Miller, 1999; Andersen, 2000; 
Patton, 2003; Sadler-Smith and Shefy, 2004; Miller and Ireland, 2005; Sinclair and 
Ashkanasy, 2005; Dane and Pratt, 2007; Hodgkinson et al, 2008). A growing number 
of authors have argued that intuitive judgement plays an important role in decision 
making and is the key to effective organisational outcomes under particular sets of 
circumstances (Agor, 1984, 1986; Allinson et al, 2000; Kliatri and Ng, 2000; Sadler- 
Smith, 2004; Shapiro and Spence, 1997; Sinclair and Aslikanasy, 2005; Dane and 
Pratt, 2007; Sadler-Smith and Spari'ow, 2008).
In this chapter, a historical perspective of intuition research in decision making will 
be adopted and the models of intuition and decision making developed by the most 
important thinkers in this field will be explored. In particular, the following traditions 
of research will be reviewed: logical versus non-logical processes; bounded 
rationality; heuristics and biases; fast and frugal heuristics; recognition primed 
decision making; affect hemistic; and Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory. The 
chapter will conclude with an overview of the most recent developments in intuition 
research.
2.1 Chester I. Barnard: Logical versus Non-Logical
Chester Barnard (1886 to 1961) was a telecornmimications executive, whose 
importance for management research lies in creating a new theory around 
organisational structure, focusing on the organisation as a communication system. 
After working as an engineer with the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
(AT&T) in Boston, eventually he moved on to become the president of the New
Jersey Bell Telephone Company where he remained as the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) until his retirement (Anonymous, 2003). Although he was a practitioner rather 
than a scholar', he is one of the founding fathers of decision making analysis in 
management theory (Novicevic, Hench and Wren, 2002).
Barnard recorded his insights about management in his best-known books The 
Functions o f the Executive (1938) and Organization and Management (1948). 
Barnard looked at organisations as systems of cooperation of human activity and 
focused on the impor'tance of communication (Gehani, 2002). In his 
conceptualisation of logical rational and non-logical intuitive processes, Barnard was 
one of the first management writers to ar-ticulate what intuition is, to speculate upon 
its nature and origins, and upon the circumstances and particular'job roles in which it 
is relevant.
Intuition was addressed by Barnard in the Cyrus Fogg Brackett Lecture to the 
Engineering Faculty and Students of Princeton University on the 10^ *’ of March 1936. 
In his lecture entitled ‘The Mind in Everyday Affairs’ (the Appendix of his most 
famous book The Functions o f the Executive, 1938) Bar nard talked about impor-tant 
aspects of human beings’ mental frinctioning in the work of, what he termed, 
‘everyday affairs’. He stated that the difference in mental processes, often reflected 
and expressed by such phrases as difference in “mental attitude”, “point of view”, 
“way the mind works” (Barnard, 1938: 302) and the wide divergence of opinion, 
often not realised, as to what constitutes a proper intellectual basis for opinion or 
deliberate action, that is, what is good evidence, proof, or justification. In addition, 
the difference in mental processes, quite independent of loiowledge or experience, is 
at the root of these very irnpor-tant practical difficulties in many cases. Barnard’s 
thesis was that these mental processes consist of two groups which he called “non- 
logical” and “logical”, which are not clearly separated but meld into each other 
(Barnard, 1938: 302).
“By ‘logical processes’ I mean conscious thinking which could be expressed in 
words, or other symbols, that is, reasoning. By ‘non-logical processes’ I mean 
those not capable of being expressed in words or as reasoning, which are only 
made known by a judgement, decision or action.” (Barnard, 1938: 302)
In Barnard’s point of view, the most significant difference in individuals and in the 
various types of work that they do lies in the degree to which actual thinking, that is 
reasoning, is used or is required. His argument was that executives, as contrasted 
with scientists, do not often make their decisions on the basis of orderly rational 
analysis, but depend largely on intuitive or judgemental responses to decision 
demanding situations (Simon, 1987).
Although Barnard did not provide a set of formal criteria for distinguishing between 
logical and judgemental decision making, he did provide a characterisation of the 
two styles that makes them easily recognisable, at least in their more extreme forms. 
In ‘logical’ decision making, goals and alternatives are made explicit, the 
consequences of pursuing different alternatives are calculated, and these 
consequences are evaluated in terms of how close they are to the goals. In 
‘judgemental’ decision making, the response to the need for a decision is usually too 
rapid to permit an orderly sequential analysis of the situation, and the decision maker 
cannot usually give a valid account of either the process by which the decision was 
reached or the groimds forjudging it conect (Simon, 1987).
“Some of it is so unexplainable that we call it ‘intuition’. A great deal of it 
passes under the name of ‘good judgement’. Some of it is called ‘inspiration’ 
and occasionally it is the ‘stroke of genius’. But most of it is called ‘sense’, 
‘good sense’, or ‘common sense’, ‘judgement’, or the ‘bright idea’.” (Barnard, 
1938:305)
Barnar d did not regard the non-logical processes of decision as magical in any sense. 
On the contrary, he felt they were mostly grounded in knowledge and experience. 
According to him, the sources of these non-logical processes lie in physiological 
conditions or factors, or in the physical and social envirornnent, mostly impressed 
upon us unconsciously or without conscious effort on our' part. Because they are so 
complex and so rapid, often approaching the instantaneous, they could not be 
analysed by the person within whose brain they take place (Barnard, 1938). They 
consist of the mass of facts, patterns, concepts, teclmiques, abstractions, and 
generally what we call formal knowledge or beliefs, which are impressed upon our 
minds more or less by conscious effor't and study. This second source of non-logical
mental processes greatly increases with directed experience, study and education 
(Barnard, 1938).
As the need for expressing logical reason is one of the most important hmnan 
necessities, there is a general belief that reasoning indicates a higher order of intellect 
than do the non-logical processes underlying quick judgements (Barnard, 1938). 
From a psychological perspective, reasoning is the means by which people make use 
of their vast stores of knowledge and apply them to paiticular situations (Evans, 
Newstead and Byrne, 1993). Evans and Wason (1976) proposed that the Type 2 
process (i.e. logical process) operates at a conscious level, and hence may be 
reported by the subject as the reason for their performance. These Type 2 processes 
may have some paif in organising behavioui', but their most common function is to 
‘rationalise’ the outcome of Type 1 processes (i.e. non-logical processes) of which 
the subject is unaware (Evans and Wason, 1976).
According to Barnard, there appear' to be two chief causes for overstressing of logical 
processes in contrast to the non-logical processes: misconception concerning the 
nature of logical reasoning, and a deep desire or need to argue and to justify by 
rationalisation. Barnard asserted that if this bias against the non-logical processes is 
put aside, then it is easy to see the insufficiency of logical processes when used alone 
and the desirability of their development in coordination with the non-logical, 
intuitive processes (Barnard, 1938).
2.2 Herbert A, Simon: Bounded Rationality
Herbert Simon (1916 to 2001) was a Professor in psychology and computer science 
at Carnegie Mellon University up until he passed away in 2001. Although he was 
educated as an economist, his research ranged from political science to 
administration, psychology, and information sciences. His interest in human decision 
making and problem solving processes led to extensive use of the computer as a tool 
for simulating human thinking. In addition to the A.M. Turing Award, the National 
Medal of Science and many other awards for his work in cognitive psychology and 
computer science, Simon had been awarded the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economie Sciences in 1978 for his pioneering research into the decision making 
process in economic organisations.
In one of his best loiown, ‘epoch-making’ (Nobelprize.org, 1978) book 
Administrative Behaviour (1947), Simon described the organisation as an adaptive 
system of physical, personal and social components, which are held together by a 
network of intercommunications and by the willingness of its members to cooperate 
and to work towards common goals. He replaced the entrepreneur of the classical 
school with a nimiber of cooperating decision makers whose capacities for rational 
action aie limited by a lack of knowledge of the total consequences of their 
decisions, as well as by personal and social ties. In an attempt to contrast the 
psychological and the logical elements in the choice process, and the examination of 
the limits and the possibilities of human rationality, Simon developed the notion of 
“bounded rationality” (Simon, 1997: 118) and the role of intuition in management 
decision making.
2.2.1 Bounded Rationality
Neo-classical economic assumptions lie at the heait of rational choice models of 
decision making (Miller, Hickson and Wilson, 1999). According to the classical 
theory of economic decision making, individuals nomially act as maximising 
entrepreneurs who arrive at decisions by a step-by-step process which is both logical 
and lineal'. Consequently, the decision makers identify a problem or issue about 
which a decision has to be made, collect and sort information about alternative 
potential solutions, compaie each solution against predetermined criteria to assess 
degree of it, aii'ange solutions in order of preference, and make an optimising choice 
(Cyert, Simon and Trow, 1956; Miller et al, 1999).
The classical economic model assumes knowledge of all the alternatives that are 
open to choice; complete knowledge of, or ability to compute, the consequences that 
will follow on each of the alternatives; certainty in the decision maker’s present and 
future evaluation of these consequences; and the ability to compare consequences, no 
matter how diverse and heterogeneous, in terms of some consistent measure of utility
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(Simon, 1955). In this respect, the classical theories of decision making and the 
business firm make very specific testable predictions about the concrete behaviour of 
decision making agents.
Simon was one of the earliest authors to provide a comprehensive critique of the 
limitations of the rational economic model (Simon, 1955, 1978b, 1983, 1987, 1997). 
He argued that this kind of theory is strikingly simple: all the predictive power comes 
fr om characterising the shape of the environment in which the behaviour' takes place. 
In this respect, the enviromnent, combined with the assumptions of perfect 
rationality, fully determines the behaviour. In contrast, Simon (1979) argued that the 
pattern of hrmian choice is often more neai'ly a stimulus-response pattern rather than 
a choice among alternatives. According to this notion, hmnan rationality operates 
within the limits of a psychological environment which imposes on the individual as 
“givens” (Simon, 1997: 117), a selection of factors upon which they must base their 
decision.
Simon asser'ted that, constrained by the complexity of modern organisations, by the 
uncertainty of the enviromnent, and by their own limited cognitive capacities, 
decision makers ar'e unable to operate under conditions of perfect rationality. 
Simon’s argument was that managers have to operate within a ‘bounded rationality’ 
(Simon, 1955, 1978b, 1983, 1987, 1997). This model of rational choice emphasises 
that it is impossible for the individual to know all his alternatives or all the 
consequences, and this impossibility is a very important depaiture of actual 
behaviour hom the model of objective rationality. The important point is that the 
decision malcers intend to be rational and their behavioui' is reasoned -  it is not 
irrational. However, there is a limited degree of rationality which can be employed.
In the middle of the 1950s, a strong positive case began to emerge for replacing the 
model of classical rational “economic man” by the “administrative man” of bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1955: 99; Simon, 1997: 119; Miller et al, 1999: 43). This model 
would describe how decisions could be (and probably actually were) made when the 
alternatives had to be sought out; the consequences of choosing particulai' 
alternatives were only very imperfectly known both because of limited
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computational power and because of uncertainty in the external world; and the 
decision maker did not possess a general and consistent utility function for 
comparing heterogeneous alternatives.
In comparison, while the economic man supposedly maximises (i.e. selects the best 
alternative from among all those available to him), his ‘brother’ the administrative 
man satisfices (i.e. looks for a course of action that is satisfactory or good enough). 
Economic man purports to deal with the ‘real world’ in all its complexity, on the 
other hand the administrator recognises that the perceived world is a “drastically 
simplified model of the buzzing, blooming confiision that constitutes the real world” 
(Simon, 1997: 119). The administrator treats situations as only loosely comiected 
with each other and takes into account just a few of the factors of the situation 
regarded as most relevant and crucial (Simon, 1997).
Two concepts that are central to this characterisation are information search and 
satisficing. The word ‘satisfice’ has been described by Oxford English Dictionary 
(2"  ^edition, 1989) as “to decide on and pursue a course of action that will satisfy the 
minimum requirements necessary to achieve a particular goal.” Simon’s concept of 
satisficing, a word that originated in Northumbria, is a method for making a choice 
from a set of alternatives encountered sequentially when one does not know much 
about the possibilities ahead of time (Simon, 1956). If the alternatives for choice are 
not given initially to the decision maker, then he must sear ch for them.
Simon asserted that, instead of searching for the best alternative, the decision maker 
is usually concerned with finding a satisfactory alternative, one that will attain a 
specified goal and at the same time satisfy a number of auxiliary conditions. It could 
be assumed that the decision malcer had formed some aspiration as to how good an 
alternative he should find. As soon as he discovers an alternative for choice meeting 
his level of aspiration, he would terminate the search and choose that alternative. In 
this respect, satisficing takes the shortcut of setting an adjustable aspiration level and 
ending the search for alternatives as soon as a satisfactory solution has been 
discovered that exceeds the aspiration level, even though the field of possibilities has 
not been exhausted (Cyert et al, 1956; Simon, 1979).
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Having analysed the two different schools of thought, the classical theory of decision 
making and the model of bounded rationality, Simon (1978b) asserted that the 
classical model does not work when we are seeking to explain the decision maker’s 
behaviour- in complex, dynamic circumstances that involve a great deal of 
uncertainty. This is because the classical theory of rational choice has generally 
ignored the information processing limitations and assumed that rationality was 
concerned with choice among alternatives that were already specified, and whose 
consequences were known or were readily calculable (Simon, 1965). On the other- 
hand, there is a tremendous weight of evidence that the bounded rationality theory 
describes the way people do in fact make decisions and solve problems in the real 
world (Simon, 1983). Therefore, in Simon’s view, the assumptions of the 
behaviomal model are almost certainly closer to reality than those of the classical 
theory.
2.2.2 Simon’s Conceptualisation of Intuition
Simon (1992) stated that in everyday speech we use the word ‘intuition’ to describe a 
problem-solving or question-answering performance that is speedy and for which the 
expert is unable to describe in detail the reasoning or other process that produced the 
answer. Simon explained this as a process of inputting certain premises and 
outputting cer-tain conclusions or decisions such that the situation provides a cue, this 
cue gives the expert access to information stored in memory, and die information 
provides the answer. In this respect, Simon suggested that “intuition is nothing more 
and nothing less than recognition” (Simon, 1992: 155). In other words, intuition 
enables the expert’s rapid recognition of and response to situations that are marked 
by familiar cues, and thereby gives access to large bodies of knowledge assembled 
through training and experience (Simon, 1997,1983).
Simon regarded the expert behaviom- as a production system where cues in the 
environment that the expert encounters trigger information in memory, hence 
initiating actions appropriate to the situations marked by these cues. Information 
organised in a production system of this kind can produce expert behaviour- (Simon, 
1992). This interpretation and linldng form the foundation for two related types of
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reasoning used by experts: analysis and intuition. Analysis involves sustained, 
systematic thought over a substantial span of time, while intuition reflects timely and 
seemingly less deliberate reasoning that is sometimes referred to as a “hunch” or 
“professional judgement” (Prietula and Simon, 1989: 122).
Analytical reasoning corresponds to Barnard’s ‘logical’ processes. This is typically 
associated with complex problem solving and consists of gathering information, 
mobilising relevant knowledge, making observations about the situation, and 
proposing solutions. Analytical reasoning takes time and requires extensive use of 
mental capital. On the other hand, intuitive reasoning conesponds to Barnard’s ‘non- 
logical’ or ‘judgemental’ processes. This type of reasoning occurs when experts 
generate accurate observations or even solutions without thinking more than a few 
seconds and without appearing to examine the situation closely.
At the time when the book Administrative Behaviour was written in 1947, Herbert 
Simon was troubled by Bariiar-d’s account of intuitive judgement largely because he 
left no clues as to what subconscious processes go on while judgements are being 
made. Wlrolly persuaded, however, that a theory of decision making had to give an 
account of both conscious and subconscious processes, Simon finessed the issue by 
assuming that these processes draw on factual premises and value premises, and 
operate on them to form conclusions that become the decisions.
*Split-Brain * Research
During the 1980s and 1990s physiological research on the human brain, and 
specifically the concept of hemispheric differences in brain functioning (the so-called 
‘split-brain’ research) has provided encouragement to the idea of qualitatively 
different kinds of decision making processes -  what could be described in the context 
of this chapter as the analytical and the intuitive. The ‘two brains’ hypothesis ar gued 
that rational and intuitive processes are so different that they are carried out in 
different parts of the brain (Simon, 1987). The primary evidence for this dichotomy 
is that (in right-handed people) the right hemisphere plays a special role in the
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recognition of visual patterns, and the left hemisphere in analytical processes and the 
use of language.
In one of the most famous and widely-cited paper on the subject, “Plamiing on the 
Left Side and Managing on the Right”, which appeared in Harvard Business Review, 
Mintzberg (1976) suggested a similar hemispheric specialisation which set the 
framework for the understanding of the brain at the time. He explained that the 
logical thinking processes are found in the left hemisphere of the brain. It seems that 
the mode of operation of the brain’s left hemisphere is linear: it processes 
information sequentially, one bit after another, in an ordered way. On the contrary, 
the right hemisphere is specialised for simultaneous processing, that is, it operates in 
a more holistic, relational way.
Speech, being linear*, is a left-hemispheric activity, but other forms of human 
communication, such as gestur ing, ar e relational rather than sequential and tend to be 
associated with the right hemisphere. According to this theory, most lawyers, 
accountants, and plarmers are likely to have better developed left-hemispheric 
thinking processes, while artists, sculptors, and perhaps politicians may be expected 
to have better developed right-hemispheric processes. Mintzberg (1976) further 
explained that the techniques of plarming and management science are sequential, 
systematic and articulated. Therefore, planners and management scientists are 
expected to proceed in their work through a series of logical, ordered steps, each one 
involving explicit analysis. However, the key managerial processes are enormously 
complex and “mysterious” (Mintzberg, 1976: 53), drawing on the vaguest of 
information and using the least arficulated of mental processes. These processes 
seem to be more relational and holistic than ordered and sequential, and more 
intuitive than intellectual; they seem to be most char acteristic of right-hemispheric 
activity.
Mintzberg (1976) concluded that the great powers that appear to be associated with 
the right hemisphere are obviously useless without the faculties of the left. Therefore, 
truly outstanding managers are no doubt the ones who can couple effective right-
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hemispheric processes (e.g. hunch, judgement, synthesis) with effective processes of 
the left; (e.g. articulateness, logic, analysis).
Although these findings had great implications for the wider understanding of the 
left-brain/right-brain dichotomy in the field of management science at the time, the 
research in psychology, physiology and cognitive neuroscience has moved on, and 
when we look at the cognitive neuroscientific-neurological aspects of decision 
making, a more complex picture emerges. In a provocative and cautionary short 
piece entitled “The Brain as Boondoggle”, Michael Gazzaniga, one of the pioneers of 
split-brain reseai'ch and student of Nobel Prize wiimer Roger Speny, stated that 
neuroscientists now know more and more about the automatic ways in which the 
brain works. For example, when experiencing a strong emotional response, one part 
of the brain tends to light up more than others (Gazzaniga, 2006). He suggested that 
this finding is potentially useful in business, for example in order to offer 
practitioners a clearer pictur e of the physiology of customers’ desires, however it has 
created a false expectation about what neuroscience can do. He drew attention to the 
fact that despite the advancements in this field, managers should not expect to be 
able to choose the right people for their organisation by simply looking at their brain 
scan. Gazzaniga (2006) argued that this kind of quest for certainty could devalue the 
intuition that managers traditionally rely on.
The real evidence for two different forms of thought comes from what Barnard relied 
on: the observation that in everyday affairs men and women often rnalce competent 
judgements or reach reasonable decisions rapidly, without any overt indication that 
they have engaged in systematic reasoning, and without their being able to report the 
thought processes that took them to their conclusions. There is also some evidence 
for the very plausible hypothesis that some people, when confr onted with a particular 
problem, make major use of intuitive processes in solving it, while other people 
make relatively more use of analytical processes.
Barnard’s evidence shows that although the process is quite different from each 
other, there is no incompatibility between analytical and intuitive reasoning. Simon 
fiuther reinforced this argument by stating that intuition grows out of experiences
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that once called for analytical steps (Prietula and Simon, 1989). He proposed that 
“intuition and judgement -  at least good judgement -  are simply analysis frozen into 
habit and into the capacity for rapid response through recognition” (Simon, 1987: 
63). As experience builds, the expert begins to ‘chunk’ the information into patterns 
and bypasses the steps for analysis. If the same pattern of infomiation is encountered 
again, the expert will know what data are relevant and what are not, and therefore 
possible answers generated from previous experience will pop up intuitively. Over 
time as more patterns ai*e chunked and linked, the hunches become better.
Evidence from Chess Masters
Simon (1998) illustrated this with the game of chess. Chess is usually believed to 
require a high level of intellect as well as a high level of analytical approach, with 
players working out systematically the consequences of moves and countermoves 
such that a single move can take a substantial amount of time. However, in 
simultaneous games the chess expert takes much less time for each move as there is 
no time for careful analysis. Evidence supports that in this rapid play, a large part of 
the chess master’s expertise lies in his intuitive or recognition capabilities based on 
large amormts of stored and indexed knowledge derived from training and experience 
(Simon, 1992).
Chase and Simon (1973a, 1973b) carried out a number of experiments to discover 
and characterise the chunlc size and memory span of chess players from master to 
novice. In these studies, they briefly presented chess positions to the subjects with 
randomly reannnged chess pieces (i.e. chunks). At that time. Chase and Simon 
believed that storage of new information in long-term memory (LTM) was quite time 
consuming, and that memory for briefly presented information could be maintained 
only in short-term memory (STM) for experts and non-experts alike. Therefore, their 
hypothesis was that recall is limited by the number of chunks that can be stored in 
STM.
This proposition was reconciled with the known limits of STM by observing that for 
the chess master a position from a game does not consist of 25 isolated pieces but of
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five or six chunks of familiar patterns. The finding showed that the superior memory 
for briefly presented chess positions is not due to any general memory ability, such 
as photographic memory, but depends critically on subjects’ ability to perceive 
meaningfiil patterns and relations between chess pieces (i.e. chess skill).
Empirical evidence suggests that the master or grandmaster holds in his memory 
about 50,000 different patterns of pieces that he will recognise instantly when they 
are present in a chess position. Associated with each pattern in his memory is 
information about the significance of that pattern, for instance what dangers it holds, 
and what offensive or defensive moves it suggests. Recognising the pattern brings to 
the grandmaster’s mind, at once, moves that may be appropriate to the situation. It is 
this recognition that enables the professional to play very strong chess at a rapid rate. 
Therefore, the speed with which players can perceive information on the chessboard 
depends upon their chess skill, and chess skill depends in large part upon a vast, 
organised LTM of specific information about chessboard patterns. Previous learning 
that has stored the patterns and the information associated with them in memory 
makes this performance possible (Simon, 1978a, 1987, 1998). Simon and Chase 
(1973) argued that a 10-year period of intense preparation is necessary to reach the 
level of an international chess master.
2.3 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky: Heuristics and Biases
Daniel Kahneman earned his PhD in psychology from the University of California, 
Berkeley in 1961. He began his academic career as a lecturer in psychology at 
Hebrew University, where he then became an Associate Professor in 1970 
(Nobelprize.org, 2002). Currently, Kahneman is a senior scholar and faculty member 
Emeritus at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, also a fellow at 
Hebrew University, Jerusalem. A long time collaborator of Kahneman, Amos 
Tversky (1937 to 1996) was a cognitive and mathematical psychologist, a pioneer of 
cognitive science, and a key figure in the discovery of systematic human cognitive 
bias and handling of risk (Nobelprize.org, 2002). His early work with Kalmernan 
focused on the psychology of prediction and probability judgement.
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In 1979, Tversky and Kalmernan originated ‘prospect theory’, as an alternative to 
expected utility theory, to describe decisions between alternatives that involve 
uncertain outcomes with risk (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The theory is 
developed for simple prospects with monetary outcomes and stated probabilities, but 
it can be extended to more involved choices. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
summarised it as follows:
“Prospect theory distinguishes two phases in the choice process: an early phase 
of editing and a subsequent phase of evaluation. The editing phase consists of a 
preliminary analysis of the offered prospects. In particular*, people set a 
reference point and consider lower outcomes as losses and higher outcomes as 
gains in which case gains and losses coincide with the actual amounts that are 
received or paid. In the second phase, the edited prospects are evaluated and 
the prospect of highest value is chosen.” (Kalmeman and Tversky, 1979: 274).
The idea that the cari'iers of utility are changes of wealth rather than asset positions 
was described as the cornerstone of prospect theory (Kalmeman and Tversky, 1979). 
This statement implied that people normally perceive outcomes as gains and losses, 
rather* than as final states of wealth or* welfare.
One novelty of prospect theory was that it was explicitly presented as a formal 
descriptive theory which tries to model real-life choices, rather* than optimal 
decisions (Kahneman, 2003). In developing this theory, the psychologists argued that 
people are not as calculating as economic models assume, instead they repeatedly 
make errors in judgement that can be predicted and categorised (Trei, 2002). For* his 
joint work in prospect theory with the late Amos Tversky, Kahneman received the 
Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002 (officially titled The Bank o f Sweden Prize in 
Economic Sciences in Memory o f Alfred Nobel), “for* having integrated insights from 
psychological research into economic sciences, especially concerning human 
judgement and decision-making under* uncertainty” (Nobelprize.org, 2002).
2.3.1 The Heuristics and Biases Programme of Research
Inspired by the ideas of Her*ber*t Simon, Kahneman and Tversky developed their own 
perspective on bounded rationality. Their research attempted to obtain a map of 
bounded rationality, by exploring the systematic biases that separate the intuitive
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beliefs people have and the choices they make from the optimal beliefs (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1973; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 
1982). Kahneman and Tversky defined intuition as “thoughts and preferences that 
come to mind quickly and without much reflection” (Kahneman, 2002: 449). Their 
research focused on eiTors of intuition and was guided by the idea that intuitive 
judgements occupy a position between the automatic operations of perception and 
the deliberate operations of reasoning. In the terminology that became accepted 
much later, Kahneman and Tversky held a two-system view, which distinguished 
intuition fr om reasoning.
Kahneman (2000: 682) stated that “in decision theory, rationality is defined by the 
coherence of beliefs and preferences, not by the ability to reason correctly about 
immediately available information”. Kahneman and Tversky proposed that intuitive 
judgements of probability or frequency are based on ‘natural assessments’ of 
similarity, causality, affective valence, or past frequency which are effortless and 
largely automatic (Kahneman, 2000).
The first research programme Kahneman and Tversky undertook together consisted 
of a series of studies of various types of judgement about uncertain events, including 
numerical predictions and assessments of the probabilities of hypotheses (Tversky 
and Kalmernan, 1971; Kalmeman and Tversky, 1972; Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; 
Tversky and Kalmeman, 1973; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The central idea of 
the ‘heuristics and biases’ programme was that judgement imder uncertainty often 
rests on a limited number of simplifying heuristics rather than extensive algorithmic 
processing (Kalmeman et al, 1982). The programme suggested that ordinary people 
are ‘cognitive misers’ who use little information and little cognition, and thus are 
largely unable to estimate probabilities and risks (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999). The 
conclusion in a review of this work was that “people rely on a limited number of 
hemistic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and 
predicting values to simpler judgemental operations. In general, these heuristics are 
quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors” (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974: 1124).
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The tenu ‘heuristic’ is of Greek origin, meaning “serving to find out or discover” 
(Gigerenzer, Todd and The ABC Research Group, 1999: 25). From its introduction 
into English in the early 1800s up until about 1970, ‘heuristic’ referred to useful, 
even indispensable cognitive processes for solving problems that cannot be handled 
by logic and probability theory. After 1970, a second meaning emerged in the field 
of psychology and decision making research: overused, mostly dispensable cognitive 
processes that people often misapply to situations where logic and probability theory 
should be applied instead (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). With this description, a 
very different notion emerged in psychology in the eaiiy 1970s, emphasising how the 
use of hemistics can lead to systematic errors and lapses of reasoning that indicate 
human iiTationality. Within the heuristics and biases programme launched by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974), heuristics were often invoked as the explanation 
when en'ors, mainly deviations ftom the laws of probability, were found in human 
reasoning (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999).
Although Tversky and Kalmeman (1974) repeatedly asserted that heuristics 
sometimes succeed and sometimes fail, their experimental results were typically 
inteipreted as indicating some kind of fallacy which was usually attributed to one of 
the tlnee main heuristics that underlie many intuitive judgements under uncertainty:
‘representativeness’ (judgements influenced by what is typical); ‘availability’ 
(judgements based on what comes easily to mind); and ‘adjustment and anchoring’ 
(judgements relying on what comes first) (Kalmeman and Tversky, 1973; Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974; Kalmeman et al, 1982; Kahneman, 2002, 2003). Gilovich and 
Griffin (2002; 4) ai'gued that these heuristics were proposed as a set of highly 
efficient “mental shortcuts” that provide subjectively compelling and often quite 
serviceable solutions to judgemental problems, however not exact or perfectly 
accurate. The first three heuristics of judgement was later followed by the 
development of a fourth one called ‘simulation hemistic’ (judgements based on the 
mental construction of examples or scenarios) (Kalmeman and Tversky, 1982). The 
idea of an ‘affect heuristic’ (judgements guided by positive or negative feelings) by 
Slovic, Finucane, Peters and MacGregor (2002) came much later in 2002 and was 
regarded as one of the most important developments in the study of judgement 
heur istics in the last decades.
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Representativeness
Kahneman and Tversky explained that people typically rely on the representativeness 
hemistic, in which probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which A is 
representative of B, that is, by the degree to which A resembles B. This assessment 
invariably leads to the inference that A and B are connected probabilistically, simply 
because they bear some resemblance to each other in terms of their descriptive 
features (Saks and Kidd, 1980). In a demonstration of this effect it was observed that 
people often predict by selecting the outcome (e.g. an occupation) that is most 
representative of the input (e.g. the description of a person) (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974).
For example, the probability that Steve is a libraiian is assessed by the degree to 
which he is representative of or similar to the stereotype of a librarian. The 
confidence people have in their prediction depends primarily on the degree of 
representativeness, that is, on the quality of the match between the selected outcome 
and the input. Thus, people express great confidence in the prediction that a person is 
a librarian when given a description of his personality which matches the stereotype 
of librarians, even if the description is umeliable or outdated. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) ar gued that this approach to the judgement of probability leads to 
serious erxors, because similarity or representativeness is not influenced by several 
factors that should affect judgements of probability.
Another study in the same design involved one of the best-known characters in the 
hemistics and biases literature. In this example, the respondents were given the 
following description:
“Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student she was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice and also participated in antinuclear 
demonstrations.” (Kalmernan, 2002: 468).
Respondents were shown the description of Linda and a list of eight possible 
outcomes describing her present employment and activities. The two critical items in 
the list were #6 “Linda is a bank teller” and the cory unction item #8 “Linda is a banlc
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teller and active in the feminist movement”. The other six possibilities were 
nmelated and miscellaneous. Some respondents ranked the eight outcomes by 
representativeness, others ranked the same outcomes by probability. The ordering of 
the two items was reasonable for judgements of similarity: Linda does resemble the 
image of a feminist banlc teller more than she resembles a stereotypical bank teller. 
However, the reliance on representativeness as a heuristic attiibute yields a pattern of 
probability judgements that violates monotonicity % and has been called the 
“conjunction fallacy” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983: 293). The conjunction fallacy 
is an anomaly in human reasoning for which the conjunction of two events is rated 
more likely to occur than one of the events alone (Zizzo, Stolarz-Fantino, Wen and 
Fantino, 2000).
Availability
A  second heuristic discussed by Tversky and Kahneman is availability. According to 
this heuristic, people are likely to judge the probability or frequency of an event 
based on the ease with which they can recall instances or occuiTences of the event. 
The reseai'chers noted that availability may be a helpfril cue when assessing 
probability, because events that are more frequent may be recalled better and faster 
than events that occur less frequently. However, availability is affected by factors 
other than frequency and probability, such as familiarity and salience which affect 
the retrievability of instances. Furthermore, recent occiuTences are likely to be 
relatively more available than earlier occmrences and enhance the potency of the 
availability heuristic.
For example, in a demonstration of the availability effect, subjects heard a list of 
well-known personalities of both sexes and were subsequently asked to judge 
whether the list contained more names of men than of women. In actuality, the 
numbers of men and women were equal. Different lists were presented to different 
groups of subjects. In some of the lists the men were relatively more famous than the 
women, and in others the women were relatively more famous than the men. In each
* Monotonicity concerns the choice between arguments. Judgement is called ‘monotonie’ if the first 
argument of the pair is deemed stronger (Lo, Sides, Rozelle and Osherson, 2002).
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of the lists, the subjects eiToneously judged that the class (i.e. gender) that had the 
more famous personalities was the more numerous. (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
Consequently, it was concluded that reliance on availability leads to predictable 
biases.
Adjustment and Anchoring
Tversky and Kalmeman (1974) stated that when making certain types of judgements, 
people often start with an initial estimate and then make adjustments or revisions of 
these initial estimates. However, it is often the case that the adjustments depend 
heavily on initial values that often lead to different final estimates. This phenomenon 
is known as anchoring. This heuristic is usually employed in numerical prediction 
when a relevant value is available.
For example, to illustrate the anchoring effect, two groups of high school students 
were given one of two problems to solve. One group was asked to estimate, without 
the aid of paper and pencil, the product of the sequence of numbers ft om eight to 
one. The other group was asked to estimate the product of the same numbers 
presented in ascending order. Usually the students simply multiplied together the 
first two or thr*ee numbers and then extrapolated ftom this product to the final guess. 
If this was indeed how they perfoiined the calculations to anive at a final product, 
then the anchoring principle should have caused the first (descending) group to judge 
the final product as larger than the second (ascending) group. In fact, this was the 
case although the correct answer was supposed to be the same in both cases. With 
this experiment Tversky and Kahneman (1974) concluded that people were 
influenced by an initial anchor value and the adjustment was often insufficient.
Simulation Heuristic
Kahneman and Tversky discussed two classes of mental operations under the 
availability hemistics: the retrieval of instances, and the construction of examples or 
scenarios, which are quite different ways of bringing things to mind. Past research 
has mainly dealt with the retrieval of instances from memory, and the process of
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mental construction has been relatively neglected. To advance the study of 
availability for construction, the authors have sketched a mental operation that they 
labelled the “simulation heuristic” (Kahneman et al, 1982: 201).
Kahneman and his colleagues (1982) argued that there appear to be many situations 
in which questions about events are answered by an operation that resembles the 
running of a simulation model. The simulation can be constrained and controlled in 
several ways, and does not necessarily produce a single story which starts at the 
beginning and ends with a definite outcome. Rather, people interpret the output of 
simulation as an assessment of the ease with which the model could produce 
different outcomes, given its initial conditions and operating parameters. Thus, the 
mental simulation yields a measure of the propensity of one’s model of the situation 
to generate various outcomes. The ease with which the simulation of a system 
reaches a par ticular* state is eventually used to judge the propensity of the real system 
to produce that state.
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) argued that assessments of propensity and probability 
derived from mental simulations are used in several tasks of judgement, and also that 
they play a significant role in several affective states. Some judgemental activities in 
which mental simulation appears to be involved are: prediction, assessing the 
probability of a specified event, assessing conditioned probabilities, counterfactual 
assessments, and assessments of causality.
Initial investigations of the simulation heuristic have focused on counterfactual 
judgements. In particular, the authors have been concerned with the process by 
which people judge that an event ‘was close to happening’ or ‘nearly occurred’. The 
psychological significance of this assessment of distance between what happened 
and what could have happened is observed on the cognitive rules that govern the 
mental imdoing of past events. Kalmeman and Tversky (1982) stated that the 
construction of scenarios is used as a heuristic to assess the probability of events by a 
mediating assessment of the propensity of some causal system to produce these 
events. An assessment of the ‘goodness’ of scenarios can serve as a heuristic to judge
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the probability of events. Like any other heuristic, the simulation heuristic is 
associated with a risk of lar ge and systematic eri'ors.
Affect Heuristic
Slovic et al (2002) asserted that images, marked by positive and negative affective 
feelings, guide judgement and decision making. The authors used the term ‘affect’ to 
mean the specific quality of “goodness” or “badness” (Gilovich, Griffin and 
Kahneman, 2002: 397) experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness) 
and defining a positive or negative quality of a stimulus. They argued that reliance on 
such feelings can be characterised as the ‘affect heuristic’. It is proposed that people 
use an affect heuristic to make judgements, that is, representations of objects and 
events in people’s minds are “tagged” (Slovic et al, 2002; 400) to varying degrees 
with affect. In the process of making a judgement or decision, people consult or refer 
to an ‘affect pool’ containing all the positive and negative tags consciously or 
unconsciously associated with the representations.
Slovic et al (2002) argued that just as imaginability, memorability and similarity 
serve as cues for probability judgements (e.g. the availability and representativeness 
heuristics), affect may serve as a cue for many important judgements and decisions 
(Kahneman et al, 1982). Affective responses tend to occur rapidly and automatically. 
Using an overall, readily available affective impression can be far* easier and more 
efficient than weighing the pros and cons, or retrieving from memory many relevant 
examples, especially when the required judgement or decision is complex or mental 
resoui'ces are limited. This characterisation of a mental shortcut leads to labelling the 
use of affect a “heuristic” (Slovic et al, 2002: 400).
Several empirical studies have demonstrated a strong relationship between imagery, 
affect, and decision making. Many of these studies used a word-association 
technique which involves presenting subjects with a target stimulus, usually a word 
or very brief phr ase, and asking them to provide the first thought or image that comes 
to mind. The process is then repeated a number of times or until no further 
associations are generated. A study by Alhakami and Slovic (1994, cited in Slovic et
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al, 2002) found that the inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived 
benefit of an activity was linked to the strength of positive or negative affect 
associated with that activity. This result implies that people base their judgements of 
an activity or a technology not only on what they think about it, but also on what 
they feel about it. If they like an activity, they are moved to judge the risks as low 
and the benefits as high; if they dislike it, they tend to judge the opposite -  high risk 
and low benefit.
Slovic et al (2002) explained that like other heuristics that provide efficient and 
generally adaptive responses (but which occasionally lead us astray), reliance on 
affect can also deceive us. There are two important ways that experiential thinking 
misguides us: one results from the deliberate manipulation of our affective reactions 
by those who wish to control oui* behaviours; the other results from the natmal 
limitations of the experiential system and the existence of stimuli in oui* enviromnent 
that aie simply not amendable to valid affective representations.
2.3.2 Critique of Heuristics and Biases
Given that actual human reasoning has been described as “biased”, “fallacious”, or 
“indefensible” (Gigerenzer, 1991: 259), the most common critique of the research on 
hemistics and biases was that it offers an overly pessimistic assessment of the 
average person’s ability to make sound and effective judgements (Gilovich and 
Griffin, 2002). In response to this view, Kahneman (2000) stated that the purpose of 
studying deviations of human judgements and choices hrom standard rational models 
(e.g. Bayesian reasoning and expected utility theory) is to develop diagnostics for 
particulai* psychological processes (Kahneman, 2000).
Kahneman (1991) explained that the focus on error in the heuristics and biases 
research programme was due to two standar d featmes of psychological methodology. 
The first is that the determinants of normal performance are commonly studied by 
inducing failmes. In this context the heuristics of judgement and choice were 
identified by the biases they tend to produce. The second reason for the emphasis on 
errors was tliat the proximal objective of most psychological research is the rejection
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of a plausible or otherwise respectable null hypothesis. Kahneman (1991) asserted 
that psychologists study errors because the logic of belief and choice is a rich sour ce 
of null hypotheses, and because the prestige of the rational model makes these null 
hypotheses sufficiently interesting to deserve refutation. Kahneman (2000) asserted 
that the biases that hemistics induce are not constant eri'ors. To conclude, one 
important aspect of heuristics and biases research prograimne of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) was to discover how to ‘debias’ people so they could overcome 
their eiToneous hemistic decision making (Todd, 2007).
2.4 Gerd Gigerenzer: Fast and Frugal Heuristics
Gerd Gigerenzer is a psychologist who studied the use of bounded rationality and 
heuristics in decision making, especially in medicine. Gigerenzer is the director and 
founder of The Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (ABC), an 
interdisciplinary research group formded in 1995 to study the psychology of bormded 
rationality and how good decisions can be made in an uncertain world at the levels of 
both individuals and social groups. The programme combines a strong theoretical 
focus with practical applications, that is, the research group both develops specific 
models and explores their applications. The theoretical focus is on rationality and can 
be divided into three aspects: bounded, ecological, and social rationality (Max Planck 
Institute for Hmnan Development, 2007). A critic of the work of Kalmeman and 
Tversky, Gigerenzer focused on how hemistics can be used to make optimal 
decisions rather than their production of cognitive biases.
2.4.1 Fast and Frugal Heuristics
A research programme in the spirit of Simon’s bounded rationality is the programme 
o f ‘simple hemistics’, also refeiTed to as ‘fast and fiugal hemistics’ (Gigerenzer et al, 
1999b). They are fast because they do not involve much computation and they do not 
integi'ate the acquired information in a complex and time-consmning way, instead the 
decision is based on just one single reason. They are frugal because they search for 
only some of the available information in the environment, that is, they stop 
searching for fmfher information early in the process of infoiination acquisition
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(Gigerenzer, Czerlinski and Maitignon, 1999; Hoffrage and Reimer, 2004; Garcia- 
Retamero, Wallin and Dieckmann, 2007; Gaicia-Retamero, Hoffrage and 
Dieckniann, 2007).
In this respect, fast and frugal heuristics employ a minimum of time, knowledge, and 
computation to make adaptive choices in real environments. They can be used to 
solve problems of sequential search tlirough objects or options. They can also be 
used to make choices between simultaneously available objects, where the search for 
infoiination (in the foim of cues, featmes, and consequences) about possible options 
must be limited, rather than the search for the options themselves (Gigerenzer et al, 
1999a). An important argument for simple heuristics is the high accuracy that they 
exhibit in simulations. This accmacy may be because of, not just in spite of, their 
simplicity (Hutchinson and Gigerenzer, 2005).
Herbert Simon (1990) once illustrated the logic of bounded rationality with the 
metaphor of a pair of scissors whose blades are cognitive heuristics and the structure 
of environments. He asserted that to understand behaviour, one has to look at both 
and how they fit together. In other words, to evaluate cognitive strategies as rational 
or irrational, one needs to also analyse the environment, because a strategy is rational 
or iiTational only with respect to a particulai* (physical or social) environment 
(Simon, 1955). Accordingly, the study of bomided rationality is the analysis of the 
hemistics people use, the analysis of the structures of environments in which people 
make decisions, and the match between the two (Todd and Gigerenzer, 2001). The 
ABC programme studied simple decision heuristics of this sort that expands on 
Simon’s own search for mechanisms of bounded rationality. The research 
programme has two interrelated components: the first is to study the hemistics that 
people actually use, and the second is to demonstiate in which environments a given 
hemistic performs well. The first one is called the study of the ‘adaptive toolbox’ and 
the second is tlie study of the ‘ecological rationality’ of hemistics (Hutchinson and 
Gigerenzer, 2005).
Gigerenzer et al (1999b) stated that different domains of thought require different 
specialised tools. This is the basic idea of the adaptive toolbox: “the collection of
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specialised cognitive mechanisms that evolution has built into the human mind for 
specific domains of inference and reasoning, including fast and frugal heuristics” 
(Gigerenzer et al, 1999b: 30). Gigerenzer (2001) stated that there are various kinds of 
tools in the adaptive toolbox. One kind, Simon’s ‘satisficing’, involves search and an 
aspiration level that stops search, and the second kind is fast and frugal heuristics. 
The difference is that satisficing involves search across alternatives assuming that the 
criteria are given; in contrast, fast and frugal hemistics search for criteria or cues, 
assuming that the alternatives are given (Gigerenzer, 2001).
Gigerenzer (2001) argued that the hemistics in the toolbox are domain specific, not 
general; they are not good or bad, rational or irrational but only relative to an 
environment just as adaptations ar e context-bound. Thus, different environments can 
have different specific fast and frugal heuristics that exploit their particular 
information structme to make adaptive decisions. As a result, hemistics can perform 
astonishingly well when used in a suitable enviromnent. Gigerenzer (2001) 
emphasised that the rationality of the adaptive toolbox is not logical, but rather 
ecological.
The goal of the study of ecological rationality is to provide an mrderstanding of the 
particular decision mechanisms people and animals use to make good decisions 
given particular structures of information in the enviromnent. Gigerenzer used the 
term “ecological rationality” (Gigerenzer et al, 1999b: 13) to mean that a heuristic is 
ecologically rational to the degree that it is adapted to the structure of an 
enviromnent. Hemistics that are matched to particular enviromnents allow agents to 
be ecologically rational, making adaptive decisions that combine accmacy with 
speed and frugality (Todd and Gigerenzer, 2003). Thus, simple heuristics and 
enviromnental structure can both work hand in hand to provide a realistic alternative 
to the ideal of optimisation, whether rmboimded or constrained.
Although fast and frugal heuristics differ with respect to the problems they have been 
designed to solve, they shar*e the same guiding construction principles. In particular, 
they are composed of thr*ee classes of building blocks: principles of ‘search’ direct 
how information is searched; principles of ‘stopping’ define when search is
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terminated; and principles of ‘decision making’ specify how the information 
searched for is used to make a decision. In more detail, Todd and Gigerenzer (2003) 
described these building blocks as follows:
Search is a central concept in Simon’s notion of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955, 
1956) and it refers to seeking information in memory or externally. When knowledge 
that can guide search is limited or absent, search can be simply random. With more 
available knowledge, options or information about options can be sought in some 
order determined by a criterion related to usefulness, or in an order based on a 
recollection about which options or cues worked previously when making the same 
type of judgement. To enable fast inferences and decisions, sear ch for alternatives or 
information must be terminated at some point in a readily computable way. For 
example, one simple stopping rule is to cease searching for information about 
available alternatives, and make a decision as soon as the first cue or reason that 
favours one alternative is foimd.
Once search has been stopped, an inference or decision must be made. At this stage, 
fast and frugal heuristics can make use of simple decision strategies that follow 
naturally from the concepts of limited sear'ch and stopping, such that a decision or 
inference could be based on only one cue or reason, regardless the total number of 
cues foimd during search. Todd and Gigerenzer (2003) stated that different types of 
these building blocks can be put together to form a variety of fast and frugal 
heuristics. The adaptive toolbox, therefore, has a large number of heuristics at its 
disposal built from a smaller number of building blocks.
Rieskamp and Hoffrage (1999) stated that the principles of search, stopping and 
decision are cormected to each other. For example, when a heuristic searches for only 
one cue, this constraints the possible decision rules to those that do not integrate 
information. Thus, if an individual does little search, then the process-oriented 
approach has strong implications for the possible char acter of the heuristic principle 
of decision. On the other hand, if search extends too many cues, this does not 
constrain the decision rule. The cues may be weighted and integrated, or only the 
best of them may determine the decision.
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It is argued by these authors that the latter case illustrates the limits of Üie process- 
oriented approach, which focuses on search. If an individual acquires a large amount 
of information, this does not necessarily imply that the person also would base the 
decision on all of this information. Nevertheless, the underlying assumption of the 
process-oriented approach is that information search is related to the decision 
strategy, and hence characteristics of the search reveal important aspects of the 
decision strategy actually used by a person.
2.4.2 Classes of Fast and Frugal Heuristics
There are four main classes of heuristics in the adaptive toolbox that have received 
the most attention.
Ignorance-Based Decision Making
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999) asserted that some very simple heuristics can rely 
on a lack of knowledge to make appropriate decisions. The ‘recognition heuristic’ 
says that for choosing between two objects on some criterion, when one object is 
recognised and the other is not, then pick the recognised one (Todd, 2007). 
According to the assumptions of this heuristic, an object is said to be ‘recognised’ if 
it has been previously experienced (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 1999). A decision 
maker who recognises the name of one object but not of a second one can use this 
pattern of recognition to infer that the recognised object has a higher value on a 
criterion.
The recognition heuristic can only be applied when one of the two objects is not 
recognised, that is, under partial ignorance. In other words, the recognition hemistic 
is so frugal that it actually requires a beneficial lack of knowledge to work (Goldstein 
and Gigerenzer, 1999). This hemistic can thus lead to a paradoxical situation where 
those who know more exhibit lower inferential accuracy than those who know less -  
this leads to the ‘less-is-more’ effect.
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For example, in Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002) Experiment 2, participants were 
presented with a series of pairs of German cities and asked to choose the city they 
believed to have the larger population. In addition to the city names, participants 
were taught some extra information about some of the cities in the sample that could 
be incorporated into the decisions. Before beginning tire cities task, participants were 
given a training phase in which they were told that nine of the 30 largest cities in 
Germany have soccer teams, and that the nine cities with teams ar e lar ger than the 21 
without teams in 78% of all possible pairs. They were also taught the names of four 
well-known cities that have soccer teams and four* that do not. Participants were then 
tested on this knowledge, and were only allowed to continue in the study when they 
had recalled the information without error.
The critical pairs in the cities task that followed were those that included one 
unrecognised city and one recognised city that did not have a soccer team. Goldstein 
and Gigerenzer (2002) argued that, equipped with the laiowledge from the training 
phase and placing no special emphasis on recognition, participants should have 
chosen the umecognised city in such pairs. This is because from the information 
given, participants could work out that if a city does not have a soccer team, even if it 
is recognised, it is only likely to be lar ger than an unr ecognised city in 22% of all 
possible pairs. Thus, any chance that the umecognised city has a soccer team should 
lead participants to choose against the prediction of the recognition heuristic.
Despite being provided with this conflicting information, Goldstein and Gigerenzer 
(2002) reported that participants’ inferences followed those of the recognition 
heuristic on an average of 92% of the critical pairs. This finding was their key 
evidence for a one-cue, noncompensatory inference strategy. Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer proposed that “search terminates as soon as recognition has been assessed 
for both objects. The decision is consequently based on only one piece of 
information, recognition” (1999: 57).
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999) stated that the recognition heuristic is adaptive 
since in some situations missing information results in more accurate inferences than 
a considerable amount of knowledge can achieve. In these situations, the heuristic
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can be said to be ‘ecologically rational’, having the capacity to exploit structures of 
information in the environment in a simple and elegant way. The adaptive-toolbox 
framework predicts domain-specific and individual differences (Gigerenzer et al, 
1999b). The overall validity of the recognition cue should therefore depend on 
char acteristics of the given domain: “The recognition heuristic is domain-specific in 
that it works only in environments where recognition is conelated with the criterion” 
(Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 1999: 41). Thus, applying the heuristic would be 
beneficial in some, but not in other domains.
Newell and Shanks (2004) criticised that the design Goldstein and Gigerenzer used 
in their experiment was perhaps not ideally suited to test the strong claim about the 
irrelevance of furlher knowledge about recognised alternatives. The authors argued 
that, firstly, the design did not require participants to learn about the validity of 
information in an incremental fashion, rather it relied on participants integrating 
information about percentages provided at training into their test decisions. 
Secondly, and more importantly, because the study did not include a critical control 
group (i.e. a group whose members were not taught the soccer team information), it 
was not possible to conclude whether the soccer team information had any effect on 
performance.
Studies on recognition hemistic undertalcen by various researchers (Pohl, 2006; 
Newell and Shanks, 2004; Newell and Fernandez, 2006; Richter and Spath, 2006) 
suggested that there is no experimental evidence that people indeed use recognition 
in a noncompensatory maimer, that is, without consulting their knowledge about the 
known alternative. In the experiments of Pohl (2006), detailed analysis showed that 
choosing the recognised object was influenced by further knowledge, thus 
contradicting the claim of a one-reason, noncompensatory decision making strategy.
Newell and Shanks (2004) fomrd little evidence suggesting that recognition is treated 
any differently from other cues in the enviromnent. The finding that participants 
learned about recognition-based information and relied on it appropriately comiters 
the suggestion that recognition exerts a noncompensatory influence on decision 
making.
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In the experiments conducted by Newell and Fernandez (2006) there was clear 
evidence that fiirther knowledge was not inconsequential, but rather that it was used 
in a compensatory mamier. The authors also found clear' evidence for the graded 
rather than binary use of recognition information. In line with other previous studies, 
the results by Richter and Spath (2006) demonstrated that people do not always rely 
on recognition blindly whenever it discriminates between two alternatives. Rather, 
they consider additional information and integrate this information with knowledge 
about the recognised alternative. Taken together, the results appear to question the 
psychological reality of a distinct recognition heuristic.
One-Reason Decision Making
Heuristics in this class search for reasons or cues beyond mere recognition, either in 
recall memory or in external stores of information. They deliberately ignore 
information although it is available, and use only a single piece of information for 
malting a decision (this is their common building block). Therefore, they can stop 
search as soon as the first reason is fomid that allows a decision to be made. A 
variety of heiu'istics in this class include the ‘Minimalist’, ‘Take The Last’, and 
‘Take The Best’. All of these heuristics have the same stopping and decision rule 
building blocks (i.e. stop after the first discriminating cue, and use that cue alone to 
make the decision), but they differ in terms of the cue-search building block (Todd, 
2007). For instance, the Minimalist heuristic looks at cues in a random order, while 
Take The Best looks at cues in order of their validity, that is, how often they point to 
the right choice. These are explained in more detail below.
Minimalist Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1999) stated that the Minimalist has only the 
minimal intuition and the minimal knowledge. Nothing is known for instance about 
which cues are better predictors than others. The only thing a person needs to know 
is which direction a cue points, that is, whether it indicates a higher or a lower value 
on the criterion (Gigerenzer et al, 1999a). Consequently, the search strategy of 
Minimalist is to look up cues in random order and stop when it finds a cue that 
discriminates between the two objects (Czeiiinski, Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1999; 
Gigerenzer et al, 1999a).
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Take The Last: Like the Minimalist, Take The Last only has an intuition in which 
direction a cue points, but not which cues are more valid than others. This heuristic 
differs from the Minimalist only in the search stage. It uses a heuristic principle for 
search that draws on a strategy known as an “Einstellung set” (Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein, 1999: 80). According to this, when people work on a series of problems 
they tend to start with the strategy that worked on the last problem when faced with a 
new, similar-looking problem, and thereby build up an Einstellung set of approaches 
to try. In this respect, for the first problem. Take The Last tries cues randomly like 
the Minimalist, but from the second problem onward it starts with the cue that 
stopped search the last time.
Take The Best: This heuristic is designed to infer which of two alternatives has a 
higher value on a quantitative criterion; for example, which of the two university 
professors earns more money based on cues such as gender, rank, or number of years 
in current rank (Garcia-Retamero et al, 2007a). Unlike the Minimalist and Take The 
Last, it is related to lexicographic strategies which signify that the cues are looked up 
on a fixed order of validity rather than a random search (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 
1999; Gigerenzer et al, 1999a; Chater, Oaksford, Nakisa and Redington, 2003). Take 
The Best tries cues in order, one at a time, searching for a cue that discriminates 
between the two objects in question. Once a discriminating cue is found, it serves as 
the basis for an inference, and all other cues are ignored. If this cue does not 
discriminate then the next-best cue is tried and so fortli. Its motto is “take the best, 
ignore the rest” (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1999: 81). For instance, if gender 
discriminates between two professors, the inference is made tliat the male earns a 
higher salar y, and no other information about rank or years of experience in cunent 
rank is considered (Czerlinski et al, 1999).
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1999) stated that all three heinistics are candidates for the 
collection of heuristics in what is called the ‘adaptive toolbox’. None of these 
strategies can perform all possible inferences under uncertainty. For instance, all 
three are designed to make estimates about which of two objects is larger or more 
effective, however they carmot estimate the quantitative values of one object. 
Furthermore, Gigerenzer and colleagues (1999a) stated that these heimstics violate
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two maxims of rational reasoning: they do not search for all available information, 
and they do not integrate information. Therefore Minimalist, Take The Last, and 
Take The Best aie fast and frugal.
Elimination Heuristics
Ignorance-based and one-reason decision heuristics are most appropriate for tasks 
where one of two options must be selected. A third class of heuristics uses 
elimination, which is particularly useful when lar ger nmnbers of objects are involved 
in categorisation or estimation tasks. This heuristic uses cues one by one to cut down 
the set of remaining possible choices, stopping as soon as only a single category 
remains. Todd and Gigerenzer (1999, 2003) stated that in situations where 
categorisation must be performed quickly and cues take time to search for, this fast 
and fi'ugal approach has clear* advantages.
Satisficing Heuristics for Sequential Search
Todd and Gigerenzer (1999) explained that the previous tlu*ee classes of heuristics 
are designed for situations in which all of the possible options are immediately 
available to the decision maker, that is, the categories of possible intentions are all 
known. However, a different class of heuristics is needed when alternatives as 
opposed to cue values take time to find, appearing sequentially over an extended 
period. In this type of choice task, a fast and fr ugal reasoner should limit not only the 
search for information (cues) about each alternative, but also the search for 
alternatives themselves. In such a case, Simon’s (1955, 1990) concept o f ‘satisficing’ 
by means of aspiration levels provides a tool for choice. Accordingly, an aspiration 
level is set, and search for alternatives is stopped as soon as the aspiration is met. 
Todd and Gigerenzer (2003) stated that simple mechanisms for setting the aspiration 
level (and revising it), such as checking the first few alternatives and taking the best 
as the aspiration level for further search, can prove ecologically rational both in 
individual and mutual search.
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2.5 Gary Klein: Recognition Primed Decision Making
Gary Klein is a research psychologist famous for his work in pioneering the field of 
‘Naturalistic Decision Making’. By studying experts in their natural environment, he 
discovered that laboratory models of decision making could not describe decision 
making under rmcertainty. In this respect, in 1985 he examined for the first time the 
life-or-death decisions made by highly experienced fire-fighters in the US Army in 
exceedingly time-pressured, real life situations. This project led to others with pilots, 
nur ses, military leaders, nuclear power plant operators, chess masters, and experts in 
a range of other domains. In 1978, he founded Klein Associates in order to study a 
range of topics that are now described as the Naturalistic Decision Making 
framework (Klein, 1998).
2.5.1 Naturalistic Decision Maiding
Natur alistic Decision Making (NDM) can be defined as the study of “the way people 
use their experience to make decisions in field settings” (Zsambok, 1997: 4). The 
NDM framework is designed to investigate the strategies people use in performing 
complex, ill-structured, high-stakes tasks, under time pressure and uncertainty, with 
changing conditions, and in the context of team and organisational constraints (Klein, 
1997a). In Klein’s view, NDM focuses on how people use their knowledge and 
experience by exploring the methods used by experts, working as individuals or in 
groups, to identify and assess their situations, make decisions, and take actions 
whose consequences are meaningful to them and to the larger organisation in which 
they operate (Zsambok, 1997; Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu and Salas, 2001). NDM 
perceives decision making as being a process rather than a one-time, point specific 
event. In this view, it has broadened the focus of decision making fr om the decision 
event to the larger process of situation assessment (Zsambok and Klein, 1997).
Zsambok (1997) identified four* themes of NDM: (1) task and setting involve ill- 
structured problems, uncertain, dynamic environments, shifting ill-defined or 
competing goals, action/feedback loops, time pressure, high stakes, multiple players, 
and organisational goals and norms; (2) subjects are experienced participants; (3)
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locus of interest includes situation awareness, diagnosis, and plan generation rather 
than fixating on the moment of choice; and (4) the purpose of research is to describe 
the strategies people use rather than prescribing the strategies they ought to use.
Researchers working in the NDM framework have observed that for most high- 
stakes tasks, it is the people with experience who make the decisions, rather than 
novices. Therefore, NDM model’s focus is on experienced decision makers since 
only those who know something about the domain would usually be making high- 
stalces choices (Klein, 1998). Klein (1997b) asserted that people with experience can 
use their experience to generate a reasonable course of action as the first one 
considered. This assertion is based on the result described by Klein, Wolf, Militello 
and Zsambok (1995, cited in Klein, 1997b) on chess players, showing the high 
quality of the first move they considered.
Cognitive Task Analysis
In order to find out how skilled decision makers thinlc. Cognitive Task Analysis 
(CTA) has been developed. It is a set of methods for identifying cognitive skills, or 
mental demands, needed to perform a task proficiently (Militello and Hutton, 1998). 
Klein (1998: 169) defined CTA as “the description of the expertise needed to 
perform complex tasks”. He explained the steps of CTA as follows:
Step 1 Identify sources o f expertise: The aim is to find individuals whose experience 
is respected in the organisation, in order to learn how they see their job.
Step 2 Assay the knowledge: Once the sources of expertise are located, then the 
importance of knowledge has to be balanced against the costs of extracting it. The 
aim is to evaluate what will be gained from the project against its costs.
Step 3 Exti'act the knowledge: CTA methods have been developed for getting inside 
the heads of experts (Klein, 1998). These methods include structured interviews, 
interviews about actual events that were challenging, interviews about the concepts
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experts use to think about a task, and simulated tasks that require the expert to thinlc 
aloud dining performance or respond to interview questions after completion.
Step 4 Codify the Imowledge: Applied researchers use diagrams, charts, lists of 
critical cues, computer simulations of the experts’ thought processes, armotated 
stories, tr anscripts of interviews, and even videotapes of interviews.
Step 5 Apply the knowledge: CTA has been used for training niu’ses to recognise cues 
for diagnosis of sepsis, to provide cognitive modelling of the troubleshooting 
strategies of expert programmers, and to show system designers what essential 
decisions have to be supported by interfaces. CTA can also be used for market 
research as well as for identifying consumers’ decision strategies.
Militello and Hutton (1998) explained that CTA methods focus on describing and 
representing the cognitive elements that underlie goal generation, decision making 
and judgements. Although CTA often begin with high-level descriptions of the task 
based on observations or initial interviews, the bulk of the data collection occurs via 
in-depth interviews with subject matter experts. These interviews focus on gaining 
infomiation about the cognitive strategies used to accomplish the task including 
situation assessment strategies, identification and inteipretation of critical cues, 
metacognitive strategies, and important perceptual distinctions. According to 
Militello and Hutton (1998), one of the strengths of these methods is that they aid 
experts in articulating knowledge that is generally difficult to verbalise.
2.5.2 Recognition Primed Decision Maldng
Several models of decision making and decision-making research have emerged out 
of the NDM body of research. Most common among these is the ‘Recognition 
Primed Decision’ (RPD) model. The model focuses on experienced agents, working 
in complex, imcertain conditions, who face personal consequences for their actions. 
The model tries to describe rather than prescribe, and it addresses situation awareness 
and problem solving as part of the decision making process (Klein, 1997c). The RPD 
model attempts to describe what people actually do under conditions of time
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pressure, ambiguous information, ill-defined goals, and changing conditions (Klein, 
1997c). It postulates that under such conditions experts can make good decisions 
without having to perform extensive analysis. They are able to do so by employing 
their experience to recognise problems that they have previously encountered, and 
for which they already know solutions. Therefore, instead of analysing each problem 
as though it were a new encounter, experts use their experience to fonn mental 
simulations of the problem currently being encountered and use these simulations to 
suggest appropriate solutions. Evans (2007) stated that this application involves some 
explicit reasoning (sometimes mental simulations to check feasibility of solutions), 
but the key to intelligent action is the automatic retrieval process. This strategy 
allows experts to quickly make difficult decisions by saving them the time they 
would otherwise have used to decompose the situation into basic elements, and to 
perform analysis and calculations based on those elements (Howell, 1997; Beach, 
Chi, Klein, Smith and Vicente, 1997).
To summarise, the RPD model was developed on the basis of field studies of the way 
that experienced personnel actually make decisions. The model explains how people 
can use experience to react rapidly and make good decisions without having to 
contrast options. The model has been tested and supported by different research 
teams working in a variety of settings. In Klein’s (1998) view, the significance of the 
RPD model is that it appeal’s to describe the decision strategy used most frequently 
by people with experience; it explains how people can use experience to make 
difficult decisions; and it demonstrates that people can make effective decisions 
without using a rational choice strategy.
Research on Fire-Fighters
The RPD model was developed on the basis of cognitive task analyses of fire­
fighters. The initial research was designed to better understand how experienced 
commanders could handle time pressure and uncertainty. The purpose of this 
research was not to challenge traditional decision making but to conduct a 
descriptive inquiry. In the first interviews, Klein and colleagues asked the 
participants if they could recall a recent event that had been nonroutine and had
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demanded special experience, then asked the commanders to go through it telling it 
in their own words. The researchers then hied to identify the decision points, i.e. 
times when several cour ses of action were open and how the choice was made.
In Klein’s (1998) naturalistic studies of decision making in groups, he asserted that 
very little rational decision making goes on in the sense of deliberation between 
alternatives. What typically happens is that, the proficient decision makers recognise 
the situation as typical and familiar (e.g. a typical fire or search-and-rescue job) and 
proceed to take action. They understand what types of goals make sense (so the 
priorities are set), which cues are important (so there is not an overload of 
infonnation), what to expect next (so they can prepare themselves and notice 
surprises), and the typical ways of responding in a given situation. Klein (1998) 
stated that by recognising a situation as typical, they also recognise a course of action 
likely to succeed.
These findings were evident in the research with fire-fighters. Klein and his 
colleagues found that the commanders could reliably identify good options and 
evaluate an option without comparing it to any others. This is a case of singular 
evaluation, i.e. looking at one action at a time to see if it will work or can be made to 
work. Klein explained that it was not that the commanders were refirsing to compare 
options, rather they did not have to compare options. The real finding was that they 
could come up with a good course of action from the start. Even when faced with a 
complex situation, the commanders could see it as familial' and know how to react. 
The study led to the conclusion that the commanders’ secret was that their experience 
let them see a situation, even a nonroutine one, as an example of a prototype 
therefore they loiew the typical course of action right away. Their experience let 
them identify a reasonable reaction as the first one they considered, so they did not 
bother thinking of others. According to Klein (1998) they were not being perverse, 
they were being skilful.
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Research on Nurses
Crandall and Getchell-Reiter (1993) conducted a research project to study the way 
muses could tell when a very prematm*e infant was developing a life-threatening 
infection. They found that one of the difficult decisions the muses had to make was 
to judge when a baby was developing a septic condition. When the premature babies 
develop an infection, it can spread through their entire body and kill them before the 
antibiotics can stop it. Therefore, noticing the sepsis as quickly as possible is vital. 
Somehow, the nurses in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit could do this; they could 
look at a baby and tell the physician when it was time to start the antibiotic. The 
participating nurses all had experienced a limited number of such incidents where the 
cues varied from one case to the other. When they were asked how they were able to 
make these judgements, they could not describe it. Their answers were “it’s 
intuition” or “thr ough experience”.
2.5.3 Klein’s Definition of Intuition
Klein (1998: 3) stated that people draw on a large set of abilities that are “sources of 
power”. The conventional sources of power include deductive logical thinking, 
analysis of probabilities, and statistical methods. Yet the sources of power that are 
needed in natural settings are usually not analytical at all, but involve the power of 
intuition, mental simulation, metaphor, and storytelling. Klein (1998) explained that 
the power of intuition enables us to size up a situation quickly; the power of mental 
simulation lets us imagine how a course of action might be carried out; the power of 
metaphor lets us draw on om' experience by suggesting par allels between the current 
situation and something else we have come across; and the power of storytelling 
helps us consolidate om' experiences to make them available in the future.
Klein (1998: 33) defined intuition as “recognising things without knowing how we 
do the recognising”. He explained that intuition depends on “the use of experience to 
recognise key patterns that indicate the dynamics of the situation” (Klein, 1998: 31). 
Because patterns can be subtle, people often cannot describe what they noticed, or 
how they judged a situation as typical or atypical. In the simple version of the RPD
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model, people size the situation up and immediately know how to proceed: which 
goals to pursue, what to expect, how to respond. Klein’s claim was that intuition 
grows out of experience and that the RPD model is a model of intuition (Klein, 
1998). He suggested that some aspects of intuition come from the ability to use 
experience to recognise situations and know how to handle them. However, he 
stated, intuition is not infallible: our experience will sometimes mislead us, and we 
will make mistakes that add to our experience base.
2.5.4 Mental Simulation and Decision Making
Decision researchers refer to mental simulation as the “ability to imagine people and 
objects consciously and to transform those people and objects through several 
transitions, finally picturing them in a different way than at the start” (Klein, 1998: 
45). Klein (1998) explained that mental simulation serves several functions in 
nomoutine decision making: it helps us to explain the cues and information we have 
received so that we can figure out how to interpret a situation and diagnose a 
problem; it helps us to generate expectancies by providing a preview of events as 
they might unfold and by letting us run through a course of action in our' minds so we 
can prepar e for it; and it lets us evaluate a course of action by searching for pitfalls so 
we can decide whether to adopt it, change it, or look fur'ther. Mental simulation 
shows up in at least tliree places in the RPD model:
Situation awareness: Mental simulation is one way to make sense of events and form 
an explanation. Wlien people use mental simulation to derive a plausible explanation, 
they feel that they have diagnosed the situation. The diagnosis is a mental simulation 
that weaves together different events into a story that shows how the causes led to the 
effects. Situation awareness can be formed rapidly through intuitive matching of 
features, or deliberately through merrtal simulation. Sometimes a situation reminds us 
of a previous event, and we try to use this analogy to malce sense of what is 
happening. At times there are several competing explanations, and we may have to 
compar e them. Usually we scan each explanation to see if there ar e elements that do 
not seem plausible, so we can reject the less likely ones and keep the best.
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Expectancies: In diagnosing a situation, people construct mental simulations of how 
the events have been evolving and will continue to evolve. The more experienced the 
decision makers are, the more clear-cut are the expectancies. By checking whether 
the expectancies are satisfied, the decision maker can judge the adequacy of the 
mental simulation. The greater the violations and the more effort it takes to explain 
away conflicting evidence, the less confident the decision maker feels about the 
mental simulation and diagnosis.
Courses o f action: When people size up a situation they will be aware of some 
typical ways of reacting to it. In variation 1 of the RPD model, the person just 
chooses the first action thought of, without deliberating about the little details. 
However, that simple model does not describe the major decisions. Klein (1998) 
explained how to use mental simulation to evaluate a new course of action, which is 
variation 3 of the RPD model (see Klein, 1998). Research with the fire ground 
commanders showed that when they needed to evaluate a coiuse of action, they used 
the strategy of mental simulation.
Klein (1998) asserted that the person assembling a mental simulation needs to have a 
lot of familiarity with the task, and needs to be able to think at the right level of 
abstraction. If the simulation is too detailed it can use up memory space, however if 
too abstract it does not provide much help. According to Klein, mental simulations 
run fi'om the past into the present or the present into the flitiu'e, can stretch to help 
people infer a missing cause, a missing effect, or a bridge between the two. However, 
they can also mislead us. Klein explained that the fact that the mental simulations 
can sometimes be wrong is not a weakness. His estimate is that most of the time they 
ar e fairly acciuate. Besides, he considers them as a means of generating explanations, 
not generating proofs. Despite its shortcomings, Klein (1998) stated that mental 
simulation allows us to make decisions skilfiilly and solve problems under conditions 
where traditional decision analytical strategies do not apply.
45
2.5.5 Intuition and Expertise
According to Klein (1998), the key to effective decision making is to build up 
expertise. What distinguishes experts from novices can be tied to two primary 
sources of power: pattern matching (i.e. intuition) and mental simulation.
Klein (1997a) identified the following strategies for developing expertise in 
judgement and decision making: (1) engaging in deliberate practice; (2) using 
attentional control exercises to practise flexibility in scanning situations; (3) 
sampling alternative task strategies; (4) compiling an extensive experience bank; (5) 
obtaining feedback that is accurate, diagnostic, and reasonably timely; (6) emiching 
experiences by reviewing prior experiences to derive new insights and lessons from 
mistakes; (7) building mental models; and (8) obtaining coaching (see Klein, 1997a 
for full details).
Ericsson and Chainess (1994) stated that expert performance reflects extreme 
adaptations accomplished thr ough life-long effort to demands in restricted and well- 
defined domains. In their study on expert performance, Ericsson and Charness (1994) 
showed evidence from a wide range of domains that the top-level experts spend a 
very lar ge amount of time on deliberate practice, improving their performance, and 
that the total arnormt accumulated during development is several year s of additional 
full-time practice more than that of other less accomplished performers.
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (2005: 779) argued that “expertise in general cannot be 
captured in rule-based expert systems, since expertise is based on the making of 
immediate, umeflective situational responses; intiritive judgement is the hallmark of 
expertise”. The authors stated that deliberation is certainly used by experts if time 
permits, but it is done for the pmpose of improving intuition, not replacing it. 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (2005) proposed a five-stage model of the acquisition of 
expertise.
Stage 1 Novice: Normally, the instruction process begins with the instructor 
decomposing the task environment into context-free featiues that the begiimer can
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recognise without the desired skill. The beginner is then given rules for determining 
actions on the basis of these features, like a computer following a programme.
Stage 2 Advanced Beginner. As the novice gains experience actually coping with real 
situations, begins to develop an imderstanding of the relevant context. After seeing a 
sufficient number of examples, the student learns to recognise these new aspects. 
Still, at this stage, learning can be carried on in a detached, analytic frame of mind, 
as the student follows instructions and is given examples. However, to progress 
fuither seems to require a special kind of involvement.
Stage 3 Competence: With more experience, the number of potentially relevant 
elements and procedures that the learner is able to recognise and follow becomes 
overwhelming. To cope with this overload and to achieve competence, people learn 
(through instruction or experience) to devise a plan or choose a perspective that then 
determines which elements of the situation or domain must be treated as important 
and which ones can be ignored. Natui'ally, to avoid mistakes, the competent 
performer seeks rules and reasoning procedures to decide which plan or perspective 
to adopt. Only at this level there is an emotional investment in the choice of action. 
The emotional involvement seems to play an essential role in switching over from a 
left-hemisphere analytic approach to a right-hemisphere holistic one.
Stage 4 Proficiency: The resulting positive and negative emotional experiences will 
strengthen successful responses and inhibit unsuccessfirl ones, and the performer’s 
theory of the skill, as represented by rules and principles, will gradually be replaced 
by situational discriminations, accompanied by associated responses. However, the 
proficient performer has not yet had enough experiences with the outcomes of the 
wide variety of possible responses to each of the situations to react automatically. 
Thus, after spontaneously seeing the point and the important aspects of the current 
situation, the proficient performer must still decide what to do. To decide, he or she 
must fall back on detached rule and maxim following.
Stage 5 Expertise: The proficient performer, immersed in the world of skilfrrl 
activity, sees what needs to be done, but decides how to do it. The expert, on the
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other hand, not only sees what needs to be achieved, he or she also sees immediately 
how to achieve the goal. Thus, the ability to make more subtle and refined 
discriminations is what distinguishes the expert fi’om the proficient performer. 
Among many situations, the expert has learned to distinguish those situations 
requiring one reaction from those demanding another. That is, with enough 
experience in a variety of situations, all seen from the same perspective but requiring 
different tactical decisions, the brain of the expert gradually decomposes the class of 
situations into subclasses, each of which requires a specific response. This allows the 
irmnediate intuitive situational response that is characteristic of expertise. We can see 
now that a begirmer calculates using rules and facts just like a heuristically 
programmed computer, but with talent and a great deal of involved experience, the 
beginner develops into an expert who intuitively sees what to do without recourse to 
rules.
Recent research in different domains of expertise has shown that expert performance 
is predominantly mediated by acquired complex skills and physiological adaptations. 
The acquisition of memory skill in a domain is integrated with the acquisition of skill 
in organising acquired knowledge and refining of procedures and strategies, and it 
allows experts to circumvent limits on working memory imposed by the limited 
capacity of STM (Ericsson and Chainess, 1994).
Ericsson and Charness (1994) stated that experts’ internal representation of the 
relevant information about the situation is critical to their ability to reason, to plan 
out, and to evaluate consequences of possible actions. According to Ericsson and 
Charness (1994), the critical aspect of experts’ working memory is not the amount of 
information stored per se, but rather how the information is stored and indexed in the 
LTM. In support of this claim, several cases have been reported in which non-experts 
have been able to match the amoimt of domain-specific information recalled by 
experts, but without attaining the expert’s sophisticated representation of the 
information.
In their skilled memory theory. Chase and Ericsson (1982) explained experts’ 
remarkable memory and problem solving abilities through tliree principles: (1)
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information is encoded with numerous and elaborated cues related to prior 
knowledge; (2) experts develop a retrieval structure, that is, a LTM structure for 
indexing material in LTM; and (3) time required for encoding and retrieval 
operations decreases with practice.
The skilled memory theory has been extended into the long-term working memory 
(LTWM) theory by Ericsson and Kintsch (1995). They presented compelling 
empirical evidence that experts in various domains are able to encode information 
into LTM faster than was proposed by traditional models of human memory. The 
core of their LTWM theory is that “cognitive processes are viewed as a sequence of 
stable states representing end products of processing” and that “acquired memory 
skills allow these end products to be stored in long-term memory and kept directly 
accessible by means of retrieval cues in short-term memory” (Ericsson and Kintsch, 
1995: 211). A key element in the LTWM theory, which distinguishes it from most 
other theories of memory, is that experts develop, tlnough practice and study, 
retrieval structures (a set of retrieval cues that are organised in a stable structur e) for 
the task domain.
2.6 Paul Slovic: The Affect Heuristic
Although affect has long played a key role in many behavioural theories, it has rarely 
been recognised as an important component of human judgement and decision 
making (Finucane, Alhakarni, Slovic and Johnson, 2000). The main focus of 
descriptive decision research has been cognitive, rather than affective. Despite this 
cognitive emphasis, the importance of affect is being recognised increasingly by 
decision researchers (Slovic et al, 2002, 2007; Zajonc, 1980; Isen, 1993; Janis and 
Mann, 1977; Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee and Welch, 
2001; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho and Ritov, 1997).
As explained earlier (in section 2.3.1), the term ‘affect’ is used to refer to the specific 
quality of “goodness” or “badness” (Gilovich et al, 2002: 397) experienced as a 
feeling state (with or without consciousness), and demarcating a positive or negative 
quality of a stimulus (Slovic et al, 2002: 397). Zajonc (1980) argued that affective
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reactions to stimuli are often the very first reactions, occuii'ing automatically and 
subsequently guiding infonnation processing and judgement. According to Zajonc, 
all perceptions contain some affect. Therefore, “we do not just see ‘a house’: we see 
a handsome house, an ugly house, or a pretentious house” (Zajonc, 1980: 154).
Affect plays a central role in dual-process theories (see Chaiken and Trope, 1999) of 
thinking, knowing, and information processing (Slovic et al, 2002, 2007). The 
‘analytical system’ uses algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus, 
formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortful, and requires 
conscious control. In contiast, the ‘experiential system’ is intuitive, fast, mostly 
automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness.
“It was the experiential system, after all, that enabled human beings to siuvive 
during their long period of evolution. Long before there was probability theory, 
risk assessment, and decision analysis, there were intuition, instinct, and gut 
feeling to tell us whether an animal was safe to approach or the water was safe 
to drinlc.” (Slovic, Finucane, Peters and MacGregor, 2004: 313)
Slovic et al (2004) argued that as life became more complex and humans gained 
more control over their environment, analytic tools were invented to ‘boost’ the 
rationality of our experiential thinking. Subsequently, analytical thinking was placed 
on a pedestal and portrayed as the fundamental nature of rationality. However, 
current wisdom suggests that the rational and experiential systems operate in parallel 
and each seems to depend on the other for guidance. Studies have demonstrated that 
analytic reasoning camiot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect 
(Slovic et al, 2004).
Slovic et al (2004) suggested that the affect heuristic enables us to be rational actors 
in many imporiant situations, but not in all situations. The authors stated that it works 
well when our experience enables us to anticipate accurately how we will like the 
consequences of our decisions. However, it fails miserably when the consequences 
turn out to be much different in char acter than we anticipated.
50
2.6.1 Affective Impressions in Decision Making
The concept of evaluability has been proposed as a mechanism mediating the role of 
affect in decision processes. Affective impressions vary not only in their valence (i.e. 
goodness, badness, or likeability), but in the precision with which they are held. 
There is growing evidence that the precision of an affective impression substantially 
impacts judgements. In particular', Hsee (1996, 1998) has proposed the notion of 
evaluability to describe the interplay between the precision of an affective impression 
and its meaning or importance for judgement and decision making.
Evaluability is illustrated by an experiment in which Hsee (1996) asked people to 
assume they were looking for a used music dictionary. In a joint evaluation 
condition, par'ticipants were shown two dictionaries: A (with 10,000 entries in Tike 
new’ condition) and B (with 20,000 entries and a torn cover), and were asked how 
much they would be willing to pay for each. Willingness-to-pay was far higher for 
Dictionary B, presumably because of its greater niunber of entries. However, when 
one group of par'ticipants evaluated only A and another group evaluated only B, the 
mean willingness to pay was much higher for Dictionary A.
Hsee (1996) explained this reversal by means of the evaluability principle. He argued 
that in separ ate evaluation without a direct comparison, the number of entries is hard 
to evaluate because the evaluator does not have a precise notion of how good 10,000 
(or 20,000) entries is. However, the defects attribute is evaluable in the sense that it 
translates easily into a precise good/bad response and thus it carries more weight in 
the independent evaluation. Most people find a defective dictionary unattractive and 
a Tike new’ dictionary attractive. Under joint evaluation, the buyer can see that B is 
far' superior on the more important attribute, i.e. number of entries. Thus, the number 
of entries becomes evaluable through the comparison process.
According to the evaluability principle, the weight of a stimulus attribute in an 
evaluative judgement or choice is proportional to the ease or precision with which 
the value of that attribute (or a comparison on the attribute across alternatives) can be 
mapped into an affective impression. The essence of evaluability is that affect
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conveys meaning upon information and the precision of the affective meaning 
influences om* ability to use information in judgement and decision making. In other 
words, without affect, information lacks meaning and will not be given weight in 
decision making. Evaluability can thus be seen as an extension of the general 
relationship between the variance of an impression and its weight in an impression- 
formation task. Hsee’s work on evaluability is noteworthy as it shows that even very 
important attributes may not be used by a judge or decision maker unless they can be 
translated precisely into an affective frame of reference (Bateman, Dent, Peters, 
Slovic and Starmer, 2007).
2.6.2 Functions of Affect in Judgement and Decision Processes
Integral affect (experienced feelings about a stimulus) and incidental affect (feelings 
such as mood states that ar e independent of a stimulus, but can be misattributed to it 
or can influence decision processes) have been used to predict and explain a wide 
variety of judgements and decisions (Schwarz and Clore, 1983). Peters, Vastfjall, 
Gariing and Slovic (2006) argued that integral and incidental affect have four- 
separable roles important to judgement and decision making processes.
First, affect can act as information. At the moment of judgement or choice, decision 
makers consult their feelings about a choice and ask “how do I feel about this?” 
(Schwarz and Clore, 2003). These feelings act as information to guide the judgement 
or decision processes (Slovic et al, 2002). The feelings themselves often are based on 
prior experiences and thoughts that are relevant to choice option but can be the result 
of a less relevant and ephemeral state of emotion (e.g. a mood).
Second, affect appear s to serve as a common currency in judgements and decisions, 
allowing us to compare the values of very different decision options or information. 
By translating more complex thoughts into simpler affective evaluations, decision 
makers can compare and integrate good and bad feelings rather than attempt to make 
sense out of a multitude of conflicting logical reasons. This fimction is thus an 
extension of the affect-as-information function into more complex decisions that
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require integration of information. It implies that affective information can be more 
easily and effectively integrated into judgements than less affective information.
Third, affect also appears to play a role as a spotlight in a two-step process. First, the 
extent or type of affective feelings (e.g. wealc versus strong affect, or anger versus 
fear-) focuses the decision maker on new information. Second, the new information 
(rather than the initial feelings themselves) is used to guide the judgement or 
decision.
Finally, affect appears to fimction as a motivator of information processing and 
behaviour. Chen and Bargh (1999, cited in Peters et al, 2006) linked affect to 
behavioural tendencies of approach and avoidance. Incidental mood states also have 
been shown to motivate behaviour- as people tend to act to maintain or attain positive 
mood states (Isen, 2000).
2.6.3 Measurement of Imagery and Affect
One of the most fundamental psychological processes that people use to comprehend 
their world is affective evaluation (Damasio, 1994; Zajonc, 1980). MacGregor, 
Slovic, Drernan and Beny (2000) stated that typically affective evaluations are of the 
form good versus bad, attractive versus unattractive, or pleasant versus unpleasant 
(i.e. valence). In essence, affective evaluations vary along a bipolar- dimension of 
positive versus negative impressions. Since they are a fundamental component of 
human information processing, affective evaluations can contribute significantly to 
other judgements about the same stimulus object (MacGregor et al, 2000).
One of the basic approaches for measuring affect relies on the method of images or 
word associations. Word association techniques are strongly rooted in the history of 
psychology and are capable of revealing the cognitive and affective elements of 
images people hold about complex stimuli. The method involves presenting subjects 
with a target stimulus, usually a word or very brief plirase, and asking them to 
provide the first thought or image that comes to mind. The process is then repeated a 
number of times or until no further associations are generated. Subjects are then
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asked to rate each image on a scale ranging from very positive (e.g. +2) to very 
negative (e.g. -2), with a neutral point in the centre. Scoring is done by summing or 
averaging the ratings to obtain an overall imagery index. MacGregor et al (2000) 
used this technique in a study in which images were used to measure the affective 
meanings Üiat influence people’s preferences for different cities and states.
A second measurement is derived from the semantic differential, a well-known 
psychological technique developed by Osgood to asses meaning (see Osgood, Suci 
and Tannenbaum, 1957). In this approach, the subject provides ratings of stimuli on a 
set of bipolar* adjective scales. Each scale is comprised of a positive/negative 
adjective pair. The ratings for each scale can be analysed and studied separately, or 
the ratings can be averaged or summed to obtain an overall affective score.
MacGregor et al (2000) explained that the two approaches to measuring affect differ 
in the amount of structure provided to the respondent. In the case of word 
associations, relatively little structure is given with the advantage that respondents 
are free to express images in their own natur*al language terms. The disadvantage of 
this approach is that the content of the imagery may not be equivalent across 
respondents. The more structured approach offered by semantic differential scales 
overcomes this difficulty, but at the expense of constraining respondents’ expression 
of affect to the scales provided.
2.7 Seymour Epstein: Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) was introduced by Epstein in 1973 
(Epstein, 1973) as a global tlieory of personality. Since then, it has undergone 
considerable development and has been investigated in an extensive research 
programme. CEST is a psychodynamic theory (i.e. relating to the interplay of 
psychological processes) that posits two systems of information processing (i.e. 
rational and experiential), each functioning according to its own principles (Epstein, 
1994). CEST is an example of dual-process theories which is the subject of the next 
section.
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2.7.1 Dual Systems of Reasoning
Although dual-process theories come in a number of forms, what they have in 
common is the idea offered by Stanovich and West (2000) that there are two 
different modes of processing. In order to emphasise the prototypical view adopted, 
the two systems have simply been generically labelled System 1 and System 2. 
System 1 is characterised as contextually dependent, automatic, largely unconscious, 
associative, intuitive and implicit in nature. Thus, it is relatively undemanding in 
terms of its use of scar ce cognitive resources. This system has as its goal the ability 
to model other minds in order to read intention and to make rapid interactional 
moves based on those modelled intentions. In contrast, System 2 processing is 
contextually independent, analytic, rule-based, and explicit in nature. Hence, it is 
relatively slow and makes greater demands on cognitive resources than its System 1 
counterpart (Stanovich and West, 2000). Different forms of dual-process theories 
have been established by many cognitive and social psychologists. See Table 2.1 for 
examples.
Table 2.1 Dual-Process Theories
System I System 2
Reber (1993) Implicit cognition Explicit learning
Epstein (1994) Experiential system Rational system
Sloman (1996) Associative system Rule-based system
Klein (1998) Recognition primed decisions Rational choice strategy
Source: Stanovich and West, 2000
For example, SIonian (1996) has asserted that human reasoning is a function of two 
systems that are designed to achieve different computational goals. One is 
‘associative’ and operates reflexively. It draws inferences from a kind of statistical 
description of its environment by making use of the similarity between problem 
elements interpreted using such aspects of general knowledge as images, stereotypes 
and prototypes. The other system described by Sloman (1996) is ‘rule-based’ which 
tries to describe the world by capturing different kinds of structure that is logical, 
hierarchical and causal-mechanical.
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Lakoff and Jolmson (1999) stated that metaphorical, frame-based, and prototype 
reasoning are cognitive mechanisms that have developed in the course of hmnan 
evolution to allow us to function as well as possible in everyday life. Therefore, it 
would be irrational not to use the cognitive mechanisms that in general allow us to 
function well overall. The authors claimed that if we did not reason automatically 
and unconsciously using prototypes and conceptual frames, we would probably not 
survive.
2.7.2 Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory
A fundamental assumption of CEST is that individuals apprehend reality and thereby 
adapt to the environment by two information processing systems that are independent 
and interactive: a ‘rational system’ which is a verbal reasoning system, and an 
emotionally driven ‘experiential system’ which is a nonverbal automatic learning 
system (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj and Heier, 1996; Epstein, 2008). A comparison 
of the experiential system and the rational system is shown in Table 2.2.
Epstein (1994) stated that the experiential system is assumed to have a much longer 
evolutionary history and to operate in animals as well as in humans. Due to their 
more highly developed brains, it is assumed that the experiential system processes 
information in far* more complex ways in humans. According to Denes-Raj and 
Epstein (1994), the experiential system operates in an automatic, holistic, 
associationistic manner, and is primarily nonverbal. Although it encodes experience 
in the fonn of nonverbal concrete representations (e.g. images, feelings, physical 
sensations), it is able to generalise and to construct relatively complex models for* 
organising experience and directing behaviour* by the use of prototypes, metaphors, 
scripts and narratives (Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994),
At the time, this was a new concept sometimes referred to as the “cognitive 
unconscious” (Epstein, 1994: 710) which holds that most infor*mation processing 
occurs automatically and effortlessly outside of awareness, a mode that is far more 
efficient than conscious deliberative thinking (Epstein, 1994). Lakoff and Johnson 
(1999: 13) claimed that “conscious thought is the tip of an enormous iceberg. It is the
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rule of thumb among cognitive scientists that imconscious thought is 95 percent o f all 
thought -  and that may be a serious underestimate. Moreover, the 95 percent below 
the surface o f conscious awareness shapes and structur es all conscious thought. I f  the 
cognitive unconscious were not there doing this shaping, there could be no conscious 
thought” .
Table 2.2 Comparison of the Experiential and Rational Systems
Experiential System Rational System
1. Preconscious
2. Automatic
3. Concrete: Encodes reality in images, 
metaphors and narratives
4. Holistic
5. Associative: Connections by similarity 
and contiguity
6. Intimately associated with affect
7. Operates by hedonic principle (what 
feels good)
8. Acquires its schemas by learning from 
experience
9. Outcome oriented
10. Behaviour* mediated by ‘vibes’ from 
past experience
11. Rapid processing: Oriented toward 
immediate action
12. Resistant to change: Changes with 
repetitive or intense experience
13. Crudely differentiated: Broad 
generalisation gradient; categorical 
thinking
14. Crudely integrated: Situationally 
specific; organised in part by 
cognitive-affective modules
15. Experienced passively and 
preconsciously: We are seized by om* 
emotions
16. Self-evidently valid: “Experiencing is 
believing”______________________
1. Conscious
2. Deliberative
3. Abstract: Encodes reality in symbols, 
words, and numbers
4. Analytic
5. Cause-and-effect relations
6. Affect-free
7. Operates by reality principle (what is 
logical and supported by evidence)
8. Acquires its beliefs by conscious 
learning and logical inference
9. More process oriented
10. Behaviour mediated by conscious 
appraisal of events
11. Slower processing: Capable of long 
delayed action
12. Less resistant to change: Can change 
with speed of thought
13. More highly differentiated, nuanced 
thinking
14. More highly integrated: Organised in 
part by cross-situational principles
15. Experienced actively and 
consciously: We believe we are in 
control of our thoughts
16. Requires justification via logic and 
evidence
Source: Epstein, 2008
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Epstein (2008) stated that neither system according to CEST is superior to the other. 
Each has its strengths and limitations. The rational system is capable of solving 
abstract problems, plaiming, applying principles broadly across situations, and taking 
long-term considerations into account. The experiential system on the other hand is 
able to effortlessly direct behaviour in everyday life. It is a source of motivation and 
passion. Without it, the ability of people to engage in motivated behaviour would be 
seriously compromised (see Damasio, 1994). The experiential system can solve 
problems that are beyond the capacity of the rational system because they require a 
holistic rather than analytic orientation, because they depend on lessons from lived 
experiences, or because they require creativity via associative connections. 
According to Noms and Epstein’s findings (2007, cited in Epstein, 2008), the 
experiential system plays a particularly important role in creativity, humour, 
empathy, emotionality, and interpersonal relationships. Epstein (2008) asserted that 
without an experiential system, people would be like robots with computers in their 
heads: they would be incapable of feeling.
2.7.3 Role of Emotions in Experiential System
The experiential system is intimately associated with the experiences of affect, 
including ‘vibes’ which refer to subtle feelings of which people are often unawaie, 
representing events in the form of concrete exemplars and schemas inductively 
derived fiom emotionally significant, intense or repetitive past experiences. Epstein 
(1994) summarised the sequence of reactions when a person responds to an 
emotionally significant event as follows: the experiential system automatically 
searches its memory banks for related events, including their emotional 
accompaniments. The recalled feelings influence the comse of furiher processing and 
reactions, which in subhuman animals are actions and in humans are conscious and 
unconscious thoughts as well as actions. If the activated feelings are pleasant, they 
motivate actions and thoughts anticipated to reproduce the feelings. If the feelings 
are unpleasant, they motivate actions and thoughts anticipated to avoid feelings.
Damasio’s (1994) work is par ticularly relevant to the present discussion of the role of 
emotions. Damasio’s (1994) Somatic-Mar'ker Hypothesis (SMH) offers a
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physiological explanation to the operation of the experiential (i.e. intuitive) system. 
The main point of this hypothesis is that decision making is a process guided by 
emotions. Damasio argued that in reality many decisions are influenced by the poiver 
of ‘gut feel’. Before any kind of rational analysis is applied to a judgemental 
problem, if a bad outcome connected with a par ticular response comes to mind, an 
unpleasant gut feeling is experienced. Since this feeling is about the body, Damasio 
called it “sornatic-marker” (Damasio, 1994: 173) from ‘soma’ the Greek word for 
body, and ‘marker’ because the gut feeling marks an image which serves to focus our 
attention on the potential outcome. On the affective aspect of SMH, Damasio (1994) 
stated that somatic markers are a special instance of feelings generated from 
secondary emotions. These emotions and feelings play a crucial role by helping us 
filter various possibilities quickly, even though our conscious mind might not be 
aware of it.
According to CEST, behaviour* and conscious thought are guided by the joint 
operations of the two systems, with their relative influence being determined by 
various parameters including the nature of the situations, individual differences in 
style of thinking, and the degree of emotional involvement. Pollock’s (1991, cited in 
Stanovich, 2002) view offers an explanation of the relation between emotions and 
rationality. In Pollock’s model. System 1 is composed of ‘quick and inflexible’ 
(Q&I) modules including emotions that perform specific computations. On the other* 
hand. System 2 processes are grouped under the term ‘intellection’ and refer to all 
explicit reasoning in the service of theoretical or practical rationality.
Stanovich (2002) asser*ted that if emotions are conceived as Q&I modules for* 
practical reasoning, there are two ways in which the rational regulation of behaviour 
could go wrong. First, Q&I emotion modules might be missing or might malfunction. 
In this case, the automatic and rapid regulation of goals is absent and System 2 is 
faced with a combinatorial explosion of possibilities because the constraining 
fimction of the emotions is missing (cf. Damasio, 1994). A module failure of this 
type represents a case where there is not too much emotion but instead too little. The 
second way that behavioural regulation can go wrong has the opposite properties. In 
this case, the Q&I module has fired but it happens to be one of those instances where
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the module’s output is inappropriate and needs to be overridden by the controlled 
processing of System 2. In this situation, the emotions of the Q&I practical reasoning 
module are too pervasive and immodifiable. The problem in this second case is 
indeed a problem of too much emotion, rather than too little. Consequently, this leads 
to the cliché that emotion interferes with rational thought. However, the absence of 
emotions is also problematic for behaviour and conscious thought.
Epstein (1994) explained that CEST assumes there is a ubiquitous influence of 
automatic thinking outside of awaieness on conscious thinking and behaviour. In 
most situations, the automatic processing of the experiential system is dominant over 
the rational system because it is less effortful and more efficient, and accordingly is 
the default option. Moreover, because it is generally associated with affect, it is apt to 
be experienced as more compelling than is dispassionate logical thinking. Finally, 
since the influence is usually outside of awareness, the rational system fails to 
control it because the person does not know there is anything to control. The 
advantage of insight in such situations is that it pemiits control at least within limits.
The rational and experiential systems normally engage in seamless integrated 
interaction, but they sometimes conflict, experienced as a struggle between feelings 
and thoughts (Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994). However, certain situations (e.g. 
solving mathematical problems) are readily identified as requiring analytical 
processing, whereas others (e.g. interpersonal behaviours) are more likely to be 
responded to in an automatic, experientially determined manner. Holding such 
situational features constant, the greater the emotional involvement the greater the 
shift in the balance of influence from the rational to the experiential system (Denes- 
Raj and Epstein, 1994).
2.7.4 CEST and Intuition
Epstein (2008) stated that, everything discussed about the experiential system is 
relevant to intuition since intuition is regarded as a subset of experiential processing. 
Intuition can be defined, according to CEST, as “the accumulated tacit information 
that a person has acquired by automatically learning from experience” (Epstein,
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2008: 29). As intuition is automatically acquired from personal experience, it does 
not include other non-rationally derived beliefs that, although primarily influenced 
by the experiential system, were acquired in ways other than by personal experience. 
Intuition also does not include beliefs acquired from experience if people are able to 
aiticulate the source of the beliefs. Knowing the source of a non-rationally derived 
belief violates the requirement that an intuitive belief must be tacit. That is, a 
defining aspect of intuition is that it involves “knowing without knowing how one 
knows”, which gives intuition its aura of mystery (Epstein, 2008: 29).
2.8 A ‘New Wave’ of Intuition Research in Management
The fundamental conceptual and theoretical developments in the psychological and 
biological sciences that were necessary to build an integrative understanding of 
intuition’s role in organisational behaviour were themselves not consolidated until 
the 1990s. Therefore, at the beginning of the new millemiium, management 
researchers were fortunate to have the pragmatic rationale (e.g. Burke and Miller, 
1999; Parikh et al, 1994) and the conceptual and theoretical resources (i.e. Damasio, 
1994; Epstein, 1994; Finucane et al, 2000; Klein, 1998) to enable them to embark on 
a more scientifically rigorous programme of intuition research and scholarship based 
on empirical and theoretical work. Table 2.3 suimnarises a range of definitions for 
intuition.
2.8.1 Selective Review of Empirical Studies
The empirically-based developments witnessed in the early 2000s drew on insights 
from Behaviom'al Decision Theory (BDT) and dual-process theories, and went 
beyond the reporting of frequencies and percents that characterised the descriptive 
and prescriptive work of the 1990s. Several groups of researchers in the USA, 
Europe, and beyond chose instead to deploy multivariate statistical tecliniques in 
medium- to large-sample cross-sectional studies to examine relationships between 
intuition and behaviour and performance, as well as pursuing construct validation 
issues.
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One of the first significant studies of this type was that of Kliatri and Ng (2000) who 
compared the use of intuition in strategic decision making across thi ee industry types 
(type was a proxy for environment instability). Khatri and Ng’s (2000: 57) 
justification for their research was that “although intuitive processes are critical for 
effective strategic decision making, there is little in the way of applied research on 
the topic [and] only a handfril of serious scholaidy work on the subject”. Other cross- 
sectional studies have examined the relationships between intuition and performance 
in a variety of areas of business, for example small firm performance (e.g. Sadler- 
Smith, 2004), strategic decision preferences (Hough and ogilvie, 2005), project 
management (Leybourne and Sadler-Smith, 2006), performance in non-profit 
organisations (Ritchie, Kolodinsky and Eastwood, 2007), and strategic decision 
effectiveness (Elbanna and Child, 2007). By incorporating insights from dual-process 
theory, researchers also were able, on theoretical grounds, to challenge the orthodoxy 
of the unitary (‘split-brain’) position as it applied to individual differences in 
managers’ information processing (i.e. cognitive) styles (see Hodgkinson and Sadler- 
Smith, 2003a; Hodgkinson, Sadler-Smith, Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2009).
More recently, researchers have augmented hypothetico-deductive inquiry with other 
approaches in order to captme subjective experiences and retrospective accounts of 
intuition using inductively-driven methods. For example, on the basis of interviews 
with 14 loan officers in a lai'ge Israeli connnercial baiilc, Lipshitz and Shulimovitz 
(2007) found that in rating the credibility of loan applicants, loan officers integrated 
‘hai'd’ financial data with ‘soft’ impressions and gut feelings, but regai'ded feelings as 
more valid indicators of applicants’ credit worthiness than they did relevant financial 
data. Woiceshyn (2009) studied how 19 oil company CEOs managed complex 
situations; she refeiTed to the interplay between intuition and rational analysis as a 
tlnee-loop ‘spiralling’ process (zooming-out/zooming-in; analysis-by-principles; 
testing the tentative decision). Hensman and Sadler-Smith (2011) used in-depth 
semi-sti'uctured interviews with 15 highly-experienced banking executives to study 
intuitive decision making in the finance sector. They found that reliance on intuition 
was related not only to the nature of the task (e.g. factors of time and uncertainty) 
and individual factors (e.g. paiticipants’ experience and confidence), but also 
organisational contextual factors (e.g. constraints and conventions, accountability
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and hierarchy, team dynamics, and organisational culture). These recent qualitative 
studies aie welcome; the processes of intuiting and associated intuitive outcomes 
present unique challenges and opportunities to intuition researchers wishing to 
‘captui’e’ intuitions. The potential of the full range of methods has yet to be exploited 
(e.g. psycho-phenomenology. Critical Incident Technique, Experience Sampling 
Methods, and Day Reconstruction Method), Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith (in press) 
provided a critical review of methods available for investigating intuition.
2.8.2 Selective Review of Conceptual and Theoretical Work
The 2000s have also witnessed a significant number of conceptual and theoretical 
advances which have built on the foundational work in BDT and NDM described 
above. For example, finin the viewpoint of establishing valid intuitions, Hogailh 
(2001, 2010) suggested that opportunities for learning in ‘kind’, as opposed to 
‘wicked’, environments ai’e necessary conditions for the development of intuitive 
expertise. He defined ‘kind’ learning environment as those where the information 
tacitly processed leads to valid inferences, and the sample of experiences 
encountered is representative of the environment in which the ensuing intuitive 
judgement is applied, and is followed by feedback. On the other hand, ‘wicked’ 
learning enviromnerits refer to those whereby the samples of experience are not 
representative and feedback might be missing or distorted.
Building on the work of Hogarth (2001) and others, and in an initial attempt at a 
conceptual synthesis of NDM and SMH, Sadler-Srnith and Shefy (2004) drew 
attention to the affective (‘intuition-as-affect’) and cognitive (‘intuition-as-expertise’) 
facets of intuition, and used this as a basis for recoimiiendations to executives on 
how to make more effective use of intuition and develop better intuitive judgement 
skills. In parallel with these developments, Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005: 357) 
defined intuition as a “non-sequential information processing mode, which comprises 
both cognitive and affective elements and results in direct knowing without any use 
of conscious reasoning”. Sinclair and Ashkanasy’s (2005) contribution is significant 
for two reasons: (1) they used the extant literature to build an integrative model of 
analytical and intuitive decision making, which combined characteristics of the
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problem at hand, decision makers’ dispositions, decision context, the decision itself, 
and conscious analytical and nonconscious intuitive processes, with affect and 
gender as moderating variables; (2) they (re-)introduced a ‘supra-consciousness’ 
element in their discussions, suggestive of a transpersonal intuition, which they 
“reserved for unknown processes” (Sinclair and Aslikanasy, 2005: 360, emphasis 
added), thereby reprising the mystical, Jungian and spiritual perspectives that earlier 
writers had adopted (e.g. Vaughan, 1979 mooted a ‘spiritual intuition’).
The tenor of Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2004) was largely sympathetic towards the 
utility of intuitive judgement (i.e. they offered an advocacy for ‘informed’, i.e. 
expertise-based intuition), whilst that of Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005) was mixed 
(the title of their article was ‘Intuition: Myth or a Decision-Making Tool?’). A more 
sceptical tone was also adopted by Miller and Ireland (2005: 21) who, although 
acknowledging that many executives and managers embrace intuition as a viable and 
sometimes effective approach, concluded that it is a “troublesome decision tool”. 
They distinguished between ‘holistic hrmch’ (the underlying processes which are not 
“well understood” but is valuable when firms are emphasising exploration) and 
‘automated expertise’ (recognition of familiar situations and the straight-forward but 
partially subconscious application of previous learning) (cf. Crossan et al, 1999). 
Miller and Ireland (2005) advocated that managers should (1) exercise caution and 
only deploy holistic hunches when the costs of failure can be absorbed without 
significantly affecting a firm’s viability; (2) rely on automated expertise when 
exploiting existing strategies and technologies (rather than when exploring), and 
where constraints of time or other resources preclude raising Icnowledge to an 
explicit level. Kirton (2003: 52) has also addressed the issue of logic and intuition 
with respect to imiovation, ar guing that both adaptors and innovators need logic and 
intuition (e.g. “intuition can be very useful as a way of setting up a hypothesis but is 
unacceptable as ‘proof”), but that they are likely to use them not only to different 
degrees, but in qualitatively different ways.
Although the researchers referred to above acknowledged fundamental principles 
underpinning crment understanding of intuition as manifest in BDT, NDM and 
SMH, none provided a comprehensive, integrated account and testable research
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propositions. The need for such a contribution was recognised by Dane and Pratt 
(2007: 40) who not only defined the construct in a way that has become widely 
accepted (i.e. “affectively char ged judgements that arise tlrrough rapid, nonconscious 
and holistic associations”), but also provided a comprehensive review and 
theorisation of intuition and its role in managerial decision making. Dane and Pratt 
(2007) provided much-needed conceptual clarity by delineating intuition from other 
related constructs such as instinct and insight (cf. Hogarth, 2001), discriminated 
between intuiting and intuition, and developed a theoretical model and hypotheses 
that incorporated the role of domain knowledge, learning, task and environmental 
characteristics, situation awareness, and affect.
In a review of intuition research across the behaviomal sciences more generally, 
Hodgkinson et al (2008: 19) argued that although until comparatively recently the 
construct has been regarded as “scientifically weak” and on the “fringes” of 
psychology, intuition has now emerged from the shadows to become “legitimate 
subject of scientific inquiry”. However, despite the many notable developments that 
have taken place (as summarised above) Hodgkinson et al (2008) saw considerable 
challenges ahead for researchers, not least the need to understand more frilly the 
relationships between intuition’s somatic, affective, and cognitive components. 
Although recent years have witnessed significant advances in the integration of 
concepts and models fr om areas such as the behavioural neurosciences, dual-process 
theory, and NDM, there is still no fully-integrated and holistic theoretical picture of 
how the frmdamental processes of intuiting interact within and between the 
physiological and psychological levels of analysis; nor, indeed, how the basic 
processes identified by cognitive and behavioural neuroscientists relate to specific 
aspects of organisational behaviour (see Hodgkinson and Healey, in press).
2.8.3 New Directions
Recent years have witnessed significant new developments in intuition research both 
from within management and organisation studies, and in base and previously 
umelated disciplines (e.g. neuroscience and moral philosophy). In the final section of 
this review a number of promising new directions will be considered.
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Table 2.3 Authors and Definitions of Intuition (in alphabetical order)
Source Definition of intuition
Bastick(1982: 2)
Bowers, Regehr, 
Balthazard and 
Parker (1990:
74)
Dane and Pratt 
(2007: 9)
Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus (1986: 
56)_________
A powerfiii human faculty, perhaps the most universal natural ability we 
possess._____________________________________________________
Intuition is a perception of coherence at first not consciously represented 
but which comes to guide our thoughts toward a ‘hunch’ or hypothesis. 
Intuition has two stages: a guiding stage involving an implicit perception 
of coherence that guides thought, unconsciously toward a more explicit 
perception of the coherence in question. By a process of spreading 
activation, clues that reflect coherence activate relevant mnemonic 
networks, thereby producing a tacit or implicit perception of coherence. 
A second integiative stage, involving integrating into consciousness a 
plausible representation of the coherence in question; it occurs when 
sufficient activation has accumulated to cross a threshold of awareness.
The defining characteristic of intuitive processing is that: (1) It is 
nonconscious...it occurs outside of conscious thought. While the 
outcomes of intuiting, intuitive judgements are clearly accessible to 
conscious thinking, how one arrives at them is not. (2) As a holistically 
associative process it may help to integrate the disparate elements of an 
ill-defined problem into a coherent perception of how to proceed. For 
this reason intuitive judgements are said to become more effective 
relative to rational analysis as a problem becomes increasingly 
unstiuctured. (3) It involves a process in which environmental stimuli 
are matched with some deeply held nonconscious categoiy, pattern or 
feature. The matching process has names including awareness, 
apprehension, recognition, and seeing. (4) Intuitive processing has speed 
when compared with rational decision making processes._____________
Intuition is manifested in the fluent, holistic, and situation-sensitive way 
of dealing with the world.
Hogarth (2010: 
339)
Jung (1933: 567- 
568)
The essence of intuition or intuitive responses is that they are reached 
with little apparent effort, and typically without conscious awareness. 
They involve little or no conscious deliberation. Intuition is the result of 
learning._____________________________________________________
A psychological function that unconsciously yet meaningfully transmits 
perceptions, explores the unknown, and senses possibilities which may 
not be readily apparent._________________________________________
Miller and Intuition can be conceptualised in two distinct ways: as holistic hunch
Ireland (2005: and as automated expertise. ...hituition as holistic hunch corresponds to
21) judgement or choice made through a subconscious synthesis of
information drawn from diverse experiences. Here, information stored in 
memory is subconsciously combined in complex ways to produce 
judgement or choice that feels right. ‘Gut feeling’ is often used to 
describe the final choice. Intuition as automated expertise is less 
mystical, corresponding to recognition of a familiar situation and the 
straightforward but partially subconscious application of previous 
learning related to that situation. This form of intuition develops over 
________________ time as relevant experience is accumulated in a particular domain. ____
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Polaiiyi (1964: Intuitions are implicitly or tacitly informed by considerations that are not
24) consciously noticed or appreciated._______________________________
Reber (1989: 
232)
Rowan (1986: 
96)
Sadler-Smith and 
Shefy (2004: 77)
Intuition may be the direct result of implicit, unconscious learning: 
through the gradual process of implicit learning, tacit implicit 
representations emerge that capture environmental regularities and are 
used in direct coping with the world (without the involvement of any 
introspective process). Intuition is the end product of this process of 
unconscious and bottom up learning, to engage in particular classes of 
action._________________________________________________ _____
hituition is knowledge gained without rational thought. It comes from 
some stratum of awareness just below the conscious level and is slippeiy 
and elusive. Intuition comes with a feeling of ‘almost, but not quite 
knowing’.____________________________________________________
hituition is a capacity for attaining direct knowledge or understanding 
without the apparent intrusion of rational thought or logical inference.
Shirley and 
Langan-Fox 
(1996: 564)
A feeling of knowing with certitude on the basis of inadequate 
information and without conscious awareness of rational thinking.
Simon (1987: 
63)________
hituition is ‘analysis frozen into habit’
Smolensky 
(1988: 82)
Vaughan (1979: 
27-28)
Westcott (1968)
hituition has the characteristics of being implicit, inaccessible and 
holistic. Intuition and skill are not expressible in linguistic forms and 
constitute a different kind of capacity, reflecting ‘sub-symbolic’ 
processing.___________________________________________________
Knowing without being able to explain how we know. Intuitive 
experiences have four discrete levels of awareness: physical, which is 
associated with bodily sensations; emotional, where intuition enters into 
consciousness through feelings; that is, a vague sense that one is 
supposed to do something and instances of immediate liking or disliking 
with no apparent reason; mental, which comes into awareness through 
images or ‘inner vision’, this is an ability to come to accurate 
conclusions on the basis of insufficient information; and spiritual, which 
is associated with mystical experience, a holistic understanding of 
actuality which sui-passes rational ways of knowing.__________
Intuition involves awareness of things perceived below the threshold of 
conscious perception._____________________________  ____________
Source: Adapted from Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox and Sadler-Srnith, 2008 
Dis-aggregation into Types
Historical examination of intuition research reveals the idea of intuition as non- 
imitary to be not new. For example, Epstein et al (1996: 403) speculated that just as 
mathematical, verbal, and abstract logic comprise rational processing (i.e. facets of
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System 2), there may also be “several experiential [intuitive] abilities, such as 
visualisation, imagination, and aesthetic sensibility” (i.e. facets of System 1). Earlier 
still, other scholars such as Wild (1938), Vaughan (1979), and Cappon (1994) also 
postulated different types of intuition.
Dane and Pratt (2009) disaggregated intuitive outcomes systematically into three 
types based on the ‘natur*e of associations’, ‘intensity of affect’, and ‘level of 
incubation’ as follows: (1) problem-solving intuition is the outcome of a process of 
pattern-matching “honed through repeated training and practice” (Dane and Pratt, 
2009: 5). In essence it conesponds to what Kahneman and Klein (2009) and Salas, 
Rosen and DiazGranados (2010) referred to as ‘intuitive expertise’. However, Dane 
and Pratt (2009) used the term problem-solving intuition to avoid conflating this type 
of intuition with one of its causes (i.e. expertise); (2) creative intuitions are “feelings 
that arise when knowledge is combined in novel ways” (Dane and Pratt, 2009: 5) 
based on loose problem structures involving integration of knowledge across 
different domains. However, Dane and Pratt question whether creative intuition is an 
intuition at all because it is relatively slow (i.e. the outcome of incubation, and hence 
more closely related to insight) and therefore may not wanant the descriptor 
‘intuition’; and (3) the third type is moral intuition (see Hauser, 2006).
In their disaggregation of intuitive processes, Glockner and Witteman (2010) ar gued 
that dual-process models do not provide any differentiation within the categories of 
intuitive or deliberative processing. They proposed a four-fold categorisation 
according to a series of underlying cognitive processes (i.e. associative intuition, 
matching intuition, accumulative intuition, constructive intuition), and argued that 
their taxonomy qualified some of the more ambiguous assumptions of dual-process 
models (e.g. that intuition operates on affective information, but it was not clear- 
how). In Glockner and Witteman’s (2010: 18) differentiated analysis, “affect is 
important as an input to as well as output from  the different processes” (emphases 
added). This view is consistent with Slovic et al’s (2002) model of the affect 
heuristic (i.e. affectively-tagged images already in the affect pool are inputs to the 
decision process) and Dane and Pratt’s (2007: 40) definition of intuition as
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“affectively charged judgements” (i.e. the affective charge is subjectively 
experienced as an output refeiTed to generically as ‘gut feel’).
The extent to which Glockner and Witteman’s analysis of intuitive processes maps 
onto related processes such as insight (see Hogarth, 2001; Jimg-Beeman, Bowden, 
Haberman, Frymiare, Aiambel-Lui, Greenblat, Reber and Kounios, 2004) or intuitive 
outcomes such as the creative and moral types of intuition (Dane and Pratt, 2009) is 
not clear- (note that Glôckner and Witteman’s matching intuition shares some of the 
features of Klein’s RPD model, and hence is less problematic in this regard). Fur-ther 
research is required to explore the relationships between the disaggregated processes 
of intuiting (i.e. Glockner and Witteman’s analysis) and disaggregated types of 
intuition (i.e. Dane and Pratt’s analysis), as well as relationships to the SMH (e.g. are 
somatic markers inputs or outputs in Glôckner and Witteman’s conceptualisation?) 
and dual-process theory more generally (e.g. how does the intensity (higli/low) and 
valence (positive/negative) of an affective charge vary across different types of 
intuitive processes and outcomes?).
The Emergence of  ^ Intuitive Expertise*
From the perspective of ‘intuition-as-expertise’ (Hogarth, 2001; Sadler-Smith and 
Shefy, 2004) informed intuition is the result of extensive and deliberate practice, 
reflection, feedback, and analysis (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; Ericsson, Prietula and 
Cokely, 2007). Hence, it is not possible to understand intuition or improve decision 
makers’ intuitive judgement skills in business organisations without first 
understanding the nature of intuitive expertise, and the conditions under which it is 
acquired and when it succeeds or fails (Salas et al, 2010). Kalmeman and Klein 
(2009) mapped the boundary conditions that separate intuitive expertise froru 
overconfident and biased judgements. Paralleling Kahneman and Klein (2009), Salas 
et al (2010) identified the factors that influence the use and effectiveness of intuition 
(i.e. level of expertise and processing styles of the decision maker; task structure and 
the availability of feedback; and the characteristics of the decision environment).
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The recent emergence of ‘intuitive expertise’ as a distinctive topic in its own right 
represents the conjoining of two major traditions in intuition research, namely NDM 
and heuristics and biases on the basis that professional (i.e. expert) intuition is 
“sometimes marvellous and sometimes flawed” (Kahneman and Klein, 2009: 515). 
Although there are still major differences between the NDM and the heuristics and 
biases positions on intuition (e.g. with respect to the concept of bias) Kahneman and 
Klein (2009) have succeeded in bringing the insights of both traditions to bear on the 
analysis of intuitive judgement. In order to further advance intuition research from 
the expertise perspective, Salas et al (2010) have called for a programme of empirical 
research in field settings that tests models of individual- and team-level expertise- 
based intuition using methods such as think-aloud protocols, narratives, and 
shadowing, in order to unpack “the black box of intuition” (Salas et al, 2010: 965), as 
well as to longitudinally track evaluations designed to develop the intuitive expertise 
of individuals and teams.
2.9 Conclusion
Intuition research started with a practitioner (i.e. Baruard) initiating intuition 
scholarship in management and organisation studies. Over time, the significance of 
intuition in relation to the cognitive limitations of decision makers became apparent 
and moved to the fore, but the view of intuition as an attribute of humans as 
cognitive misers gave way to a naturalistic view of intuition as an affective, 
nonconscious mechanism that was both fast-and-frugal, as well as potentially 
powerful and perilous. With the acknowledgement of the role of affect in cognition, 
intuition’s place as a bridging construct was recognised. It has come to occupy an 
important role in the broader dual-process architecture of cognition as the latter 
moved centre stage in the psychological sciences in the 1990s and beyond. Part way 
through the story, management researchers were seduced by the latéralisation of 
brain function and wandered down the blind alley of hemispheric dominance. There 
have been recent overtures in the direction of cognitive neuroscience, and these 
developments are not only conceptually and theoretically coherent and compelling, 
they are commensur able with many of the centr al tenets of dual-process theory.
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At the present junctui'e, intuition researchers have a rich and diverse set of 
conceptual, theoretical and methodological resources from which to draw. History 
shows that meaningful and long-lasting development in the study of the role of this 
vital aspect of human cognition in a management and organisation context cannot, 
because of the nature of the construct, come from within the field of management 
and organisation studies alone; instead scientific progress is likely to be maintained 
and enlianced from seeking a deeper and wider perspective which acknowledges the 
potential contr ibutions of psychology, biology, and philosophy.
The above key issues will fiame and guide the research undertaken in this thesis with 
the aim to explore the role of intuition in decision making as it perlains to 
organisational learning. In tliis respect the next chapter introduces the second stream 
of resear ch reviewed in this thesis and focuses on decision making in management 
teams.
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Chapter 3 Decision Maldng in Management Teams
3.0 Introduction
Since Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) upper echelons model of organisations, an 
extensive literature has developed in the field of strategic decision making (Bantel 
and Jackson, 1989; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Keck and Tuslunan, 1993; 
Hambrick, 1995; Jackson, 1992; Carpenter, 2002; Kauer et al, 2007). Given the 
limited view of the upper echelon theory, for the past few decades researchers have 
focused their interest on the interactions within the top management teams to explore 
strategic decision making effectiveness (Edmondson, Roberto and Watkins, 2003; 
Roberlo, 2003; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989, 1990; Eisenhardt, 
Kahwajy and Bourgeois, 1997). In recent years, in search of deeper-level 
characteristics of the top managers (e.g. personality), research has ultimately led to 
the investigation of the cognitive processes in top management team decision making 
(Olson, Parayitam and Bao, 2007; West, 2007; Gibson, 2001; Leonard, Beauvais and 
Scholl, 2005; see Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008).
In this chapter, decision making is discussed as a team process from a collective 
perspective. The TMT is the community of interest because of their seniority and 
breadth of experiences, it is presumed that these managers should possess more tacit 
knowledge than others in the rest of the organisation. The chapter starts with the 
conceptualisation of TMTs and follows with three important aspects of the TMT 
research: team composition; dynamics of the decision making processes; and 
cognitive perspectives of TMT decision making.
3.1 Conceptualising Top Management Teams: A Multi-Perspective Approach
The senior management coalition, widely refeiTed to as the ‘top management team’, 
plays a central and critical role in formulating and executing coiporate decisions and 
transfoimations (Klenke, 2003). The term ‘top management team’ entered the 
academic literature in the 1980s and is now an expression widely used by both
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scholars and executives. This focus on top teams represents an important advance in 
thinking about executive leadership, since the management of an enterprise is 
typically a shared activity, extending well beyond the chief executive. Hambrick 
(1995: 111) stated that to some, the term top management team implies a formalised 
management-by-committee or co-executive arrangement such as “the office of the 
CEO”; also called the ‘dominant coalition’ which constitutes the organisation’s 
power elite (Cyert and March, 1963). Most commonly it refers simply to the 
relatively small group of most influential executives at the apex of an organisation 
(Hambrick, 1995) which acts as a strategic decision making unit for the organisation 
(Bantel and Jackson, 1989). Hambrick and Mason (1984: 194) defined “strategic” 
decisions as complex and of major significance to the organisation which represent 
the most important responsibility of the senior management (Harrison and Pelletier, 
1998).
Cyert and March (1963) theorised that the dominant coalition of managers set 
organisational goals, and the values of this group shape organisational behaviours. 
According to Child (1972), the concept of dominant coalition draws attention to the 
view of organisations in relation to the distribution of power and the process of 
strategic decision making. He suggested that it is primarily to distinguish between 
those who have the power to take the initiative on matters such as the design of 
organisational structure, from others who are in a position of having to respond to 
such decisions.
The effectiveness of the entire organisation is generally attributed to the effectiveness 
of the strategic decisions made by its senior executives (Haiiison and Pelletier, 
1998). Therefore, top teams are considered a significant organisational tool to make 
decisions with important consequences (Salas and Fiore, 2004). Orasanu (1990) 
suggested the notion that teams ‘think’ implying that they possess knowledge that 
allows theiu to function effectively as a team, as a result they can make better 
decisions and can be more productive than individuals, which malce teams a popular 
configuration in organisations (Cooke, Salas, Kiekel and Bell, 2004).
73
According to Hambrick, Nadler and Tusliman (1998) the TMT is not simply an 
aggregation of individual executives, rather the dynamics and complementarities that 
exist within the team greatly influence corporate outcomes, detennine coiporate 
governance, and are instrumental in achieving corporate coherence or unity of 
purpose and action. Many scholais contend that successflil organisational 
perfonnance requires efficient decision making and effective implementation 
(Boui'geois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Janis, 1989). This suggests that the decision 
making process unfolds smoothly, managers select a course of action in a timely 
manner (Eisenlrardt, 1989), and that managers cairy out the selected course of action 
and meet the objectives established duiing the decision process (Andrews, 1987).
Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret (1976) proposed that the top team can be 
considered as the aggregate infoimational and decisional entity tlirough which 
competitive moves are made. These moves depend on the team’s scanning of the 
environment, recognising problems and opportunities, and interpreting other external 
stimuli, developing potential moves, negotiating, refining and selecting moves, and 
implementing decisions.
Edmondson et al (2003) suggested that encouraging the CEO and senior executives 
to work as a team is a way of enhancing strategic leadership effectiveness in complex 
organisations. Teamwork allows the CEO to engage in a participative group process 
tlu'ough which diverse members confront difficult issues to make decisions and build 
commitment to implementing them, with the aim of leading improved strategic 
leadership effectiveness.
Despite the potential effectiveness of TMTs, considerable reseai'ch and anecdotal 
evidence suggest that they often fail to achieve their potential. Some scholars have 
found that many senior teams do not engage in real teamwork (Hackman, 1990). 
Others have reported that TMTs can find it difficult to resolve conflict (Amason, 
1996), build commitment (Wooldiidge and Floyd, 1990), or reach closuie in a timely 
fashion (Eisenliaidt, 1989). Several in-depth case studies showed how dysfunctional 
group dynamics can lead to errors in judgement and flawed decisions. For example, 
Janis’ (1982) work on groupthink attributed certain foreign policy failuies to the
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pressm-es for conformity that arise within cohesive senior groups. In addition, Ross 
and Staw (1986, 1993) examined how groups of senior executives escalate 
commitment to failing cour ses of action. According to Edmondson et al (2003), these 
leadership failures can be explained by an inability to manage group processes 
effectively, reducing decision quality and overall team effectiveness.
3.2 Top Management Team Composition
Research on TMTs goes back to a milestone article by Hambrick and Mason (1984); 
the acknowledgement of the importance of groups in decision making has led to a 
stream of research termed ‘organisational demographics’. Numerous studies over the 
last two decades examined the demographic factors influencing TMTs’ decision 
making and found significant associations between the demographic composition of 
the team and firm performance (e.g. Hambrick, Cho and Chen, 1996; Jackson, 1992; 
Carpenter, 2002; Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Keck 
and Tushman, 1993; Papadakis and Bai'wise, 2002; Kauer et al, 2007; Michel and 
Hambrick, 1992). The foundations of this research is established by Hambrick and 
Mason’s (1984) ‘upper echelons’ model of organisations which proposes that 
personal characteristics of senior managers ultimately determine their strategic 
decision choices.
3.2.1 Upper Echelons Model
In Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) upper echelons model, organisational outcomes -  
strategic choices and performance levels -  are viewed as reflections of the values and 
cognitive bases of powerfiii actors in the organisation. This theory argues that 
organisational outcomes can be partially predicted by managerial background 
characteristics from executives’ experiences, values, and personalities which 
influence their interpretations of the situations they face and which in turn affect their 
choices (Hambrick and Mason, 1982, 1984; Hambrick, 2007; Kauer et al, 2007; 
Carpenter, Geletkanycz and Sanders, 2004). Hambrick and Mason (1984) argued that 
if strategic choices have a large behavioural component, then to some extent they 
reflect the idiosyncrasies of the decision makers. The authors used the term ‘strategic
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choice’ as theorised by Child (1972), to refer to choices generally associated with 
strategy; made formally and informally, indecision as well as decision, and major- 
administrative choices (e.g. reward systems and structme).
As March and Simon (1958) argued each decision maker brings his/her own set of 
‘givens’ to an administrative situation. These givens reflect the decision malcer’s 
values (i.e. principles for ordering consequences or alter-natives according to 
preference) and the cognitive base in terms of knowledge or assumptions about 
futur e events, knowledge of alter-natives, and knowledge of consequences attached to 
alternatives. In the upper echelons theory, values are treated as something that on the 
one hand can affect perceptions, but on the other hand can directly enter into a 
strategic choice; because theoretically a decision maker can arxive at a set of 
perceptions that suggest a cer-tain choice, but discard that choice on the basis of 
values. As a result, the decision maker brings cognitive base and values to a decision, 
which create a screen between the situation and his/her eventual perception of it. 
Consequently, it is the combination of the manager’s perception of the situation with 
his/her- own values which influences the manager’s decision making (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984).
Hambrick and Mason (1982) explained that the values and perceptions ai-e created by 
a host of factors, including aspects of managers’ backgrounds that may be useful for- 
predicting organisational outcomes. However, since the cognitions, values, and 
perceptions of upper level managers are difficult to measure, the primary emphasis of 
the upper echelons theory is placed on observable managerial characteristics as 
indicators of the givens that a manager brings to an administrative situation. 
Examples of such characteristics are age, tenure in the organisation, fiinctional 
background, education, socioeconomic roots, and financial position (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1982, 1984).
In the literature there is consensus that the CEO is the most powerful member of the 
TMT (Peterson, Smith, Martorana and Owens, 2003) and the previous research on 
linkages between top managers and the strategies they pursue has almost entirely 
focused on the CEO (Hambrick and Mason, 1982). However, at a more practical
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level, the CEO shares power and tasks with the TMT who are involved in the 
decision malcing process. Upper echelons studies typically emphasise the efforts of 
the entire team, and not a single person, based on the belief that teams ar e essential to 
“the specialised work of maintaining the organisation in operation” (Barnard, 1938: 
215). Hambrick (2007) asserted that a focus on the characteristics of the TMT will 
yield stronger explanations of organisational outcomes than will the customary focus 
on the individual top executive (e.g. CEO) alone. The original upper echelons model 
is shown in Figui'e 3.1.
The left-hand side of Hambrick and Mason’s original model shows the organisation’s 
internal and external situation. Upper echelon characteristics such as age, functional 
background, and educational experiences are next taken as observable proxies for the 
psychological constructs that shape the team’s inteipretation of the internal and 
external situation and facilitate formulation of appropriate strategic alternatives. The 
prominent role of psychological constructs such as values and perceptions are 
attributed to executives’ bounded rationality (see Chapter 2).
In other words, faced with such common decision challenges as information 
overload, ambiguous cues, competing goals and objectives, executives’ perceptions 
of stimuli are filtered and interpreted through cognitive bases and values. Since these 
psychological constructs are unobservable, the theory points that observable 
managerial characteristics ar e efficient proxies that provide reliable indicators of the 
unobservable psychological constructs. Wliat is more, managers are expected to 
economise on these efforts by working collectively as a team. In turn, Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) proposed that demography’s impact on cognitive processes will 
subsequently be revealed in strategic outcomes. Thus, the third box reports a range of 
strategic variables, from irmovation to response time, expected to reflect executive 
team characteristics. Finally, Hambrick and Mason’s model predicts that the resultant 
organisational performance, gauged along a number of dimensions from profitability 
to the firm’s basic survival, will ultimately be impacted (Carpenter et al, 2004).
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To sunnnai'ise, the three central tenets of the upper echelons perspective are that: 
strategic choices made in firms are reflections of the values and cognitive bases of 
poiverful actors; the values and cognitive bases of such actors are a fimction of their 
observable characteristics such as education or work experience; and as a result 
significant organisational outcomes will be associated with the observable 
char acteristics of those actors. These tlrr ee central tenets inform the upper echelons 
theory which proposes that an organisation and its performance will be a reflection of 
the composition of its TMT.
3.2.2 Critique of Upper Echelons Model
A criticism of the upper echelons research came from Edmondson et al (2003) who 
asserted that by relying on relatively stable and deterministic causal models, the 
upper echelons research ignores the ways team processes and outcomes might var y 
across multiple situations faced by senior teams. The authors argued that this work 
assumes a consistency of conditions and team performance that is unlikely to exist in 
real TMTs. Accordingly, Edmondson et al (2003) concluded that demographic 
analysis, as proposed in the upper echelons research, underspecifies the role of 
process and provides an incomplete explanation of variations in a team’s 
performance over time.
In this respect, Roberto (2003: 123) argued that membership in the firm’s dominant 
coalition is rather fluid, typically consisting of a “stable core group” combined with a 
“dynamic periphery”, i.e. a changing set of individuals who work together closely 
with the core group to address particular- strategic challenges. This finding suggested 
that multiple ad hoc groups form over time to address specific issues, different 
members of the TMT become involved in each decision, whilst a few members 
participate in all processes.
Roberto (2003) found thr-ee major factors that appeared to influence the composition 
of the decision making groups: expertise, personal relationships, and expected 
implementation responsibility. Since each of these factors tended to differ in any 
given situation, different groups of managers came together to make each decision.
79
The composition of these groups, in turn, shaped the decision process. According to 
Roberto (2003), people became involved if they possessed relevant expertise. 
People’s job titles and functional responsibilities did not necessarily dictate whether 
they became involved, instead involvement depended on how their expertise matched 
the specific issues that waiTanted attention. People also became involved based upon 
their personal relationships with others already participating in the decision process. 
Personal relationships sometimes affected group composition in a different way. At 
times, executives attempted to avoid stimulating interpersonal conflict. Finally, an 
individual’s expected impact on implementation success also influenced whether 
they became involved. If managers knew that someone would play a critical 
implementation role, they often solicited that person’s advice to insure effective 
execution.
Furfherinore, according to Roberto (2003), strategic decision processes do not take 
place strictly at the highest levels of the organisation. Managers from lower levels 
may siuface strategic issues, bring them to the attention of the TMT, and play a 
major role in strategic choices. Therefore, an individual’s position in the organisation 
structme does not determine his/her role in the decision process, instead people’s 
roles vary by situation.
Another criticism for the upper echelons theory came from Kauer et al (2007). The 
authors stated that while demography based research has the advantage that the data 
is objective, easily accessible and more reliable (Priem, Lyon and Dess, 1999), it also 
has two major drawbacks: it makes assumptions as to how demographics reflect 
deeper-level factors such as personalities, attitudes and cognitive characteristics 
(Pitcher and Smith, 2001), and it ignores or makes assumptions about mediating 
cognitive or organisational processes (Priem et al, 1999). Only rarely have the 
mediating processes (e.g. information sharing, interpreting or problem solving) been 
integrated into the research; how they affect outcomes and what the underlying 
causal relationships ar-e has remained widely rmexplored (Carpenter et al, 2004; 
Papadakis and Barwise, 2002).
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In this respect, Kauer et al’s (2007) study suggested that the interaction of the top |
managers during strategic decision making appeared to be related to deeper-level j
characteristics, that is personality variables such as flexibility, achievement I
motivation, netivorking abilities and action orientation, which help them to interact 
well with each other and explore the potential offered by their diversity of 
experience.
The next section moves the discussion from team demographics to team interactions 
in order to explore the dynamics of the TMT decision making processes.
3.3 Dynamics of TMT Decision Making Processes
When decisions are made in a group setting they are likely to be influenced by social 
interaction among the various members of the decision making team. In this respect, 
scholars have recently recommended that TMT decision making research should 
stretch beyond demography and place more emphasis on group processes to 
understand the ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ of effective strategic decision making (Carpenter 
et al, 2004). The dynamics of group decision making processes have been analysed 
by various researchers with a particular focus on comprehensiveness (Simons, Felled 
and Smith, 1999), political behaviour in TMTs (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988), 
and speed in the strategic decision making process (Eisenhardt, 1989). In this section 
previous research on group interactions and behaviours relating to decision making 
processes is reviewed.
3.3.1 Politics of Strategic Decision Making
Many scholars found that political activity plays a critical role in organisational 
decision making processes (Bower, 1970; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988;
Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer, 1992). These authors have shown that managers engage in 
political behavioiu' to build support within the firm for their proposals.
According to Allison (1971), most strategic decision processes are ultimately 
political in that they involve decisions with uncertain outcomes, actors with
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conflicting views, and resolution through the exercise of power. Politics are the 
observable but often covert actions by which executives enhance their power to 
influence a decision (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). Various researchers argued 
that decisions follow the desires and subsequent choices of the most powerful people 
(March, 1962; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974). Accordingly, decision makers often 
attempt to change the power structure by engaging in political tactics such as 
coalition formation, lobbying, cooptation, strategic use of information, withholding 
agendas, and the employment of outside experts (Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer, 1981, 
1992; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). However, since all interest groups may be 
engaging in similar behaviour*, the decision making process may be characterised by 
various forms of bar gaining, negotiation and compromise that may lead to outcomes 
which are less than optimum for all parties (Miller et al, 1999). Nevertheless, the 
traditional view is that politics are essential to organisations such that creating 
effective change and adaptation within organisations depend upon effective use of 
politics (Quirm, 1980; Pfeffer, 1981, 1992).
Power
Decisions can be viewed as being fundamentally concerned with the allocation and 
exercise of power in organisations (Miller et al, 1999). Many authors argued that 
politics arise when power is decentralised (Hage, 1980; Pfeffer, 1981). According to 
these authors, domination by powerful CEOs combined with the desire for control by 
TMTs leads to political behaviom* in the organisations. When the power of individual 
actors is roughly equivalent, individuals band together to influence decision 
processes; conversely, when power is highly centralised, conflict is submerged and 
the use of politics declines (Pfeffer, 1981).
Contrary to the claims stated above, in a study of politics in eight fiiins in the 
microcomputer industry, Eisenhaidt and Bouigeois (1988) found specifically that 
politics tended to emerge when power was centralised. The more powerful a CEO, 
the greater the tendency among remaining executives to consolidate power and 
engage in alliance and insurgency behaviouis, while the CEO engaged in tactics for 
controlling and withholding information. Where power was centralised, the authors
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found competition among executives. On the other hand, where power was relatively 
decentralised these researchers found that the team maintained a collaborative 
viewpoint and engaged in cooperative behaviour focusing on group rather than 
individual goals.
Bachrach and Baiatz (1962) talked about the ‘two faces’ of power and looked 
beyond what is readily observable in organisations. As such, the authors argued that 
one way managers impose power is when conflict is kept quiet and not allowed to 
surface into open debate so that it does not become an item for discussion. This 
means that some decisions do not get onto the agenda as they are usually 
controversial topics which go against the interests of powerfiii stakeholders. 
Therefore, they are not considered acceptable for discussion and are quietly side­
stepped, suppressed or dropped.
Conflict
The view that organisations are political systems of conflicting preferences has been 
supported by several case studies (Allison, 1971; Baldridge, 1971; Pettigrew, 1973, 
1985; Quinn, 1980; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1989). Eisenliardt and Zbaracki 
(1992) suggested that in the political model, people are viewed as individually 
rational but not collectively so. The key assumption is that organisations are 
coalitions of people with competing interests. While these individuals may share 
some goals such as the welfar e of the organisation, they also have conflicts. On one 
side conflict can improve decision quality, uncover flawed assumptions, and improve 
the understanding of a decision’s rationale; on the other side it can slow the decision 
process, undermine satisfaction, and hinder open interaction (Schweiger, Sandberg 
and Ragan, 1986).
Eisenhardt et al (1997) emphasised the importance of conflict in TMTs. The authors 
asserted that management teams whose members challenge one another’s thinking 
develop a more complete understanding of the choices, create a richer range of 
options, and ultimately luake effective decisions. The challenge, however, is to keep 
constructive conflict over issues from degenerating into dysftmctional interpersonal
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conflict, to encourage managers to argue without destroying their ability to work as a 
team.
Talaulicar, Grimdei and van Werder (2005) argued that diverse knowledge of the 
team members must be articulated and discussed within the group to result in high- 
quality decisions. Hence, cognitive conflicts and open debate are important processes 
that serve as moderators of the relationship. Both soliciting and providing 
information are more likely to take place if the executives trust each other.
Amason and colleagues (Amason, 1996; Amason and Mooney, 1999) suggested that 
cognitive conflict is fiinctional because it is task oriented and focused on members 
discussing and challenging each other’s diverse perspectives. On the other hand, 
affective conflict is dysfunctional as it is more emotional and focused on debating 
issues peripheral to the decision context. It is likely that what starts as cognitive 
conflict may often spiral into affective conflict. Teams that experience higher 
behavioural integration (i.e. the extent to which the TMT engages in mutual and 
collective interaction) (Hambrick, 1994, 1998) make better decisions and achieve 
higher levels of performance. As a result, behavioural integration encourages teams 
to manage conflict effectively by engaging in cognitive conflict and avoiding 
affective conflict.
Formation of Alliances
Political activity has often been described as organised into temporary and shifting 
alliances (Bachiach and Lawler, 1980; Gamson, 1961; Mai'ch, 1962). The argument 
is that individuals foim alliances around common points of view on a given issue in 
order to enhance their influence on the decision, and the alliances disband when the 
issue is resolved. In addition, Pfeffer (1981) asserted that individuals try to make 
these alliances as laige as possible in order to smooth implementation.
In contrast to this argument, findings of the study by Eisenliai'dt and Bourgeois
(1988) suggested that politically active TMTs were likely to be organised into stable 
alliance patterns and executives did not shift allies as issues changed. Rather, they
developed stable coalitions with one or possibly two other executives, and they 
routinely sought out alliances with the same people. Accordingly, when usual allies 
disagree on an issue, they generally do not seek out more favouiably disposed 
executives; rather they either drop the issue or pui'sue their interests alone 
(Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988).
Additionally, Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) found evidence that coalitions 
developed on the basis of demographic factors such as age, office location, similarity 
of titles, and prior experience together. One explanation might be that people choose 
to ally with those with whom they interact frequently and with whom they feel 
comfortable (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). This evidence is consistent with the 
upper echelon view (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) that demographics can play an 
important role in the functioning of TMTs.
The finding that alliances are not particularly issue-based is consistent with the views 
that most people are not comfortable with politics (Gandz and MuiTay, 1980), that 
they use politics only when they think that they must, and that when they do use 
politics they try to engage in safe, familiar allies. Overall, the findings fiom the 
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) study give fiuther credence to the existence of a 
social, rather than an ideological, basis of alliance formation.
3.3.2 Fast and Effective Decision Making
Reseaidi by Eisenhardt (1989) explored how managers make fast, yet high-quality 
strategic decisions in high-velocity environments. By high velocity. Bourgeois and 
Eisenhardt (1988) meant those environments in which there is rapid and 
discontinuous change in demand, competitors, technology and/or regulation, such 
that information is often inaccurate, unavailable, or obsolete. Such environments are 
particularly challenging because information is poor, mistakes are costly, and 
recovery fiom missed opportunities are difficult.
The results of Eisenhardt’s (1989) study link fast decisions to several factors 
including the use of real-time information, multiple alternatives, counselors, conflict
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resolution, and decision integration. The research findings provided evidence that 
fast decision makers use more, not less, information than slow decision makers. The 
former also develop more, not fewer, alternatives and use a two-tiered advice 
process. Eisenhardt (1989) found that conflict resolution and integration among 
strategic decisions and tactical plans are also critical to the pace of decision making. 
These findings are discussed below in detail.
Information Processing
In the literature, there are several perspectives on how rapid strategic decisions are 
made. One research stream emphasises the idea that a high level of 
comprehensiveness (i.e. the extent to which organisations attempt to be exhaustive or 
inclusive in the making or integrating of decisions) slows the strategic decision 
process (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984; Fredrickson, 1984). According to this 
perspective, consideration of few alternatives, obtaining input firom few sources, and 
limited analysis lead to quick decisions (Mintzberg, 1973; Nutt, 1976; Janis, 1982). 
This perspective implies that the greater the use of information, the slower the 
strategic decision process. Within the notion of comprehensiveness, it is important to 
acknowledge that decision makers in organisations have cognitive limits i.e. they are 
bomidedly rational (Mai'ch and Simon, 1958), and that decision makers satisfice 
instead of optimise. Talaulicar et al (2005) found that TMT processes, namely debate 
and ti'ust, significantly influenced the comprehensiveness and speed of strategic 
decision making in stai1-ups.
Contraiy to this argument, the findings from Eisenhardt’s (1989) research indicated 
that executive teams making fast decisions used extensive information -  often more 
information than the slower decision makers used. However, there was a crucial 
difference in the kind of information used (Eisenhardt, 1990). Slow decision makers 
relied on planning and forecasting information. They spent time tracking the likely 
path of technologies, markets, or competitor actions, and then developed plans. In 
contrast, the fast decision makers looked to real-time information, that is, 
information about cuiTent operations and current environment which is reported with 
little or no time lag.
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Eisenliardt (1989, 1990) argued that there are several reasons why the use of real­
time information speeds the pace of the strategic decision process. One reason is that 
such information speeds issue identification, allowing executives to spot problems 
and opportunities sooner (Dutton and Jackson, 1988). Real-time information acts as 
an early warning system so that managers can respond before situations become too 
problematic. Secondly, Simon (1987) indicated that intuition relies on patterns 
developed through continued exposure to actual situations hence building up the 
experience base of the decision maker. Consistent with this view, Eisenhardt (1990) 
asserted that executives who track real-time information are actually developing their 
intuition. Aided by intuition, they recognise patterns and can react quickly and 
accurately to changing events in their organisation and its envhnmnent. Eisenhardt
(1989) stated that executives who relied most heavily on real-time information were 
also most frequently described as being intuitive. Finally, constant attention to real­
time information may allow executive teams to gain experience in responding as a 
group. The fiequent review of real-time information may develop the social routines 
people need to respond quickly when pressing situations arise (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Similariy, Brockrnann and Anthony (2002) stated that faster and higher quality 
decisions are made when managers rely on their intuition. The authors ar gued that if 
intuition is used within the team, managers would have a larger inventory of tacit 
knowledge to select from which would lead to even faster and higher quality 
decisions. Brockrnann and Anthony (2002) stated that tacit knowledge may be the 
element missing in explaining, at least partially, how some strategic decisions work 
out even though they may not appear rational at the time they were made. For 
instance, a decision considered non-rational because it lacked information might 
simply have been an application of tacit knowledge to fill the gaps. Thus, by 
recognising the potential influence of tacit knowledge, the effect of decisions on the 
organisation may be better explained.
Multiple Alternatives
Various researchers noted that multiple alternatives are likely to slow the strategic 
decision process (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984; Janis, 1982; Vroorn and Yetton,
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1973). The underlying logic was that fewer alternatives aie faster to analyse than 
more. In contrast, Eisenhardt’s (1989) findings suggested that faster decision making 
was associated with more, not fewer, alternatives. Moreover, the sequencing of 
alternatives was crucial to the pace, often working several options at once.
Eisenhardt’s (1989) study revealed that there appears to be a fundamental difference 
in how fast and slow decision makers treat alternatives. Fast decision makers develop 
multiple alternatives, but analyse them rapidly. They rely primarily on quick, 
comparative analysis which reveal relative rankings and sharpen preferences. Their’s 
is a “breadth-not-depth” strategy (Eisenliardt, 1990: 47). On the contrary, slow 
decision makers emphasise depth of analysis. They analyse few alternatives, but do 
so in greater depth, and without gaining the confidence in their choice that multiple 
alternatives bring and without gaining the advantage of fallback positions.
According to Roberto (2004), for organisations to perform well, managers must 
make high-quality decisions in an efficient manner and simultaneously build 
consensus to facilitate implementation. The author found that groups attained greater 
efficiency and consensus if they made a series of small but critical choices during the 
process, rather than focusing entirely on the final selection of a course of action. 
These choices concerned the decision criteria, the elimination of options over time 
and the specific events on which the final choice was contingent. Accordingly, 
managers established well-defined criteria prior to debating alternatives and 
demonstrated that this approach typically resulted in greater efficiency and 
consensus. This ensured comparisons of alternatives and helped to surface 
underlying causes of disagreement. High efficiency/high consensus groups did not 
try to choose directly fiom the entire set of options. Instead they identified many 
alternatives and formed subgroups of similar options. Then they eliminated one or 
more subsets of options and proceeded to evaluate the remaining alternatives. This 
process made the evaluation of options more transparent thereby entrancing the 
understanding of the decision within the team and leading to effective decision 
making.
Role of Advisers
Eisenhai'dt’s (1989) findings showed that teams making faster decisions had a two- 
tier advice process. Their CEOs sought counsel from all members of the top 
management team, but they focused on obtaining advice from one or two of the 
firm’s most experienced executives, whom Eisenhaidt (1989: 559) termed 
“counselors”. Typically, coimselors work in the background advising the key 
decision maker about a wide range of issues. On the other hand, CEOs whose teams 
made slow decisions either had no counselor or had a less experienced executive in 
the coimselor role. Eisenhardt (1989) found that the counselor hastens the 
development of alternatives, providing a readily available sounding board for ideas 
and relating the decision to past experience. In addition, experienced counselors aie 
likely to provide useful, high-quality advice more readily than less experienced 
colleagues.
Conflict Resolution
Several authors (Hickson, Butler, Cray, Mallory and Wilson, 1986; Mintzberg et al, 
1976) ai'gued that conflict influences the length of a decision process. For example, 
Mintzberg and his colleagues (1976) found that conflict created interruptions in the 
process such that increasing conflict slows the pace of strategic decisions. Although 
conflict can have this effect, Eisenhardt (1990) stated that fast decision makers know 
how to gain the advantages of conflict without extensive delays in their decision 
process through conflict resolution.
According to Eisenhardt’s (1989) findings, the approach to conflict used by fast 
decision makers contrasts markedly with that used by the slow decision makers. Fast 
teams take a realistic view of conflict and actively deal with it. They see it as natural, 
valuable, and almost always inevitable. Fast decision makers typically use a two step 
process, termed ‘consensus with qualification’ to resolve deadlocks among 
individuals. Eisenhardt’s (1989) study showed that, first, executives talk over an 
issue and attempt to gain consensus. If consensus occurs, the choice is made. 
However, if consensus is not forthcoming, the key manager makes the choice guided
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by the input from the rest of the group. Therefore, fast decision makers recognise that 
choices must be made even if there is disagreement. On the contrary, slow decision 
makers wait for consensus as they look for an option which satisfies everyone. 
However, since conflict is common in decision making, the search for consensus 
often drags on for months delaying the decision mitil external events force a choice.
Decision Integration
Evidence from Eisenhardt’s (1989) study indicated that fast teams attempted to 
integrate strategic decisions with one another and with tactical plans, whereas the 
teams making slower decisions treated decisions as discrete and even disconnected 
events with little concern for how decisions related to each other or to tactical plans.
Accordingly, decision integration helps executives to analyse the viability of an 
alternative and potential conflicts with other decisions more quickly, hence limiting 
discontinuities between decisions. In contrast, slow decision makers treat each 
decision as a separate event, detached from other major choices and from tactics of 
implementation. In effect, they employ a linear view of decision making. Overall, 
slow decision makers see decisions as very large, discrete, and anxiety-provoking 
events whereas fast decision makers see individual decisions as a smaller part of an 
overai'ching pattern of choices (Eisenliardt, 1990).
3.3.3 Group Heterogeneity
Also of relevance is the amount of dispersion, or heterogeneity, within a managerial 
group. Hoffman and Maier (1961) proposed that diversity enhances the breadth of 
perspective, cognitive resources, and overall problem-solving capacity of the group. 
According to their view, with multifaceted backgrounds and orientations, members 
of a diverse team can observe more opportunities, tlireats and overall stimuli on 
multiple fronts and thus have a broader potential repertoire for generating actions. 
However, at the same time, because of diversity, a heterogeneous team may 
experience internal conflict, which could hinder the group’s ability to function and
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make effective decisions (McCain, O’Reilly and Pfeffer, 1983; Wagner, Pfeffer and 
O’Reilly, 1984).
Janis (1972) argued that homogeneity, as manifested in cohesiveness and insularity, 
leads to inferior decision making. In his view, homogeneity is one of several 
conditions that bring on groupthink, which amounts to restricted generation and 
assessment of alternatives. Filley, House and Ken' (1976) found that routine problem 
solving is best handled by a homogeneous group, and that ill-defined, novel problem 
solving is best handled by a heterogeneous group in which diversity of opinion, 
knowledge, and background allows a thorough airing of alternatives. Similarly, 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) stated that heterogeneity yields benefits in turbulent 
enviromnents whereas homogeneity is beneficial in stable enviromnents. However, 
Carpenter’s (2002) findings suggested that heterogeneity had a positive relationship 
with performance at low levels of complexity, but exhibited a negative relationship at 
high levels of complexity. These results stand in contrast to previous views of 
heterogeneity which argue that TMT diversity will serve films best when they face 
great complexity.
In addition to the conflicting ai'gmnents above, research on TMT demography has 
produced further mixed results regarding group heterogeneity. Some studies reported 
positive effects of homogeneity such as better team communication (Zenger and 
Lawience, 1989), faster decision implementation (O’Reilly and Flatt, 1989), and 
better financial performance (Smith, Smith, Sims, O’Bamion and Scully, 1994). 
Other researchers, however, have obtained results that indicated that heterogeneity at 
the top leads to greater creativity and innovation (Bantel and Jackson, 1989) and a 
diversity of perspectives resulting in higher decision qualities (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1990). Several authors (e.g. O’Bannon and Gupta, 1992) suggested 
that both homogeneity and heterogeneity may coexist in TMTs. More specifically, 
these authors argued that creativity and decision making will be enhanced through 
the heterogeneity of diverse backgrounds, while at the same time social cohesion 
which fosters similarity of attitudes and values results fiom the homogeneity at the 
top. Similai'ly, Jackson (1992) reported tliat heterogeneity is important in decision 
malting confen ing breadth of perspective on the one hand, and the potential for team
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dissent and inefficiency on the other. Accordingly, while heterogeneity improves 
decision quality, it can also make implementation more difficult -  hence it is viewed 
as a double-edged sword.
3.4 A Cognitive Approach to Decision Making in Teams
The roots of the cognitive perspective in strategic management and strategic decision 
making go back to the work of Simon on bounded rationality (March and Simon, 
1958). Cognitive perspective is concerned with the way executives conceptualise 
strategic problems, the way they develop their own rules and guidelines, the personal 
and organisational characteristics that influence this process, and the ways these rules 
influence their own decision making (Schwenk, 1995).
Research into cognitive processes in TMTs has advanced considerably over recent 
years (see Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008) and various researchers examined the 
cognitive processes within decision making by TMTs (Olson et al, 2007; West, 
2007). Rajagopalan, Rasheed and Datta (1993) suggested that cognitive 
psychological theories of decision making (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1984) and 
theories of group decision making (e.g. Gladstein and O’Reilly, 1985) might 
contribute to a better understanding of the strategic decision processes used by 
TMTs.
3.4.1 Individual Differences
Consistent individual differences in information processing have been referred to as 
“cognitive style” (Messick, 1984: 5). Cognitive style characterises the way 
individuals arrive at judgements or conclusions based on their observations (Hunt, 
Krzystoflak, Meindl and Yousry, 1989). According to Messick (1984), cognitive 
style is concerned with what an individual will do in a given type of situation. The 
main contribution of the cognitive style construct lies in its ability to bring together 
notions of information processing theory and personality (Hayes and Allinson, 1994; 
Sternberg and Grigorenko, 1997; Riding and Rayner, 1998). It has been used to study 
decision making behaviour’, conflict, strategy development, and group processes.
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Clarke and Mackaness (2001) asserted that individual differences in perception occur* 
principally because managers: (1) take ‘bounded’ views of problems (March and 
Simon, 1958); (2) search for and select information in different ways; and (3) have 
contrasting ‘cognitive styles’ (Allinson and Hayes, 1996). This view is central to 
Schwenk’s (1984) perspective of strategic decision making which integrated 
previous models developed from organisational, political, and cognitive perspectives. 
The organisational view implies that structures and processes influence information 
flows; the political perspective highlights the interplay between external influences 
and inter*nal political manoeuvring, and power struggles within the group; and the 
cognitive perspective emphasises the effect of how problems are comprehended. 
Central to all three models is the way in which individuals within the group perceive 
the decision enviromnent and exert their cognitive biases and assumptions.
Hodgkinson and Healey (2008) stated that individual differences in information 
processing preferences represent a broad class of cognitively based variables that 
have been adopted widely in the analysis of organisational behaviour, reflecting in 
general terms the distinction between analytic and intuitive processing (Chaiken and 
Trope, 1999, see Chapter 2). One view maintains that analysis and intuition are 
served by a common underlying cognitive system that individuals have a stable 
overarching preference for one approach or the other, and that these tendencies are 
organised along a unidimensional, bipolar continuum (see Allinson, Armstrong and 
Hayes, 2001; Hayes, Allinson, Hudson and Keasey, 2003). In contrast, a second 
perspective accords greater agency to individuals, arguing that analytic and intuitive 
processing capabilities are served by independent cognitive systems that permit 
individuals to switch back and forth from one approach to the other as required (a 
process refened to as ‘switching cognitive gears’) albeit moderated to some extent 
by stylistic preferences (see Dane and Pratt, 2007; Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith, 
2003a, 2003b).
According to Hayes and Allinson (1998), cognitive style influences the way 
managers scan the environment for new information, organise and interpret this 
information, and incorporate their interpretations into the mental models that guide 
their actions. On the basis of their review of the cognitive styles literature, Hayes and
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Allinson (1994) concluded that a single, overai'ching dimension imdeipins the 
various facets of cognitive style which they refer to as ‘the analysis-intuition 
dimension’. The ‘intuition’ pole is used to describe what is often called ‘right-brain’ 
thinking (i.e. immediate judgements based on feeling and the adoption of a global 
perspective), while the ‘analysis’ pole is used to describe ‘left-brain’ thinking (i.e. 
judgements based on mental reasoning and a focus on detail) (Allinson and Hayes, 
1996: 122) (see Chapter 2 for the discussion on ‘split-brain’ reseai’ch).
Drawing on dual-process theories from cognitive psychology and social cognition, 
Hodgkinson and Clai'ke (2007) outlined a two-dimensional framework to 
demonstrate the impact of individual differences in cognitive style on the observed 
behavioui'S of strategy makers (see Figure 3.2). The authors suggested that these 
individuals would, cognitively speaking, fall into one of foui' broad types, depending 
upon the degree to which they are characterised by a marked preference for an 
analytical and/or intuitive approach to the processing of information.
Figure 3.2 Individual Differences in Cognitive Style
Analytic
High
Cognitively
versatile
Detail
conscious
Low
Big picture 
conscious
Non-
discerning
High Intuitive
Low
Source: Hodgkinson and Clarke, 2007
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Individuals falling within the first category are characterised as the ‘detail conscious’ 
(highly analytic with little or no regard for intuition). A considerable volume of 
research (see Hayes and Allinson, 1994) suggests that individuals dominated by an 
analytic cognitive style have a tendency to approach problems in a step-by-step, 
systematic fashion. However, a potential problem facing such individuals is that 
when confronted with an abundance of information, paificularly under time pressure 
(Klein, 1998), they might become over burdened to the extent that they experience 
difficulty in extracting the bigger pictui'e fr om the detail, the state of affairs identified 
by Langley (1995) as ‘paralysis by analysis’.
The second category is the ‘big picture conscious’ individual (highly intuitive with 
little or no regard for analytic approaches to problem solving and decision making). 
A major strength of intuitive approaches is that they gain an overview of the problem 
quickly but at the expense of the detail. Such individuals might overlook salient data 
seen by their counterparts with more highly developed analytical capabilities (Clarke 
and Mackaness, 2001) leading to ill-conceived, arbitrary decisions, the state of 
affairs identified by Langley (1995) as ‘extinction by instinct’.
Individuals characterised neither by particularly strong analytical nor intuitive 
inclinations constitute the third category within this framework called ‘non- 
discerning’. These individuals lack discernment in the sense that they deploy 
minimal cognitive resources in order to derive strategic insight, being disinclined to 
process the detail or to extract a bigger picture from such detail. It is possible that 
such individuals rely on the opinion and received wisdom of others, thus relieving 
themselves of the bur dens of analytic and intuitive processing altogether.
Individuals falling within the fourih category, the ‘cognitively versatile’ (highly 
analytic and highly intuitive), possess in equal abimdance the inclination to attend to 
analytic detail and cut tlnough that detail, as and when required. Such individuals are 
able to switch more readily between analytic and intuitive processing strategies.
This framework provides a useful tool regarding differences in information 
processing from an individual point of view. As the focus of this chapter is
95
concerned with the TMTs, it is also important to understand the cognitive 
composition of the team. Thus, the following section reviews cognitive style from a 
collective perspective.
3.4.2 Collective Cognition
Hodgkinson and Sparrow (2002) stated that specifically in the team context, several 
labels have been used to outline various concepts of shared cognition, such as 
collective cognition, team knowledge, team mental models, shaied knowledge, 
transactive memory, and shared mental models. Collective cognition is defined in 
terms of the group processes involved in the acquisition, storage, transmission, 
manipulation, and use of information (Gibson, 2001). The key to understanding this 
fonn of cognition is to examine the patterns of connections between individuals and 
the weights that ar e put on them. Gibson (2001: 123) stated that “collective cognition 
does not reside in the individuals taken separately, though each individual 
contributes to it. Nor does it reside outside them. It is present in the inteiTelations 
between the activities of group members”. The author observed that understanding 
collective cognition processes has important implications for organisational 
knowledge management and learning. Similarly, West (2007) argued that collective 
cognition is frmdarnentally different from individual cognition or from the 
aggregation of individual cognitions.
Cooke et al (2004) emphasised that teams perform cognitive tasks. That is, they 
detect and recognise pertinent cues, make decisions, solve problems, remember 
relevant information, plan, acquire knowledge, and design solutions or products as an 
integrated unit. These authors ar gued that team cognition is more than the sum of the 
cognition of the individual team members. Instead, team cognition emerges from the 
interplay of the individual cognition of each team member and team process 
behaviour s. These two intertwined aspects of team cognition -  individual cognition 
of team members and team process behaviours -  ar-e viewed as analogous to 
cognitive structures and cognitive processes at tire individual level. With a newly 
formed team, team cognition begins as the sum of individual cognition. Then as the 
team interacts, dynamic changes occur* in the team’s mind as a natural result of the
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interaction. Team members interact through communication, coordination, and other 
process behaviours and in doing so transform a collection of individuals’ knowledge 
to team knowledge that ultimately guides action. In other words, the outcome of this 
transformation is effective team cognition.
Rentsch, Delise, Salas and Letsky (2010) suggested that teams consisting of team 
members who each possess expert knowledge must extract and integrate team 
members’ information to exploit the team’s decision making capacity. Team 
members must transfer their knowledge such that the knowledge initially possessed 
by individual team members become usable by all team members. Once the 
loiowledge is available collectively, the team increases its ability to elaborate, 
integrate and synthesize the unique knowledge in combination with common 
loiowledge, thereby increasing the team’s potential to develop a common 
understanding of the task and to generate effective solutions to complex problems 
(Rentsch, Delise and Hutchison, 2008). Cannon-Bowers and Salas (2001) stated that 
shared cognition leads to better team processes, which in turn lead to better task 
performance, such as more efficient communication, more accurate expectations and 
predictions, consensus, similar interpretations, and better coordination.
3.4.3 Dominant Management Logic
One of the important outcomes of organisational demographics resear ch has been the 
development of the concept of ‘dominant management logic’ or the cognitive maps 
of the management teams. With regard to organisational cognitive maps, Prahalad 
and Bettis (1986) proposed that firm’s strategic decisions are guided by a dominant 
management logic, that is, a shared understanding of the factors relevant to the 
business strategy and the relationship between these factors. The authors suggested 
that the dominant logic is a shared schema (a term generally used to describe 
individual-level cognitive structur es) developed as a result of the experiences of the 
key executives among the dominant coalition of the organisation. According to the 
authors, dominant logic is a mind set or a world view, or conceptualisation of the 
business and the administrative tools to accomplish goals and make decisions in that
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business. It is stored as a shared cognitive map (or set of schemas) among the 
dominant coalition and it is expressed as a learned, problem solving behaviour.
Prahalad and Bettis (1986) suggested that schemas permit managers to categorise an 
event, asses its consequences, and consider appropriate actions and to do so rapidly 
and often efficiently. Without schemas, a manager and ultimately the organisations 
with which he is associated, would become paralysed by the need to analyse 
‘scientifically’ an enormous number of ambiguous and uncertain situations. In other 
words, managers must be able to scan environments selectively so that timely 
decisions can be made (Hambrick, 1982).
While these authors defined the dominant management logic as the way the TMT 
members collectively understand their environment, Leonard et al (2005: 125) 
proposed that the dominant logic is the result of social interaction over time and this 
continued social interaction also leads to a cognitive “style” or patterns of behaviour 
by the TMT which they termed “group cognitive style”. Group cognitive style has 
been defined broadly as group-level patterns of behaviour* in the str ategic decision 
making process of a group (Leonard et al, 2005). The proposed model suggests that 
decision process differences ar e the result of differences in the cognitive style of the 
group as a whole. It is suggested that, just as individuals have a cognitive style, over* 
time as the group members interact with each other and with the decision making 
enviromnent, they develop patterns of behaviom* in terms of how they gather and 
process information, and how they evaluate that information in order to make a 
decision. The cognitive style of the groups is proposed to reflect differences in the 
composition and structure of the group, as well as the cognitive style and the social 
interaction of individual group members.
In their later development of the dominant logic perspective, Bettis and Prahalad 
(1995) have come to view the dominant logic as an information filter whereby 
organisational attention is focused only on data deemed relevant by the dominant 
logic, other data are largely ignored. Accordingly, relevant data are filtered by the 
dominant logic and by the analytic procedures managers use to aid strategy 
development. These filtered data are then incorporated into the strategy, systems.
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values, expectations, and reinforced behaviour' of the organisation. In this regard, 
Bettis and Prahalad (1995) asserted that the dominant logic can be viewed as a 
fimdarnental aspect of organisational intelligence, and an emergent property of 
complex organisations seeking to adapt. It provides a set of hemistics that simplify 
and speed decision making, and allows the organisation to ‘anticipate’ the 
environment. When conditions change, a new dominant logic must be developed 
quickly (including unlearning the old dominant logic) if the organisation is to 
survive.
3.4.4 Cognitive Diversity in Groups
Cognitive diversity, defined as differences in beliefs and preferences relating to 
various goals of the organisation, is found to exist among CEOs and members of 
their TMTs (Miller, Burke and Glide, 1998). The result of such differences can affect 
the way an issue is inter-preted or a problem is formulated. Research on group 
problem solving demonstrated that cognitive resources are a key determinant of 
group performance (Yetton and Bottger, 1983). Cognitive resources can differ in 
both degree and kind. Regarding differences in degree, the general view is that 
groups composed of people with higher levels of knowledge and ability perform 
better on creative problem-solving tasks than groups with lower levels of these 
resources. Bantel and Jackson (1989) argued that knowledge and ability facilitate the 
identification and formulation of problems, as well as the identification and 
evaluation of feasible solutions. Regarding differences in kind, it is suggested that 
when solving complex, non-routine problems, groups are more effective when 
composed of individuals having a variety of skills, knowledge, abilities, and 
perspectives (Shaw, 1976; Wanous and Youtz, 1986). Therefore, cognitive diversity 
is a valuable resource. In other words, the presence of people with differing points of 
view ensur es consideration of a lar'ger set of problems and a lar ger set of alternative 
potential solutions. The need to reconcile dissimilar solutions stimulates effective 
group discussion, prevents ‘groupthink’ and leads to high quality and original 
decisions (Janis, 1972; Nemeth, 1985; Hoffman and Maier, 1961; Hoffman, 1959; 
Hall, 1982).
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Gallen’s study (2009) found support that, as in the individual level (Gallen, 2006), 
the cognitive composition of the TMT has an effect on strategic decisions at the team 
level, and thus could prove a more promising measure of heterogeneity than the 
traditional demographic measures. Furthermore, Olson et al (2007) stated that it is 
imperative to understand how differing viewpoints affect decision making process in 
management teams. The authors examined cognitive processes within strategic 
decision making specifically focusing on cognitive diversity, task conflict, and 
competence-based trust to determine their impact on decision outcomes. Their 
findings suggested that cognitive diversity is beneficial in the decision making 
process: both competence-based tnrst and task conflict were found to act as 
moderators/mediators within the decision process, which benefit the decision 
imderstanding, decision commitment, and the overall decision quality.
On the other hand, Kisfalvi and Pitcher (2003) found that, because of some CEOs’ 
own extensive knowledge of and feel for their firms and then* markets, they are able 
to make strategic choices that have a positive impact on performance in the absence 
of a cognitively rational team process, thereby challenging the underlying 
assumption in the TMT literatine that good decisions reflect the consensus resulting 
from the free exchange of ideas within a diverse team. The authors argued that it is 
possible that strategic decisions based on optimal information and group consensus, 
i.e. rational decisions, may not necessarily always be better or* more innovative than 
those based on a CEO’s flash of intuition.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented a selective review of the literature on decision making in 
TMTs to show the development of research in this field over the years. Particular* 
interest in three aspects of TMTs has been identified. These are team composition, 
dynamics of team decision making processes, and team cognition. The key points 
from the literature review are summarised below.
Research on TMTs started with Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) theory of upper* 
echelons which stated that organisational outcomes can be predicted by managerial
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background characteristics. Whilst the theory has been subject to much attention at 
the time, it has later on been criticised in its limitations to assume a consistency of 
conditions; neglect the team processes that senior executives are involved in; and 
ignore deeper-level characteristics of top managers. In this respect, reseai'ch moved 
from demographics to explore the strategic decision making processes, i.e. the 
dynamics of the decision process and the interactions that take place among the top 
managers. Notable work has focused on investigating how managers make fast yet 
high-quality strategic decisions in fast-moving environments, and the political 
activity that takes place in TMT decision making. Most recently a separate stream of 
research focused on cognition in TMTs in relation to individual differences in 
information processing and collective cognition.
These developments in the literature suggest that the current literature offers a useful, 
however limited perspective of decision making processes in TMTs. It appears that 
little research has been done which attempts to link intuition to the decision making 
processes in the TMTs. Despite integration of behavioural aspects focused on group 
composition and interactions in relation to performance outcomes, the body of 
research has not fully explored the role played by intuition in TMT decision making.
This thesis aims to address this gap in the literature. The next chapter introduces the 
organisational learning framework which, by combining both the individual level of 
intuition and the group level of TMT decision making, frames the scope of this 
research.
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Chapter 4 Organisational Learning
4.0 Introduction
There has been extensive research over several decades on organisational learning. 
Multiple conceptualisations and theoretical fonnulations have been presented 
(Crossan et al, 1999; Easterby-Smith, 1997; Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Aigyris and 
Schôn, 1978; Huber, 1991; Levitt and March, 1988; also see Bapuji and Crossan, 
2004, and Easterby-Smith, Crossan and Nicolini, 2000 reviews). For example, Fiol 
and Lyles (1985) suggested that learning is the development of insights, loiowledge, 
and associations between past actions, the effectiveness of these actions, and future 
actions. Some scholai's aigued that learning occurs through individuals and that 
organisations do not learn by themselves (Dodgson, 1993), while others contended 
that learning occurs at the social level i.e. group and organisation (March, 1991). 
There is growing consensus in the literature that learning is multifarious, i.e. it can be 
behavioural and cognitive, exogenous and endogenous, methodical and emergent, 
incremental and radical, and can occur at various levels in an organisation (Bapuji 
and Crossan, 2004).
The aim of this chapter is to review organisational learning from the perspective of 
the 41 framework (Crossan et al, 1999) as it forms a conceptual anchor for this 
research given its explicit acknowledgement of the role of intuition in collective 
learning. The chapter is organised in six sections as follows: the first section provides 
a general overview of organisational learning research; the second section presents 
the 41 fr amework; the third section reviews the SECl-ba as a model of organisational 
knowledge creation; the fourth section presents a selection of research on the 41 
framework and develops a comprehensive conceptual framework in light of this 
review; the fifth section concludes the chapter; and the final section provides an 
integrative summary of the three literature review chapters.
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4.1 Overview of Organisational Learning Research
Interest in organisational learning dates back to 1950s, and the origin of the concept 
of organisational learning can be traced to the foundational work of Cyert and Mar ch 
(1963) who were first to articulate the idea that an organisation could learn in ways 
that were independent of the individuals within it.
Two seminal contributors to organisational learning theory are Argyris and Schôn 
(1978) who proposed that organisations learn thr ough individuals acting as agents for 
firms. The scholars developed the concepts of single- and double-loop learning, and 
explained learning in terms of individual level error detection and erxor correction. 
Accordingly, single-loop learning is linked to incremental change, and double-loop 
learning is linked to radical change (e.g. change in strategic direction).
The 1980s saw a nirmber of foundational works, such as Hedberg (1981), 
Shrivastava (1983), Daft and Weick (1984), and Fiol and Lyles (1985) whose 
contributions were significant in terms of defining the terminology of organisational 
learning. In 1990s the literature on organisational learning has focused on the 
processes involved in individual and collective learning inside organisations. March 
(1991), Huber (1991), and Simon (1991) were influential in setting the research 
agenda of this decade. March (1991) was among those who argued that 
organisational learning was simply the sum of what individuals learn within 
organisations. Similarly, Simon (1991: 125) asserted that organisational learning is 
about individual learning since “all learning takes place inside individual human 
heads”. However, others argued that organisational learning was more than the 
learning of its individual members. For example, the social constructionist 
perspective suggested that learning occurs and knowledge is created through 
conversations and interactions between people (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Lave and 
Wenger, 1991; Gherardi and Nicolini, 2001). Eventually, the levels of analysis 
debate moved frnrn individual to group and integrated organisation level to examine 
learning in a more dynamic way (Crossan et al, 1999).
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At the time there was a lack of convergence in organisational learning theories and 
different schools of thought started to emerge. Bell, Wliitwell and Lukas (2002) 
offered four schools of thought each with distinctive focus of interest; the economic 
school (learning by doing) (e.g. Arxow, 1962; Lieberman, 1987); the developmental 
school (learning by evolution) (e.g. Dechant and Marsick, 1991; Torbert, 1994); the 
managerial school (learning by management-led change) (e.g. Senge, 1990, 1993; 
Garvin, 1993); and the process school (learning by information processing) (e.g. 
March, 1991; Huber, 1991; Cyert and March, 1963; Argyris and Schôn, 1978).
In a review of the literature, DeFillippi and Ornstein (2003) incorporated 
psychological theory into organisational learning and identified four broad 
theoretical approaches: information processing; behavioiaal/evolutionary; social 
construction; and applied learning perspectives.
The information processing perspective views organisations as systems of 
information (Huber, 1991). This approach assumes that information, knowledge or 
learning is stored in collective memory based on tire cumulative experiences of 
individuals comprising the organisation. It is predicated on shared mental models of 
interpretation to give meaning to information. Huber (1991: 89) stated that “an 
organisation learns if any of its units acquires knowledge that it recognises as 
potentially useful to the organisation.” This is based on an individualistic learning 
perspective with the assumption that “an organisation learns something even if not 
every one of its components learns that something” (Huber, 1991: 89).
Behavioural theories of organisational learning focus on the antecedents to and 
changes in organisation’s routines and systems as the organisation responds to its 
own experience and that of other organisations. Nelson and Winter (1982) developed 
the ‘evolutionary model of the firm’ theory which presumes that organisations learn 
by encoding inferences from history into routines that guide behaviour. As such, 
behavioural theories rely on the notion that all current learning is influenced by the 
past (the path-dependence notion. Nelson and Winter, 1982).
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The social constructionist perspectives of organisational learning emphasise the 
social context whereby learning is embedded in the relationships and interactions 
between people (Oit, 1990; Wenger, 1998) which takes place in action and tlirough 
action (Gheraidi and Nicolini, 2001). Leaining therefore has to do with participating 
and becoming a member of a community of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991; 
Brown and Duguid, 1991) which shares a common language, values and practices. 
Gherardi and Nicolini (2001: 47) take the sociologist approach to learning that is 
“produced and reproduced in the social relations of individuals when they pailicipate 
in society”. The authors suggested that organisational learning enables exploration of 
an organisation as though it were a subject that learns, processes information, reflects 
on experiences, and possesses a stock of knowledge, skills and expertise.
The applied perspectives of organisational learning suggest that learning is grounded 
in direct experience and also requires active intervention by trained facilitators or 
consultants to improve organisational and individual learning practices. The applied 
learning perspective adopts a multiple levels view of learning. For example, Coghlan 
(1997) offered a recent view of organisational learning as a dynamic inter-level 
process that inter-relates learning by individuals, teams, interdepartmental groups 
and organisations. This kind of a multi-level perspective on organisational learning is 
also evident in other applied perspectives, such as Senge (1990).
Crossan et al’s (1999) work is another example of multi-level research. The authors 
developed the 41 framework to explain how individuals and groups in organisations 
collectively engage in social actions of learning, involving both behavioural and 
cognitive changes. The theory provides an integrative framework of how learning 
occurs at the individual, group and organisation levels, how learning at one level 
impacts learning at other levels, and how knowledge flows from one level to the 
others. As the main focus of the current research, the 41 framework of organisational 
learning is discussed in the following section in detail.
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4.2 The 41 Framework of Organisational Learning
Crossan et al (1999) view organisational learning as the process of change in thought 
and action -  both individual and shared -  embedded in and affected by the 
institutions of the organisations. They define it as a dynamic process, occurring over 
time and across levels, that involves a tension between new and existing learning. 
Crossan and her colleagues (Crossan et al, 1999) offered what they tenn a ‘41 model’ 
of organisational learning (see Figure 4.1) that occurs over three levels: individual, 
group and organisation, each informing the others. These three levels of learning are 
linlced by four social and psychological processes: intuiting, interpreting, integrating 
and institutionalising (the 4Is). In this model, intuiting and interpreting occur at the 
individual level, interpreting and integrating occur* at the group level, and integrating 
and institutionalising occur at the organisation level. The various processes overlap 
at the interface between the levels.
Figure 4.1 41 Organisational Learning Framework
Individual Group Organisation
Individual
Group
Organisation
Feed forward
Intuiting
Interpreting
I
Integrating
Institutionalising
Som'ce: Crossan, Lane and White, 1999
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Crossan et al (1999: 525) defined the 41 processes as follows:
“Intuiting is the preconscious recognition of the pattern and/or possibilities 
inherent in a personal stream of experience. This process can affect the 
intuitive individual’s actions, but it only affects others when they attempt to 
(inter)act with that individual. Interpreting is the explaining, through words 
and/or actions, of an insight or idea to one’s self and to others. This process 
goes fr*om the preverbal to the verbal, resulting in the development of language. 
Integrating is the process of developing shared understanding among 
individuals and of taking coordinated action through mutual adjustment. 
Dialogue and joint action are crucial to the development of shared 
understanding. This process will initially be ad hoc and informal, but if the 
coordinated action taking is recurring and significant, it will be 
institutionalised. Institutionalising is the process of ensuring that routinised 
actions occur. Tasks are defined, actions specified, and organisational 
mechanisms put in place to ensure that certain actions occur*. Institutionalising 
is the process of embedding learning that has occuned by individuals and 
groups into the organisation, and it includes systems, structures, procedures, 
and strategy.”
The 41 framework offers useful insights on how intuitions get ar*ticulated and 
transcend from the enterprising individuals to a wider* organisational system (Crossan 
et al, 1999; Crossan and Berdrow, 2003; Dutta and Crossan, 2005). According to this 
framework, ideas occur* to individuals tlrrough ‘intuiting’ on the basis of their* prior* 
experience and recognition of patter*ns. Crossan et al (1999) stated that intuition is a 
uniquely individual process. It may happen within a group or organisational context, 
but the recognition of a patter*n or* possibility comes from within an individual; 
organisations do not intuit. Intuiting focuses on the subconscious process of 
developing insights and as individuals begin to explain what once were simply 
feelings, hunches or sensations the process of interpreting begins picking up on the 
conscious elements of the individual learning process. Regrettably, the model 
conflates insight and intuition (see Chapter* 2). The process of intuiting is an 
important part of the 41 framework and a distinction is made between ‘expert’ and 
‘entrepreneurial’ intuition. Dutta and Crossan (2005) state that expert intuition is 
based on (past) pattern recognition and it emphasises the complex knowledge base of 
the individual as being the primary means by which patterns are recognised; whereas 
entrepreneurial intuition relies on the individual’s creative capacity to recognise gaps 
and to identify (friture) possibilities.
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Through ‘interpreting’ individuals develop cognitive maps about various domains in 
which they operate. Language plays a significant role in the development of these 
maps and as individuals ultimately share those ideas within a group, the interpretive 
process moves beyond the individual and becomes embedded within the workgroup; 
it becomes integrative.
‘Integrating’ within the 41 model occurs by developing shared understanding, and the 
taking of coherent and collective action by the members of the group. It is through 
the continuing conversation among the members of the community and through 
shared practice that shared imderstanding or ‘collective mind’ (Weick and Roberts, 
1993) develops, and mutual adjustment and negotiated action take place. This 
process will initially be ad hoc and informal but if the coordinated action taking is 
recurring and significant, it will be institutionalised.
‘Institutionalising’ is the process of embedding learning that has occuned by 
individuals and groups into the organisation. The underlying assumption is that 
organisations are more than simply a collection of individuals and thus organisational 
learning is different from the simple sum of the learning of its members. Although 
individuals may come and go, what they have learned as individuals or in groups 
does not necessarily leave with them. Some learning is formalised and embedded in 
the systems, structures, procedures, strategies, and investments in information 
systems and infiastrncture. This institutionalisation is the means for organisations to 
leverage the learning of the individual members (Crossan et al, 1999).
Crossan et al (1999) view organisational learning as a dynamic process whereby 
understanding guides action, but action also informs understanding. The authors 
stated that this creates a tension between assimilating new learning (feed forward) 
and exploiting or using what has already been learned (feedback). Accordingly, 
individual intuiting feeds forward new ideas to groups who in turn interpret and 
integrate the information, thereby permitting exploration, new learning and coherent 
collective action. At the same time, institutionalising at the level of the organisation 
feeds back to the group and individual levels, exploiting what has been learned, 
affecting how people act and think, and causing tension with feed forward processes.
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Building on the 41 framework, Vera and Crossan (2004) investigated how the 
dominant coalition of the firm influences the strategic process of organisational 
learning. The fundamental premise of the conceptual framework they presented in 
this work was that at certain times organisational learning processes tlnive under 
transactional leadership, and at other times they benefit more from transformational 
leadership. Particularly in times of change, these processes make evident the need to 
alter the firm’s institutionalised learning -  a task best suited to transformational 
leadership. On the other hand, in times of stability, organisational learning processes 
serve to refresh, reinforce, and refine current learning -  a task best suited to 
transactional leadership. Vera and Crossan (2004) concluded that in order to manage 
organisational learning, the most effective strategic leaders will be those best able to 
function in both transformational and transactional modes, and that both leadership 
styles are effective in facilitating organisational learning, albeit in different 
situations.
4.3 SECl-ba Model of Knowledge Creation
According to Vera and Crossan (2005), learning and knowledge are intertwined in an 
iterative, mutually reinforcing process: while learning (the process) produces new 
knowledge (the content), knowledge impacts future learning. An alternative theory to 
the 41 framework which clearly differentiates between learning processes and 
learning content is Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) SECI-ètr model, ‘èa’ is defined as 
a context in which knowledge is shar ed, created, and utilised in recognition of the 
fact that knowledge needs a context in order to exist (Nonaka, Toyama and Byosiere, 
2001).
Nonaka, Konno and Toyama (1998) proposed a multi-layered model of ‘knowledge 
creation’ in order to understand how organisations create lorowledge dynamically. 
According to this model, loiowledge is created through a continuous and dynamic 
interaction between tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge in the creative activities 
of human beings (Nonaka et al, 2001). Nonaka et al (2001: 495) call the interaction 
of the two types of knowledge “knowledge conversion”. This conversion is a social 
process between individuals; it is not confined within an individual. Knowledge is
109
created through interactions between individuals with different types and contents of 
knowledge. This interaction is shaped through the SECI process (see Figure 4.2), that 
is, through the shifts from one mode of knowledge conversion to the next: (1) 
socialisation (from tacit knowledge to tacit knowledge); (2) externalisation (from 
tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge); (3) combination (from explicit knowledge to 
explicit knowledge); and (4) internalisation (from explicit knowledge to tacit 
knowledge). The ‘knowledge spiral’ represents a dynamic process in which the scale 
of the interaction between tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge increases as it 
moves up the levels of knowledge entities (e.g. individual, group, organisation, and 
inter-organisational actors).
Figure 4.2 SECI-^« Model of Knowledge Creation
TacitTacit
Socialisation Externalisation
•t
Combination
Explicit Explicit <-
Source: Nonaka and Takeucki, 1995
As in the intuiting process of the 41 model, the knowledge creation process begins 
with ‘socialisation’ by bringing together tacit knowledge through shared experiences. 
Because tacit knowledge is context-specific and difficult to formalise, the key to 
acquiring tacit knowledge is to share the same experience through joint activities. It 
is through this social process that individuals sympathise or empathise with others, 
share feelings, emotions, experiences, and mental models. A classic example of 
socialisation is the learning of an apprentice; not largely through spoken words or
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written textbooks but mainly by exposrue, experience, observation, imitation and 
modelling.
The second process of SECI, ‘externalisation’, is the process of articulating tacit 
knowledge as explicit knowledge and it corresponds to the interpreting process of the 
41 framework. Of the four modes of knowledge conversion, externalisation is the key 
to knowledge creation because it creates new, explicit concepts from tacit 
knowledge. When tacit knowledge is made explicit, “knowledge becomes 
crystallised” (Nonaka et al, 2001: 495) at which point it can be shared by others and 
can be made the basis for new knowledge. This relies on a social process of 
articulation. The successfril conversion of tacit knowledge into explicit Imowledge 
depends on the use of metaphors, analogies and models.
In the ‘combination’ process, discrete elements of explicit knowledge are connected 
into a set of explicit knowledge that is more complex and systematic than any of its 
parts. Similar' to the integrating process of the 41 model, knowledge is exchanged and 
combined through such media as docmnents, meetings, telephone conversations, and 
computerised communication networks. In practice, combination entails thr*ee 
processes: first, explicit knowledge is collected from inside or outside the 
organisation and then combined; second, the new explicit Icnowledge is disseminated 
among the organisational members; and third, the explicit knowledge is edited or 
processed in tire organisation in order to make it more usable.
Finally, ‘internalisation’ is the process of embodying explicit knowledge as tacit 
knowledge. It is closely related to learrring-by-doing. Much like the institutionalising 
process of the 41 model, tlrrough inter'nalisation, knowledge that is created is shar ed 
tlu'oughout an organisation. Internalised knowledge is used to broaden, extend, and 
reframe organisational members’ tacit Icnowledge. When knowledge is internalised 
in individuals’ tacit knowledge bases through shared mental models or technical 
know-how, it becomes a valuable asset. This tacit knowledge accumulated at the 
individual level is, in tmn, shared with other individuals through socialisation, and it 
sets off a new spiral of knowledge creation. It should be noted that the SECI-bfl
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model is not improblematic, especially with regard to the notion of the conversion of 
tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge (see Tsoiikas, 2003).
Tsoulcas (2003) asserted that Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) interpretation of tacit 
knowledge as ‘knowledge-not-yet-articulated’, i.e. knowledge awaiting for its 
translation or conversion into explicit knowledge, is greatly misunderstood. Tsoukas 
(2003) stated that this interpretation ignores the essential ineffability of tacit 
knowledge, thus reducing it to what can be articulated. According to Tsoukas (2001), 
new knowledge comes about not when tacit becomes explicit, but when our skilled 
performance is pimctuated in new ways thr ough social interaction.
It is important to draw the distinction between intuition and tacit knowledge. Epstein 
(1994) stated that the experiential (i.e. intuitive) system represents events primarily 
concretely and imagistically; it is capable of generalisation and abstraction through 
the use of prototypes, metaphors, scripts, and narxatives. Whilst we ar e not able to 
tell the soiu'ce of intuitions (i.e. how we know), we are able to explicitly 
cormmmicate intuitions once we are aware of them (e.g. thr ough metaphor). On the 
contrary, Tsoulcas (2003) argued that tacit knowledge camiot be ‘captured’, 
‘translated’, or ‘converted’ to explicit knowledge, but only displayed and manifested 
in what we do. This resonates with Polanyi’s (1966: 4) statement that “we can know 
more than we can tell”.
According to Polanyi (1962) (credited as the inventor of the term), tacit knowledge is 
associated with skilful performance and know-how. In his most famous example, 
Polanyi (1962) explains that in order to be able to ride a bicycle one needs to have 
the tacit knowledge of how to stay upright. This is knowledge that one possesses, not 
the activity of riding itself, but the knowledge used in riding. Whilst explicit 
Icnowledge can be used as an aid to acquire tacit knowledge (Cook and Brown, 1999) 
(e.g. telling someone how to turn to avoid a fall), explicit knowledge alone cannot 
enable someone to ride a bicycle. To do so, one must spend time on a bicycle to 
acquire the tacit knowledge necessary for riding, ultimately achieving competence by 
becoming unaware of how it is done.
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To siuîi up, the review of the literatiue on SECl-ba suggests that the theory is more 
concerned with knowledge creation through conversion of tacit to explicit 
knowledge, and vice versa. As such, it does not consider the natiue of organisational 
learning processes as it evolves from individual level to collective level (cf. Crossan 
et al, 1999). There is also no mention of the role of intuition in the knowledge 
creation process. While intuitions may be acquired tacitly, they are different from 
tacit knowledge in that intuitions are essentially ‘judgements’ (Dane and Pratt, 2007) 
which can be interpreted and communicated, whereas tacit knowledge remains 
essentially inarficulable (Polanyi, 1962) but manifested in behaviour.
Accordingly, given its explicit acknowledgement of the role of intuition in collective 
learning, the main focus of this research is the 41 framework of organisational 
learning. The remainder of tliis chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical 
developments on the 41 framework since its conception by Crossan et al in 1999.
4.4 Research to Date on 41 Framework
A number of empirical studies and conceptual developments of the 41 fr amework 
have been conducted and proposed with the pmpose to advance the original model as 
introduced by Crossan et al (1999). In this section a selection of these studies will be 
reviewed in terms of their contribution to the knowledge on organisational learning 
fr'orn the perspective of the 41 fr amework.
4.4.1 Elaboration of Feed Foiward and Feedback Processes
Kleysen and Dyck Study
Kleysen and Dyck (2001) criticised the 41 framework on the grounds that whilst 
Crossan et al (1999) recognised intuitions as the source of exploration and learning in 
organisations, they have not acknowledged the conscious perception of opportunities 
for learning and the role of attention to external circumstances as generators of new 
ideas. These authors argued that this omission gives the impression that 
organisational learning depends on the ‘eiueka’ (i.e. insightful) experiences of
113
individuals. Given this criticism, in an attempt to conceptually expand the 41 
framework, Kleysen and Dyck (2001) developed a linkage between the 
organisational learning framework and the environment. The authors suggested that 
in addition to intuiting, individuals are also engaged in an ‘attending’ process which 
may be a scarming or search process that gathers information from opportunity 
sources. The resultant information then becomes the raw material for intuition and 
new ideas. However, Kleysen and Dyck are not forthcoming on whether such 
attending processes are automatic or controlled (cf. System 1 versus System 2) or the 
extent to which they overlap with entrepreneurial alertness (Kirzner, 1979).
Furthermore, the authors introduced ‘championing’ and ‘coalition building’ as two 
socio-political processes to reflect the influence of power and leadership that are 
essential to feed forward learning. Accordingly, organisations need champions to 
cany ideas forward (even though they may have not originated the ideas).
Championing and interpreting processes interact; champions actively promote 
particular’ metaphors and use language associated with new ideas in an effort to shape 
and direct conversation with the intent of changing cognitive maps and lessening 
resistance by those opposed. Championing is not however sufficient for new ideas 
and learning to become institutionalised. Coalition building is essential to feed 
forward new ideas from group to organisation levels. Kleysen and Dyck (2001) 
argued that coalition building and integrating processes are interacting to produce the 
necessary resources and support needed to realise the new idea into coherent and 
collective action.
Finally, the authors asserted that the 41 framework depicts but fails to specify the 
feedback processes from organisation to group, and from group to individual levels.
In this regard, Kleysen and Dyck (2001) introduced two additional processes, and 
named them ‘encoding’ and ‘enacting’, to identify the feedback processes.
Accordingly, the feedback process between organisation and group levels encodes 
institutional procedures and principles into group scripts which in turn ar e enacted by 
individuals. The authors suggested that encoding is the diffusion tluoughout the 
organisation of informational constraints on action such as managerial visions, |
policies and procedures; and enacting refers to the interaction of groups of i
I
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individuals in an infoiination field that contains both the organisational encoding and 
the demands of actual work situations.
4.4.2 Facilitators and Impediments of Organisational Learning 
Zietsma et aVs Study
In a longitudinal case study of the learning processes involved in the strategic 
renewal of MacMillan Bloedel (a forest company), Zietsma, Wimi, Branzei and 
Vertinsky (2002) found evidence for a more active process of information seeking 
from the environment. The authors suggested that leaining arose not only from 
subconscious and pre-verbal internal intuiting processes but also from careful 
‘attending’ to external stimuli which bring external information into the organisation. 
The authors stated that some individuals, particulaiiy unconstrained actors and 
chaiacteristically open-minded people, are able to attend to divergent perspectives 
and engage in intuiting, especially if they have direct exposure to alternate views 
and/or relational ties to those who hold them.
Additionally, in their empirical study Zietsma et al (2002) found a parallel action- 
based leaiiiing process to interpreting, labelled ‘experimenting’, suggesting that 
individuals and groups act on, test and develop their interpretations through 
experimenting which adds substance to their cognitive interpretations. The authors 
showed that action involves experiments that generate additional data for 
interpreting. Accordingly, the results of mrsuccessfril experiments can be used to 
adjust interpretations while the results of successful experiments can assist intuiting 
individuals in integrating and institutionalising their learning.
Finally, the authors provided insights into the facilitators and impediments of the 
learning process (see Table 4.1 for the list). They also introduced the concept of a 
‘legitimacy trap’ to describe an organisation’s over-reliance on institutionalised 
Icnowledge when external challenges arise. They explained that when an organisation 
feels that it is imfairiy under attack by illegitimate sources, it can become caught in a
115
legitimacy trap, actively and dysfunctionally resist pressures for change, and prevent 
the initiation of feed forward learning processes.
Lehesvirta*s Study
Lehesvirta (2004) conducted an etlinographic study of tlie learning processes in a 
metal industry company over a fom-year period. The author used Crossan et al’s 
(1999) 41 framework to examine the critical elements of learning sub-processes and 
shed some light on how the sub-processes on different levels of learning are linked 
with each other. The study revealed that conflicts and confusion were significant 
incentives for learning, which started intuiting process in either an open 
confrontation or through a collision in an individual’s mind. The author found that 
sharing of intuitions appear ed to be incidental which has implications on information 
sharing as a precondition for collective interpretation and integration. Furthermore, 
Lehesvirta (2004) stated that sharing one’s intuitions requires not only the ability to 
recognise the significance of information, but also the ability and willingness to 
share.
Schilling andKluge^s Study
In a conceptual paper Schilling and Kluge (2009) described impediments to 
organisational learning based on the expanded 41 model as developed by Lawrence, 
Mauws, Dyck and Kleysen (2005), and analysed the impact of particular' baniers on 
different kinds of organisational miits. The authors used the four learning processes 
of intuiting, interpreting, integrating and institutionalising to categorise the barriers 
to organisational lear-ning, and adopted three forms of influencing factors.
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These are: actional-personal (characterised by individual thinking, attitudes, and 
behaviour'); structural-organisational (rooted in organisational strategy, technology, 
culture and formal regulations); and societal-environmental (characterised by the 
perceived changes and developments in the exter-nal organisational environment 
which are relevant at all stages of the organisational lear'ning processes). The authors 
reviewed an extensive literatrue on organisational lear'ning and identified an 
exhaustive list of impediments to organisational learning, these are summarised in 
Table 4.2.
Schilling and Kluge (2009) view organisational enviromnent as an important aspect 
in the organisational learning process. The authors expanded the 41 framework to 
include the external enviromnent as the background of the organisation, representing 
those par'ts of the social and material world that members perceive as relevant for 
organisational action (e.g. customers, suppliers, competitors, socio-political 
environment, technology). The interrelation between the organisation and its 
environment is intended to represent the flow and processing of information. 
According to the authors, the organisational enviromnent is relevant at all stages of 
the organisational learning process, as perceived changes and developments in the 
external organisational environment are important somces of ideas and innovation in 
organisation. Schilling and Kluge (2009) asserted that the generation of new ideas 
(i.e. intuiting), their interpretation by certain groups, their integration as 
organisational products and practices, and their implementation would rely on the 
complexity of the data collected from the environment. As a result, the authors 
suggested that the three forms of influencing factors (i.e. actional-personal, 
structmal-organisational, and societal-enviromnental) on the organisational learning 
process should be distinguished from the levels of analysis (i.e. individual, group, 
and organisation).
Berends andLammers* Study
Building on the 41 framework, Berends and Lammers (2010) examined 
organisational learning processes in a longitudinal case study of implementation of 
knowledge management in an international bank, focusing on the social and temporal
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structuiing of learning over time. The authors found that learning did not progress 
along a linear path, and identified discontinuities where micro-processes of 
organisational learning were inteiTupted or did not progress fi’om level to level. In 
regard to the social structuring, the authors found that the involvement of individuals 
and groups changed over time due to political interventions, thereby interrupting 
some micro-processes of learning, and triggering or reinforcing others. The findings 
showed the importance of timing in the progress of learning and politics of 
organisational learning. Accordingly, temporal structiues were found to be a source 
of tension, and triggered political interventions to speed up, interrupt or postpone 
processes. Additionally the study revealed that who is involved in learning affects 
M>hat leaining occms when, and vice versa.
4.4.3 Organisational Learning and Strategic Renewal 
Crossan and Berdrow*s Study
Crossan and Berdrow (2003) conducted empirical research to examine the process of 
strategic renewal in a comprehensive case study of Canada Post Corporation. The 
authors used the 41 framework to explore the underlying processes that form the 
tension between exploration and exploitation. Wliilst the authors have not expanded 
the original 41 framework, they acknowledged the value of a champion (as 
introduced by Kleysen and Dyck, 2001) to articulate a vision and persuade others to 
accept it, in order for the intuitions and interpretations to be shared and integrated. 
Additionally, they observed issues such as constrained power and hierarchical 
leadership emerging from the case study, which are not directly taken into account in 
the original framework.
4.4.4 Power and Political Dynamics in Organisational Learning 
Lawrence et aVs Study
In a conceptual paper, Lawrence et al (2005) criticised Crossan et al’s (1999) 41 
framework on the basis that it neglects the role of power and politics, and that
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consequently it is insufficient to address the issue concerning which new ideas will 
form the institutions of the organisation, and which institutions will provide the basis 
for further intuitions. In this respect, the authors explored the political dynamics of 
organisational learning and proposed the integration of a set of political strategies 
into the 41 organisational learning framework. The authors asserted that different 
foiins of power in organisations are comiected to specific leaining processes: 
intuition is linked with discipline; inteipretation with influence; integration with 
force; and institutionalisation with domination.
More specifically, Lawrence et al (2005) argued that interpreting an idea so that it 
becomes accepted by others necessarily involves influence, whether on the part of 
the originator of the idea or some other actor who champions the idea. By using 
political strategies to affect the language and cognitive maps that others adopt and 
construct, influence is useful to overcome the ambiguity and uncertainty associated 
with inteipretation. Lawr ence et al (2005) identified that the most important political 
strategy during the integrating process is force, which facilitates the accomplishment 
of collective action by creating the circumstances that restrict the options available to 
the organisational members, such that they were unable to do other than enact those 
new ideas.
According to these authors, within the context of organisational learning, the most 
effective political strategy for institutionalisation is domination which overcomes 
potential resistance to change and thus supports institutionalisation. Finally, 
Lawrence et al (2005) proposed that the political dynamics of intuition involve 
discipline as a form of power that helps organisational members to gain expertise that 
is necessary to foster intuition. Accordingly, important forms of discipline in modern 
work organisations include practices such as socialisation, compensation, training, 
and teamwork. The authors suggested that an examination of these different forms of 
power provides a basis for imderstanding why some intuitions become 
institutionalised while others do not.
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4.4.5 Inter-Organisational Learning
Jones and Macpherson *s Study
Jones and Macpherson (2006) explored how mature Small Medium Enterprises 
(SME) which lack internal resources access external knowledge to facilitate strategic 
renewal through inter-organisational learning. The authors extended the 41 
framework by incorporating an external dimension, labelled ‘intertwining’, to the 
institutionalisation of knowledge in SMEs. In tliree case studies, the authors showed 
how external actors (customers, suppliers, and Icnowledge providers) can play an 
active role by intertwining knowledge to support the development of processes, 
systems, and routines that distribute and institutionalise learning throughout the 
organisation.
Jones and Macpherson (2006) stated that intertwining indicates active engagement 
between the organisation and its external knowledge network, and signifies that 
learning mechanisms are at the interstices between organisations and not just within 
organisational boundaries. In their extension of the 41 framework, the authors 
acknowledged the additions of ‘attending’ and ‘experimenting’ by Zietsma et al 
(2002). The authors asserted that intertwining promotes a feedback learning flow 
within the recipient company. Accordingly, the institutionalisation of external 
knowledge leads to a cycle of integrating, interpreting, and intuiting as employees 
learn from operating new procedures. The authors emphasised the importance of the 
links with customers, suppliers, and knowledge providers as the most accessible 
sources of learning (e.g. customer requests for improvements in products and 
services; supplier suggestions for cost reductions by streamlining joint processes; or 
knowledge sharing with academic sources).
Each of the three case studies demonstrated tlnee different types of learning 
processes: ‘normative’ learning as a result of the influence of professional bodies in 
the case of hiunan resource issues; ‘mimetic’ learning by copying best practice from 
other organisations; and ‘coercive’ learning as a result of direct pressure from an 
external organisation for the adoption of new knowledge.
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4.4.6 Leadership and Organisational Learning
Berson et aVs Study
Berson, Nemanich, Waldman, Galvin and Keller (2006) provided a conceptual and 
empirical review of research on leadership and organisational learning. The authors 
built their review on the distinction between exploration and exploitation, and the 41 
framework of organisational learning by linking leadership constructs and processes 
of organisational learning at different levels of analysis as presented by Crossan et al 
(1999).
Berson et al (2006) suggested that leaders play a central role in the organisational 
learning processes in multiple ways: leaders provide the contextual support in the 
organisation by obtaining the needed resources for learning to occur tlrrough 
exploration and exploitation; leaders enable and enhance integration by providing a 
foundation of shared imderstandings of needs and purpose at different levels of the 
organisation; leaders are important in institutionalising learning by integrating new 
and existing knowledge in the organisation’s policies and practices.
In their review, the authors presented leadership as a positive influence on 
organisational learning, however they acknowledged that authoritarian and 
rnanagement-by-exception forms of leadership may actually inhibit learning. 
Accordingly, when leaders rely on warnings and fear, followers may avoid bringing 
new ideas and accept institutional procedures which may hinder the learning process.
Table 4.3 provides a suimnary of the relevant research on the 41 framework as 
reviewed in this section.
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Table 4.3 Summary of Relevant Research on 41 Framework
41 Processes Key Contribution Authors Type of Study
Intuiting Attending
Attendirrg
Initiated by conflict
and confirsion
Discipline
Barriers
Discontinuities
Kleysen & Dyck (2001) 
Zietsma et al (2002) 
Lehesvirta (2004)
Lawrence et al (2005) 
Schilling & Kluge (2009) 
Berends & Lammers 
(2010)
Conceptual
Empirical
Empirical
Conceptual
Conceptual
Empirical
Interpreting Championing
Experimenting
Facilitated by
knowledge sharing
Influence
Barriers
Discontinuities
Kleysen & Dyck (2001) 
Zietsma et al (2002) 
Lehesvirta (2004)
Lawrence et al (2005) 
Schilling & Kluge (2009) 
Berends & Lammers 
(2010)
Conceptual
Empirical
Empirical
Conceptual
Conceptual
Empirical
Integrating Coalition building
Facilitated by
knowledge sharing
Force
Barriers
Discontinuities
Kleysen & Dyck (2001) 
Lehesvirta (2004)
Lawrence et al (2005) 
Schilling & Kluge (2009) 
Berends & Lammers 
(2010)
Coirceptual
Empirical
Conceptual
Conceptual
Empirical
Institutionalising Domination
Barriers
Discontinuities
Lawrence et al (2005) 
Schilling & Kluge (2009) 
Berends & Larmriers 
(2010)
Conceptual
Conceptual
Empirical
Inter-
organisational
learning
Intertwining Jones & Macpherson 
(2006)
Empirical
Feedback
processes
Encoding and
Enacting
Discontinuities
Kleysen & Dyck (2001)
Berends & Lammers 
(2010)
Conceptual
Empirical
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4.4.7 Development of 41 Framework
This section presented a selection of the literature relating to the 41 organisational 
learning framework. In particular, several empirical and theoretical studies which 
expanded the conceptual underpinnings of the 41 model have been reviewed (as 
summarised in Table 4.3). In light of this review, the following integrative model is 
developed (Figure 4.3) by incorporating the recent contributions from the literature 
into the original 41 model.
Figure 4.3 Development of 41 Framework
Individual Group Organisation Intcr-Organisation
Feed forwird
Intuiting
Attending' Influence
Individual
Interpreting
Experimenting
Championing
EnactingI ForceGroup I —#
Integrating
\  Coalition 
\  Building
Encoding ^
Discipline & 
. Domination
Organisation
IntertwiningInstitutionalising
Environment
Intcr-
Organisation
Source: Adapted from Kleysen and Dyck, 2001 ; *Zietsma ct al, 2002; Lawrence et al, 2005; Joncs and Macpherson, 2006; 
Schilling and Kluge, 2009
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4.5 Conclusion
In summary, the 41 model (Crossan et ai, 1999) regards organisational learning as a 
fundamental strategic process which, starting with an intuition, gets articulated and 
transcends from the individual to a wider organisational system. A similar process 
occurs in the SECI-ôa model (Nonaka et al, 1998) where tacit knowledge 
accumulated at the individual level is converted into explicit knowledge through 
externalisation. However, for the purposes of this research, this theory is limited in 
that there is no mention of the role of intuition in the knowledge creation process, 
and additionally it does not consider the nature of organisational learning processes 
as it evolves from individual level to collective level. Accordingly, given its explicit 
acknowledgement of intuition in organisational learning, the main focus of this 
chapter has been the 41 framework.
4.6 Integrative Summary
The theoretical basis of this thesis has been set out in the previous thr ee chapters of 
the literature review. Following these, the three primary concepts of this thesis are 
intuition, strategic decision making, and organisational learning. To recap, intuitions 
are “affectively charged judgements that arise through rapid, nonconscious and 
holistic associations” (Dane and Pratt, 2007: 40). Another definition of intuition 
specific to expertise based judgements is offered by Simon (1987: 63) who stated 
that intuitions “are simply analysis frozen into habit and into the capacity for rapid 
response through recognition”. As the second focus of this research, Hambrick and 
Mason (1984: 194) defined “strategic” decisions as complex and of major 
significance to the organisation which represent the most important responsibility of 
the senior management (Hanison and Pelletier, 1998). Finally, Vera and Crossan 
(2005) stated that organisational learning is the process of change in individual and 
shared thought and action, which is affected by and embedded in the institutions of 
the organisation. Accordingly, when individual and group learning becomes 
institutionalised, organisational learning occius and knowledge is embedded in non­
human repositories such as routines, systems, structures, culture, and strategy 
(Crossan et al, 1999).
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Crossan et al’s (1999) 41 model provides a multi-level research framework, and 
fonus the foundation of this research by integrating the individual level of intuition 
and group level of TMT decision making as presented in the previous chapters. In 
this respect, the 41 framework provides insights into the dynamics occurring within 
the management teams in the context of intuitive decision making. In the group level 
processes of interpreting and integrating, Crossan et al (1999) noted that language 
plays a critical role and is essential as a means of integrating ideas and negotiating 
actions with others. Individuals need to be able to communicate, through words and 
actions, their own cognitions. Accordingly, this process entails conversation and 
dialogue in order to develop a shared understanding within the group. Through 
conversation, decision making groups identify areas of difference and agreement, 
gain language precision, and develop a shar ed understanding of their task domain. As 
part of this process, groups negotiate mutual adjustments to their actions. The 
assumption is that a certain coherence of actions should emerge from a shared 
understanding of the situation, by which learning becomes embedded in the 
organisation’s systems, structures, procedures and practices.
The 41 framework acknowledges and integrates the thr ee streams of research which 
form the foimdation of this thesis. In this regard, the 41 framework views 
organisational learning as a result of the decisions and judgements which are initiated 
by the intuitions of individuals, that transcend to the group level by way of 
interactions between the members of the group through interpreting and integrating, 
and finally become institutionalised on the organisation level.
This chapter ends the literature review and the following chapter outlines the 
research methodology.
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Chapter 5 Research Methodology
5.0 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to outline the research methodology employed in the 
thesis. The chapter provides the rationale underlying the research philosophy 
adopted, and explains in detail the studies undertaken in order to achieve the research 
objectives. The chapter is organised in six sections and it addresses the following 
issues respectively: research objectives; research philosophy; research choice and 
approach; research strategy; research methods; and research design.
5.1 Research Objectives
The primary objective of this thesis is to undertake empirical research to explore the 
role of intuitive judgement in cognition and decision making as it pertains to police 
work in general, and organisational learning in the context of police organisations in 
particular from the individual and organisational perspectives. The research will seek 
to answer the following fundamental questions:
RQl Are there individual differences in the use of intuitive (experiential) and 
analytical (rational) thinking (cognitive) styles amongst members of police 
organisations;
RQ2 Do senior managers use intuitive judgement in decision making, and under 
what circumstances do they use it;
RQ3 How effective are intuitive judgements perceived to be (for example, when 
does intuition ‘hit’, and when does it ‘miss’?);
RQ4 Do ‘good’ and ‘bad’ intuitions become embedded within the organisation’s 
systems and structures, if so how, and what are the consequences;
RQ5 How does intuiting lead to organisational learning, and how can intuitions be 
capitalised upon as a source of organisational lear ning?
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These questions form the basis of the two main studies in this research. In order to 
achieve the objectives of the research a plan is outlined in Table 5.1, also shown in 
Figure 5.1. The specific research questions referred to above are also stated in the 
table.
Table 5.1 Summary of Research Methodology
Levels Approach Adopted Rationale
Research
Philosophy
Pragmatism Philosophical stance determined by research 
questions, offering a practical approach to 
integrate different perspectives for collection 
and inter pretation of data
Research 
Choice and 
Approach
Mixed-methods 
research, deductive 
(RQl) and inductive 
(RQ2-5) approach
To deductively test hypotheses set out in 
Study 1, and inductively build on the theory 
(i.e. 41 framework) in Study 2
Research
Strategy
Survey (RQl) Analytical survey strategy in Study 1 to 
collect data from a sample of police officers 
and police staff through a cross-sectional 
web-based self-administered questionnaire
Case study (RQ2-5) Multiple, holistic approach in Study 2 to 
explore intuitive decision making as single 
imit of analysis in thr ee police organisations
Research
Method
Questionnaire
(RQl)
To use an established self-report inventory 
for the assessment of intuitive and analytical 
information processing styles in Study 1
Critical Incident 
Technique (RQ2-5)
To investigate retrospective accounts of 
senior managers’ critical incidents of 
effective and ineffective intuitive decisions 
in Study 2
Data
Collection
Teclmiques
Rational Experiential 
Inventory (RQl)
To assess individual differences in intuitive 
and analytical thinking styles amongst 
members of police organisations in Study 1
Focus group and 
individual interviews 
(RQ2-5)
To collect data from members of senior 
management teams in relation to their 
collective experiences of intuitive decision 
making processes in Study 2
Data
Analysis
Procedures
Statistical analysis 
(RQl)
To use corTelational and factor analyses, and 
draw descriptive and sub-group comparisons 
from the quantitative data in Study 1
Template analysis 
(RQ2-5)
To employ the 41 model as the underlying 
fr amework of Study 2, and qualitatively 
analyse the interview data
130
Figure 5.1 The Research Onion
Poutivisin
ReuismDeductive
Intapretivistn
ObjectivismSurvey
\  study
I ActionMixed t  roaeuchmethod Pragmatism
Functionalist
Mum-aMlnod B h n e g ^ y
Archival research
Interpretive
Radical
humanist
Inductive
Radical structuralist
Philosophies
Approaches
Stratégies
Choices
Time horizons
Techniques and 
procedures
Source: Saunders et al, 2007
5.2 Research Philosophy
Research philosophy relates to the development of knowledge and the nature of that 
knowledge (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2007). Understanding of different 
philosophical positions is fundamental as the philosophy the researcher adopts 
contains important assumptions about the way in which they view the world. The 
ontological (the nature of reality) and epistemological (the best ways of inquiring 
into the nature of the world) assumptions will influence the research strategy and the 
methods chosen in the research process (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2002). 
In other words, beliefs about what is regarded as acceptable knowledge in a 
discipline will affect how the research will be carried out and the findings 
interpreted.
There is a wide array of philosophies in the literature of social science research, such 
as positivism, realism, pragmatism, interpretivism, objectivism, and constructionism 
(Saunders et al, 2007). Easterby-Smith et al (2002) stated that, although the
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distinction between paradigms may be very clear' at the philosopliical level, it is not 
possible to identify any philosopher who ascribes to all aspects of one pai*ticular 
view. Especially in the management field many researchers deliberately combine 
methods drawn from different philosophical traditions because they are able to 
provide multiple perspectives on the phenomena being investigated.
In this respect, the philosophical foundation of the current research is based on 
pragmatism. The foimders of this philosophical school of thought are Peirce (1839- 
1914), James (1842-1910), and Dewey (1859-1952). Pragmatism is a theory of 
meaning, which asserts that concepts are only relevant in as much as they are 
relevant for action. Building on this basic insight, pragmatism favours a reality that is 
in the making and a social model of knowledge (Kelemen and Rumens, 2008). This 
suggests that knowledge cannot be a mere individual achievement, but a social one, 
for the validity of a theory is assured when that theory makes sense to a certain 
comimmity of practice. Groups ar e bound together by similar* or shared experiences, 
and are able to reflect on new knowledge via dialogue and deliberation. Rorty (1982, 
cited in Jolmson and Duberley, 2000) associates pragmatism exclusively with social 
construction where knowledge arises out of the language-games of a community of 
people which is incommensur able with that of other communities, and which cannot 
be judged by the standards of another community.
Researchers in this tradition do not necessarily recognise that a ‘reality’ exists 
independent of human thought and belief, however they recognise that people 
socially construct interpretations of reality (Tashakicori and Teddlie, 2003). In this 
respect, in a pragmatic paradigm of inquiry, knowledge is believed to derive from 
actions, situations and consequences (Creswell, 2003).
Pragmatism ar gues that the most important determinant of the research philosophy 
adopted is the research question, and as such one approach may be better than others 
for answering particular questions. In this regard, it is possible to work within both 
positivist and interpretivist positions. Pragmatism offers a practical approach 
integrating different perspectives to collect and interpret data; hence researchers are 
not constrained by research techniques and procedures. Accordingly, mixed-
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methods, both qualitative and quantitative, are deemed possible and highly 
appropriate within one study (Saunders et al, 2007).
5.3 Research Choice and Approach
There are three approaches to research: quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-methods 
(Cresswell, 2003). Quantitative research aims to develop knowledge by identifying 
variables, testing textual research questions and theories which reflect the stances of 
positivism and post-positivism (Johnson and Onvmegbuzie, 2004). On the other 
hand, qualitative research has been defined by van Maanen (1983: 9) as “an array of 
interpretative techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate and otherwise 
come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally 
occurring phenomena in the social world”. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 
2) this means that “qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings 
people bring to them”. In recent years, this hard divide between the quantitative and 
qualitative methods has been broken down, and mixed-methods research is becoming 
increasingly recognised as the third major research approach (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie 
and Turner, 2007).
‘Mixed-methods’ is a general term for when both quantitative and qualitative data 
collection techniques and analysis procediues are used in a research design (Saunders 
et al, 2007). Philosophically, mixed-methods research adopts a pragmatic position, 
based on a view of knowledge as being both socially constructed and based upon the 
reality of the world we experience and live in (Johnson et al, 2007). Gray (2009) 
stated that in mixed-method research, quantitative and qualitative methods can be 
used focusing either on the same research question or different questions. In mixed- 
method research qualitative and quantitative data are collected either at the same 
time or one after the other, however these are not combined (Saunders et al, 2007). 
This means that although mixed-method research uses both quantitative and 
qualitative world views at the research methods stage, quantitative data are analysed 
quantitatively and qualitative data are analysed qualitatively. In addition, it is often
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the case that quantitative or qualitative techniques and procedures predominate in a 
particular* project.
In light of these discussions, the cunent resear ch adopts a mixed-method approach, 
however the qualitative study predominates the thesis in terms of its scope. In this 
research, the mixed-method approach is used for* the purpose of expansion, that is, to 
broaden and widen the range of the study (Greene, Caracelli and Graham, 1989). 
Accordingly, whilst the quantitative method is used to investigate the individual 
differences in intuitive and analytical information processing styles of police officers 
and police staff from an individual perspective (Study 1), the qualitative method is 
used to explore the decision making and leaining processes in top management teams 
from an organisational perspective (Study 2).
This research makes use of both deduction (testing theories and hypotheses) and 
induction (identifying patterns). In this respect. Study 1 of research uses a self-report 
inventory to deductively test several hypotheses derived from the literature; Study 2 
of research involves exploratory, qualitative framework through focus group 
interviews which deductively applies a theory adopted from the literature (i.e. 41 
framework) to help towards the identification and classification of themes, and 
inductively builds on to the theory through the emerging concepts derived fr om the 
data.
5.4 Research Strategy
The adopted research strategies in this research are survey and case study. As 
mentioned in the previous section, in the cmrent research quantitative and qualitative 
methods will be used in combination. This section focuses on presenting survey and 
case study strategies and their characteristics.
5.4.1 Survey
Surveys are usually associated with tlie deductive approach. They allow the 
collection of a large amount of data from a sizeable population. Surveys involve the
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systematic collecting of data therefore standardisation is an important aspect of 
sui'veys (Gray, 2009). Siu'veys are usually exercises of measurement (often of 
attitudes) which attempt to identify something about a population, about which the 
researcher wishes to make generalisations (Gray, 2009). Gray (2009) explains that 
sui'veys fall into two main categories, i.e. analytical and descriptive. Analytical 
surveys take many of the features of experimental, deductive research and therefore 
place an emphasis on reliability of data, and statistical control of variables and 
sample size. The rigoui’ of these controls is anticipated to allow for the generalisation 
of the results. On the other hand, descriptive surveys tend to use an inductive 
approach, often using open-ended questions to explore perspectives. In this respect, 
the quantitative study of the cuiTent research (Study 1) adopts an analytical suiwey 
strategy.
There are a number of data collection techniques that belong to the survey strategy, 
e.g. questionnaire, structured observation, structured interviews (Saunders et al, 
2007). In Study 1 of this research, a cross-sectional web-based self-administered 
questionnaire is used (see Appendix 1 for the screen print of the online survey). 
Questiomiaires are used to gather data ftom a defined group of individuals who 
answer identical questions where a rigid structure is necessary to produce numerical 
data for comparisons (Wilson and McLean, 1994). They are often used to establish 
patterns of associations and illustrate particular* features identified in targeted 
audiences (Bryman, 2004). Questionnaires may have disadvantages such as sampling 
error when the sample is not representative of the whole population, and non­
response or missing data which may reduce the response rates (Gray, 2009). 
However, they are generally identified with the advantages of simplicity, reliability 
and the capability to obtain large quantities of data. They are also relatively easier 
(compared to qualitative data) to code, analyse and interpret through the use of 
statistical software (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson and Tatharn, 2006).
5.4.2 Case Study
Yin (1994: 13) defined the case study as “ ...an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when... the
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boundaiies between phenomenon and context aie not cleaiiy evident”. Accordingly, 
case studies explore subjects and issues where relationships may be ambiguous or 
uncertain. Yin (2003) suggested that the case study approach is ideal when a ‘how’ 
or ‘why’ question is being asked about a contemporary set of events to understand 
the dynamics present within a specific context over which the researcher has no 
control.
In terms of data collection, this method requires the use of multiple sources of 
evidence (Gray, 2009). Yin (2003) claimed that the case study approach can be used 
as both qualitatively and quantitatively, and include multiple methods such as 
interviews, focus groups, participant observations, and surveys (Hartley, 2004). 
Study 2 of this resear ch adopts a qualitative multi-case study approach, and the data 
are collected thr ough focus group interviews.
Yin (1994) pointed out that the case study approach has not been universally 
accepted by researchers as reliable, objective, and legitimate. One problem with case 
studies is that it is often difficult to generalise from a specific case. However, most 
scientific inquiries have to be replicated by multiple examples of the experiment, and 
case studies too can be based upon multiple cases of the same issue or phenomenon. 
Additionally, Yin (2003) argued that it is not the intent of case study research to 
claim generalisability; its purpose is to entrance our* understanding of patterns and 
connections of theoretical importance rather than to conclude general findings from a 
sample to a population.
Types of Case Studies
Yin (2003) distinguished between fom* case study strategies based upon two 
dimensions requiring to decide whether the study will adopt a single case or multiple 
case designs, and whether the unit of analysis for the study will be holistic (single 
unit of analysis) or embedded (multiple imits of analysis). The fom* main types of 
case study designs are shown in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2 Types of Case Study Design
single case 
designs
Multiple case 
designs
Holistic (single l y p e l Type 3
unit of analysis) Single/Holistic Multiple/Holistic
Embedded (multiple Type 2 Type 4
units o f analysis) Single/Embedded Multiple/Embedded
Source: Yin, 1994
Accordingly, in Type 1 only a single case is examined, and at a holistic level. The 
single case study should be chosen when it can play a significant role in testing a 
hypothesis or theory, or when the case study represents a unique or extreme case. 
Type 2 consists of a single case study with a number of different units of analysis. 
Type 3 is used where a multiple case study approach is needed but it is not possible 
to identify multiple imits of analysis, therefore a more holistic approach is taken. Yin 
(1994) warns of a very serious danger of holistic design where the reseaicher may 
have begim the investigation on the basis of one set of questions, but the evidence 
from the case study may begin to address a very different set of questions. This 
problem may be reduced in Type 4 whereby embedded case studies involve multiple 
units of analysis. Usually this type of case studies is not limited to qualitative 
analysis alone, it allows for a multiplicity of methods that may be applied within the 
subunits (Scholz and Tietje, 2002).
In the current research. Type 3 case study design is adopted since the study involves 
multiple case studies with a holistic unit of analysis (i.e. decision making processes 
as single unit of analysis in multiple police organisations). The rationale for using 
multiple cases focuses upon the need to establish whether the findings of the first 
case occur in other cases and as a consequence the need to generalise from these
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findings (Saunders et al, 2007). For this reason, Yin (2003) argues that multiple case 
studies may be preferable to a single case study.
Evaluating the Quality of Case Study Research
There is a list of quality standards within the case study research which the 
researchers must address. Yin (1994) highlights four aspects of the quality of case 
study design which are construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
reliability.
Construct validity refers to the extent to which the results of the research fit the 
theory which was tested (Sekaran, 2003). Yin (2003) points out that construct 
validity is particularly problematic for qualitative case studies, due to the difficulty of 
defining the constructs being investigated. In order to increase the construct validity 
of this resear ch, the r esear cher defined the concepts under investigation at the outset, 
conducted focus group interviews (i.e. multiple sources of key informants) for the 
investigation of the case studies, and used verbatim interview transcripts for the 
analysis of the data.
Internal validity refers to the establishment of causal relationship where the 
researcher is attempting to show whether event ‘x’ led to outcome ‘y’ (Gray, 2009). 
Saunders et al (2007) referred to internal validity in relation to the ability of the 
questionnaire to measure what the researcher intend it to measure. Yin (2003) 
suggested that internal validity is only suitable for explanatory and causal case 
studies. Since the pmpose of Study 2 is not to establish causal relationships, internal 
validity is not relevant to this study.
External validity is sometimes referred to as generalisability, in the sense that the 
research results are equally applicable to other research settings (e.g. other 
organisations) (Saimders et al, 2007). This is par ticular ly problematic if a smgle case 
study research is conducted. The external validity of this research is increased by 
undertaking a multi-case study approach in three police organisations. Whilst the
138
study is specific to the police domain, transferability of the findings is deemed to be 
feasible in terms of their broader implications on management practice in general.
Reliability refers to the extent to which data collection techniques or analysis 
procedures will yield consistent findings (Saunders et al, 2007). Conditions for 
reliability are met if the findings and conclusions of one researcher can be replicated 
by another researcher doing the same case study (Gray, 2009). In line with Yin’s 
(2003) reconnnendations, the researcher documented the data collection and analysis 
procedures, and additionally kept verbatim tianscriptions of the interviews which 
would enable the replication of the same case studies by another researcher.
5,5 Research Method
In this research two different methods are used for the collection of the data: a 
questionnaire as part of the quantitative Study 1; and Critical Incident Technique as 
part of the qualitative Study 2. These methods are discussed in detail below.
5.5.1 Questionnaire
Study 1 of this research adopted an established self-report inventory, i.e. Rational 
Experiential Inventory, in order to assess the individual differences in intuitive and 
analytical information processing styles amongst the members of police 
organisations.
Self-report inventories emerged during the second half of the 20^ *' century as the most 
widely used and studied method for assessing personality (Weiner and Craighead, 
2010). Self-report inventory is a type of questionnaire which typically requires 
survey takers to respond to a series of statements (items) by indicating whether, or to 
what extent, the item describes some aspect of their functioning. The response format 
varies from a ‘true’ or ‘false’ to a Likert scale indication of degree of agreement with 
the statement as a self-description (Weiner and Craighead, 2010).
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Numerous psychologically oriented self-report measures exist (e.g. questionnaires 
and rating scales), and they are most commonly designed to gather information about 
behaviours, personality traits, values, beliefs, and life experiences. In most respects, 
self-report is an indirect psychological assessment method, because no direct 
behavioural observation is made, instead individuals provide information about their 
subjective experience. In some cases, however, direct measuiement of a phenomenon 
of interest is not feasible (Weiner and Craighead, 2010). For example, in the case of 
the cuiTent research, intuitive thinking style cannot be measured any more directly 
than by asking people to verbalise or report them. Thus, for phenomena such as 
thoughts, feelings and beliefs, self-report may be considered one of the most direct 
assessment methods available.
Although self-report measures are convenient and inexpensive, there are several 
disadvantages to consider when using this assessment method. Jensen and Haynes 
(1986) reported that the accuracy of data obtained from self-report measures can be 
compromised by such factors as social desirability, demand chaiacteristics of the 
situation being assessed, subjective misperception of the items on the scale, reactive 
influences, response bias, and errors in the construction or application of measures. 
In addition, when questiomiaires or rating scales are used, it is possible for 
individuals completing the self-rating scale to provide incomplete ratings. However, 
despite their limitations, self-report measures are widely used in psychology because 
they have the advantages of being economical, quantifiable, and easy to administer. 
More importantly, many self-report measmes have published norms to aid in the 
interpretations of an individual’s scores. They also provide a means for assessing 
subjective or private phenomena (e.g. thoughts) that cannot be observed directly 
(Weiner and Craighead, 2010).
5.5.2 Critical Incident Technique
Study 2 of this research employed a valiant of Critical Incident Teclinique (CIT) to 
explore senior managers’ most critical experiences whereby intuitive judgement was 
used in aiiiving at a decision and its effect on the decision outcome.
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The CIT was proposed by Flanagan (1954: 327) who defined it as “a set of 
procedures for collecting direct observations of human behaviour in such a way as to 
facilitate their potential usefulness in solving practical problems and developing 
broad psychological principles”. By ‘incident’ Flanagan (1954) meant any 
observable human activity that is sufficiently complete in itself to peimit inferences 
and predictions to be made about the person performing the act. To be ‘critical’ the 
incident must occur in a situation where the pmpose or intent of the act seems fairly 
clear to the observer and where its consequences are sufficiently definite to leave 
little doubt concerning its effect. Another definition is offered by Chell (1998):
“The Critical Incident Technique is a qualitative interview procedure 
which facilitates the investigation of significant occurrences (events, 
incidents, processes, or issues) identified by the respondent, the way they 
are managed, and the outcomes in terms of perceived effects. The 
objective is to gain understanding of the incident from the perspective of 
the individual, taking into account cognitive, affective, and behavioural 
elements.” (Chell, 1998: 56)
A common attribute of CIT is that it elicits aspects of best and worst practices. 
Flanagan (1954) stated that the focus of a CIT study can range fiom studying 
effective and ineffective ways of doing something, to looking at helping and 
hindering factors, collecting fimctional or behavioural descriptions of events or 
problems, examining successes and failures, or determining characteristics that are 
critical to important aspects of an activity or event.
CIT is essentially a proceduie for gathering certain important facts concerning 
behaviour in defined situations. Flanagan (1954) clearly stated that the CIT does not 
consist of a single rigid set of rules governing data collection. Rather, it should be 
thought of as a flexible set of principles that must be modified and adapted to meet 
the specific situation at hand.
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Description o f the CIT Research Method
As described by Flanagan (1954), the CIT has five main steps;
General aim o f the activity: A basic condition in the first step of CIT is to create a 
functional description of an activity, determining the aim or objective of that activity, 
before any other aspect of the study could proceed. In its simplest form, the 
functional description of an activity specifies precisely what is necessary to do and 
not to do if participation in the activity is to be judged successful or effective.
Plans and specifications: At this stage, Flanagan (1954) advocated that precise 
instiuctions must be given to the observers to ensure that everybody is following the 
same set of rules. One of the primary aims of scientific techniques is to insure 
objectivity for the observations being made and reported. By having everyone work 
according to the same set of rules, Flanagan (1954) believed that objectivity could be 
achieved as well as consistency across observers. In most situations, the following 
specifications would need to be established and made explicit prior to collecting the 
data: defining the types of situations to be observed; determining the relevance of a 
specific incident to the general aim; understanding the extent of the effect the 
observed incident has on the general aim; deciding who will be making the 
observations.
Collecting the data: Data collection can be done in a number of ways, such as having 
expert observers watch people perform the task in question, or by having individuals 
report from memory about significant incidents that occurred in the past (Flanagan, 
1954). A necessary condition for this phase is that the behaviours or results observed 
be evaluated, classified, and recorded while the facts are still fresh in the mind of the 
observer for accuracy. It is essential that the reporting be objective and include all 
relevant details. Flanagan (1954) suggested fom* ways of obtaining recalled data in 
the fomi of critical incidents: interviews, group interviews, questionnaires, and 
wi'itten record foi*ms (recording details of incidents either in narrative form or by 
placing a check maik beside an activity on a pre-existing list of the most likely 
activities to be observed).
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Related to data collection is also the concept of sample size. Flanagan (1954) 
stressed that in a CIT study tlie sample size is not determined by the number of 
participants, but rather by the number of critical incidents observed or reported, and 
whether the incidents represent adequate coverage of the activity being studied. 
There is no set rule for how many incidents are sufficient. The important thing is to 
ensure that the entire content domain of the activity in question has been captured 
and described.
Analysing the data: The pmpose at this stage is to create a categorisation scheme that 
summarises and describes the data in an efficient mamier so that it can be effectively 
used for various practical purposes. Formation of categories as a result of analysing 
the data is one of the hallmarks of the CIT. The aim is to increase the usefulness of 
the data while sacrificing as little as possible of their comprehensiveness, specificity, 
and validity. This necessitates navigating through three primary stages: determining 
the general frame of reference that will be most useful for describing the incidents; 
formulating the categories (an inductive process that involves insight, experience, 
and judgement); and determining the level of specificity or generality to be used in 
reporting the data.
Interpreting and reporting: In this stage, the data obtained needs interpretation if it is 
to be used properly. Flanagan (1954) maintains that it is not collecting the data which 
is most problematic but interpreting them and developing systems of classification. 
Flanagan (1954) suggested that researchers start by examining the previous four 
steps to determine what biases have been introduced by the procedrrres used and 
what decisions have been made. In order to avoid faulty inferences and 
generalisations, tire limitations imposed must be brought into clear focus. Similarly, 
the degree of credibility and the value of the results should also be emphasised in the 
final reporting of the results. An important principle of CIT is that reporting should 
be limited to those behaviours which, according to competent observers, make a 
significant contribution to the activity.
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Evaluating the Quality of CIT
Since Flanagan’s (1954) first conception of CIT, there have been major changes in 
the area of measures used by researchers to convince readers of the credibility of 
their research results. This is mainly due to tire evolution of the CIT away from direct 
observation to retrospective self-report, and from task analysis to examining 
psychological concepts (Butterfield, Borgen, Amundson and Maglio, 2005). Clearly, 
by using the CIT for exploring personal experiences, psychological constructs, and 
emotions, the method has expanded beyond its original scope. In this respect, there 
appears to be a lack of literature regarding a standard or recommended way to 
establish the trustworthiness or credibility of the results in a CIT study. Because of 
this, many different and umelated methods of establishing credibility have 
historically been in use. Some examples include triangulation, face validity, and 
inter-rater reliability (Skiba, 2000), peer checks and experts to examine the 
categories (Ellinger and Bostrom, 2002), and more extensive checks such as 
participant checks, intra-judge reliability, inter-judge reliability, category formation, 
and content analysis (Keaveney, 1995).
Two often-quoted studies were undertaken to examine the reliability and validity of 
the CIT method. The first study by Andersson and Nilsson (1964) looked at various 
reliability and validity aspects of the CIT method, including saturation and 
comprehensiveness, reliability of collecting procedures, categorisation control, and 
the centrality of the critical incidents to the subject matter. The authors concluded 
that “the information collected by this method is both reliable and valid” (Andersson 
and Nilsson, 1964: 402). A second study by Ronan and Lathan (1974) examined 
three reliability measures (inter-judge reliability, intra-observer reliability, and inter­
observer reliability) and four validity measures (content validity, relevance, construct 
validity, and concurrent validity). Their study confirmed Andersson and Nilsson’s 
findings, stating “the reliability and content validity of the critical incident 
methodology are satisfactory” (1974: 61).
It should be noted that both of these studies examined the CIT within the context of 
its original task analysis role (i.e. analysis of how a task is accomplished by direct
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observation). Therefore, this raises the question of whether using the credibility and 
taistworthiness approaches from these two studies applies to new research that uses 
the CIT method for exploring issues that are not related to task analysis.
Between 1991 and 2003, a series of credibility checks has evolved that is consistent 
with Flanagan’s (1954) original intent. Butterfield et al (2005) provided a detailed 
description of nine credibility checks offering them as a proposed protocol for 
researchers to follow when conducting a CIT study. These include: independent 
extraction of the critical incidents; participant cross-checking; independent judges 
placing incidents into categories; tracking the point at which exhaustiveness or 
redundancy is achieved; submitting the tentative categories that result from the data 
analysis to two or more experts in the field; participation rate; theoretical validity; 
descriptive validity; and interview fidelity.
Flanagan (1954) made one last suggestion in relation to the credibility of the 
findings. This has to do with the level of detail provided by the participant regarding 
a particular critical incident. He suggested that the accuracy of an incident could be 
deduced from the level of full, precise details given about the incident itself. This is 
something that should be considered by a CIT researcher before an incident is 
deemed appropriate for inclusion in the study. Flanagan (1954) suggested that 
general or vague descriptions of incidents might mean an incident is not well 
remembered and therefore should be excluded. The criteria for incidents to be 
included in a study are coimnonly thought to be: (1) they consist of antecedent 
information (what led up to it); (2) they contain a detailed description of the 
experience itself; and (3) they describe the outcome of the incident. Creswell (1998) 
suggested that when combined, these checks enhance the credibility of the findings 
as the reseai'ch protocols consistent with the CIT method would be followed.
Justification for the Use o f CIT
In this research, a variant of the CIT is adopted as it meets the objective of 
investigating top management’s experiences of intuition in their decision making. 
The teclinique has been used by qualitative researchers to great effect, particulaiiy in
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conjunction with in-depth interviews (see Butterfield, Trevino and Ball, 1996;
Isabella, 1990; Druskat and Wlieeler, 2003; Pulalcos, Aiad, Donovan and Plamondon,
2000; Edvardsson, 1992; Gabbott and Hogg, 1996).
In investigating the role of intuitive judgements in decision making and
organisational learning, the CIT provides a number of advantages:
(1) The CIT does not consist of a single rigid set of rules on data collection. This 
provides the researcher with flexibility to modify and adapt principles to meet the 
research objectives.
(2) The CIT is an inductive method that needs no hypotheses. Patterns aie formed as 
they emerge from the responses allowing the researcher to generate concepts and 
theories (Olsen and Thomasson, 1992). However, the teclmique can also be used 
as a deductive method whereby the reseaicher may wish to test and extend an 
extant conceptual fiamework (Chell, 2004). Therefore, the CIT is suitable to 
deductively apply the 41 framework and inductively build on the theory.
(3) Focus is on critical events, incidents or factors that help promote or detract from 
the effective performance of some activity, or the experience of a specific 
situation. This feature of CIT fits best to investigate critical experiences of 
managers in their intuitive decision making.
(4) The focus of CIT study ranges from studying effective and ineffective ways of 
doing something, which fits the purpose of investigating managers’ decisions 
when the use of intuitive judgement has resulted in effective or ineffective 
outcomes.
(5) Participants are asked about specific events grounded in their real life 
experiences rather than for general information or conclusions. In this respect, 
the respondent accounts gathered when using this approach provide rich details 
of firsthand experiences. Paiticipants aie asked to report their own memory for 
specific events, therefore data stems directly fiom the participants’ actual
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sequences of thought processes in their own words (Edvardsson, 1992). The CIT 
method therefore provides a rich source of data by allowing respondents to 
determine which incidents are the most relevant to them for the phenomenon 
being investigated, and provides the opportunity for the respondents to give a 
detailed account of their own experiences (Stauss and Weinlich, 1997). 
Therefore, the context is developed entirely from the respondent’s perspective 
and not forced into any given framework (e.g. scenarios) (Chell, 1998).
(6) A number of reseai'chers (Martin, Feldman, Hatch and Sitkin, 1983; Mitroff and 
Kilman, 1975) have noted that allowing managers to tell stories about their 
experiences allows responses to be relatively unconstrained, compared to those 
obtained with quantitative research tecliniques. Thus, CIT offers a vehicle by 
which rich meanings and interpretations can be conveyed from managers to 
researchers.
(7) Data collection is primarily tlrrough interviews, either in person (individually or 
in groups) or via telephone. This provides the opportunity to interview managers 
individually as well as in groups to conform the nature of this reseaich as it is set 
in the top management team context.
The qualities of CIT discussed above sets out the justification that it is the most 
appropriate method to adopt for the purposes of this research.
Limitations of the Method
Besides many advantages, CIT also has some limitations. For example, one might 
argue that phenomena like imperfect recall and attributional biases (i.e. any 
systematic distortion in infening the causes of behaviour) on the part of the 
respondents may compromise the accuracy of managers’ retrospective accounts and 
perceptions of their intuitive incidents. It is important to use material that can be 
substantiated since tliere are criticisms of the technique relating to recall, and the 
natural tendency of individuals to use hindsight in rationalising the past (Easterby- 
Smith et al, 2002). The CIT method relies on events being remembered by
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respondents and requires the accurate and truthful reporting of them. An incident 
may have taken place some time before the collection of the data, thus the 
subsequent description may lead the respondent to reinterpret the incident (Johnston, 
1995). For this reason, Butterfield et al (1996) argued that the managers’ stories 
regarding critical incidents will evolve over time.
According to Butterfield et al (1996), because the same participants discuss both 
effective and ineffective incidents, the data are subject to self-serving bias (i.e. 
tendency to take credit for success but deny responsibility for failure) and contrast 
effects (i.e. enhancement or diminishment of perception and cognition as a result of 
experience of a comparison stimulus of lesser or greater value) which may 
compromise the accuracy of managers’ retrospective accounts and perceptions of 
their experiences. The concern was that if the participants were asked to choose only 
one incident to discuss, they would present only the effective ones. Therefore, to 
minimise this type of bias, in their CIT study the authors asked each participant to 
discuss both an effective and an ineffective incident. The contrast between the two 
represented important data which captured a wide range of incidents viewed as 
effective or ineffective by participants.
Finally, the method has been criticised on issues of reliability and validity 
(Edvai'dsson, 1992; Gabbott and Hogg, 1996). According to these authors, the main 
weakness is that the researcher can filter, misinterpret, or unconsciously 
misunderstand the respondent thiough the ambiguity of certain word meanings. 
Therefore, to obtain good validity in data collection, it is essential for the researcher 
to describe what is meant by critical incident, and to ask follow up questions to 
ensure the interviewee has given a comprehensive and detailed account of the 
incident in question (Edvardsson, 1992).
5.6 Research Design
This section presents the research design. In this research there are two main studies 
(Study 1 and Study 2), and one pilot study. The sample selection, data collection
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techniques, and data analysis procedures undertaken in these studies are described in 
detail below.
5.6.1 Study 1
The purpose of Study 1 is to address RQ 1 to assess the individual differences in 
intuitive and analytical information processing styles in police organisations, using a 
sample of police staff and police officers.
Sample Characteristics
The participants of this study consisted of police staff and police officers across 
various job types and various ranks in two different police organisations (Police 
Organisation A (PGA) and Police Organisation C (POC))^. The researcher obtained 
access to these police organisations thiough professional contacts. In POA, the linlc 
to the online questiomiaire was emailed to the entire organisation by the Chief 
Superintendent in order to provide a large sample of participants. In POC, a sample 
of 100 people was chosen by the senior management team (SMT) across different job 
levels and job types to participate in the survey, and only those people were given 
access to the questioimaire. In total 752 participants attempted the online 
questionnaire and 516 of those submitted the fully completed questionnaire 
(representing 69%). Six paiticipants were eliminated from the analysis (who were 
Special Constables) as they did not belong to either the police staff or police officer 
category, and the sample size was too small for a separate category. As a result, a 
total of 510 participants represent the sample of this study (461 fiom POA, and 49 
from POC).
The sample comprised of 178 police staff (35%) and 332 police officers (65%); and 
190 female (37%) and 320 male (63%) paiticipants. The sample of police officers (in 
descending order of rank) comprised three Chief Superintendents, four* 
Superintendents, 10 Chief Inspectors, 47 Inspectors, 81 Sergeants, and 187 Police
 ^These are the same organisations as represented in Study 2 of this research. Please note that the third 
organisation (refened to as Police Organisation B (POE) in Study 2) has not participated in Study 1.
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Constables. The sample of police staff occupied a wide vai’iety of job types including 
intelligence, administration, and investigation.
Data Collection Technique
In this study, a self-report inventory i.e. Rational Experiential Inventory (REI) was 
used in the version developed by Pacini and Epstein (1999) which measiues rational 
(analytical) and experiential (intuitive) infomiation processing styles, and includes 
self-reported ability and engagement subscales.
Individual differences in preferences for analytical and intuitive processing have long 
been of interest to organisational psychology/behaviour researchers. Two rival 
theoretical traditions have vied for supremacy: the unitary perspective and the dual­
process view. Within the unitary perspective, intuition and analysis are seen as 
opposite ends of a single dimension (Allinson and Hayes, 1996). On the other hand, 
within the dual perspective, intuition and analysis are seen as context-specific modes 
that are complementary facets of an underlying System 1/System2 cognitive 
architecture (see Chapter 2). In this respect, in the management literature two well- 
known self-report instruments for the assessment of intuitive and analytical cognitive 
styles are the REI and the Cognitive Style Index (CSI, developed by Allinson and 
Hayes, 1996), each of which adopt a dual-process and unitary perspective 
respectively. Hence, the theoretical stances of these two instruments are opposing 
and incommensurable. This issue has engendered considerable debate (see 
Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith, 2003a, 2003b).
Most recently, Hodgkinson et al (2009) evaluated the factor structure of the CSI 
using a five-point Likert response format, rather than the trichotomous format 
adopted by the test’s developers, which raised questions regarding the constr*uct 
validity of this instrument. On the other hand, Hodgkinson et al (2009) found that the 
REI’s dimensionality (two unconelated factors, i.e. intuition and analysis) was 
consistent overall with the underlying dual-process theory of CEST (see Chapter 2) 
which the instrument was designed on.
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Given the above argument and in keeping with the dual-process perspective as the 
underlying foundation of this reseaich, REI is the preferred instrument for the 
assessment of individual differences in this research study. This 40-item instrument 
is a development of a previous version of the REI which is available in long- (31 
items) and short- (10 items) forms (Epstein et al, 1996) (see Appendix 2 for the list 
of REI items). It consists of a total of 40 positively- and negatively-worded items in 
four scales: experiential ability (EA, 10 items), experiential engagement (EE, 10 
items), rational ability (RA, 10 items), and rational engagement (RE, 10 items). The 
questionnaire was administered via an online survey in two police organisations 
(POA and POC) over a one-month period. The paiticipants rated the questionnaire 
items on a five-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (completely false) to 5 
(completely true). In addition to the REI, participants were asked to answer a number 
of demographic questions such as age, gender, job level, job type, and length of 
experience as the basis for sub-group comparisons. Previous reseaich has shown the 
REI to be fi'ee of problems relating to social desirability (Pacini and Epstein, 1999).
Data Analysis Procédure
Data analysis in Study 1 consisted of a thiee-stage process. In this study a number of 
hypotheses were derived fiom the relevant literature and the data were analysed to 
test the hypotheses using various statistical tests and procedur es as implemented in 
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 16.0), i.e. correlations, 
reliability analyses. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and sub-group comparisons. 
In addition. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was conducted using AMOS 7.0.
The first two stages involved factor analysis. Generally speaking, factor analysis is 
used to analyse the structure of the inteiTelationships (coiTelations) among a large 
number of variables by defining a set of common underlying dimensions, known as 
factors (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1998). Exploratory and confirmatory ai*e 
the two major types of factor analysis. In EFA, the aim is to describe and summarise 
data by grouping together variables that are correlated. It is usually performed in the 
early stages of reseai'ch when it provides a tool for consolidating variables and for 
generating hypotheses about underlying processes. CFA is a more sophisticated
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teclinique used in the advanced stages of the reseai'ch process to test a theory about 
latent processes (employing a variety of goodness-of-fit statistics). Thus, EFA is 
associated with theory development and CFA is associated with theory testing 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). The examination of factor loadings is the principal 
means of interpreting the role each variable plays in defining each factor. That is, 
factor loadings aie the conelation of each variable and the factor, and they indicate 
the degree of correspondence between the variable and the factor, with higher 
loadings making the variable representative of the factor (Hair et al, 1998).
In the third stage, firstly descriptive analyses were used for computing frequency 
counts, percentages, mean scores and standard deviations, and reliabilities 
(Cronbach’s alpha). For the sub-group comparisons, analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was used to compare two or more means to see if there are any statistically 
significant differences among them. The differences between components were 
examined using the E-statistic. Internal consistency of the measurement scales were 
assessed using the Cronbach’s alpha reliability test scores. Typically a scale is 
considered to be satisfactory if it exceeds the tlneshold value of 0.70 (Sekaran, 
2003). Additionally, normality of variables was assessed, and the distributions were 
checked for skewness (symmetry) and kuilosis (peakedness) components of 
normality.
5.6.2 Pilot Study
The aim of the pilot study was to employ CIT in order to empirically test its usability 
in the main study (Study 2) as a qualitative tool for the investigation of intuitive 
decision making processes for the purposes of this research.
Sample Characteristics
The sample of this study has been recruited tlnough professional contacts of the 
researcher. Accordingly, this study has been undertaken in collaboration with a UK- 
based management consultancy company who has kindly granted permission to 
contact their clients and faculty in order to conduct interviews. The sample was
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deemed suitable for the pilot study as access was obtained to a group of highly 
experienced senior level decision makers. However, interviews were done on an 
individual basis since conducting focus group interviews with the management teams 
of the participants proved impossible due to clashing schedules and time constraints.
This study consisted of a sample of 13 participants in total. Six of them were the 
Managing Directors of different companies (the clients of the consultancy firm) -  
three of which were also the owners of their respective companies. The remaining 
seven were the Executive Coaches/Directors in the consultancy finir (the faculty), all 
of whom also have strong backgrounds as Chief Executives. Participants comprised 
tlrree females and 10 males.
The organisations in this study were mainly SMEs from a variety of business ar eas 
including manufacturing, publishing, financial services, and management 
consultancy. The participants’ responsibilities in their organisations primarily 
included strategy and business development and delivery, as well as other activities 
relating to the overall rimning of the company such as marketing, operations, finance, 
performance improvement, management and delivery of new programmes, and 
building relationships.
At the time of the interviews, all participants had been in their current positions for 
an average of 7.4 years (range: 2.5 to 20 years); average of 8.4 years as member of 
the top management team of their curi'ent organisations (range: six months to 25 
years); average of 10.3 years in their current organisations (range: six months to 25 
years); and average of 16.5 years in their respective industry (range: thiee to 36 
years). Their educational background ranged fiom GCSE level to PhD (one GCSE 
level, five with Bachelor’s degree, fom* with Master’s degree, one with PhD degree, 
and two with professional qualification).
Data Collection Technique
In this study a variant of CIT (Flanagan, 1954) was employed. CIT is recognised as 
an effective exploratory and investigative tool (Chell, 1998; Edvardsson and Roos,
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2001) which has been used widely in similar studies (Isabella, 1990; Druskat and 
Wheeler, 2003; van Dolen, Lemmink, Mattsson and Rhoen, 2001; Pulakos et al, 
2000; Butterfield et al, 1996). In this study the level of analysis was the individual, in 
this respect an individual interview teclinique has been used to gather senior 
managers’ retrospective accounts of incidents in which they have employed intuitive 
judgements in making managerial decisions.
Each participant has been contacted in person a number of weeks in advance of the 
interview, and has been asked for informed consent to take part in and record all 
interviews. Some of the interviewees were sent the questions in advance of the 
interview as requested. Interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis and were 
recorded with a digital recorder. Thiee of them took place face-to-face at the 
paiticipants’ place of work. The remaining ten interviews were conducted over the 
phone for the convenience of the participants. On average, each interview took 
approximately 30 minutes.
The interview protocol was designed in three sections: demographic, exploratory, 
and critical incident questions (see Appendix 4 for the interview protocol for pilot 
study). In the first part of the interview, demographic details were asked in order to 
gather backgroimd information about the participants, such as responsibility in the 
organisation, teniue in the cuiTent position, tenure in the organisation, and tenure in 
the industry, as well as highest degree obtained. The second part consisted of four 
questions in relation to use of intuitive judgement in decision making. The objective 
of these questions was to investigate the role played by intuition, as well as factors 
and circumstances that influence the use of intuition in decision making.
In the final section of the interview, CIT has been used to gather information on two 
sets of questions. Each manager was asked to identify and describe two incidents in 
which intuition was used to make a strategic decision, one as having been effective 
(as having led to the results the manager desired) and the other as ineffective (as not 
having yielded the desired results). In designing the critical incident questions, a 
suggestion by Edvardsson and Roos (2001) has been taken into accoimt which offers 
a basic model of ‘cause, comse, and result’ as a fiindamental interview guide.
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Therefore, where needed, the questions were followed by asking further details such 
as the events that led up to the critical incident, the actions taken by the people 
involved, and the outcomes in terms of perceived effects.
In the final part of the interview, three participants had difficulty recalling incidents 
(pai'ticulaiiy those with negative outcomes) during the interview. Two of the 
participants emailed the researcher with their answers after the interview, however 
the third participant could not come up with any examples relating to negative 
outcomes.
Data Analysis Procedure
In the pilot study a qualitative method has been used in analysing the data. The 
approach taken was consistent with the methodology used in previous and similar* 
studies (e.g. Isabella, 1990; Butterfield et al, 1996; Sadler-Smith and Shefy, 2007). 
Qualitative data analysis is often regarded as both interpretive and eclectic in nature, 
and there is hardly a standar dised approach to analyse it (Dey, 1993; Tesch, 1990). In 
this study, an inductive data analysis approach was favoured since it has been 
described as offering the opportunity for a good fit to develop between the social 
reality of the study informants and the theory that emerges (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornliill, 2003).
The pilot study interviews were transcribed verbatim by the researcher, and the data 
from the interview transcripts were analysed by reading and re-reading the text in 
order to become familiar* with the data. Due to the modest number* of interviews, the 
data analysis was conducted manually by the researcher. In the next stage, in line 
with the CIT procedure (Flanagan, 1954), the researcher* identified a set of concepts 
emerging from the data and created a categorisation scheme in accordance with the 
interview questions. The data were then grouped under labels (i.e. codes) when 
patterns started emerging between concepts, and were interpreted in light of the 
extant theory where applicable.
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In regal'd to analysing qualitative data, Miles and Huberman (1994) stated that the 
process of coding is the analysis of the data, which involve how the researcher 
differentiate and combine the data retrieved, and reflections are made about this 
infonnation. Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the 
descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study. The authors suggested 
that codes ar e usually attached to chunks of varying size, words, phr ases, sentences, 
or whole paragraphs, connected or unconnected to a specific setting.
In the first pari, findings were reported in direct quotations from the interviews 
which were representative of the answers given to the interview questions. In the 
second part, participants’ stories of critical incidents were used to develop a typology 
based on the findings that emerged from the pilot study.
5.6.3 Study 2
The aim of Study 2 is to address RQ 2 to 5 by exploring the role of intuitive 
judgement in senior management decision making and organisational learning 
processes.
Sample Characteristics
The participants of Study 2 comprised the SMTs of three police organisations (POA, 
FOB and POC) to whom access was secured through professional contacts of the 
researcher. This sample was suitable on the grounds that the purpose of this research 
was to investigate intuitive decision making in TMTs, and the senior police 
management teams provided an interesting context for study which has not been 
explored in previous research. Additionally, two more junior police officers (at POA) 
were interviewed given their involvement in one of the cases. The sample size was 
defined by the size of the SMTs in each organisation (typically group interviews 
involve between six and eight participants, Krueger and Casey, 2000). In total there 
were 23 participants: 11 in POA, six in FOB, and six in POC. The sample included 
(in descending order of police rank): one Chief Constable, one Deputy Chief 
Constable, two Assistant Chief Constables, two Chief Superintendents, five
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Superintendents, five Chief Inspectors, one Special Constable, one Sergeant, and one 
Police Constable. The sample also consisted of senior staff who were members of the 
SMTs: two Directors of HR, one Business Manager, and one Director of Finance. 
Participants comprised five females and 18 males.
At the time of the interviews, police officer participants had an average of 19.5 yeai's 
of experience in the policing domain, ranging fiom four* years (e.g. Police Constable) 
to 30 years. The management staff paiticipants had an average of 12.7 yeai’s of 
experience, ranging from seven to 25 years in their specific domains of expertise 
(e.g. finance, HR).
Data Collection Technique
As tested in the pilot study, the CIT proved an efficient tool for investigating the 
retiospective accounts of senior managers’ intuitive decision making. In this study 
the level of analysis was the group (i.e. SMT), hence the CIT was employed in semi- 
structuied focus group interviews. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the CIT 
has not been applied in a focus group setting in previous research. In this study, CIT 
was used together with Crossan et al’s (1999) 41 organisational learning model which 
set the fiamework of the interview questions (see Appendix 5 for the interview 
questions for Study 2).
King (2004a) stated that interviews remain the most common method of data 
gathering in qualitative research. Kvale (1983: 174) defined the qualitative research 
interview as “an interview, whose pmpose is to gather descriptions of the life-world 
of the interviewee with respect to inteipretation of the meaning of the described 
phenomena”. As Kvale (1996) noted, the aim of qualitative interviews should be to 
collect information, which captures the meaning and interpretation of phenomenon in 
relation to the interviewee’s world view.
According to King (2004a) focus group interviews are a valuable way of gaining 
insight into shared understandings and beliefs, which still allow individual 
differences of opinion to be voiced. One of the distinct features of focus group
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interviews is its group dynamics, hence the type and range of data generated tlnough 
the social interaction of the group are often deeper and richer than those obtained 
fi'om one-to-one interviews. A dynamic group allows a variety of viewpoints to 
emerge, and enables participants to hear the views and experiences of their peers 
which may cause them to reflect back on their own experiences and thoughts. The 
researcher is also likely to benefit ftom the opportunity that this method provides in 
terms of interviewing a lar ger number of individuals than would be possible tlrrough 
the use of one-to-one interviews (Saunders et al, 2007). Hedges (1985) highlighted 
the lower cost and higher speed of obtaining maximised information through group 
interviewing relative to individual interviews. However, he argued that group 
interviewing can present several disadvantages, such as biased or constrained 
parlicipant responses due to social pressure by other group members.
Bloor, Frankland, Thomas and Robson (2001) referred to the chaotic nature of focus 
groups. The authors suggested that the interactive effect of focus group interviews 
results in data which may include instances where people talk at once, where 
sentences remain unfinished, where people go on to contradict themselves and 
others, where people’s arguments develop as they discuss the topic with others, and 
where people misinterpret others’ coimnents and take the discussion off in another 
direction.
In Study 2, prior to the interviews the participants were contacted in advance and a 
mutually convenient day has been aiTanged for the focus group interviews. This 
usually took place on the day of the senior management meeting to ensur e attendance 
of all the members of the SMT. The par ticipants were asked for consent to record the 
interviews. Data was collected over a four-month period and in total 16 interviews 
(seven interviews with POA, four with FOB, and five with POC) were conducted to 
gather one incident of an ‘intuitive hit’ and one incident of an ‘intuitive miss’ ftom 
each organisation. In total 14.5 hours of interview were conducted (six hours with 
POA, tlrree with FOB, and five and a half with POC). It should be noted that whilst 
at least two interviews (one to gather an ‘intuitive hit’ and one to gather an ‘intuitive 
miss’) were conducted with the entire SMTs (except in the case of FOB), where a 
follow-up meeting was required, this took place either within smaller groups of the
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members of the SMT or on an individual basis. This was due to the fact that group 
interviewing was difficult to organise since participants had different schedules. 
Additionally, not everyone in the SMT were involved in the reported incident to the 
same extent, therefore some individuals’ participation in the follow-up interviews 
was not required.
In tire semi-structur ed focus group interviews the researcher had a list of questions to 
cover the themes as set out in the 41 fiamework, however the probing questions 
varied from interview to interview, and additional questions were required to further 
explore the incidents in different organisations. This depended on the level of detail 
the participants were already offering. The order of questions might also have been 
varied depending on the flow of the conversation.
Data Analysis Procedure
The interviews were transcribed verbatim by a professional touch typist. In order to 
manage and analyse the data collected systematically and rigorously the researcher 
used the template analysis procedure (King, 2004b). Template analysis refers to a 
varied group of techniques for thematically organising and analysing textual data. It 
combines a deductive and an inductive approach to qualitative analysis (Saimders et 
al, 2007). This quality was an important consideration for choosing template analysis 
over grounded theory which uses a purely inductive analytical approach (King, 
2004b; Saimders et al, 2007).
In this respect. King (2004b) explains that the essence of template analysis is that the 
researcher produces a list of codes (i.e. template) representing themes identified in 
the textual data. Some of these will usually be defined a priori, derived deductively 
from the extant literature and theory (Saunders et al, 2007), but they will be modified 
and added to as the researcher reads and interprets the texts. Accordingly, in Study 2 
the four* organisational learning processes in the 41 framework (i.e. intuiting, 
interpreting, integrating, and institutionalising) were used as the predetermined 
template. The template was organised in a way to represent the relationship between 
themes in a hierarchical structme (King, 2004b) whereby the 41 framework served as
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higher-order codes, and the lower-order codes were derived inductively from the 
interview data. According to King (2004b), the greatest advantage of template 
analysis is that it is a highly flexible teclmique with only few specified procedures, 
permitting researchers to tailor it to match their own requirements. The discipline of 
producing the template forces the researcher to take a well-structured approach to 
handling the data and create an organised final account of a study (King, 2004b).
Template analysis might be caii’ied out with the use of Computer Aided Qualitative 
Data Analysis Sofrwaie (CAQDAS, e.g. NVivo) which generally help with the 
thematic analysis of the data, and enable the researcher to index segments of text to 
particular themes (King, 2004b). It is most useful in terms of the speed in sorting or 
searching data thr ough large number of transcripts, and a particular advantage is in 
identifying patterns within or between data sets. Easterby-Srnith, Thorpe and Jackson 
(2008) suggested that if the data set is relatively small (for example, fewer than 20 
interviews) then these data sets may still be best understood and analysed through the 
older methods of multi-coloured highlighting pens and close reading on screen or 
paper. At the initial stage of the data analysis, the researcher attempted to use NVivo, 
however the unstructirred natirre of the data proved difficult to use this software to 
examine the data. Additionally, it was the personal preference of the researcher to do 
the coding on paper whereby she felt more immersed into the analysing process of 
the data. The manually coded sections of text was then copied from the transcripts (in 
the Word document) and pasted into a new Word document under higher- and lower- 
order codes.
The text from the interview transcripts were analysed and coded in a three-stage 
procedure. In the first stage of unitising, the researcher familiarised herself with the 
data by reading and re-reading the transcripts several times in order to identify 
individual ‘thought units’ (Gioia and Sims, 1986). Initially, the researcher identified 
sections of text which were relevant to the 41 processes and marked them with 
appropriate code fr om the initial template. Over the course of the analysis, where the 
researcher identified a recundng issue in the text of relevance to the research 
question, but not covered by an existing code, she added a new higher-order code.
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Thought units ranged from a phrase, tlirough a complete sentence, to several 
sentences with the aim to capture a complete thought or idea. The thought units that 
were relevant to the questions on the interview protocol were recorded. The only 
material excluded was what could be called ‘side tracks’. Below is an example of a 
side track which does not relate to the interview question or the interview topic in 
general.
“7’m quite passionate about trying to police the football, and getting 
the football policing right. Nom> football policing right is a balance 
between being very firm, direct policing, and then very community 
style apologetic almost policing, and in an ideal world I ’d have a 
police officer one way who’s surrounding the fans, telling the fans 
exactly what they’re d o in g .. .[Participant F, Intuitive Hit Case 1]
Once the initial coding process was complete, the researcher worked systematically 
through the full set of transcripts. In the second stage of categorising, all of the 
thought units were organised into emergent categories or themes within the higher- 
order codes, whereby groups of similar* themes were clustered together to produce 
the lower-order codes. The lower-order codes were derived from the interview data 
inductively. Given the exploratory nature of this research, the themes were allowed 
to emerge fr om the data thr ough a process of re-reading and interpreting the thought 
units. These were then revised in light of the ongoing analysis. The goal was to 
minimise differences between thought units within a category and maximise 
differences between thought imits in different categories.
In the tliird stage of classifying, the emergent categories were grouped into unifying 
themes. The researcher continued to work with the data until it was exhaustive and 
no other categories emerged, also until it was felt satisfactory for meaningful 
exploration of the emerging themes, patterns and relationships.
The tlrree-stage analysing process was repeated several times by the researcher. At 
the point when the researcher felt comfortable with the categorisation of the data 
under the main categories (higher-order) and sub-categories (lower-order), the 
process was repeated one last time for the purpose of measuring the intra-coder 
reliability. Reliability of the coding was calculated using a method suggested by
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Miles and Huberman (1994) which involves dividing the number of agreements by 
the total number of agreements plus disagreements. Miles and Huberman (1994) 
suggest that both intra- and inter-coder agreement should be in the 90% range.
Accordingly, at the initial stage a total of 783 thought units were identified; and in 
the final process the researcher found agreement on 708 thought units, representing 
an intra-coder reliability of 90.4%. As a result of this, the researcher further refined 
the thought units by re-placing some of the thought units under different sub­
categories and deleting those which were not directly relevant to the story emerging 
from the data. Additionally, 25% of the data (195 thought units) were checked by a 
second coder for the pmpose of inter-coder reliability. There was agreement on 174 
thought units, representing 89.2% reliability. Both intra- and inter-coder reliabilities 
could be said to be satisfactory.
In total five higher-order codes (four deductively and one inductively), and 34 lower- 
order codes (all inductively) were identified from the interview data within the 
‘organisational learning processes’. Two additional lower-order codes were 
identified (grouped under the higher-order code of ‘post-decision processes’) which 
were in effect reflections of the participants on the subject; these were treated 
separately from the ‘organisational learning processes’ as they were not part of the 41 
framework.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter outlined the reseaich methodology mideipinning this thesis, addressing 
the research objectives, philosophical position, reseaich choice and approach, 
research strategy, and methods. The chapter also described the reseaich design by 
demonstrating the sample chaiacteristics, data collection techniques, and data 
analysis procedures undertaken in two main studies and one pilot study. Accordingly, 
Study 1 assessed individual differences in intuitive and analytical thinking styles 
amongst the members of the police organisations via the use of self-reported REI, 
thereby addressing RQ 1. The pilot study was employed with a sample of executives 
in order to examine the suitability of the GIT method for use in the main qualitative
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study. Study 2 used CIT in focus groups together with the 41 model as the underlying 
framework of this reseai'ch in order to explore the TMT intuitive decision making 
and organisational learning processes from a collective perspective, thereby 
addressing RQ 2 to 5.
The remainder of this thesis presents the analyses of these studies respectively and 
the discussion of the findings.
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Chapter 6 Study 1: Intuitive & Analytical Thinking Styles
6.0 Introduction
This chapter presents Study 1, the analyses and findings of the data collected from 
the online survey conducted at two police organisations in the UK. In this study the 
Rational Experiential Inventory (Pacini and Epstein, 1999), a self-report inventory 
for measuring rational and experiential thinking styles, has been employed with the 
aim to explore the individual differences in intuitive and analytical thinking styles 
(sometimes referred to as infoiination processing or cognitive styles) in police work, 
using a sample of police staff and police officers.
The chapter is organised as follows: the first section presents the method used in this 
study describing the sample, measures and procedure. The second section consists of 
tlii'ee parts and presents the analyses employed: the first two pai'ts present the factor 
analyses, namely Exploratory Factor Analysis and Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
respectively, and the third part presents the descriptive statistics and sub-group 
comparisons. The following section presents the results of the analyses and finally 
the chapter is concluded with the discussion of the findings.
6.1 Method
This section reports on the participants of the study, measures used for data 
collection, and the procedure of the data analysis.
6.1.1 Participants
In this study, the self-report inventory was administered via an online survey in two 
police organisations in the UK (Police Organisations A and Police Organisation C). 
The paificipants consisted of police staff in various job types and police officers of 
valions ranks across the two organisations. In total 752 paificipants attempted the 
online sui'vey and 516 of those submitted the fully completed questionnaire
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(representing 69%). Six participants, who were Special Constables, were eliminated 
as they did not belong to either the police staff or police officer categories, and the 
sample size was too small for a separate category. As a result, a total of 510 usable 
responses were received (461 fiom POA, and 49 from POC).
6.1.2 Measures
In this study the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI) was used in the version 
developed by Pacini and Epstein (1999) which measuies rational and experiential 
(i.e. intuitive) thinking styles, and includes self-reported ability and engagement 
subscales. This 40-item self-report inventory (see Weiner and Craighead, 2010) is a 
development of a previous version of the REI which is available in long- (31 items) 
and short- (10 items) foims (Epstein et al, 1996) and in which no ability and 
engagement distinctions within the main scales was made. It consists of a total of 40 
positively- and negatively-worded items in four scales: experiential ability (EA, 10 
items), experiential engagement (EE, 10 items), rational ability (RA, 10 items), and 
rational engagement (RE, 10 items). Descriptions of the four scales aie provided in 
Table 6.1 below.
Table 6.1 Description of REI Scales
Subscale Description_______________________________________________
EA High level of ability with respect to one’s intuitive impressions and
feelings (e.g. '^When it comes to trusting people I  can usually rely on 
W  feelings’^ )
EE Reliance on and enjoyment of feelings and intuitions in making
decisions (e.g. ‘^ Ilike to rely on my intuitive impressions’^ )
RA High level of ability to think logically and analytically (e.g. ’^ Ihave no
problem thinking things through carefully”)
RE Reliance on and enjoyment of thinking in an analytical, logical
manner (e.g. '"'‘I  enjoy thinking in abstract terms”)
Source: Pacini and Epstein, 1999
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The pai’ticipants rated the questionnaire items on a five-point Likeit scale that ranged 
from 1 (completely false) to 5 (completely true) (see Appendix 1 for the screen print 
of the survey, and Appendix 2 for the list of REI items). In addition to the REI, 
participants were asked to answer a number of demographic questions, i.e. age, 
gender, job level, job type, and length of experience, as the basis for sub-group 
comparisons.
6.1.3 Procedure
Data were analysed using SPSS 16.0 for conducting EFA and sub-group 
compai'isons; and AMOS 7.0 for conducting CFA. For factor analyses the full 
sample was split randomly into Sample A (EFA, V = 350) and Sample B (CFA, N  = 
160); sub-group comparisons were based on data from one organisation only (POA, 
N  = 461). The sample was split in this study on the grounds that: (1) 160 is an 
optimum sample size for CFA (see Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith, 2003a); (2) a 
sample size of 300 for an EFA was deemed by Comrey and Lee (1992) as ‘good’. It 
should be noted that there were no statistically significant differences in responses to 
the study variables between POA and POC.
6.2 Analyses
This section reports on the analyses of data, i.e. EFA, CFA, and descriptive statistics 
and sub-group comparisons respectively.
6.2.1 Exploratoiy Factor Analyses
In the EFA, the methods of previous researchers (i.e. Pacini and Epstein, 1999; 
Hodgkinson et al, 2009) have been followed in an attempt to replicate and test the 
veracity of their findings.
In order to “confirm” the distribution of the items of the rationality and 
experientiality main scales, Pacini and Epstein (1999: 975) gathered data from 
student pai’ticipants (American psychology majors). They entered the 40 REI items
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into a Principal Components Analysis (PCA), extracted two components (no 
empirical grounds for so doing were given) accounting for 34.0% of the variance, 
and rotated to simple structure using an orthogonal (i.e. Varimax) rotation. All 
rationality items loaded on the first component, and experientiality items loaded on 
the second. Pacini and Epstein (1999: 975) further used PCA to examine the 
ability/engagement distinction in the REI’s sub-scales by forcing “a two factor 
solution” on the experientiality and the rationality items: in their analysis the 
rationality items divided into ability and engagement; the experientiality items 
divided into positively- and negatively-worded items.
Similarly, Hodgkinson et al (2009: 344) again using data gathered from student 
participants (Australian under-graduates in a vaiiety of disciplines), entered the 40 
REI items into a PCA, however rather than “a priori forcing” a two-component 
solution on the data, they used Cattell’s scree test (1966) to identify the number of 
factors for extraction. They identified thiee components that accounted for 37.6% of 
the variance, and rotated these to simple structuie using Varimax proceduie. All of 
the rationality items loaded on the first component, and the experientiality items 
loaded on the second and third components: the positively-worded experientiality 
items loaded on component two while the negatively-worded experientiality items 
loaded on component three.
In light of the review of the literature reported in Chapter 2 and these two previous 
studies, the following hypotheses aie proposed:
Hi Rationality and experientiality scales will not be coiTelated, i.e. intuition and
analysis will be independent (consistent with dual-process theory)
Hi Rational engagement and rational ability subscales will emerge as separate
factors (as theorised by Pacini and Epstein, 1999)
Hs Negatively-worded experientiality and positively-worded experientiality
items will emerge as separate factors (contrary to the theoretical expectations 
of Pacini and Epstein, 1999, but as observed by Hodgkinson et al, 2009)
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Consistent with the previous studies, to examine the construct validity of the measme 
the 40 REI items were entered into a PCA in order to ascertain the suitability of the 
dataset for performing EFA procedures. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy was .871 and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 4353.7 
significant at/) < .001, thus confirming that the dataset was suitable for performing 
EFA.
PCA revealed that there were nine components with eigenvalues greater than one 
(accounting for 54.6% of the variance). Inspection of the scree plot in accordance 
with the guidelines of Cattell (1966) showed the ‘elbow’ to be at component thi’ee. 
Given that the eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule may over-estimate the number of 
components to be extracted and that the scree test has been found to perform 
consistently better (Ford, MacCallum and Tait, 1986), two components accounting 
for 31.1% of the variance (component one 18.9%; component two 12.2%) were 
extracted. This is also in keeping with Pacini and Epstein’s (1999) ‘forced fit’ two 
factor solution (but is empirically- rather than theoretically-driven).
Two alternative methods of rotation were considered: orthogonal and oblique 
rotation. Tabaclinick and Fidell (1996) suggest that the best way to decide between 
orthogonal and oblique rotation is to initially request an oblique rotation and examine 
the degree of coiTelation among the resulting factors (components). Tabachnick and 
Fidell (1996) argue that an oblique rotation is warranted in cases where this yields 
conelations of ±.32 or greater. In consistence with the expectation that rationality 
and experientiality factors would not be correlated, the Direct Oblimin method (an 
oblique method of rotation) revealed a low value of r = .138 suggesting no 
cori’elation between these two scales, hence supporting Hi. As a result the two factors 
were rotated to simple str ucture using the Varimax method of rotation.
Hair et al (1998) suggested a criterion of salient loading of .30 for a sample size of 
350 or greater. In this respect, inspection of the rotated component matrix revealed 
component one to be comprised of experientiality items, and component two of 
rationality items. There were two cross-loading items (EA items 7 and 10) and three 
items which failed to load at the salient level (RE items 8 , 9 and 10). The
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communalities for each variable are provided, representing the amount of variance 
accounted for by the factor solution for each variable (Hair et al, 1998). Extracted 
coimmmalities of the variables ranged from .033 (RE item 10) to .567 (EA item 8).
On the basis of PCA the results are consistent with Pacini and Epstein (1999: 975) 
(i.e. two factors, “rationality and experientiality [which] are independent and 
orthogonal”) rather than with Hodgkinson et al (2009: 344) (i.e. “one rationality and 
two experientiality factors [positively- and negatively-worded]”). The matrix of 
factor loadings for 40 items (with values of greater than .30 underlined) and 
communalities is shown in Table 6.2.
In order to test for H2 (suggesting that rational engagement and rational ability 
subscales would emerge as separate factors) the researcher followed the procedure 
described by Pacini and Epstein (1999), i.e. entered the rationality items only into the 
PCA, and extracted two factors and rotated to simple structure using the Direct 
Oblimin method. In support of the H2, it is observed fr om the pattern matrix that the 
rationality items divided -  but not cleanly -  into engagement and ability components 
respectively. There were three cross-loading items (RA items 2 and 8, and RE item 
4) and two items failed to load at the salient level of .30 (RE items 9 and 10). It is 
also observed that RA items 1 and 4 loaded on the engagement component instead of 
loading on the ability component. Extracted communalities of the variables ranged 
from .061 (RE item 9) to .552 (RE item 6). The matrix of factor loadings for 
rationality items (with values of greater than .30 miderlined) and communalities is 
shown in Table 6.3.
The procedure as described above was repeated for experientiality items in order to 
test H3 (suggesting that the negatively-worded experientiality and positively-worded 
experientiality items would emerge as separate factors). In support of this hypothesis, 
it is observed in the pattern matrix that experientiality items divided into positively- 
and negatively-worded components, with two items (EE item 2 and EA item 8) 
cross-loading. Extracted communalities of the variables ranged from .297 (EE item 
10) to .569 (EA item 8). The matrix of factor loadings for experientiality items (with 
values of greater than .30 underlined) and communalities is shown in Table 6.4.
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Table 6.2 Matrix of Factor Loadings for REI Exploratory Factor Analysis
Component
1 2 I f
EEOl .604 .046 .367
RAOINEG -.093 .557 .319
EAOl .616 .054 .382
RA02NEG .043 .673 .455
EE02 .679 -.048 .463
REOl .110 -.566 .332
EA02 .550 .019 .303
RA03NEG .022 .576 .332
EA03NEG -.553 .112 .318
RE02 .023 -.431 .187
EE03 .555 -.078 .314
RA04NEG -.182 .442 .228
EE04NEG -.577 .148 .355
RA05 .016 -.443 .196
EA04 .549 -.087 .309
EE05NEG -.431 .210 .230
RA06 .021 -.393 .155
EE06 .380 .233 .199
EA05 .580 -.008 .336
EA06NEG -.558 .223 .361
RA07 -.051 -.350 .125
RE03NEG -.049 .676 .459
EA07NEG -.526 .370 .414
RE04 .077 -.671 .456
EA08 .749 -.071 .567
RE05NEG -.102 .613 .386
EE07 .655 .087 .437
RE06NEG -.085 .657 .439
EA09 .556 -.057 .312
RA08NEG -.053 .584 .344
EE08NEG -.574 .241 .387
RE07NEG -.126 .489 .255
EE09NEG -.583 .092 .349
RA09 .012 -.512 .262
EEIONEG -.553 -.018 .306
RE08 .049 -.258 .069
EAIONEG -.365 .421 .310
RAIO -.023 -.475 .226
RE09NEG .270 .282 .152
REIO .037 -.177 .033
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Table 6.3 Matrix of Factor Loadings for REI EFA Rationality Items Only
(Pattern Matrix)
Component
1 2
RAOINEG .440 -.231 .321
RA02NEG .383 -.438 .460
REOl -.553 .120 .368
RA03NEG .247 -.474 .371
RE02 -.524 -.020 .268
RA04NEG ,386 -.130 .202
RA05 .057 .665 .417
RA06 -.108 .412 .214
RA07 .165 .650 .371
RE03NEG .591 -.205 .480
RE04 -.496 .327 .471
RE05NEG .741 .050 .525
RE06NEG .736 -.018 .552
RA08NEG .371 -.336 .342
RE07NEG .432 -.154 .259
RA09 -.043 .643 .435
RE08 -.531 -.258 .249
RAIO -.034 .596 .371
RE09NEG .133 -.165 .061
REIO -.285 -.058 .073
Although the PCA of all 40 REI items failed to replicate Hodgkinson et aPs (2009) 
findings (i.e. thiee components), in common with these reseai'chers no support was 
found for Pacini and Epstein’s (1999) four-component (i.e. theoretical) 
intei-pretation. In following Pacini and Epstein’s (1999) method, the findings show 
clear evidence of the empirically-observed division between positively- and 
negatively-worded items for experientiality rather than experiential 
ability/engagement. These results coiToborate previous findings and cast fuifher 
doubt on the validity of the ability/ engagement distinction for experientiality.
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Table 6.4 Matrix of Factor Loadings for REI EFA Experientiality Items Only
(Pattern Matrix)
Component
1 2
EEOl .453 -.230 .351
EAOl .589 -.108 .416
EE02 .466 -.331 .466
EA02 .596 -.024 .369
EA03NEG -.278 .390 .327
EE03 .444 -.213 .328
EE04NEG -.107 .600 .429
EA04 .480 -.170 .332
EE05NEG .164 .728 .449
EE06 .621 .244 .309
EA05 .661 .000 .437
EA06NEG -.168 .539 .400
EA07NEG -.115 .584 .415
EA08 .529 -.350 .569
EE07 .630 -.098 .463
EA09 .732 .085 .487
EE08NEG -.002 .725 .527
EE09NEG -.115 .583 .413
EEIONEG -.263 .374 .297
EAIONEG .091 .609 .329
6.2.2 Confirmatory Factor Analyses
Neither Pacini and Epstein (1999) nor Hodgkinson et al (2009) deployed CFA in 
their construct validation of the REI (long-form). However, the CFA is particularly 
useful in the validation of scales for the measurement of previously specified 
constructs, therefore the researcher opted to use CFA as implemented in Amos 7.0 in 
order to test the following competing models (see Table 6.5, ‘L’ indicates long-form 
REI, the relevant path diagrams are to be found in Appendix 3).
(1) Model 1 (two factors, L2): experientiality (E); rationality (R);
(2) Model 2 (three factors, L3.1): E; rational engagement (RE) and rational ability 
(RA) (i.e. empirically-derived, Pacini and Epstein, 1999);
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(3) Model 3 (tlii’ee factors, L3.2): experientiality positively-worded (EP) and 
experientiality negatively-worded (EN); R (i.e. empirically-derived, Hodgkinson 
et al, 2009);
(4) Model 4 (four factors, L4 .1): experiential engagement (EE) and experiential 
ability (EA); RE and RA (i.e. theoretically derived, Pacini and Epstein, 1999);
(5) Model 5 (foui' factors, L4.2): EP and EN; RE and RA (i.e. Pacini and Epstein, 
1999 but retaining the distinction between positively- and negatively-worded 
experientiality items).
In assessing model fit, as well as (sensitive to sample size), a range of other 
measures has been used (for baseline comparisons, Goodness of Fit Index [GFI], and 
Incremental Fit Index [IFI, non-nonned, not constrained to upper limit of 1]; for 
insensitivity to sample size. Root Mean Square Error of Approximation [RMSEA]). 
The following has been accepted as indicators of goodness of fit: %^ /df < 2.00; fit 
indices > ,90 (some researchers repori fit indices >.85 as generally acceptable, see 
Hinkin, 1995); RMSEA < .08. The researcher further tested the fit of these data to 
one-factor (unitary, Si) and two-factor (dual, S2) models based on the responses to 
the 10-itern REI shorf-form (Epstein et al, 1996) (five RE and five EA items). Table 
6.5 presents the fit indices for the var ious models.
Intuition researchers working within a dual-process paradigm and wishing to adopt a 
more nuanced interpretation of the REI are confi'onted by a number of choices. The 
best-fitting model to the data in this study was Model L4 .2  (EN, EP, RE, and RA). 
However, since EN/EP is not a psychologically (as opposed to psychometrically) 
meaningful distinction to adopt, and given that EFA and CFA results suggest the RE 
and RA distinction is worth retaining, the sensible conclusion to be drawn from these 
data is that Model L3 .1 ought to be the model and scoring method of choice for the 
RBI. This conclusion is drawn with the important caveat that, although they 
exceeded the requirements of %,^ /df and RMSEA, none of the baseline comparisons 
(i.e. GFI and IFI) met the .90 criterion of fit for these indices. However, as may be 
seen from Table 6.5, the REI short-form when scored as two factors (as 
recommended by Pacini and Epstein, 1999) has fit indices which exceed the .90
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tlii'eshold. On this basis, the shoit-fonn REI is recommended as an instrument of 
choice for the assessment of individual differences in rational and experiential 
processing. For the purposes of further analysis Model L^a is retained.
6.2.3 Descriptive Statistics and Sub-Group Comparisons
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, in descriptive statistics and sub-group 
comparisons only the data from POA have been used {N= 461). The data comprised 
of police staff (N = 163, 35.4%) and police officers (N = 298, 64.6%), and 171 
female (37.1%) and 290 male (62.9%) participants. The age of the participants 
ranged fr om 20 to 66 (average age was 42 year s). The length of experience ranged 
from two months to 46 year's and eight months (average of 14 year s of experience).
The police officers were categorised into four groups based on their job level as 
follows: Police Constable {N= 176), Sergeant (N = 76), Inspector (N= 34), and SMT 
(N -  12). The ranks above the Inspector (i.e. Chief Inspectors, Superintendents and 
Chief Superintendent) were categorised under one group, the SMT, as the number of 
sample was smaller in higher ranks.
The police staff were categorised according to their job type, as follows: 
administrative (N = 83), intelligence (N = 55), and community support {N = 16). It 
should be noted that the intelligence and community support roles consisted of police 
staff as well as police officers. In order to avoid duplication of data (as police 
officers were categorised by their rank), the sample in these job types included only 
the police staff; the police officers were excluded.
Although there is a general perception of intuitive style of being stereotypical of 
females, in previous reseaich Sadler-Smith (2011), Hayes, Allinson and Aimstrong 
(2004), and Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith (2003a) failed to confirm this perception. 
In addition, Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith (2003a) found that higher levels of 
intuition were associated with higher levels of seniority. Based on these findings of 
the previous research, the following hypotheses are developed in order to test RQ 1,
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i.e. aie there individual differences in the use of intuitive (experiential) and analytical 
(rational) thinking styles amongst members of police organisations.
H4 There is no gender difference in teiins of intuitive (experiential) thinking
style
H5 Intuition is positively related to job level
Hô Intuition is positively related to experience
H7 Police officers are more intuitive than police staff
The sub-group compai'isons aie based on a thiee-factor model (i.e. RE, RA, and E). 
Table 6.6 shows the inter-coiTelations (police staff above diagonal and police officers 
below diagonal), reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha for sample in bold along diagonal), 
means (and SDs), and sub-group comparisons by occupational group and gender.
For police staff the coiTelations between experientiality and rationality (ability and 
engagement) were non-significant (.10 < r < .11), whilst for the police officers the 
correlations were statistically significant ip < .01) but small (.16 < r < .19) fuither 
confiiining the independence of intuition and analysis (see Hi above).
The Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities for the scales are reported in Table 6 .6 : a = .75 for 
rational engagement, a = .80 for rational ability, and a = .89 for experientiality, 
indicating that the scales had good internal reliability. Typically a scale is considered 
to be satisfactory if above 0.70 (Sekaran, 2003).
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) indicate that with negative skewness there is a pileup 
of cases to the right and the left tail is too long, and that Kurtosis values above zero 
signify a distribution that is too peaked with short, thick tails. Whilst a more ‘peaky’ 
distribution with a slight negative skewness was noted for rationality variables, the 
concentration of scores appears to be relatively bell-shaped in all thiee distributions. 
It is observed from the statistical data that for all three variables the cases fall within 
.50 standard deviation of the mean. This suggests that the actual degree of depaiture 
fiom normality is maiginal which indicates reasonably noimal distribution of the 
vai'iables.
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A two-way analysis of vaiiance (occupational group x gender) revealed a small but 
statistically significant effect of occupational group on experientiality (F= 16.143; p  
< .001), i.e. police officers reported higher experientiality scores than did their staff 
colleagues, thus supporting H?. Additionally, there was a marginally significant 
interaction (F -  2.684; p  = .102) between occupational group and gender in their 
effect on experientiality (Model = .03), see Table 6.7. Also, in contrast with 
previous research there was no main effect of gender on rational ability (F= .932; p  
~ .335) or experientiality {F = .114; p  = .736) (Pacini and Epstein, 1999). This 
finding supports H4.
Table 6.7 Summary of Two-Way ANOVA
F  (sig.)
Main effects Interaction
Occupational
Group
Gender Occupational 
Group X Gender
RE .357 (.551) .013 (.909) .377 (.540)
RA .757 (.385) .932 (.335) .048 (.827)
E 16.143 (.000) .114 (.736) 2.684 (.102)
As presented in Table 6 .8, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) within the 
police officer sub-gioup revealed a main effect of job level on rational ability (ranks 
of Chief Inspector, Superintendent and Chief Superintendent, i.e. the SMT, reported 
higher rational ability scores). Unlike in previous research (e.g. Allinson and Hayes, 
1996), a suiprising finding was that there was no effect of job level on 
experientiality, thus rejecting H 5 . Within the police staff gi’oup there was a main 
effect of job type on rational ability and engagement (staff in intelligence roles 
reported higher levels of rationality than their administrative or community support 
colleagues). Similaiiy, no effect of job type on experientiality was observed.
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Finally, there were a number of statistically significant (p < .05) but small 
coiTelations between RE and RA and paificipants’ levels of experience at .09 and .10 
levels respectively (see Table 6.9). This is surprising given that the expertise-based 
view of intuition (e.g. Simon, 1987) suggests a positive relationship between 
intuition and experience. It is however consistent with previous empirical work 
which found statistically significant but low coiTelations between intuition (i.e. 
experientiality) and years of experience (Leybourne and Sadler-Smith, 2006). 
Moreover, the differential pattern of these associations supports the 
engagement/ability distinction. An anticipated relationship between experientiality 
and experience has not been observed, thus rejecting Hg.
Table 6.9 Correlations between RE, RA and E, and Experience
RE RA E
Sample .09* .10* .07
Gender
Female -.22** -.14 .13
Male .23** .18** .02
Occupational Group
Police Officer .11* .17** -.04
Police Staff .06 -.00 .09
Job Level
Constable .05 .13 -.03
Sergeant .20 .14 -.05
Inspector .05 -.02 -.17
SMT .29 .55 -.28
Pearson product moment; < .05; < .01
Higher levels of correlation between rational engagement and experience were 
observed across females and males. Additionally, the pattern of coiTelations for RE 
and RA for males and females, whilst of similar magnitude, is reversed. A negative 
correlation for females between level of experience and rationality (ability and 
engagement) indicates that as females become more experienced, their level of 
rationality goes down. Also supporting this finding, the positive correlation between
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level of experience and experientiality suggests that as females become more 
experienced they become more intuitive. For males, positive high correlation 
between level of experience and rational engagement suggests that as they become 
more experienced their level of rational engagement increases. A very low 
correlation is noted between experience and experientiality for males. |
A statistically significant but small correlation is observed between rationality and :
experience for police officers. Finally, contrary to previous research (Hodgkinson |
i
and Sadler-Smith, 2003a), higher correlations aie noted between rationality and j
experience for senior officers suggesting that with more experience they become ;
more rational/analytical (and less intuitive). However, with all of the statistically I
significant correlations the effect sizes are small, and hence the conclusions drawn 
from coiTelational analyses must be treated with considerable circumspection.
6.3 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter reported the findings of the REI survey. In Section 6.2.1 the EFA 
revealed that, in support of Pacini and Epstein (1999), rationality and experientiality 
scales emerged as two separate scales. Additionally, rational engagement and ability 
subscales emerged as separate factors, and the findings foimd support for the 
negatively-worded and positively-worded experientiality items rather than 
experiential ability/engagement distinction. Therefore, in adopting Pacini and 
Epstein’s (1999) refinement of the REI, the ability/engagement distinction may be 
waived for experientiality, but not for rationality.
In Section 6.2.2, using CFA five competing models of the REI factor structuie have 
been tested and also compared to the REI’s short-form (Epstein et al, 1996). The 
long-form REI based on three factors (i.e. experientiality, rational engagement and 
rational ability) offered the model and scoring method of choice for the REI based on 
fit indices and theory. Researchers for whom rational ability and engagement are not 
vital distinctions should not loose sight of the fact that the short-fonn REI provides a 
highly compact and reliable measure ideally suited to use in field settings.
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Finally, in Section 6.2.3 the sub-group compai'isons revealed that, in support of 
previous reseai'ch there is no gender difference in terms of the intuitive thinking 
style; and as anticipated the police officers appear* to be more intuitive than police 
staff. However, there is lack of support to confirm that intuition is positively related 
to job level or experience. The findings are summarised in Table 6.10.
Table 6.10 Results of Hypotheses Testing 
Hypotheses
H i Rationality and experientiality scales will not be 
correlated
y
H2 Rational engagement and rational ability subscales will 
emerge as separate factors
y
Hs Negatively-worded experientiality and positively-worded 
experientiality items will emerge as separate factors
y
H4 There is no gender difference in terms of intuitive 
orientation
y
Hs Intuition is positively related to job level X
He Intuition is positively related to experience X
H? Police officers are more intuitive than police staff y
Accepted X Rejected
Overall, these data clearly demonstrate that there are individual differences between 
members of police organisations in terms of the extent to which they use intuitive 
and analytical processing. These data also confirm that the distinction between 
analysis and intuition as separate modes of information processing is a valid one and 
commensmate with dual-process theory.
The remainder of this thesis adopts a qualitative approach for the study of how senior 
police officers use intuitive judgement. As noted by many intuition researchers, there 
is a dearth of qualitative research in this field. Moreover, it will also be necessary to 
explore the feasibility of such an approach which is the focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter 7 Pilot of Study 2
7.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the pilot study which explores senior managers’ experiences of 
intuition from an individual perspective. The main objective was to employ CIT in 
order to test its usability in Study 2 to investigate intuitive decision making processes 
in senior management teams. The pilot study also provided insights into the 
properties senior managers ascribe to intuition and the factors which influence its use 
in decision making.
The chapter is organised in fom* sections. The first section relates to the participants’ 
use of intuition in managerial contexts and reports the data in direct quotations 
gathered from individual interviews. The second section documents a selection of 
these managers’ retrospective accoimts of critical incidents, and a typology of 
intuition-décision outcome (i.e. ‘intuitive hits’ and ‘intuitive misses’) is developed in 
light of the findings. Section three summarises the findings, and section four 
concludes the chapter. A list of participants and their positions within their respective 
organisations is provided in Table 7.1. For confidentiality, the names of the 
participants and their organisations remain anonymous.
7.1 Use of Intuition in Decision Making
The findings fi'om the interviews indicate that the majority of managers (12 out of 13 
participants) said that they use intuition in making strategic decisions. While some of 
them use intuition nonconsciously, others are more consciously aware of their use of 
intuition.
certainly use intuitive judgement. I  think sometimes it’s quite 
difficult to he entirely conscious o f the way you make decisions. 
Perhaps I  use intuition even more than I  consciously think I  do. Very 
often I  get very quickly a sort o f gut feel, a sense o f where I  want to 
go. I  look at the facts and the rationalisation o f that. But because I
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have a sense o f where I  want to go, it’s like 1 see what should happen 
next and it always seems incredibly clear to me. ” [Participant A]
“I  make a conscious effort to use my intuition more. Because my 
education was as an engineer so I  basically have all the intuition 
beaten out o f me. For so many years, my natural decision making 
process tended to be very rational, logical and I  probably did use 
intuitive judgement but I  wasn’t very aware o f it. Whereas now, I  
actually consciously ask myself what my gut, my stomach is telling 
me. ” [Participant B]
Table 7.1 List of Participants in Pilot Study
Code Position Industry
Participant A Executive Coach Management consultancy
Participant B Chairman Management consultancy
Participant C Managing Director- Manufacturing
Participant D Managing Director Management consultancy
Participant E Director Management consultancy
Participant F Managing Director- Manufactm-ing
Participant G Managing Director Financial services
Participant H Board Director Management consultancy
Participant I Managing Director- Systems integration
Participant J Managing Director/Owner Publishing
Participant K Director/Owner Management consultancy
Participant L Managing Director/0 wner Manufacturing
Participant M Executive Coach Management consultancy
On the other hand, one of the participants said, being technically biased in his work, 
he does not rely on intuition in making strategic decisions, however more so when he 
is trying to solve a problem.
"Whether you call it intuition or experience, I  feel that often given 20 
avenues o f investigation to solve a problem, I  may hit the correct 
avenue on first or second go. That’s probably where I  would call it 
intuition. Intuition, when applied in this way, is actually application o f 
experience without going through a different level o f understanding.
You are using analytical processes and you ’re not aware but you are 
actually using information that you’ve gathered over years. ” 
[Participant C]
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Although the significance of intuitive judgement is recognised in managerial 
decision malting by the pai'ticipants, one problematic aspect of it for them is that it is 
not backed up by ‘hard’ evidence; therefore it is difficult for them as decision makers 
to ‘prove’ whether their intuition is right or wi’ong.
“When faced Mnth a situation where your intuition is telling you to 
make a certain decision hut one cannot hack that up with anything 
much more than a statement that says 'it feels the right thing to do ’ 
then you are very exposed and isolated. ” [Participant D]
“You have hunches ahout something which could M’ork, hut which is 
not necessarily provable. An awful lot o f good ideas, I  suspect, would 
have heen lost i f  someone said ‘prove to me this is going to M>ork 
firs t’. ” [Paiiicipant E]
“I  see that intuition also comes into effect when I  look at management 
accounts and M>hole set o f figures. I  M>ould say there is something 
wrong. I  don’t know what’s wrong hut there is something wrong and 1 
can’t say where it came from. Normally when that happens there is 
something wrong. That’s in fact an intuition and then it leads on to 
some change. ” [Participant F]
Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2004) suggested that in decision making, intuition is as 
important as rational analysis, and executives might achieve a more balanced 
perspective by considering both rationality and intuition as complementary and 
mutually reinforcing components of a decision making approach.
“I  think I  come to rely on intuition quite heavily, because I  believe 
that it plays an important part. But I  don’t solely rely on it. I  am also 
quite analytical. When 1 have sufficient time and where it’s economic 
to do so, I  will research all o f the options very carefully. Then I  will 
make any decision based on my analysis o f that research, hut that 
decision will he influenced by intuition. Sometimes you find there isn’t 
sufficient time to carry out the level o f research that you would wish 
then you rely most exclusively on intuition. ” [Paiticipant G]
“Obviously a lot o f decisions are based on facts but in terms o f 
exactly where the final direction o f a decision really relies on is 
intuition. I  would say probably 50-60 percent o f the time the final 
decision is through intuition. ” [Participant F]
In relation to the importance of balancing intuition with rational analysis. Participant 
E added the following comments:
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"Certainly in a business scenario it’s actually very useful to have 
people who are on both sides o f the fence. I f  you have a group o f 
people who are highly intuitive, the likelihood is that there will be 
nothing but thinking o f new ideas. They’ll never get around doing 
anything about them. ” [Participant E]
According to the participants, there are a few factors that influence the use of 
intuition in decision ruaking. For example. Participant B would employ intuitive 
judgement in his decisions depending on the availability of facts and data. If there is 
not enough time to find out the information required to go through an analytical 
process, he would rely more on intuition. Additionally, other participants added that 
their use of intuition depends on how quick the decision needs to be made.
“I  think speed, where you need to make a decision quickly and you 
perhaps have not got the time to do research. ” [Participant H]
“When you need to make a quick decision, that could be based on 
past experiences, or that could be based on just what you feel at that 
time. ’’ [Participant I]
For most of the participants the effective use of intuitive judgement is down to 
experience.
“I  think experience, definitely previous experience, background, 
knowledge, and information. ” [Participant D]
“I  think it’s down to experience. Experience gives you a better idea 
about how to use your gut feel, intuition to make the right choices. ” 
[Participant I]
“I  think it’s mainly experience. I  think that over time you learn from 
your mistakes. Also, when you made decisions in the past that 
happened to be the right ones that can programme the w>ay in which 
you respond in the future to similar circumstances. When I ’m faced 
with a decision now, what I  do partly subconsciously is to refer back 
to some o f the decisions that I ’ve made before and the circumstances 
that they are related to. Essentially I  use the experience o f the result 
o f those decisions to inform the decisions that I ’m currently required 
to make. ” [Participant G]
From the participants’ point of view, intuition is effective when related to ‘people’ 
type of decisions, such as: whether tlrey feel they can trust certain people, whether 
they want to do business with them, or whether they can establish a ‘pull’ with them.
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It is also most obvious in recruitment decisions, for example, do they want to employ 
somebody; do they want to work with somebody; do they want somebody as a 
client? These kinds of decisions, from the perspective of the interviewees, tend to be 
more intuitive and based on intuition rather than going tlirough an analytical process.
Participants expressed their views on when intuition is most effective:
“When the decision needs to be made in hurry and there is a lack o f  
other information it’s the most effective thing that you have. It might 
be ineffective, but it is the most effective thing that you have. ” 
[Participant D]
“I  think it can be most effective when faced with a need to make a 
very quick decision. Certainly I ’ve noticed that as I ’ve become more 
experienced my intuition has become more effective in that I ’m able 
instinctively to make a decision that proves to be correct based on my 
past experience. ’’ [Participant G]
“I  suppose the more complex the situation the more important it is to 
call on intuition. Because we work on such intricate projects 
sometimes that you almost have to go with the information and 
beyond information too. I t’s like the expression ‘taking the helicopter 
view ’ you almost have to put everything under the table and let go, 
elevate yourself, look at it and you have intuitive element which is 
helping you decide what to do. ’’ [Participant J]
7.2 Critical Incidents
In the interview protocol, participants were only asked to provide examples of 
effective and ineffective intuitive decisions they made, however other examples also 
emerged fiom the interviews whereby the participants did not follow their intuitions. 
One of the hallmarks of GIT is its use in the fonnation of categories as a result of 
analysing the data (Flanagan, 1954). On the basis of the analysis of the data, there are 
four emerging categories from this part of the interviews: (1) intuitive hits (intuition 
heeded -  positive outcome); (2) intuitive misses (intuition heeded -  negative 
outcome); (3) intuition inelevant? (intuition not heeded -  positive outcome); and (4) 
what if? (intuition not heeded -  negative outcome). These are summarised below 
with relevant examples. From the analysis of the critical incidents an intuition- 
décision outcome typology can be drawn as follows.
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Figure 7.1 Intuition-Décision Outcome Typology
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2. Intuitive misses 4. W hat if?
The above typology is founded on two principal factors: first is the decision whether 
to heed an intuition or not; and the second is the outcome of the event. In this respect, 
an intuition -  whether heeded or not -  consequentially leads to a positive or a 
negative outcome. As shown on the left hand side of the typology, if a heeded 
intuition leads to a positive outcome, it can be said that it was a good decision to 
follow the intuition and this immediately promotes a sense of “wy gut feel was 
right”. On the other hand, if a heeded intuition leads to a negative outcome, it is 
judged that the intuition was wrong and following the intuition was a bad decision. 
This will prop up the sense of “/  should not have listened to my gut feel”. Boxes 1 
and 2 therefore represent ‘intuitive hits’ and ‘intuitive misses’ respectively.
The situation in which intuition is not heeded is somewhat more problematic to 
conceptualise. The right hand side of the typology shows the possible outcomes if an 
intuition is not heeded. It should be noted here that on this side of the typology the 
status of the intuition (i.e. right or wrong) is ‘indeterminate’ simply because the 
intuition was not heeded. The outcome has been reached regardless of what direction
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the intuition pointed. Therefore, the intuition cannot be judged to be right or wi'ong 
per se, as we cannot be suie whether the same (or the opposite) outcome would have 
been attained if we did follow our intuition. Furthermore, it is the outcome of the 
situation that matters (i.e. positive or negative), and it is the outcome of the situation 
by which we judge the decision of following the intuition to be a good or bad action, 
as well as the intuition to be right or wrong (if the intuition is heeded). Box 3 
represents the situation of intuition as ‘irrelevant?’ since a positive outcome was 
experienced anyway. Box 4 represents ‘what if?’ (intuition had been followed).
Accordingly, if an unheeded intuition leads to a positive outcome, not listening to the 
intuition can be said to be part of a process that ultimately led to a good decision. 
Although, given the explanation above, the status of the intuition is indeterminate, it 
is perhaps understandable for decision makers in such circumstances to think that 
^frobably my gut feel was wrong” since not heeding my intuition led to a positive 
outcome. Finally, if an unheeded intuition leads to a negative outcome, it can be said 
that not heeding the intuition was part of a process that ultimately led to a bad 
decision and perhaps prompts the view that ^"probably I  should have listened to my 
gut feel”. But again the intuition is indeterminate as we are not sure what the 
outcome would have been if we did follow our' intuition.
Summar ies of relevant examples fr om each category are provided in the remainder of 
this section.
Intuitive Hits (Intuition Heeded -  Positive Outcome)
Examples that fall under this category are those where a heeded intuition led to a 
positive outcome:
■ Around 1990 Participant C was faced with a decision to manufacture a new type 
of machine his company has never made before. He recalls that at the time he 
was pressured for time to come to a decision and he did not have enough facts to 
make a reasoned decision. Therefore, he followed his intuition to go ahead with 
this project as he felt it would be successful and have positive outcomes for the
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company. In the beginning it was a struggle but it did tmn into a success and it 
marked the start of a new product line which has been very successfril for the 
company.
■ In 1975 Participant E was offered to become the sole UK distributor for a brand
new range of designer sunglasses. Although at the time he knew very little about 
simglasses and fashion accessories, he felt that there was an opportunity there and 
that it could work. Everybody else told him that he was over-committing and that
the product was too expensive. But it sold well. 12 years later Participant E had a
£5 million business which he sold to a public company. Following his intuition in 
this case resulted in being very profitable for him.
■ Following the events of 9/11 the stock market started to fall dramatically. 
Participant G felt that this fall would not be recovered quickly. Whilst he could 
not be sine that he was right, he followed his intuition and made some strategic 
changes in the company which included downsizing the staff numbers. In order 
to make it easier, or more likely that they survived the downturn in the economy, 
Participant G had to make 15 people redundant. This decision helped them 
sur vive a period of two years when business revenue was much lower than it was 
previously budgeted. He believes that if he had not taken that decision back then, 
they could have ended up making 25 people redundant later on. Therefore, acting 
quickly on his intuition saved the company in difficult times as well as the jobs of 
10 people.
Intuitive Misses (Intuition Heeded — Negative Outcome)
Examples of situations where intuition was heeded but it led to a negative outcome:
■ A few years ago Participant B intuitively felt it was a good opportunity to get 
together with four other colleagues doing the same kind of job to establish their 
own company. He felt that he and his colleagues all had the same attitude and 
approach, and wanted to do the same kind of things. He recalls that he did not 
really do any rational logical analysis of the whole thing. After working together
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with this team for about 6 months he realised that they all had different 
motivations and interests, and tliere was a complete misunderstanding of 
expectations. Two years later, he came to the conclusion that it just was not going 
to work and they closed down the business. Reflecting back. Participant B 
explicated that he should have put a lot more effort in rational logical side about 
the strategy, objectives and expectations instead of simply following his intuition.
■ About four years ago. Participant F decided to set up business operations in 
China as they believed that there would be a big market for selling their software. 
Since they needed to make the decision quickly at the time, they did not do a 
thorough research and they did not base their decision on facts. They believed 
that Beijing was the right place to set up. Consequently the business failed as it 
turned out that Beijing was totally the wrong place. Shanghai would have been a 
much better place for the operations, and they should have planned it better to 
have the right people with industry knowledge for the operations to survive.
■ Participant K introduced someone into the company whom he has known for 
some time but never really worked with. He seemed to be a good guy with lots of 
knowledge and know-how. Participant K did not interview him the way they 
would normally do, he just came along to meetings and joined the company. As it 
turned out he was too much of a ‘thinker’ but not someone to go and get 
business. Reflecting back, Participant K defined it as a poor judgement on his 
part. Perhaps more structured analysis would have helped him to decide whether 
he was the right person for the company or not.
Intuition Irrelevant? (Intuition Not Heeded — Positive Outcome)
Examples for this category would include situations where intuition was not heeded 
but still a positive outcome was experienced. However, no examples were generated 
fi'om the interview data that would fit in this category. The reason for this is that in 
the interview schedule the participants were only asked to report critical incidents 
where they did follow their intuition to make a decision. They were not prompted to 
report situations where not heeding their intuition led to a positive outcome.
191
Nevertheless this category emerged as one of the four possible outcomes from the 
conceptual framework created ai’oimd the interview data and it provides a direction 
for further exploration of this kind of situations.
The examples below that relate to situations where not heeding an intuition led to a 
negative outcome were volunteered by the participants themselves without being 
asked as part of the interview schedule.
What If? (Intuition Not Heeded-Negative Outcome)
The following examples include situations where intuition was not heeded and it led 
to a negative outcome:
■ A client company was having certain issues with an individual employee and 
they sought advice from Participant D. Listening to the profile of the individual 
and the characteristics of what was happening, the situation looked similar' to a 
previous one that Participant D has come across before. Therefore, he advised the 
client to get rid of that individual as soon as possible as he intuitively felt that this 
individual could potentially put the company in jeopardy. In due course, his 
advice was not talcen and some rationality was put into the decision with the hope 
to modify the employee’s behaviour. About eight months after the initial 
conversation with this client, it turned out that the employee continued with the 
same behavioru' and was not being open and honest which actually put the 
company in jeopardy. At that point, the client decided to fire the employee. 
Participant D concluded that if his intuition was followed in the first place, it 
probably would have saved a lot of time and money.
■ Participant C recalls recruiting two people although he did not have good feelings 
about them. However, he did not follow his intuition and recruited them as there 
was not a lot of choice at the time, and he needed somebody for the job. In both 
cases, with the passage of time it became apparent that the people he recruited 
were not right for the company.
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7.3 Summary of Findings
This pilot study has presented the research findings that emerged from the 
investigation of the use of intuitive judgement in decision making. One of the 
important conclusions derived from the literature is that many managers use intuitive 
judgement to assist their problem solving and decision making, especially under 
complex or uncertain conditions (Burke and Miller, 1999; Hayashi, 2001; Isenberg, 
1984; Parikh et al, 1994). The data from the interviews revealed similar findings 
which are summarised in the following sixteen key points.
The following factors influence the use of intuition in decision making:
■ speed to make the decision
■ when the decision is related to people issues (e.g. recruitment)
■ when there ar e many decisions to be made
■ pattern recognition (i.e. does the variety of events represent a pattern that is
similar* to the ones I have dealt with before?)
The findings from the analysis of the interviews suggested that participants use 
intuition in making strategic decisions in the following circumstances:
■ when there is a lack of data (i.e. the facts are not available)
■ when in huny to make a quick decision
■ when there is lack of time and resources to be devoted for resear ch
■ when the situation is complicated
■ in imcertainty and when there is a lot of unknowns
■ in crises and when there is not a lot of time to reflect
■ when there needs to be made a judgement rather than an analysis
The participants indicated that the effective use of intuitive judgement in decision 
making depends on:
■ experience, background, and knowledge of the decision maker
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Additional themes that emerged from the interviews included:
■ in business it is useful to have both types of people -  intuitive and analytical -  as 
they create a good balance
■ intuition cannot be proven, thus ideas and opportunities may get Tost’ or remain 
indeterminate (see Figure 7.1)
■ intuition is referred to by managers as a ‘feeling’ thus confriming the somatic 
aspect of intuition
■ intuition is perceived to become more effective as the decision maker gains 
experience.
7.4 Conclusion
On the basis of this pilot study several points and emerging themes have been 
identified which confirm and extend previous research. The findings provided 
evidence that intuition is used in complex and uncertain enviromnents, to make fast 
decisions, and it can lead to improved managerial decision making through 
development of experience. These findings open up further questions and therefore 
require frirther investigation of the use of intuitive judgement in strategic decision 
making. It should be noted that an important limitation to this study was the selection 
of the sample group. Large proportion of the participants was already informed about 
intuition, thus they were not naïve decision makers. Therefore, it raises the question 
on the extent to which they were able to comment objectively on the use of intuition. 
In ftitiue research it would be beneficial to work with a sample of managers who 
were less informed but have a greater wealth of strategic and operational decision 
making experience upon which to draw.
To conclude, the application of the CIT provided a useful tool for the thorough 
exploration of senior executives’ accounts of intuitive decision making. In this 
respect, the pilot study has been instrumental in the development of the intuition- 
décision outcome typology as a imique analytical tool. The focus of Study 2 is the 
decisions whereby the decision makers heeded their intuitions. Therefore, Study 2 
will employ the concepts o f ‘intuitive hits’ and ‘intuitive misses’ from this typology.
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Chapter 8 Study 2a: Intuitive Hits
8.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the first part of Study 2 of the research. There aie three case 
studies of decision making processes that took place at thiee police organisations 
(POA, FOB and POC). These cases are referred to as ‘intuitive hits’ as these 
decisions were described by the participants to have involved ‘intuitions’ as a 
response to a critical incident and were judged to have had effective outcomes.
The three decision making processes presented in this chapter were based on Crossan 
et al’s (1999) 41 framework specifically identifying the feed forward learning 
processes: the intuiting (li), inteipreting (I2), integrating (I3 ) and institutionalising (I4 ) 
processes, linking the individual, group and organisation levels. Essentially the cases 
described and analysed here focus on what happens duiing the above processes, such 
as: how intuitions aiise during the intuiting process and on what basis; how the 
participants make sense of their intuitive judgements and explain them to others in 
the interpreting process; what interactions occur within the management teams 
dming the integrating process; and how these teams embed their intuitions in the 
organisation thiough the institutionalising process. The figures at the end of each 
case illustrate the decision making process in respect to the 41 framework. Each level 
of process is marked tluoughout the case as well as on the figures (e.g. by the lower 
case letters (a), (b), (c) etc.) and can be read in conjunction with these.
The data presented here includes direct quotations gathered from the focus group 
interviews with the participants. The complete list of the categorisation of the 
thought units from the interviews relating to ‘intuitive hits’ are provided in Appendix 
6, Only a small selection of quotes were included in this chapter; the choice of quotes 
is based on the researcher’s subjective judgement of being the most illustrative 
examples to complement the ‘stories’ presented here. All names of participants and 
organisations have been changed to protect the anonymity and confidentiality of the
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individuals and their respective organisations. Table 8.1 shows the list of participants 
and their positions within their respective organisations.
Table 8.1 List of Participants in Study 2
Participant Position
Organisation: POA
Paiticipant A Chief Superintendent
Participant B Superintendent Partnerships
Participant C Superintendent Operations
Pailicipant D Detective Chief Inspector Crime Operations
Participant E Detective Chief Inspector Crime Management
Participant F Chief Inspector Ops & Neighbourhood Policing
Paiticipant G Special Constable
Participant H Business Manager
Participant 1 Director of HR
Participant J Police Sergeant
Paiticipant K Police Constable
Organisation: POB
Participant L Chief Constable
Participant M Deputy Chief Constable
Participant N Assistant Chief Constable
Paiticipant O Assistant Chief Constable
Participant P Director of HR
Participant Q Director of Finance
Organisation: POC
Participant R Chief Superintendent
Participant S Superintendent Operations
Participant T Superintendent
Participant U Detective Superintendent
Participant V Chief Inspector
Participant W Chief Inspector
8.1 Case 1: Organisational Restructure at PGA
At the end of 2007, the PGA was luider considerable pressure both externally and 
internally to restructure the organisation in order to ‘re-engineer’ the way they did 
business. In the initiating process, externally, there was a drive from the government 
to deliver an ‘effective and efficient’ police service, and the changes occurring within
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the local Coimcil meant that POA needed to structure its business in line with their 
local partners in order to work with them collaboratively.
“What we saw was a change, a change in demand both internally and 
externally in the case that we needed to reengineer the M’ay that we 
did business. We didn’t w’ake up one morning and say we ’re going to 
do this. What we 5'aw waa' the external influences that were impacting 
upon us. ” [Participant B]
“Externally there is a drive from the government to deliver an 
effective and an efficient police service. There are a number o f papers 
and government policies, there is a reducing bureaucracy paper... a 
national gr'een paper that talks about delivering core standards to the 
policing, so a Policing Pledge and again this is about structuring our 
services, so that we can deliver pure customer service, according to 
that Policing Pledge. ” [Participant C]
On the other hand, internally, staff workloads were extr-emely high mainly due to 
rmclear lines of accountability, which led to high anxiety and sickness levels within 
the organisation. This in turn resulted in poor performance around detection and 
reduction of crime, thus causing poor satisfaction and confidence within the local 
community. The crime performance figures were ‘in the red’ and the senior officers 
were under scrutiny from the chief officers group.
“A year ago a response officer would have turned up to go to work, 
and there wouldn’t have been enough people in my world, so they 
would have ended up with the prisoners themselves, and somebody 
from a neighbouring policing side would have moved across to the 
response team, and there was this merry-go-round, where everybody 
M>as doing somebody else’s instead o f what they were trained in. ” 
[Participant E]
“I  think certainly there were meetings with the wider management 
team and there was an event where they were asked to review for 
example are our existing stt'uctures fit for purpose and some o f those 
questions that drew the answers out led again to us knowing that we 
couldn’t just sit where we were with the status quo, there needed to be 
a change. ” [Participant C]
Around the same time, the County Basic Command Unit (BCU) had changed to a 
certain structure and this also initiated a motivation amongst the senior officers of 
POA to emulate that structme. They recognised the inefficiencies in how they were 
operating. Collectively they had the vision of what they needed to do in order to
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achieve improved performance efficiency and provide the highest quality service to 
the public.
“It might have started as a bit o f stalking horse but eventually it 
became a no brainer in the sense we couldn’t carry on the way we 
did. We weren’t managing the demand effectively as we ought to have 
been. " [Participant A]
“I  think we knew we had to move towards the structure o f the County 
BCU. " [Participant A]
However, the senior officers were not able to progress these changes as quickly as 
they would have liked. Due to the strict hierarchical structure of the organisation, at 
the time all decisions were being made by the Headquarters. For any kind of change 
within the organisation there needed to be an authority and ‘go ahead’ from the chief 
officers, who at the time were reluctant to allow anything as radical as changing the 
BCU structure as it had been tried before rmsuccessfiilly.
“The time line sort o f stopped, whilst we \\>ere going through the 
scoping bit, we weren’t able to progress it quite as quickly as we 
would have liked, because there were barriers that had been put up at 
the chief officer level. ” [Participant C]
By the time of David’s anival, as the new BCU Commander (and the Chief 
Superintendent) in early 2008, there was a growing frustration within the senior 
management team over the performance deficiencies as they were not able to manage 
the demand effectively. It was summer 2008 when the Deputy Chief Constable 
finally said “go for it”. Eventually the flood gates were opened and providing that 
they stayed within the budget of £20 million the POA’s senior officers were given 
the authority to start the change process. The senior officers emphasised that this was 
a time pressured process as they were given only a short time frame to make the 
change happen.
“Then when the green light came on the sort o f pace o f change picked 
up and we were told, ‘yeah, you can crack on with it now’, and 
actually we needed to deliver it by X, so there was a very, very short 
timeframe. ” [Participant C]
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As tlie next step, the senior officers started looking at some of the best practice in 
other parts of the country by visiting various BCUs similarly positioned to POA, to 
see what models they had, and how they have structured and operated.
“Inevitably there was going to be the point where we actually start 
looking what other Forces do around their neighbourhood policing 
teams, and realising that what we ’re trying to achieve, no-one else 
was trying to achieve, well very few other Forces were trying to 
achieve, and what we should be tiying to achieve is actually a lower 
level o f staffing in the neighbourhood policing teams. ” [Participant F]
It became apparent that they needed to reduce the number of the neighbourhood 
policing team and divide the resources between the tluee major divisions of policing 
within the organisation: the neighbourhood policing team including response 
functions; the investigation of serious and organised crime; and the crime 
management and custody. However, this presented uncertainty and complexity since 
there was no straightforward formula which they could apply to the allocation of 
resources. Furthermore, at the time the Goveriunent changed their view on how the 
police would be assessed, and the single top-down indicator was going to be based 
on public confidence. The senior officers had to find the right balance of resources 
between the thr'ee areas in order to deliver what the Government was demanding 
from them.
“I  think it’s fair to say there is no magic formula in this. There is no 
logarithm you can apply to policing that says this, [POA], you need to 
put X  percent into uniform policing, X  percent into neighbourhood 
policing, X  percent into CID, Xpercent into back office support and 
through applying that distribution o f resources success is guaranteed.
That formula does not exist. So you then really do have to rely upon 
intuition and professional judgement. ” [Participant A]
“There was a lot o f business processes, it wasn’t just a simple 
question ofjust saying 20 there, 60 there, 50 there, it’s all fixed. It 
was actually reengineering the machine. ” [Participant D]
“I f  we put too many resources into the serious crime well the other 
stuff goes without, but i f  you don’t put enough and the serious 
offenders get away, and although there’s less offences there’s more o f 
a high-profile impact. So three very different competing areas where 
we have to get the balance right. ” [Participant E]
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Additionally, there was ambiguity regarding the number of staff in the organisation 
as no one seemed to know the exact number of employees. Therefore, they needed to 
make sure that the staff numbers were accur ate before starting the resource allocation 
process.
“So at the very beginning there were posts all over the place, and 
each o f the Chief Inspectors thought they had a number o f people 
under them, but they were double counting, so we needed to make 
sure that actually they had the right number to start wnth " 
[Participant H]
In the beginning of the change process, an external consulting firm was brought in 
who were tasked first to validate the number of staff in the organisation, and then to 
analyse the demand of policing across the organisation and to provide a ‘formula’ 
based on that demand (which would be called ‘the demand profile’) establishing how 
many people are needed in each division which could then be applied to the business 
in terms of redistribution of the resoiuces. Following a few months’ work, the 
consultants were not able to deliver a ‘resourcing formula’ and they have not 
managed to take the process forward.
“We had an outside firm come in and say, okay, we ’re being tasked to 
look at the Force, and find the resource formula, and find the magic 
button that’s going to tell everybody how the whole Force should 
look, and that just collapsed andfaded. ” [Participant D]
In the discussions with the consultants, the senior officers were asked: “So what are 
your business rules in terms o f how you redistribute staff, and what is your rationale 
in terms o f deploying X  and Y, and how have you decided that you can take from 
there and add to here for instance?”. Through these discussions, it became obvious 
that there was no ‘magic formula’ to apply to the redistribution of resources, and 
hence the external consultants, who had no personal experience of policing at POA, 
have not been successfril in delivering one. The big realisation for the senior officers 
was that it was not only the analysis of demand and supply of policing that was 
needed to take into account in making the resourcing decisions, but also there was 
something about ‘knowing’ the business. These senior officers had many years of 
policing experience, therefore they were best placed to make the resour cing decisions
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themselves. What they had to do was to rely on their ‘professional judgement’. 
Indeed, the senior officers were refemng to their intuitive judgement:
“Well how do you do that, well we’ve been doing the job, you know, 
that’s how many people you need for that, and all the science in the 
world, it actually wouldn’t put us far off ” [Paiticipant D]
“I  think it is intuitive, but there’s a lot about knowing your business. ” 
[Participant E]
“I  think a lot o f it was down to that, to the gut feeling at the end o f the 
day, and then I ’d say professional judgement through one base or 
another, but it was also backed up in terms o f professional judgement 
around supply and demand, etcetera, levels o f staff and other things, 
so those things I  suppose are, when you put them all together, there’s 
not a magic formida, it is about knowing that’s what I  think, a lot o f it 
was about that. ” [Participant D]
“There is no magic equation, there is no magic formula and it’s 
relying upon experience and the understanding, finger in the air, but 
perhaps more professional judgement o f what’s needed to deliver 
policing in [POA]. ” [Participant C]
This realisation marked the beginning of the intuiting (a) (see figure 8.1) process 
which started with the three Chief Inspectors who were going to model the 
restructure in POA. They were aware of the needs in various areas and also they 
knew the individuals in their teams, their strengths and weaknesses, hence they were 
best placed to make a professional judgement on how to spread that expertise across 
the three divisions.
“They did it all on their own experiences, because they knew their 
teams, so they would know which personality or which person would 
have the right skills per any particular role. ” [Participant H]
The Chief Inspectors explained that their intuitive judgements were influenced by the 
accumulation of their learning and experiences tluough the years in the police service 
suggesting that their past experience was the underlying foundation of their 
intuitions.
“I  think there was intuition for the whole, it comes from something in 
the back o f your mind, your experiences, and we’ve all got a certain 
amount o f experience to stand up here. ” [Participant E]
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“Inevitably we are a product o f our learning and our experiences 
through the police service, the routes we have taken to the position 
we Ve in now, and the positions, the other various roles w e’ve had will 
affect those opinions and things. ” [Participant F]
The Detective Chief Inspector for crime management attempted to explain his 
personal experience of intuiting which he described as having a ‘gut feeling’. He 
stated that all the information gets processed in his mind nonconsciously and the 
solution appeal's suddenly as a feeling, the basis of which is based in his knowledge 
and experience of the business.
“I  tend to go on gut feelings quite a lot, but the thing is that, ideally gut 
feeling, there’s a lot o f numbers and stuff going through my head, it’s 
like you can’t work it all out, and you wake up in the middle o f the 
night, and there it is, because your brain’s processed it all. So yeah, 
there is a lot o f gut feeling, but a lot o f that fi^om previous 
experiences, and it’s like I  say, knowing the business really, for where 
we’ve got to in the other little bits. ” [Participant E]
The Chief Inspector for operations and neighbomhood policing stated that their 
intuitive judgements aroimd the distribution of resources were based on what each of 
them felt was the right balance to have in their respective divisions; again 
emphasising the fact that the model they have come up with was not an outcome of 
analysis of har d data, but of their judgement and gut feeling of what was needed at 
POA to operate effectively.
“The decisions we were making I  think was an awful lot based on our 
intuition o f what we feel is the right thing to do. ” [Participant F]
“The division up o f where those officers went was based around I  
think, the needs in various areas, and I think that probably, where 
there was an awful lot o f intidtion rather than hard fact as to where 
these individuals should go. " [Participant F]
“When you come down to basically what percentage o f staff shoidd be 
in what area o f business, bearing in mind that the area o f businesses 
all work together, and/or conflict each other in that sort o f beautiful 
way, then inevitably it’s going to have to come down to that person 
feels they need X, that person needs Y, that person feels they need Z, 
that means he get X-2, he gets Y-2 whatever it is, however it works, 
and that’s alw>ays got to happen. ” [Participant F]
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The interpreting (b) process followed with the start of conversations between the 
senior officers of POA where various discussions took place. The main issue was 
that reducing the size of the neighbourhood policing team was going to create a pool 
of officers who would then be redistributed to other divisions. The discussions 
revolved around where they felt these officers should go, and effectively what the 
restructure would look like. This is where the senior officers were trying to articulate 
what was in fact a gut feeling, thus developing dialogue amongst themselves. Their 
understanding of what should be done developed the more they talked about it.
“So there’s all this dehate that was going on about what should 
happen and what other shifts and what other departments we felt 
should be doing. ” [Participant D]
“And I  think that that perception was bourn out the longer I  stayed 
and the more we spoke, which is why to some degree, to a large 
degree, we said w e’d deal with the way the Chief Inspector 
neighbourhood policing and the Chief Inspector uniform operations 
would come under one role to provide them with the same line 
management so -  perception, intuition call it what you will -  it’s 
certainly where I  was. ” [Participant A]
“So you have all these collective discussions and then ultimately it 
came down in terms o f what’s right for the BCU in the whole, and we 
had to make something fit  to be direct. ” [Participant D]
At this stage through conversations, the senior officers were becoming clearer on 
their own intuitive judgements. In interpreting his intuitive judgement to his 
colleagues, Robert, the Chief Inspector responsible for operations and neighbourhood 
policing, tried justifying his judgement by putting forward his argument against the 
reduction of the neighborhood policing team.
“Now the easiest way logically to get confidence is to put uniforms on 
the street, I  argue. The other side o f the argument, which I ’m sure 
Andrew and some ways Peter would have is, i f  we had the information 
that every single crime that was reported to us there was a detective 
w/zo caught every baddie and brought to Justice, that would give 
confidence. Unfortunately a lot o f the detective end o f the business 
isn’t necessarily as visible as the uniform end is, so there’s that, and 
what will always be slightly conflicting, my view is put uniforms out 
on the street and you should reduce the crime. That means you have 
less to detect. ” [Participant F]
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An Inspector and a Sergeant who were experienced in project management were 
given the concept and were asked to develop different options in terms of what the 
numbers looked like (i.e. how many people go into different parts of the business) 
providing reasons for or against each option. In the integrating (c) process, those 
options were presented to the Chief Inspectors who started negotiating, focusing on 
details such as the number of staff required in each team to cover certain shifts, and 
paiticular individuals with relevant skills and training suitable for specific roles.
“We did a lot o f horse-trading as it were betw>een each other, I ’ll have 
so-and-so, and need somebody with this skill set, where can I  get 
them? Your skills, how good an investigator are you? Do you want to 
go and be a detective, are you going to make it realistically, no you ’re 
not, well... ” [Participant E]
“Because each o f us had different demands, and it was just trying to 
reconcile those different demands, not just based on say numbers and 
input in terms o f demand, and then ‘okay, so that means you need that 
amount o f people, because we ’re going to cover this many shifts, and 
this many hours ’. ” [Participant D]
There were certain parameters imposed by the organisation’s Headquarters, such as 
dividing the policing area into four main sections. Although the senior officers did 
not agree with these parameters they weren’t given the authority to apply what they 
wanted, they had to comply with the chief officers’ demands. The Superintendent 
commented, our gut feeling wasn’t taken care o f there, we had to go with the 
map as it was drawn”.
“We have to work within parameters, and none o f us wanted those 
parameters, we didn’t agree with it, none o f us. ” [Participant E]
“It was just, and it’s we had to, we don’t like that structure, we don’t 
want to go with it, we want to go with this, and got so far down the 
line it was ‘no you ’re not quite autocratic, we want four, and that’s 
what you ’re doing’. ” [Participant E]
The Chief Inspectors came up with an initial model of restructur'e quite early on, 
however the fine details were difficult to resolve. In these meetings tensions were 
ar ising fiorn time to time as the Chief Inspectors were overly protective of their own 
areas and did not want to lose their teams. As it became apparent in the previous 
discussions, especially Robert did not agree with the principle that the number of his
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neighbourhood policing team should reduce. Because of the prolonged negotiating 
process over a five-month period, information was getting out into the division 
causing rumour* and speculation, as a result new ideas were coming in which altered 
the initial decisions, putting them back to the starting point.
“I  think it was an incredibly destructive process for us to go through, 
in the \\>ay that we went through it, because we had some very long 
meetings, which were confrontational meetings between the three o f 
us, and led to, inevitably, well saying ‘okay, one’s got the bare 
minimum, right, you’ve got to lose more ’, and so inevitably that will 
push people into their position o f ‘okay, well I ’m not my bare 
minimum, I ’m not giving up anyone’. ” [Participant F]
After long-lasting and tense discussions, eventually the Chief Inspectors ariived to a 
place where they could all agree on the level of staff that was required in different 
divisions to operate effectively. From the perspective of the participants, the whole 
process in effect brought these senior officers together and made them stronger as a 
management team.
“From the rest o f SMT, it’s built us as a stronger team because we 
have worked through a real challenge together. ” [Participant H]
“I  guess apart form making a business decision, I  think M>e grew as a 
team as well, as part o f that journey. ” [Participant A]
In order to introduce what the new structure would look like, the senior officers held 
a variety of staff briefings, road shows and meetings. However, their efforts to 
communicate the new model did not seem to be received well by the organisation’s 
staff who did not engage in this process. Although the senior management’s aim was 
to take the staff with them along the process of change, it appeared that the 
consultation did not necessarily happen in the way that the staff were expecting.
“I  would accept that the consultation process was not a fulsome as it 
might have been, there are weaknesses in that, actually there are 
some strengths in that as well, because actually, we have a 
responsibility to exercise some leadership, and I  can remember in the 
early days, when people heard about change, a number o f hares were 
set running and quite clearly we coidd have excited false expectation 
around what the new’ world will look like, and that could be equally 
challenging to manage in terms o f disappointment i f  people don’t get 
what they want. ” [Participant A]
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“There were individuals in that group M>ho weren’t necessarily as 
committed to it or signed up to it as others and the end result is people 
they line managed were less well informed ahout the process o f how it 
was going to work So inevitably whether it was doubt or whether it 
was blockages in the process, but there were definite blockages in the 
process, that didn’t assist and help us put the change in place which 
meant there were some people at the grass roots level that didn’t 
actually understand why it was all happening. ” [Participant F]
The final model of restructui'e was also raised and discussed at a number of different 
forums with different management teams. On the whole, the end product received 
good support. The Chief Superintendent then presented it to the Deputy Chief 
Constable who agreed to its implementation.
Establishment of the new organisational structure facilitated the institutionalising (d) 
process. In this respect, the neighbourhood policing teams which previously 
consisted of a community beat manager as well as coimnunity beat officers have 
been reduced to have only one community beat manager, and the community beat 
officers have been put into either the response team, the crime investigation team, or 
the crime management team. The major part of the restructure also involved giving 
clai'ity around the roles of these officers and defining their functionality. As a result, 
consistent standaidised processes and systems have been put into place thioughout 
the organisation.
“By actually putting the neighbourhood policing team, making it 
smaller, but defining very tightly in terms o f what the role o f those 
officers were, and knowing what the functions were, it actually 
enabled us, it’s helped moving that to deliver on what the 
neighbourhood policing teams classically should define. ” [Participant 
D]
“Having gone through the change... we’ve got the lowest crime 
allocation to staff that we’ve had generally at any point, we’ve got an 
effective crime management system that sort o f weeds out crime, it 
also gives people scheduled appointments to come in and see us. ” 
[Participant C]
“My view overall is that it’s been a success for the BCU, actually our 
business processes are standard now, they ’re a lot more efficient, we 
actually can talk about posts and people confidently now. ” 
[Participant D]
206
“From my point o f view the success is that we noM' have an 
establishment o f our staffing, fully signed off, and we knoM> exactly 
where everybody is, so that was the thing that was missing in the very 
beginning, and now w e’ve got it. ” [Participant H]
After the launch of the new organisational structure in summer 2009, it appear ed that 
there still needed to be minor adjustments as things progressed and people moved to 
and fi'om different teams. The restructure became a continuous process rather than 
the implementation of a single decision.
“New demands come in, new analysis, new issues arise, so for 
instance, in Peter’s world we’ve got to re-adjust and lose some 
capacity which we had in some proactive teams to support the 
custody, and just supply in a 24 hour basis support to the rest o f the 
BCU wasn’t possible under the regime, so there has been some 
refinement, around that. ” [Participant D]
Reflecting back on the change process, the main comments by the senior officers 
were around the lack of consultation, not only between themselves and the staff 
during the restructuring, but also between the Headquarters and themselves. Their 
view is that having to apply the chief officers’ parameters on the restructure has 
taken away some of their own authority in being able to design POA’s new structme 
fi'om scratch.
“So to an extent I  think we might have come up with a slightly 
different map that would have perhaps mirrored our policing needs 
greater. So our gut feeling wasn’t taken care o f there, we had to go 
with the map as it was drawn. ” [Participant C]
"I think there’s elements o f it now that were taken out o f our control.
For instance the locations and the sectors we have had to come online 
with mirroring and supporting external structures that have already 
been put in place. ” [Participant C]
Also having gone through the change, there have been a few lessons learnt for the 
senior officers. They explained what they would do differently in a similar situation 
in the future:
“The learning is consultation should mean consultation, it shouldn’t 
mean communication, and i f  time consultation is about understanding 
people’s needs and taking a view from that to help steer your options, 
then that’s what it should be, and therefore there shoidd be a lot o f
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effort placed in providing the right opportunity, the right environment, 
the right understanding o f staff to engage in that. ” [Participant C]
"So for me, two things, get clarity in terms o f reference to start, and 
secondly write time off, get a\\>ay and deal with it, as opposed to just 
doing it every week, and then allowing those other things to fester or 
whatever. ” [Participant D]
"...some o f those parameters I ’d probably have challenged, i f  I  knew 
that now, where we are now, I ’d probably have challenged some o f 
those parameters a bit more at the time, where we are, the benefits we 
can see, yes there are some benefits, there are some big drawbacks. ” 
[Participant F]
In summary, the performance inefficiencies at POA put pressme on the senior 
officers initiating the restmctui’e of the business. In the begiiming of the process, 
they brought in external consultants with the intention to analyse the organisation’s 
demand and supply of policing and find a foimula on which they could apply the 
allocation of resources. With the failure of the analytical route, tlie senior officers 
became aware that they needed to employ their experience and knowledge of the 
business in order to make those decisions which started the process of intuiting (a). 
Thi'ough dialogue and justification of their intuitive judgements, the interpreting (b) 
process staited to take place between the three Chief Inspectors. They’ve developed 
a shared imderstanding thr ough discussions and negotiating, and eventually achieved 
consensus in the integrating (c) process. The establishment of the new restructure 
facilitated the institutionalising (d) process. Effectively the senior officers’ intuitive 
judgements have been successfully embedded within the organisation through the 
implementation of the restructur e.
In conclusion, as it has become evident in the analysis of this case, there appears to 
be an additional process prior to the intuiting process which the researcher called the 
‘initiating’ process. This process forms the decision context which acts as a trigger 
leading to intuiting. Based on this finding, the 41 framework is extended to 
incorporate this additional process and a 51 framework is developed. Consequently, 
the decision process presented in this case follows a 51 model in that it flows tluough 
initiating, intuiting, interpreting, integrating and institutionalising processes. See 
Figure 8.1 for the model emerging from this case.
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The POA’s senior officers described this decision as an ‘intuitive hit’ as they 
developed the resource allocation model based on their extensive experience and 
knowledge of policing, and knowing the business well was what helped them build a 
model that would work in POA. The institutionalisation of these officers’ intuitive 
judgements had been a success leading to the perception of increased effectiveness 
and efficiency in the organisation.
Figure 8.1 Intuitive Hit Case 1 Organisational Learning Process
Intuiting
Integrating
Interpreting
Institutionalising
Initiating
8.2 Case 2: Cancellation of Event at POB
POB had been planning for more than a yeai' to police a conference which was going 
to take place in October 2009. This paiticular operation was over-and-beyond what 
they would normally do in terms of policing on a day-to-day basis and required 
planning for all sorts of events such as counter-terrorism, involving a working 
paitnership with a list of other organisations including Group 4 Secmity, fire and 
rescue, and ambulance. As part of that, the chief officers at POB put a bid in the 
Home Office to receive special funding for this big organisational operation.
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totalling approximately £6 million in order to cover the entire policing operations 
diu'ing the four-day period of this conference.
This operation involved 1500 police officers including the chief officers with senior 
command level responsibilities. The operation took place in October 2009, and it had 
been a success in terms of the conference being able to cany on smoothly without 
any major incidents, having minimum impact on the local community.
At the end of the operation, in the initiating process, an email was sent out by a 
Chief Inspector to a list of police officers who took part in the operation, inviting 
them to a dinner event at a famous hotel for the celebration of the successful police 
operation to say ‘thank you’ on behalf of FOB. The Assistant Chief Constable, 
Richai'd, was also on the receiving end of this email as a result of which he has 
initiated a sequence of actions.
”An email comes out without any, I  wasn 7 aware o f any sort o f chain 
o f command actually making that decision... but an email M>ent out to 
well over a hundred people including partner agencies to invite them 
to an event at the [hotel], quite a prestigious event and venue in the 
[town centre], on the 2nd November, for this event, in the hope to see 
people there. ” [Participant N]
“Richard picked up an email from the police planner, a middle- 
ranking middle manager, who was inviting everybody to a £14-16 a 
head celebration o f the successful police operation, that money not 
being collectedfi'om each individual attendee, but incorporated in our 
overall budget. " [Participant L]
As soon as Richard read the email, through the intuiting (a) process, he had an 
immediate judgement that this was not right. From his point of view his reaction was 
intuitive which came out as a strong gut feeling, telling him that he needed to act 
quickly on what was being proposed in this email.
“ ...I a recipient o f the email, and for me the event just didn’t 
sound right. ” [Participant N]
In order to gather more information and find out about the background of this event 
he checked with Owen, the Chief Inspector, who sent the email out. It became
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apparent that within that £6 million funding for the policing operation £2,500 had 
been earmarked to cover this event to invite the staff to a ‘nice meal’.
Although previously he would not be concerned about it, Richard intuitively made a 
cormection between what was being proposed (a dinner event at a famous hotel) and 
all the issues around the budget cuts and public sector finance that were in the news 
every day. For him, this did not feel right and he was alarmed by how this event 
would be seen from outside the organisation.
“Richard intuitively felt was poor use o f public fiinds, particularly in 
the context o f recession and the economic challenges that we’re 
facing. ” [Participant L]
“Six months ago, a year ago, I  woiddn’t have felt the same way, so my 
intuition would have been different at that point in time, whereas 
today it doesn’t feel right. ” [Participant N]
The interpreting (b) process started on the individual level while Richard tried to 
articulate his gut feeling to himself by making this tacit intuitive judgement explicit. 
Through this process, he was trying to explain and justify to himself the rationale 
behind his judgement.
“Where I  was coming from initially is that I ’m looking out from this, 
and saying what is the view from outside, so I  think in terms o f the 
policing context... our decisions are looking at what’s the impact 
going to be, particularly in, what they say a single top down target o f 
public confidence and improved public confidence, so for me that was 
the big look and actually those considerations. ” [Participant N]
“An apology, but obviously the rationale behind it is that with all 
those issues that speak about public sector financing, knowing full 
well that as soon as that email goes out, that we are not water tight as 
an organisation, but that could be in the local media, so w e’ve got to 
balance those consequences up really from it. ” [Participant N]
In order to consult a second person, Richard immediately notified Duncan, the Chief 
Constable at POB, and asked for his point of view, which led to the second episode 
of intuiting (c). Hearing Richard’s point, similarly Duncan’s iimnediate intuitive 
judgement was "Hhis can’t happen'\ appearing as a gut feeling which he said "^came 
out as stress"".
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“My immediate reaction and it was intuitive, was to say, and I  don 7 
think I  do this very often, but within two minutes o f getting the 
information fi'om Richard, I  said ‘this can 7 happen \ ” [Participant L]
In interpreting (d) his judgement, Duncan explained that his reaction was based on a 
previous experience 18 months ago where the chief officers had bad publicity when 
they ran a team meeting at the same hotel. He knew that this event almost certainly 
would replicate the negative repercussions of the previous one, and they would be in 
the public eye again with the potentially damaging news to the effect that the police 
are having a nice meal at the expense of the taxpayer. Duncan further explained that 
although this sounded like a nice thought to have the opportunity to thank the staff 
and the partners, and to engage with them in an informal environment, given the 
economic challenges around public funding, it was absolutely not possible to do this 
event.
Duncan and Richard were clear about their thoughts regarding this event, however 
Duncan felt it was important to consult the Director of Finance, Brian, to seek his 
professional view fiom a financial point regarding this decision.
“However, I  thought well we do have a Director o f Finance here, who 
informally I  consider to have almost the conscious o f the organisation 
as part o f Brian‘s portfolio. I  think we all should have that, but when 
it’s issues o f money, and arguably, i f  you like, and this is over­
simplifying Brian’s role, apologies for that Brian, but he holds the 
purse stjings to a certain extent, so therefore I  thought that was, and 
he was here, so it w^ as obvious I  thought to get a very quick third 
opinion, that’s what it was. ” [Participant L]
Third episode of intuiting (e) took place with Brian who also had an immediate 
reaction by saying “«o”. In interpreting (f) his judgement, his advice was to not do 
this event. At the time he did not have many years of experience at POB, therefore 
his judgement was based on his background and previous experience as a Finance 
Director in other organisations. Given that, he explained that he wanted to back up 
his gut feeling by asking for more information and checking with the officers in 
order to find out what the standard procedure was around this kind of practice at 
POB.
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“Because, actually, I  haven’t got a lot o f experience around the police 
at [POB], so instinctively it would have been from my background an 
absolute no, we shouldn Y do this kind o f thing. ” [Participant Q]
“So I  just did a little hit o f checking and questioning around is this a 
standard, is this the kind o f thing that normally happens, is this part 
o f our kind o f reward structure, i f  you like, for these type o f events, 
j'ust to kind o f double-check it out. ” [Participant Q]
Effectively Richard asked Duncan (who was a more experienced and more senior 
chief officer) and Dimcan asked Brian (who was an expert in financial matters). In 
this way, all three of them engaged in a group interpretive process developing a 
sense of shared understanding. It became clear that the chief officers shared a 
collective gut feeling regarding this event, and consulting each other’s view was a 
way of validating their individual intuitive judgements.
“Effectively Richard presented to me the issue in a, I  think, correct, 
judgemental way, I  mean you’d got a judgement in your mind. And I  
think I  would say Richard was coming to me to confirm, endorse, 
rubber-stamp that decision, but I  suppose Pd got an option, I  could 
have said no I  think it’s alright, let it happen. ” [Participant L]
“So I  didn Y need a lot o f pet'suading and that because it y\>as almost 
presented to me as we ’re not very sure about this, our instinct is not to 
do it, and almost just really kind o f asking me for that kind o f further 
judgement confirmation, which in some ways was quite easy. ” 
[Participant Q]
The integrating (g) process started with a mutual understanding of where they stood 
as the senior management team in respect to how they would respond to this event. 
The chief officers’ discussion was not just around the financial costing of the event, 
more importantly it was about the reputation of the organisation, and the potential 
adverse publicity which would be tar geted at them. For these chief officers, it was 
important that any decision they took would be seen in compliance with the values 
of tlie organisation. Although they believed that the intention for putting such an 
event out was right from an internal viewpoint, they also ought to consider the matter 
taking into accoimt the public perception.
“We took a view, again j'ound this table, in very quick time, that 
actually, even though we could justify every penny, we didn Y w>ant the 
publicity, and didn Y want to be seen to be criticised last week, as it 
was a few months ago, and then almost ignore that criticism and still
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blandly, blithely go on ahead and have our own little conference 
spending, what is perceived to be tax payers ' money on having a nice 
time. ” [Participant L]
This collective understanding further confirmed that this was the right decision to 
take. The chief officers felt certain about it.
“Further I  understood it was right to make, and certainly I  didn Y go 
home thinking have I  made the right decision. ” [Par ticipant N]
“Like Richard I  was very confident it was the right thing to do, I  did 
think it w’as a shame, and I  think all the logic, all the responsibilities 
that go with the office and the public service, the public sector 
element to our job, I  think, confirm in my mind that it was the right 
decision. ” [Participant L]
As the discussions continued, they all agreed that they could not allow this event to 
take place in the format that it had been suggested. However, on the other hand, they 
did not want their staff to feel undervalued as a result of having cancelled a ‘nice’ 
event. In an effort to provide the opporlimity to say ‘thank you’ to those who took 
part in the successful operation, the chief officers considered a few options that 
would still allow the event to take place without being paid from the operation 
budget; this way it was not likely to cause any adverse publicity for the organisation.
“So, Fm not sure i f  it was partly to try and help him save face, 
because he’d sent this message out, and also with a little bit o f 
mischief in my mind, I  think, I  thought well if  people want to still go to 
this event, let it happen, they can pay out o f their own pocket 
privately, knowing full well that that wouldn Y promote or create an 
event at the end o f it all. ” [Participant L]
“1 mean we considered, one, that they pay, the attendees pay 
themselves, two, that we actually go to a venue in [townj and just 
have a drink together, but then when we talked around, do you do 
that, could we do that in terms o f the mix o f people who’d be coming 
together, and another one which was even dodgier, I  think, waj to 
pass it back to Group 4 Security, which is a private company, and ask 
them to pay. ” [Participant N]
In response to those options Owen’s answer (as the initiator of the idea) came back 
as “«o”. Having thought tlirough all of the options the chief officers suggested, he 
had decided that the best thing to do was to cancel the event completely.
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In consultation with the Press Office, Richard prepared a communication message to 
publish in case this incident went out into the media. Fortunately, having intuitively 
recognised the problem and then having responded to it well in advance prevented 
any adverse publicity that would potentially dent the reputation of the organisation.
When the chief officers reflected on this experience they stated that they felt 
affirmed in their intuitive judgements which informed their decision making in this 
particular case.
“The fact that we ’re all happy with the decision a week later, means 
that we’ve got confidence in using intuition. I ’m not saying you’d then 
regret a week later because you think, well maybe I  made a poor 
decision there, so it’s kind of, in some ways if  you take it as a kind o f 
confidence insurance point that our intuition stands the test o f time. ” 
[Participant Q]
The chief officers believe that this incident had been a learning experience for 
everyone involved but particularly for Owen, whose decision has been completely 
reversed by their reaction. They suggested that Owen would now know better and 
probably not make the same mistake again.
“But I  think, Richard and I  certainly had a conversation about Owen, 
the person on the receiving end o f this decision, i f  you like, who also 
would be the person who had to really public ally show that he ’d been 
brought to book and had his decision completely reversed, so I  think I  
remember asking Richard how does Owen feel about that, and I  think 
you said that he learnt by the experience. ” [Participant L]
Despite the stress this incident created for the chief officers, they have not developed 
a formalised procedure around this experience that would inform future decision 
malting in similar' occasions. The HR Director asser*ted that they would not want to 
establish a principle as a result of this incident for they would want to judge each 
occasion on its own merit.
“We ’re not making a principle out o f that, which is we 7/ never spend 
any money, ever, as it were, on rewarding staff, or saying thank you, 
or, we ’II judge those on their merit kind o f thing. Because my instincts 
M'ould go against that as an overriding principle, I  mean it’s more 
sensitive at the moment, that feels an extreme example, but there are 
other examples where spending a bit o f money we might want to 
justify really, does attract negative publicity. ” [Participant P]
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In suinmaiy, in this case the initiating process started by an incoming email from the 
Chief Inspector inviting people to a dirmer event which was going to be paid from 
the operation budget. As soon as Richard read the email, tlrrough intuiting (a) 
process, he had a gut feeling that this was not right. Interpreting (b) occuiTed on the 
individual level whilst Richard tried to malce sense of his intuitive judgement by 
explaining the underlying rationale to himself. He consulted the Chief Constable (a 
more senior officer) who then consulted the Finance Director (an expert in finance) 
to seek their views on the matter. At this stage, the Chief Constable and the Finance 
Director engaged in the intuiting process (c) (e) and interpreted (d) (f) their gut 
feelings to each other by justifying why they should not go ahead with this event. 
Tlirough verifying their intuitive judgements they created a shared understanding of 
the situation, leading to the integrating (g) process, and generated options for the 
required action that would not jeopardise the organisation’s reputation. In this 
particular case, the chief officers cancelled the event, however they have not made a 
formalised procedure to institutionalise this decision. See Figure 8.2 for the 
organisational learning model emerging from this case.
This decision was an ‘intuitive hit’ for the chief officers of POB. The fact that 
Richard intuitively recognised a potential problem and followed his gut feeling by 
acting on it in a timely manner, and eventually cancelling the event prevented 
adverse publicity which would potentially harm the organisation’s reputation. The 
collaboration of the chief officers and the harmony in their intuitive judgements 
appear ed to be imperative in this case as it has allowed for a smooth decision making 
process in order to respond to the incident swiftly.
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Figure 8.2 Intuitive Hit Case 2 Organisational Learning Process
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8.3 Case 3: Introduction of Neighbourhood Policing at POC
In 2004, there was an initiative fi-om the Government for the police organisations in 
the UK to change the police service nationally and to deliver something called 
‘neighbomhood policing’. At the time the policing priorities were mainly focusing 
on matters that were coming from the top of the organisation, such as burglary and 
vehicle crime, however the public was complaining about being affected by other 
issues, such as kids running through gardens, smashing the windows, and alcohol 
consumption on the streets. There was a lack of engagement between the public and 
the police, and as a result even though generically crime was going down, the 
public’s perception was that crime was going up. For the Police Organisation C 
(POC) the initiating process for the national change has started externally with this 
Government directive,
“I  think nationally we’d got crimes coming down, and the fear o f 
crime wasn't shifting, and it was well what do M>e need to do?” 
[Participant R]
"1 don Y know i f  we would have changed had the government not told 
us to change. And what I  say is not us in this room hut us the police 
service nationally. ” [Participant T]
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There was also an internal drive from the senior officers within POC to deliver what 
the Government was asking them to do.
‘A t the time I  was implementing it, the chief officer who was leading 
it was veiy, very clear o f this vision, this is what’s happening, this is 
where it’s going, there w>as no doubt about this officer, when he said, 
that’s what I ’m doing, you are going to go there. ” [Participant R]
“I  think it \\>as about Christmas 2004 when the Chief Superintendent 
got me in a corridor and said you are delivering neighbourhood 
policing and I  said what’s that and he said not quite sure, but i t’s a 
national driver in essence o f where we want to go as a Force. ” 
[Participant V]
On the local area level at POC, some police officers were getting out into the 
community, being known to the community and dealing with the community issues, 
but there was a lack of structme around it and it was not delivered consistently 
across all the areas. Whilst the beat managers were attending to the day-time 
problems around people committing to offences during day time in the town centre, 
they were not able to effectively manage the night time economy. There was no 
ownership of long-term problem solving such as violence and disorder.
“We had a lot o f officers that were responding to demand and just 
going around and recording crimes, and there wasn’t anybody 
actually out there doing some real street policing, actually 
challenging bad behaviour and arresting people, prosecuting people 
and putting us in a position where we could actually respond to some 
o f those criticisms, but we weren’t actually tackling some o f the 
problems. ” [Participant W]
When the Government introduced a new concept of neighbourhood policing they did 
not provide a ‘rule book’; the Police Forces were told to find their own approach in 
terms of designing and delivering it. Therefore, there was a high level of uncertainty 
ar ound what it was and how they needed to set it up.
“I  don’t think there was a Force lead at this point, there was kind o f a 
vacuum o f what does it mean to the Force aspect o f it... so it M’as Just 
about trying to figure out what it actually meant to us as individuals. ” 
[Participant V]
“So the first decisions were there without a lot o f information, without 
a lot o f guidance. It was kind ofyou interpret this national stuff in the
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way that you want to do it locally and find the best way o f doing so. ” 
[Participant R]
At the time there were two pilots nationwide, called ‘reassurance pilots’, with the 
main objective to find out what would work in a cormnunity to reassme them. When 
POC senior officers first went to look at these two pilots running, they found them to 
be entirely different from one another, realising that they needed to figure out what 
would work in their own organisation. Later on these pilots started to show some 
positive findings:
“There had been what we ’d call ‘reassurance pilots \ so what would 
work in a community to reassure them we M>ere tackling the fear o f 
crime, and what that kind o f started to show, dedicated teams, known 
to the public, delivery, problem solving, getting back to people, was 
actually a way forward, so that came out o f the organisation. ” 
[Participant R]
This was a completely new understanding for POC officers and required an entire 
change of perspective. The Chief Superintendent explained the complexity this has 
presented for them:
"... at that time we were probably very much of, we ’d got beat teams 
but it M>asn’t formalised, we determined what we tackled as an 
organisation, so this term ‘responsive \ we’ve got to find out M>hat the 
public want, that waj probably less o f a priority for us, than actually 
doing what came across and we thought as professionals. ” 
[Participant R]
“So the real shift at that time, and it seems quite straightforward now, 
although we ’re still working at it, was we ’II go out and ask the public 
what they think their issues are, and that was kind of, that point, was 
quite a big thing for us, because well how do they know, there’s all 
that professional egotism that perhaps comes into it. It woj- a big shift 
on behaviours and process really, because we had no mechanism, 
real mechanism to, on a regular basis, go and speak to the public. ” 
[Participant R]
“So there is a range o f different things, but it literally was a whole 
change o f policing, being managing its own destiny, to saying to the 
public, you now tell us, and then how do we propose problem solving, 
which again wasn’t, still isn’t endemic on how you understand 
something, how you deconstruct it, work out where the key issues are 
on and then tackle it. ” [Participant R]
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There was a time pressure imposed on this change process and the short timescale 
meant that it was important for POC to get something working on the ground fairly 
quickly which they could then build on as they went along.
“Because we didn’t have the time, it was like you’ve got this to 
implement, get it done. ” [Participant R]
Whilst the other Forces in the country were determining their own priorities based on 
surveys, the POC officers’ gut feeling was that they needed to take a leap of faith 
and let the public decide on their own priorities. In fact this was a risk to take given 
that it was never tried before, but the senior officers felt confident that this was what 
they had to do if they were going to be ‘responsive’ to the concerns of the public and 
raise confidence in police.
“We gambled and said, yeah, we need to go out and let the public 
agree the priorities, because other areas in the country, they were 
kind o f determining their own based on surveys, and Roger and myself 
we ’re very clear we have to take a leap o f faith, i f  we ’re really going 
to get the responsiveness, the public have to have a say. ” [Participant
R]
“So again, I  guess the intuition was a) we went for the difficult areas 
because we thought it would w>ork, b) we kind o f let free out in the 
community, and at a really busy time, we decided to almost commit 
professional suicide and say we ’II abstract these officers and carry 
the risk. ” [Participant R]
In the beginning of the intuiting (a) process, the senior officers (the Chief 
Superintendent Gavin and the Chief Inspector Roger) made use of some research 
data available at the time such as the findings fiom the evaluation of the national 
pilots on neighboui'hood policing and other academic research in order to inform 
their thinking about this new concept. However, they had to rely on their intuitive 
judgements for the main part in trying to come up with a model of engagement with 
the public, that would be based on what the public was expecting from them, as 
became evident in the reassurance pilots.
The senior officers had to find the best way to identify the communities, to find out 
what their views were, to prioritise the matters that were important to them, to tackle 
those issues and then to feed back to them. They stated that the intuiting process was
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influenced by their many yeai's of experience and training in the police service, and 
they referred to ‘knowing’ the business given their seniority.
"So the intuition within this example comes down to, well you’ve got 
to deliver something called neighbourhood policing but make it up as 
you go along, but in effect we ’re going to trust you to come up with 
the best model o f what you do based upon your experience. ” 
[Paiticipant T]
"So there were things that came in right at the start that we knew 
from the context o f the area, that we knew from our experience o f the 
communities as well, and we knew from what probably our levels o f 
knowledge and our engagement were so I  had to kind o f interact with 
the communities and also probably some o f the levels our staff were at 
the time because this was a big change for them. ” [Participant R]
"I think maybe everybody in here will have a model that they can 
apply to the decision making, and to some extent, whether or not you 
can go through it every time, because o f some o f the training that 
you’ve done, some o f the jobs that you’ve actually worked on, but 
they ’II be in your thought process regardless, so that will link in with 
your intuition a lot o f the time. ” [Participant W]
But I ’ll know in my owm mind what’s right. I  think that’s down to me 
and my experience across a broad range o f issues. [Participant V]
At this stage, as part of the process the senior officers were provided with an advice 
docimient, however Gavin and Roger ignored the advice as they wanted to develop 
what they thought was the right model of engagement for POC, i.e. to let the public 
determine their own priorities.
"They ignored the advice because their intuition told them to do 
something different. ” [Participant T]
"So the decisions that Roger and I  made were quite arbitrary in the 
first place and what we thought would work in that context. ” 
[Paiticipant R]
The interpreting (b) process began with dialogue between Gavin and Roger who 
started meeting regulaity to discuss things such as how to break down the geographic 
area into communities, how best to engage with the communities, and the number of 
priorities they would let the public identify at any one time.
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"It started with who are our communities, and that’s what I  need 
Roger to look at Either you kind o f break down this geographic area 
into communities because we can’t take all o f it So that was the first 
one and we kind o f had a quick decision that it probably should go 
with the beat areas which was a smaller thing that was already in 
place, and how do we best engage, and then we had a lot o f 
discussions over how. ” [Participant R]
"So it literally was a 20 minute discussion o f this is what I  think,
Roger was, I  get that, next time you come back and it was then we met 
every so often. In the first point we didn’t do any project management, 
it was like me coming back and going, how far have you got, this is 
where I ’m at. And it’s only later when it was rolled out across the 
Force, because I  think we didn’t want to put a load o f obstacles 
around it, which was kind o f let’s see how it takes us. ” [Participant R]
In one of those meetings, Gavin drew a model of neighbourhood policing on the 
board at Roger’s office in an attempt to explain his vision of the neighbourhood 
policing model at POC. He stated that although his intuitive judgement was informed 
by some of the readings he had done at the time, the model he was proposing for 
engagement with the public was nothing more than "just a feel for i f \  Effectively, he 
was trying to interpret his intuitive judgement by putting it visually in a drawing for 
Roger (who noted later on that he preferred to work with ideas visually, and that he 
was better able to understand and interpret the information when it was presented to 
him in a drawing).
"I’ve drawn it on Roger’s board, I  think it was a case o f I  read some 
o f the research documents that were out there at the time, I  think 
that’s what happened. A fair bit o f much o f what we do and then 
based on those research documents kind o f try to make some sense o f 
what it was out o f that and then kind o f drew that on Roger’s board. ” 
[Participant R]
"So it was around these are the public biggest areas that we could go 
to, this is the format o f engagement, so M>e’ll have these meetings 
every six weeks I  think we set at. At those meetings the public can turn 
up, we ’II listen to their priorities and then we ’II go and tackle them. 
Probably had no more than three because we tried to work out what 
we could manage Mnthout being overloaded, and again that was kind 
o f just a feel for it more than anything and then what we ’II do is feed  
back to them at the next meeting. ” [Participant R]
Whilst Gavin was able to justify his intuitive judgement to Roger in a simple 
drawing on the board, he was aware that in order to be able to ‘sell’ it to the more
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senior officers in the organisation he needed to translate his gut feeling and present 
his Togic’. The highly bureaucratic and hierarchical structure of the organisation 
meant that he couldn’t just say ""this feels like the right thing to dd’\  he had to post- 
hoc rationalise his intuitive judgement and show evidence in order to be able to bring 
that model into reality.
"Your intuition may be the starting point but then you are going to 
have to rationalise it, you are going to have to research it, you are 
going to have to be able to evidence it, or i f  you 're not going to be 
able to take other people with youyou 're not actually going to be able 
to get support for it. ” [Paiticipant U]
"... but i f  you are challenged about what is your rationale for making 
the decision part o f the culture o f this organisation means that it 
would be quite hard to turn around and say ‘it Just feels like the right 
thing to do ’. ” [Participant T]
"Because we've got so many checks and balances within an 
organisational structure that I  think with these things you may have 
the intuitive feeling about something and well, I  think that's right, but 
there's so many checks and balances that you end up getting almost 
potentially self justification, so the rationalisation supports what you 
think anyv\>ay or challenges it. ” [Participant S]
Eventually, they developed the model of neighbourhood policing and produced an 
initial guide-practice that presented the way that they looked at the neighbomfiood 
policing, and what the organisation needed to be able to do in order to achieve that 
model.
In the integrating (c) process, Gavin and Roger introduced the model to the rest of 
the senior officers at POC. There was a divisional meeting that took place regularly 
where the dialogue continued with the rest of the SMT. At this stage, more people 
started getting involved in the discussions and contributed to the development of the 
model based on their own experience.
"We've discussed things and put it forward and checked it out with 
each other, and the person who kind o f put it fom>ard as in policing 
our original start was kind o f intuitive and this is what we are doing, 
w e’re going to move it on. But as it got negotiated through the 
organisation, other people chipped in and said this is how we've done 
it, this is how it works, then it morphed into something that became.
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probably still based in what we originally came up with, but morphed 
into this intelligence part o f it now. ” [Paiticipant R]
Acceptance of the model was important because its delivery needed to work in a 
collaborative way not only internally within the organisation but also externally with 
partners and politicians. Therefore, they started the consulting phase by presenting 
the model to the representatives of different areas in the organisation, and to the 
external partners and communities to get their opinion. During this process, the 
senior officers had to be influential in order to get the other parties’ support on what 
they were trying to do.
"There was a long process o f getting buy-in from upwards as well as 
at the same rank in the organisation. But ultimately people could see 
the benefits o f what was being suggested. ” [Participant W]
"We managed to persuade local community workers to help us do the 
meetings, because some communities weren’t ready to engage with 
the police at that time, so they did it on our behalf and that was 
another kind o f leap offaith for them, as much for us. ” [Participant R]
"I think persuading some politicians that it was important to get to 
the wider community to find their issues, rather than having to just 
come through dedicated things, so there were structures in place, but 
they weren’t probably as inclusive as they could have been. ” 
[Participant R]
The senior officers drew attention to the importance of leadership in this process and 
stated that it was due to their credibility within and outside the organisation that they 
were able to get other people’s confidence in the leadership’s decisions.
"The other interesting thing is whether people will follow it because 
they’ve got to have confidence in the leadership. ” [Participant V]
"One issue is a leap offaith, and that i f  you have a leap offaith, other 
people have got to have faith in you that you are making the right 
leap. And so you can have all the intuitive decisions you like, i f  you 
are seen as an idiot, people will not... ” [Participant V]
Although the senior officers were successful in getting buy-in from senior colleagues 
and colleagues at the same rank, the biggest difficulty they had was about 
communicating with the ‘grass roots’ levels and getting them to understand what 
neighbourhood policing was all about and how it would work. They had tried to
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commimicate their ideas widely within the organisation, however it appeared that not 
everyone bought into the idea of community engagement and letting the public 
identify their own priorities.
"The key bit in terms o f intuitive leadership is i f  it’s not connected 
with good communication then it can fail. Because you can’t make the 
connection where you’ve gone with your intuition into actually why 
you need to do it in the first place and that’s what we ended up doing 
a lot with trying to talk to people about why. ” [Participant R]
"When you look across the whole o f the organisation, there aren’t 
that many people that have actually got that degree o f vision about 
what it all means, and even though w e’ve spent a lot o f time and effort 
in trying to communicate that. ” [Participant W]
In the institutionalising (d) process, the organisation has invested in teams which 
have become the core of neighbour hood policing in maintaining regular engagement, 
problem solving and positive enforcement with the comrnimities. These processes 
were reinforced by the development and embedding of structures, strategies, systems 
and standard procedures around the delivery of neighbourhood policing. The 
standards that have been set at POC have also been set nationally at a later stage 
through the Policing Pledge in order to provide consistent delivery of neighbomhood 
policing throughout the country.
"We have neighbourhood teams across the whole county now, if  you 
were looking right now, almost following the same procedure that wg 
started with after 20 minutes, even the national level is not far off that 
20 minute chat. ” [Participant R]
"We have engagement strategies, we have neighbourhood policing 
plans, we have web sites, we have computer packages, to look at 
problem solving, we have I'egular processes around the inter­
communities, types o f poster that can go out, everything is regularised 
now. ” [Participant R]
"The Policing Pledge has evolved out o f kind o f what we ’re doing on 
neighbourhood policing, and what was called a Quality Service 
Commitment, so they’ve kind o f come together to equal the Policing 
Pledge. ” [Participant R]
The concept of neighbourhood policing was established in 2005, however the model 
still keeps getting reviewed and adjusted regularly. It has recently gone through a 
series of changes since it needs to be kept up to date as the context keeps changing
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(such as the continually changing demands from the communities and the 
Government, and the shifting goals of the organisation). As the organisation moves 
forward, their communication plan has also evolved; now they ai'e making more use 
of the technology by developing websites to keep the public posted on issues 
concerning their neighbourhoods. POC is now also looking into social marketing in 
order to give the right messages to the communities and communicate their 
engagement plan more effectively. Also internally, the senior officers aie trying hai*d 
to get the right people and influence the behaviour change within the organisation by 
reinforcing process changes.
"You’ve got to keep interpreting the future, even i f  you’ve gone with 
one decision or one model, say, i f  everything’s changing, how do 1 
keep it up to date, and I  think that’s probably where we need to kind 
o f keep relooking at, how do we continually evolve this, keep looking 
at it, and understanding the context to agree with it, so the models will 
be right, but we’ve got to keep kind o f refining it, to tailor it to the 
context. ” [Participant R]
"It’s kind o f an evolving intuition, in a business sense, because how 
do we Icnow, how do we change it again, to keep up with the new 
context. ” [Paiticipant R]
On reflection, according to the senior officers, this process has fundamentally 
changed their perspective from looking inwards to looking outside to the world, and 
it has been a move away for POC from focusing on crime reduction to quality of life 
matters. Even though the implementation of the model has proved successful with 
the increasing satisfaction figures in the communities, there is still room for 
improvement within the organisation in terms of behavioin change which is 
necessary for the model to be fully embedded. Finally, the senior officers 
commented that they feel affirmed in their intuitive judgements given that the 
projections they made at the beginning of the process aie still the core of the model 
on which the delivery of neighbourhood policing is based.
"I think w e’ve changed the way [POC] police in some fundamental 
understanding o f it. We’ve turned it from internal to external, and 
listening to different audiences, because Mike’s audience is different, 
you see, to mine, it appears different. We’ve broadly set this 
organisation to look outwards, rather than continue to look inwards. ” 
[Participant V]
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"... w e’ve brought a lot o f complexity in, but really simply, do you 
know your area, do you engage effectively, do you identify key issues, 
do you tackle it, and do you tell them that you’ve done it, but we’ve 
never really got that fidly embedded. So I  think the behaviour change 
didn’t happen, and probably we’ve got some people who don’t feel 
comfortable in this move, and the second bit o f the processes and our 
constant leadership, I  mean consistency in leadership to make it 
happen, they ’re the bits that I  think are missing. ” [Paiticipant R]
"The fact that we meet every six weeks to determine three priorities 
which is what we started with that is maintaining engagement, and 
around problem solving, it’s still at the centre, so we weren’t far off 
on the intuitive bit. ” [Participant R]
Having gone through the process, the senior officers asserted that this process has 
been a learning experience. They are now able to see the strengths and the 
weaknesses of the process they have been tlirough. They have identified certain 
things that they would now do differently which aie mainly around the selection and 
development of the officers and staff, and the necessity of earlier engagement with 
the partners to work in closer collaboration.
"I think we probably would have had a wholesale selection process 
for it, rather than trying to build on people who were already there, so 
again it would have been a selection, deselection process, saying 
have you got the skill sets to deliver what’s important. ” [Participant
R]
"I think i f  we were going to go back in time, I  think the gut was barely 
internal, and we did it initially very much within policing, I  think i f  w^e 
M^ere going to go back and look at it again, i t’s all about context at the 
time, means w e’dprobably try to bring wider agencies on earlier than 
we did, so it became very much a neighbourhood provision 
completely, rather than by communities. So with hindsight, and that 
wasn’t generally in the wider context at that time, making a 
partnership, maybe that’s the bit that i f  we went back and rationally 
re-looked at it, with hindsight, then that would have been the 
difference. ” [Participant R]
In summary, the Government directive to establish neighbourhood policing in the 
UK started the initiating process for change at POC. This was a completely new 
concept at the time, and the senior officers were told to design and deliver their own 
model without much guidance. Wliilst they used some of the analytical data 
available, the Chief Superintendent and the Chief Inspector, through intuiting (a).
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created a model of engagement with the public whereby the key element was to let 
the public determine the priorities that the police would tackle. In the interpreting (b) 
process, Gavin explained his vision of neighbourhood policing to Roger visually by 
drawing a model, however he had to post-rationalise his intuitive projections in order 
to be able to ‘sell’ his ideas to the rest of the organisation and to the external 
partners. In the integrating (c) process, they were able to get buy-in inside and 
outside the organisation which they attributed to their credibility as effective leaders. 
Embedding structures, systems and strategies around neighbourhood policing 
facilitated the successful institutionalising (d) of the model which was primarily 
built on intuitive judgements. The organisational learning process in this case follows 
the 51 framework as shown in Figure 8.3.
According to the senior officers, this decision has been an ‘intuitive hit’ since the 
model they came up with has been a positive move away from focusing on the 
organisation to responding to public’s priorities which eventually led to increasing 
satisfaction figures in the commimities. Although their strategies keep getting 
adjusted to fit the emerging contexts, the fact that the intuitive building blocks are 
still very much at the core of the model, makes this decision a success.
Figure 8.3 Intuitive Hit Case 3 Organisational Learning Process
Interpreting
Intuiting
Initiating
Integrating
Institutionalising
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8.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented the research findings emerging from the investigation of tlii’ee 
decision making processes at three police organisations. These cases were described 
by the participants as ‘intuitive hits’ as the decisions were based on intuitive 
judgements which led to effective outcomes for their respective organisations.
Analysis of these cases fr om the perspective of 41 organisational learning framework 
revealed the following findings:
■ A significant finding in this chapter is that, as it has become evident in the 
analysis of all three cases, there appear s to be an additional process prior to the 
intuiting process referred to as the ‘initiating’ process (lo). This process forms the 
decision context which acts as a trigger leading to the intuiting process. Based on 
this finding, the original 41 fr amework is extended to incorporate this additional 
element thereby developing 41 into a 51 fr amework.
■ There appears to be a process of analysing, to the extent of varying degrees in 
different circmnstances, which takes place either prior to, after, or in parallel 
with intuiting process. In Case 1, analysing occurred prior to intuiting whereby 
the failure of attempts to develop a resourcing formula solely based on analysis 
led to the intuiting process by tire senior officers. In Case 2, analysing occuned 
after the officer had a gut feeling about tire situation by way of trying to gather 
more information. In Case 3, the senior officers employed their intuitive 
judgements alongside using analytical data.
■ Intuition is referi'ed to as coming fr om the experierrce and prior learning of the 
officers which is mostly attributed to their professional seniority. In Case 1, the 
senior officers referred to intuitiorr as ‘professional judgement’ which they 
explained as knowing the business and beirrg able to make informed judgements. 
There is also mention of intuition as a ‘gut feeling’. In Case 2, the officers stated 
that irrtuitive judgement came out as stress, i.e. negatively charged feeling. Also
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in the same case it is evident that intuition acted as a warning sign whereby the 
chief officer intuitively recognised a potential problem leading to action.
In Case 2, there appear s to be recurTing episodes of intuiting and interpreting as 
more people become involved in the decision process indicating that 
organisational learning is not a linear process.
It is evident in all tlrree cases that interpreting involves ‘talk’ with the self and 
dialogue with others, and explanation of intuitive judgements by way of 
justifying the underlying rationale. It is also observed that visual interpretation 
helps to articulate tacit knowledge. In Case 3, the senior officer was able to 
explain his intuitive judgement by drawing the visual image he had in his mind 
on the white board, i.e. making tacit knowledge explicit.
There is evidence that in order for the officers to influence the more senior 
officers, in the interpreting process they needed to post-hoc rationalise their 
intuitions. In Case 3, the officers commented on not being able to say just 
feels like i f \  they had to rationalise their argument to make it acceptable to 
others.
There appears to be various group decision making processes occruiing in the 
integrating process. The most common ones occuning across cases include 
generating options, communicating, negotiating, consulting, and influencing. It is 
observed that management team members or people outside the senior 
management team are consulted based on their expertise of the subject, and may 
become involved to contribute to the decision making process. Whilst 
disagreement amongst the team members appears to be common, reaching 
consensus plays a significant role in developing a shared understanding and 
taking coherent action.
Contrary to the original 41 framework, it is evident that the learning does not 
always get institutionalised within the organisation, hi Case 2, the officers have 
not developed formalised procedur es as a result of this incident.
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■ In Case 1 and Case 3, the learning has been institutionalised within the respective j 
organisations. In these cases it also appeal’s that the senior teams made further 
adjusting to the embedded systems and structiu’es to keep up with the changing 
context.
■ It is observed that the officers reflected on their respective decision making 
processes by noting the weaknesses encountered and what they would do 
differently in the friture in order to improve their decision making processes.
The implications of these findings are discussed in detail in Chapter 10.
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Chapter 9 Study 2b: Intuitive Misses
9.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the second part of Study 2 of the research. There ar e thiee case 
studies of decision making processes that took place at the same police organisations 
as in the previous chapter. These cases are referred to as ‘intuitive misses’ as these 
decisions were described by the participants to have involved ‘intuitions’ as a 
response to a critical incident and were judged to have had ineffective outcomes.
The procedure followed in analysing and reporting these case studies is the same as 
described for the ‘intuitive hits’ in Chapter 8. The complete list of the categorisation 
of the thought units from the interviews relating to ‘intuitive misses’ is presented in 
Appendix 7.
9.1 Case 1: The POA Police Enter the Wrong House
In May 2009, POA was preparing to undertake the execution of multiple search 
warrants as part of a ‘week of action’ against drug dealers at a number of addresses 
which the intelligence unit provided them to target. The initiating factor for this 
incident was that one of the addresses that the operations team was given had strong 
intelligence coming through continuously fr om January through April fr om various 
sources which detailed that a number of well-known drug dealers who were selling 
drugs in and around the town centre were linked to this particular address.
“January until about April time the intelligence was coming through 
about the person who lived at the address, not specifically about the 
address, and it was a lady who was living at the address who was 
letting all these people come in and sell drugs from there. So the 
intelligence was coming in that she was actively having people round 
to her house, and that drugs were being sold from the premises. ” 
[Participant J]
"More than one report came in from more than one source and the 
providence o f the intelligence was good, a lot o f the intelligence that
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was coming in w^ as from sources that have been previously sort o f
tried and tested as it were, by the police. ” [Participant K]
This was not a time-critical incident, that is to say, they did not have to rush to force 
entry to the address, they could do it in ‘slow time’. Most importantly, they needed 
to make sure that the intelligence they received was accurate and also that they 
executed the search at the right time.
Prior to the ‘week of action’. Sergeant Alex sent officers to the address several times 
to walk around the house in plain clothes in order to check if there was any activity 
in and around the address. Police Constable Steve, who was leading this drugs search 
operation, also went to the address couple of days before the execution of the search. 
The initial intuiting (a) process started during Steve’s scanning of the address. 
Looking at and around the house, Steve’s gut feeling was that there was certainly 
drug activity going on at this address especially based on his previous experience of
places used by drug dealers, it matched the prototype he had in his mind. In
interpreting (b) his judgement, he explained that the curtains were always closed, 
the garden was a mess and from what it looked, the state of the address coiToborated 
the intelligence they were receiving.
"It's just I'm going, in my head. I ’ve got this address, this is the 
address that I'm going to hit on a drugs warrant, so I'm just looking 
to corroborate what I've been told is I'm to expect inside, and from 
what I  looked at it, in my mind it corroborated it. " [Participant K]
"Yeah, you know, it's not a nice address with the curtains drawn and 
flowers on the window sill, and, yeah, it looks like a drugs address.
I'll be happy with that. ” [Participant K]
"People live how they live, don't they, but we go into enough 
addresses that are used by drug addicts, and more often than not drug 
addicts will keep their curtains closed, and more often than not, drug 
addicts maybe don't do their w^ashing up, and they’ve got rmbbish 
strewn all over the kitchen, and from what these guys saw when they 
did the little recce's on the address, that's what it looked like." 
[Participant J]
As with any intelligence the organisation receives, this one also had to be analysed 
and corroborated to get evidence from at least two reliable sources. In this respect, in 
addition to Steve and his colleagues checking around the house, the intelligence unit
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had done some régulai* checks on the address and also gathered source infoi*mation 
from people previously tried and tested by the police. The infoi*mation confirmed the 
intelligence received about the drug activity at this pai*ticulai* address.
"Any information coming in we start grading that information, even if 
\\>e have A1 fantastic information that we’re really sure w>as true, we 
would still look to corroborate that evidence. We will still look for 
evidence or information from another source, another route. " 
[Participant F]
After seeking his Inspector’s agreement, Steve spoke to thi'ee Magisftates (as per the 
regulation) at the Court about the information received and what his intentions were. 
The Magistiates agreed and signed the wanant giving permission to the operations 
team to force entry to the address in question to search for drugs.
Steve and his team were highly experienced officers in executing drugs search 
waiTants and had high success rates in similai* jobs. As far as he was concerned, it 
was just another job that they were going to attend. His comment suggested that they 
did not put a lot of conscious effort into this operation as they were fairly confident 
in what they were doing.
"We do a lot o f these warrants, it’s bread and butter for us, isn’t it, 
and it’s not an issue potentially, we weren’t as cautious and as 
worried about it, because it’s our bread and butter... ” [Participant K]
On the operation day, the execution of the warrant was perfect: the entry into the 
address was quick, the address was seemed quickly, two people in the address were 
detained and handcuffed as they would do in every drugs warrant airest. But there 
was only one problem; these were not the subjects of the warrant the police were 
looking for. The second episode of intuiting (c) occurred as soon as the officers 
entered the house. Alex’s immediate gut feeling was that this was not the right 
address. She explained that she has dealt with one of the subjects of the warrant 
before so she knew who they were looking for. Therefore, she immediately ordered 
to un-handcuff the young couple and cleared the officers out of the premises.
"It’s a gut feeling, the second, the second we got into the house, my 
gut feeling was that, I  saw the bloke that was there, my gut feeling the 
second we got into the house is "oh my God, it’s either the wrong
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address or the people aren Y here anymore ”, the second M>e got in. ” 
[Participant J]
“When I  got inside, it’s pretty instant, w’rong address.” [Pailicipant
K]
As it became cleai* after the operation took place, the subjects of the warrant had 
moved out of the address some time ago but when stopped by the police they kept 
giving this address as their residence, and still had their cai's registered to that 
address. Hence, in the intelligence unit’s database this information appeared to be 
cuiTent but in fact it was inaccurate. Additionally, contrary to what was assumed by 
the operations team, the intelligence unit has not done a comprehensive investigation 
to conftmi that the subjects were cuirent residents at the address in question. The 
Sergeant explained that noiinally more search would be done before going on an 
operation, however since there were many addresses to target that week, the officers 
could not car ry out a thorough investigation on the subjects of this particular warrant.
“...there were less [checks] carried out on this than there would have 
been. Yeah, normally, at the very least you check who’s paying the 
Council Tax, and whether anyone from that address is claiming 
benefits. ” [Participant J]
Since it was a week of action, the police invited the local press to go along with them 
as they were expecting that there would be successftil drugs arrests to provide 
positive coverage. In fact, this led to a damaging story on the front page of the local 
newspaper the next day, creating a PR nightmare for the senior team and great 
embarrassment for the operations team.
With the failure of the operation, Alex had to speak to the Duty Inspector and one of 
the Superintendents to infoim them about what they had done and what had 
happened. This started the interpreting (d) process tlnough dialogue with the higher- 
ranking officers. She had to wiite reports and attend meetings in order to explain how 
the events imfolded, and to justify the reasons behind their actions on behalf of her 
team. She expressed her justification:
“...you can’t go in and say, Just because there’s a young couple and a 
baby, you can’t say, well there’s no M>ay that this can be linked to
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drugs, because unfortunately so many people out there Mnll, with 
babies, will sell drugs. ” [Participant J]
“Until we know exactly that it’s definitely the wrong address, w>e have 
to treat everything as i f  it was the right address, so that's what we 
did. ” [Participant J]
The damaging news in the media about the police being incompetent and entering 
the wrong house impacted on the confidence of the public in the police, and 
therefore the management had to restore the external reputation of the organisation 
as quickly as possible. Also, internally they felt that they needed to do something 
about the officers concerned whose confidence and reputation were also dented.
The third episode of intuiting (e) occiUTed this time by the senior officers when they 
became involved in this incident. The Chief Superintendent explained that their 
response to the media and to the officers leading the operations team was based on 
their intuitive judgement on how they should handle the situation,
“I  think that, on a number o f different levels there, we exercised gut 
feeling in terms o f how we responded to it, so there was the external 
management o f the media and reputation, there was also the internal 
management o f the staff concerned. ” [Paiticipant A]
The interpreting (f) process took place tlnough dialogue between the senior officers 
and justification of their intuitive judgements. In their discussions they stated that 
from a rational point of view there was a neglect of duty on Steve and Alex’s part -  it 
was their responsibility to make sme all the checks were done on the address before 
entering the house. On the other hand, the gut feeling was telling them that they 
needed to consider the reputations of these officers who were actually good, high- 
performing officers with very high success rates.
“I  mean you could write it down and rationalise why you’ve come to 
that conclusion, but a lot o f it is about gut feeling and intuition in 
terms o f how you react. ” [Participant A]
Therefore, the senior officers’ collective view was that it was the management’s 
responsibility to exercise discretion, rather than punish these officers for their 
mistalce. This was the common ground for the senior officers’ justification.
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“I  don Y think that Steve gambled M>ith our reputation, he did what he 
thought was the right thing, okay, in an ideal world he should have 
made some more checks, before he left the police station to execute 
the warrant, and that’s the learning for him, but he didn Y gamble 
with our reputation, and as I  say he's done many, many warrants and 
produced some excellent results. ” [Participant A]
"Knowing the individuals, their punishment o f themselves for getting 
it wrong will be probably far more than anything I  could do to them, 
and was it right for us to have taken them through a discipline, or 
taken any form o f sanction against them, when in actual fact, in the 
cold light o f day what they 're trying to do is do their job to the best o f 
their ability, and the pair o f them noimally do get it right. '' 
[Participant F]
“...that's an intuitive response, isn Y it, because strictly speaking there 
is a neglect o f duty w>hich could have resulted in more formal 
sanctions in terms o f misconduct, but you make a value judgement, 
don't you, in terms o f the individuals concerned, their personal 
reputations, their productivity, and how they do business, and 
recognising that they are 99.9% o f the time highly effective people, 
you make that intuitive assessment. '' [Participant A]
The senior officers further justified their views by stating that they needed to be 
proportionate in their response since they did not want to create a climate within the 
organisation whereby the officers would be afraid to take decisions in similar 
situations.
“So if  we start being seen to act against someone who's made 
decisions for the right reasons, with the right intentions, although it 
was wrong, we woidd really start getting ourselves in trouble, in the 
fact that our police officers have to make decisions, today, everyday. ” 
[Participant F]
“I f  we were to be more draconian or authoritarian in our response, 
actually would you be prepared to take a risk or to put yourself out on 
a limb i f  you thought that i f  it went wrong for no fault o f your own 
you'll be in trouble. I f  you made the same mistakes time and time 
again then that obviously would be a different matter. ” [Participant 
A]
In the integrating (g) process the senior officers all agreed on the course of action 
they were going to take in order to resolve the situation: they had to put their ‘hands 
up’ and accept accountability for the mistake as an organisation, and offer 
reassurance to the broader community for not repeating the mistake again.
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“I  think that, in this particular case, it was just as much a systemic 
failure as it was an individual failure. ” [Participant A]
“Intuitively the right thing to do was just say, we ’re really, really 
sorry, we got it wrong, we 7/ do what we can to put it right. ” 
[Participant A]
This incident had a negative impact on POA, and the news about this incident also 
spread within the organisation through rumom* very quickly and became very well 
Icnown.
“This sort o f incident flies around the ECU, everybody knows about 
this, because we’ve got it wrong, i t’s embarrassing, people don’t like 
to be involved in it, and everybody learns from it, and this flew round 
the ECU like wildfire. ” [Participant F]
The senior officers felt that to minimise the effects on the reputation of the police 
officers concerned, they had to empower them to acknowledge the erTor, learn the 
lesson and continue doing the good work. The senior officers wanted to give the 
message that high-performing individuals were valued within the organisation. 
Given the values the senior officers would want to promote within the organisation 
(primarily trust, having faith in each other, and empowering individuals to deliver), it 
was important that this message would encomage all the officers to not abstain from 
making proactive decisions which was vital for the effective and successftil 
performance of POA.
“They knew they’d done wrong, but it was just as much about 
building them up and encouraging them to respond to it, so they take 
the learning but move on, rather than just dwell on the mistake. ” 
[Paiticipant A]
“We empower and entrust our people to do that which I  think is the 
right thing to do, and when you’ve got a highly motivated individual, 
such as Steve, who’s got a good track record, you want, you 
encourage your people to be successfid, so there is this delegation 
and it really is empowerment, trusting our people to go and do a good 
job. ” [Participant A]
In hindsight, the officers who caiiied out the operation reflected that they should 
have done more checks to make absolutely sure that the infomiation given to them 
by the intelligence unit was accurate. They stated that this mistake would have been
238
easily avoided if all the investigations were earned out, however due to the number 
of the search warrants they were executing during the ‘week of action’ this was not 
possible to do.
“We’ve said, Just tell us a handful o f addresses, and w e’ll carry out 
warrants at all o f them, maybe rightly or wrongly we assumed that the 
intelligence unit, prior to giving us a pack o f information, saying right 
this is for this address, this is for this address, had carried out those 
checks, so we didn’t carry them out ourselves. Maybe it was because 
o f the amount o f them that we had that it would have been too time 
consuming to carry out all o f the checks. ” [Participant J]
“At the right address, where everything was right, it M>as still a 
mistake, because there were a few checks that went undone, and 
potentially we could have avoided going through that door on the 
morning that we did. ” [Participant J]
This incident was a hard-leaiiit lesson for the officers involved. As a result of this 
experience, they now recognise that in the futine they have to make sure that all the 
checks are carried out frilly. Being the more senior officer in the operations team, 
Alex reflected on her learning for futiue reference:
“But you know, it’s not necessarily down to the individual officers, 
it’s maybe for me to liaise with the intelligence unit, find out what 
checks have been done, etcetera, and yeah, the learning for me is 
massive that we check everything before we go in, because maybe for 
me it’s had more impact on me, because I ’m the one who’s had to 
write all the reports, and go to all the meetings and stuff like that. ” 
[Participant J]
On the other hand, whilst the senior officers developed instructions around what the 
operational officers ought to do before they go out on a search warrant, they have not 
established any formal procedures or systems since this was only a one-time 
incident. The senior officers stated that due to the high profile of this incident, they 
trust that everyone in the organisation has learnt ftom it. According to the senior 
officers, there is an implicit learning in the form of shared understanding within the 
organisation that would prevent the same mistake happening again as no one wants 
to be associated with a negative incident like this one.
"... thanlfully this is one o f those once in a ‘blue moon’ events, as 
opposed to something, i f  it happened all the time I  would be really, 
really anxious, and we woidd be putting in place more stringent
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checks and balances before people went out executing M’arrants. ” 
[Participant A]
“No, I  M>ouldn’t say we ‘ve sort o f reformulated the way we do our 
business, no we haven’t. Is virtually everyone within the BCU aware 
o f this incident, yes they are. Is there an element o f making sure that 
before a warrant is signed off, it should go through an Inspector who 
verifies the information is there. So there are instructions issued 
around making sure that we got the information was up-to-date and 
relevant, and so before you sign this, you can go and apply for this 
warrant, is this information current, and relevant? ” [Participant F]
In summary, the intelligence received about ongoing drugs activity at a certain 
address initiated the decision process in this case. Looking at the house, the police 
officer’s gut feeling, tlnough intuiting (a), led him to interpret (b) that the address 
looked like it was being used by drug dealers. However, on the day of the operation, 
when the operations team forced entry into the house the Sergeant irmnediately lorew 
that this was the wrong address through a fast intuiting (c) process. In interpreting 
(d) the situation, she had to justify their actions to more senior officers. The failure 
of this operation initiated the intuiting (e) process for the senior officers who stated 
that their decisions on how to handle this incident were based on their gut feeling. In 
the interpreting (f) process the senior officers justified their intuitive judgements to 
each other, expressing why they would not punish the officers involved although the 
rational thinking would suggest that there has been a neglect of duty on their part. 
The adverse publicity about this incident damaged not only the organisation’s 
reputation but also the officers’ involved. In the integrating (g) process, the senior 
officers accepted accountability for this mistake as an organisation in order to 
provide assurance to the public that this will not be repeated again. Equally 
important was empowering these officers who were known to be high performing 
and successful. Although this incident had a negative impact on the organisation, the 
learning has not been institutionalised formally, it has been limited to the instructions 
around making sure that every possible check is done before going on a drugs 
search.
In this case, there seems to be two paiallel decision making processes. The first one 
is prior to the operation by the operational officers, and the second one involves the 
SMT’s decision process which was initiated by the failme of the operation in the
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aftermath of the incident. Accordingly the decision process emerging from this case 
in presented in Figure 9.1.
This case is an example of an ‘intuitive miss’ whereby relying on the inaccurate 
information provided by the intelligence unit as a result of lack of investigation led 
to an unsuccessful drugs seai’ch. Although Steve was certain about his gut feeling 
that the address looked like a drugs dealer’s house, his comments about drugs 
searching being their ‘bread and butter’ indicates that they were not very cautious 
(i.e. he was thinking automatically). Having been informed that this address was 
used by drugs dealers, it could be argued that he was nonconsciously making a 
biased judgement, and therefore he had not given it any consideration that it might 
not have been a drugs dealer’s address. As a result his gut feeling had failed him.
Figure 9.1 Intuitive Miss Case 1 Organisational Learning Process
Interpreting
Intuiting
Initiating
Intuiting
Integrating
9.2 Case 2: ‘Colour-Matching’ Event at FOB
FOB have grown various groups within the organisation one of which is a support 
group for women police officers and police staff called Advance. Its main objective 
is to help raise the profile of women within the organisation and promote issues 
about women employees. Advance ciuTently have a large number of members and
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they encourage women to join them to network together and develop ideas in ways 
which could improve work related matters for women. Advance is led by a 
Superintendent and run by a small committee of four people. They have previously 
run a number of events, put on conferences on key topics that were particularly of 
interest to women. They also had an upcoming networking event, Health and 
Wellbeing Day, that would cover a mixture of topics to do with general well-being, 
including work/life balance, professional skills, and maternity rights, where several 
professionals were invited to talk about issues directed towards women. One of the 
sessions they were planning to do at this event was what they called ‘colour- 
matching’ where a professional was invited to give advice on how women should 
dress to present themselves at work, part of which was about what colour s to wear' to 
look their best.
Support groups, like Advance, are folly supported and funded by the chief officers 
group, and for events like the Health and Wellbeing Day normal practice would be to 
seek the HR Director Karen’s approval for the agenda and the budget well in 
advance of the event. Karen, as a female senior staff as well as being a member of 
the chief officers group, has always been supportive of and participated in Advance’s 
flmctions, however she was aware that the freedom they have given this support 
group sometimes meant that they were doing things in the name of the organisation 
which were not thoroughly thought through.
"In a way we kind o f gave them quite a bit offree rein about getting 
themselves going, and a bit o f self determination, although I  would 
say, within that, we were already beginning to feel like some o f that 
freedom, sometimes meant they were kind o f doing things that perhaps 
hadn't been properly thought through, or the consequences hadn’t 
been properly thought through, or sometimes crossing over with other 
people. ” [Participant P]
The initiating process started when Mary, the Head of Advance, sent out a Force- 
wide email two weeks before the event to announce the programme for the Health 
and Wellbeing Day. This was the first time Karen had heard of this forthcoming 
event as Advance has not consulted or communicated their plans about it with the 
HR Office.
242
"Advance in their enthusiasm rushed ahead and came up with lots o f 
things and publicised things before they had talked to us about that, 
and that was a problem, and that partly led to the problem that we 
got. “ [Participant P]
"The first I  knew o f this, sort o f live issue, was seeing through my own 
email system, or somebody showing me. It had been publicised across 
the Force, the programme for the day, and that was the first I  knew o f 
this, what the programme was. It was issued very late in the day, it 
was a very poor piece o f paper really, it M>asn ’t a proper programme,
I  think they were in a bit o f rush, and that was the first Fd heard o f it, 
and it had then gone Force-wide. ” [Participant P]
Wlien Karen received the email, she immediately spotted the colour-matching 
session and she was alarmed by it. She asserted that, in the intuiting (a) process, her 
reaction came out as an immediate gut feeling that this was not appropriate, it did not 
feel right for her. She intuitively felt that this session would be seen wrongly from 
outside and cause adverse publicity for the organisation.
"I was horrified, I  M>as horrified, and I  said oh no, and I  hit my 
forehead like you do, and I  said that’s awful, that’s an honest... that 
was my gut reaction, oh no, we shot ourselves in the foot, when I  saw 
the bit that said about having your colour profiles done, I  was quite 
dismayed at the general layout o f the thing, but I  immediately spotted 
that particular thing, and just the way the whole programme was set 
out, in my view was not appropriate, and I  felt embarrassed about it, 
i f  I ’m honest. ” [Participant P]
"... so I  just felt, on those grounds, and my instincts told me that this 
was going to create adverse publicity and give it a bad name. ” 
[Participant P]
According to Kar en, as the HR Director, she could see that this was not positioned 
properly as an event and the proper protocols had not been followed, however most 
importantly for her as a female professional who had responsibility for supporting 
this group, she felt embarxassed about having a session at the Health and Wellbeing 
Day which was showcased as colour-matching.
Karen immediately spoke to one of her HR team members who also sat on the 
Advance Board and asked her about her involvement in the organisation of this 
event. It appeared that the planning for this event took place dur ing a meeting which 
this person was not able to attend, therefore she also was not aware of it. Karen
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asked her to go and have a chat with Mary in order to get more information about 
this particular session.
A few days later, the Health and Wellbeing Day had come up in a regular' repor-t 
from the Communications Office at the chief officers’ meeting which prompted 
Karen to mention about the colour-matching session and express her concern about 
it. This started dialogue between the chief officers on this matter and they had a short 
discussion arormd whether they should support and allow this session to take place 
or not.
"I think that was probably just less than a fortnight before the event.
Yes, that M>as the Monday, I  said to Chief -  but that was before I  
realised we were going to hit the national press — that I  wouldn’t be 
surprised if  we got some adverse publicity about it, and then by the 
middle o f that week, the Wednesday, which I  think is only a week or 
ten days before the actual event, all that adverse publicity hit us. ” 
[Participant P]
In the interpreting (b) process, whilst Chief Constable Duncan did not express a 
view, Karen and Assistant Chief Constable Tom were very clear to say that they did 
not think this should go ahead as this would be seen as the wrong thing to be 
associated with for POB. Karen felt very strongly about it, stating that "it will be 
seen as just vanity and frippery and nonsense, and what on earth are we doing that
However, in par ticular the Assistant Chief Constable Lorraine, led by her intuiting
(c), had a completely different opinion about the situation. As a result, she expressed 
how strongly she felt that it was impor-tant for the women officers to have this kind 
of opportunity to learn how to present themselves in a male-dominated workplace. 
She was basing her intuitive judgement on her own experience along the year's as a 
female police officer who currently was the only female senior police officer in the 
chief officers group.
"I think sat upon the fact that I  know, I  know obviously from personal 
experience, and I ’m very involved, throughout my career in the issues 
o f female police officers, they are very much alive... so in that sense 
yeah, I  was basing that on experience, and previous experience along 
the years. ” [Par ticipant O]
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" ...because for me I  felt, fi'om my own professional background it’s 
really important that we do this kind o f thing, it’s really important 
that female staff understand this kind o f thing, yes we might be taking 
a risk around it, but we ought to be doing it. ” [Participant O]
Lorraine felt there was nothing wr’ong with what was being proposed, for her this 
session was about giving female police officers the opportunity to present 
themselves well in the workplace. In the interpreting (d) process, she justified her 
intuitive judgement based on her own experience that, as a woman senior police 
officer, she felt strongly that the female officers needed to learn how to feel 
competent and confident as women in policing. This was one way to help them feel 
empowered.
"I know that how people present, especially when you ’re looking to 
go into some areas o f policing like the CID, which is very under­
represented by women, the culture is very strong around having to 
conform, and there are lots o f great people who are looking to break 
that. But the reality is that when you ’re looking at it from the outside 
in, you see people, largely white people, largely male people, looking 
like a certain way, and actually that’s not the only way to succeed. It 
was about trying to kind o f challenge those stereotypes. ” [Participant 
O]
"It’s really around presentation, when you ’re not in your uniform, 
and o f course that’s very much linked to self confidence, you have a 
sense o f how you feel, and o f course in a male dominated environment 
that ’s really important. So it was about how they project, how they 
present in the work place. ” [Participant O]
"Because I  feel really strongly, and felt really strongly about women 
being women in policing, and not turning into men, and this is one 
M’ay o f helping them feel empowered to do that, and I  am the only 
female police officer in the chief officer team, there aren’t many very 
senior police officer women in the country, and so I  do kind o f speak 
up on these things, and that’s the reason. ” [Participant O]
Diuing tliis discussion, there were two conflicting intuitions regarding the colour- 
matching session around the chief officers’ table. Karen’s gut feeling was telling her 
that this is not right, and she felt very imcomfortable with it. Lorxaine explained that 
at the chief officers’ meeting Karen came across as extremely nervous about this 
session, suggesting that her gut feeling was strong and negatively char ged.
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"...she had an anxiety about this one particular session on colours, 
and about how it might come across, that we’d be seen as what on 
earth are police doing working out what colour suits them, just get on 
and do some policing kind o f thing, in terms o f how they come across 
maybe in the press, or in the public eye. ” [Participant O]
"She had real anxiety about it, and it transpires she was right, but a 
couple o f others shared her anxiety. ” [Participant O]
Karen justified her intuitive judgement to the chief officers by saying that for her this 
was not appropriate and not relevant to the workplace, and it did not make any 
connections in terms of helping women be more confident to present themselves in 
the workplace.
"I thought it was inappropriate, it didn’t look professional, it didn’t 
make the connections between, it could have potentially made some 
connection, but it didn’t attempt to make the connections between 
work and having your colours done, it looked like a jolly, and I  think 
that creates a bad reputation, poor reputation for those sorts o f events 
where they are about supporting women at work. ” [Participant P]
"... for me, I  think I  would draw the line, I  would say that it’s not 
appropriate as part o f a professional work conference to have your 
colours done... I  mean somebody give you some advice on what 
colour suits your skin etcetera, that feels to me like that’s a personal 
thing, not a work thing. ’’ [Participant P]
In the begimiing of the integrating (e) process, there was a clear disagreement 
ar ound this matter. Wliilst Karen ar gued that this would be seen wrongly and create a 
bad reputation for POB, Lorraine did not see any problem with running this session. 
Eventually Lorraine influenced the rest of the team with her contrary ar gument about 
why this session was important, and it was agreed that they would support this event. 
Although Karen imderstood Lorxaine’s point of view, she was still concerned about 
the potential consequences.
"I managed to convince my colleagues to go with it, whereas actually 
their feeling is the right one. ” [Participant O]
"So I  explained why it was important, that it wasn’t just about 
frippery, it \\>as really, it was about presentation and confidence, and 
they said, oh right’o, and they got it, they understood where I  was 
coming from, and they said, in that case, fine, but they, their disqidet
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very real for them, and as it was they were right, and I  was wrong 
in terms o f how it was received. ” [Participant O]
"At the time they w>ere persuaded by my kind o f contrary argument 
really, but they were, they understood why Mary suggested it, they 
understood the motivation being a right motivation once we talked 
about it, but they were concerned about how it would be perceived. ” 
[Participant O]
A few days after this meeting, the Head of Media Communications went to Karen’s 
office to show her the news -  the colour-matching session made the national press 
with very damaging publicity. It was portrayed exactly as Karen had thought.
"It made national press over a couple o f days in the newspapers, and 
it was things like, women police choosing which colour scarf to wear, 
which was, it was really having a go at us around why aren’t you out 
there catching burglars, why have you got time to do this, the age old 
criticism that comes our way. So those are the kind o f comments, and 
o f course what that then focused on was all the negative bits about 
women in policing, about how they ’re all swanning about being airy- 
fairy and not actually getting on with it, so it land of, it back-fired 
really. ” [Participant O]
The news in the media caused concern within the chief officers group in terms of 
what was in the public domain in respect to the organisation’s reputation. Whilst the 
consequences were affirming Karen’s gut feeling, Lorxaine felt that this matter was 
taken out of context. The chief officers’ view was that the reputation of POB is 
directly related to the public’s confidence and perception of how well POB is 
policing. Therefore, the news in the media had further repercussions beyond POB’s 
reputation.
"Because reputation is all for us, policing is so much about 
reputation, not for its own sake, but there’s a really strong evidence, 
we know, that i f  people have trust in their police, they have confidence 
in their own community, they see that, they feel good about their local 
police they feel good about where they live, and i f  they feel good 
about where they live, then they feel much more empowered to solve 
their own problems. ” [Par ticipant O]
"So our reputation is really important in order to make people feel 
safe. There’s a link between the perception and policing, and so we 
guard that reputation really, really carefully, and sometimes we have 
to burn it, we know that we take the hit for things that are nothing to 
do with us, for the greater good, that’s what happens in a democracy.
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that’s fine, and we take that hit with our eyes open, but this was an 
own goal really that we didn't need to score against ourselves. ”
[Participant O]
Soon after the news got into the media, Karen spoke to Mary and they discussed 
some options around what could be done. They also considered the option of 
cancelling the whole event. However, Karen felt that this would be an over-reaction 
to the media criticism, and as the Health and Wellbeing Day had a valid part to play 
she would be keen to support and encourage Advance to continue with the planned 
event.
"I didn’t seriously consider pulling the whole event for any length o f !
time, although that waa- an option we briefly considered, it w'as more ;
about the fact that I  didn’t want, that would have seemed quite a
drastic step and I  didn’t want to cause sort o f damage and withdrcm>
something, that would seem quite a drastic step really, so that wasn’t
a serious consideration, although we did look at it quickly as an '
option. ” [Participant P]
Within hour s, the comments in the media as well as within the organisation were 
gaining some momentum, people were misunderstanding and misinterpreting what 
was happening in an exaggerated way. Karen consulted the Head of Media 
Communications in terms of what would be the best action to take as organisation’s 
immediate strategy to the news and comments in the media. With his advice it was 
agreed that the colour-matching session should be cancelled and removed ftom the 
event programme.
“I  was given the advice about how to get the media storm dying down,
and I  took that advice which was to agree that we would remove the
colour session, and that we would write, we’d produce a press
statement sort o f saying that in response to public opinion, as it were,
we’d thought better o f it, and that, we defended ourselves, but we did
say, on this occasion, in view o f public comments, w e’ve decided to \
withdraw that particular session. ” [Participant P] |
Karen and the Head of Media Communications collaboratively deployed i
organisation’s external and internal communication strategies. They prepared a press I
statement to go out externally within the next 24 hours in order to respond to bad j
publicity in the national press, they also prepared an internal advice document for !
Mary to communicate what was happening to Advance’s members.
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"I think we then had to spend a lot o f time sorting it out, mopping it 
up, doing that communication, doing the press statements, we just had 
to do a lot o f reparation, which we could have done without. ” 
[Participant O]
Eventually the media storm disappeared and the Health and Wellbeing Day took 
place successfully without the colour-matching session which caused much furore in 
the days leading to the event.
Although this incident had a negative effect on the reputation of the organisation, no 
formal systems or procedures have been developed for future reference as a means of 
taking preventative measur es. The integration of the lear ning through this experience 
has been limited to verbal instructions and agreement that it was important for the 
support groups to consult and seek the approval of the HR team to make sur e that the 
organisational values are represented in the right way.
“Well, procedures might be overstating it, but I  have made it very 
clear to the Head o f Advance that I  would wish her to work with HR 
and to give us advance sight o f drafts o f conferences and proposed 
content o f conferences before they go out. And I ’ve also asked my 
Head o f PPP to make sure there’s more proactive communication 
about that, so my expectation is that there wouldn’t be a repeat o f 
that, and that there would be an opportunity to review the content o f 
future conferences before an ill considered and ill worded email goes 
out across the Force. ” [Participant P]
Reflecting on this incident, Lorraine’s view is that by arguing against Karen’s gut 
feeling and influencing everyone to go ahead with the colour-matching session she 
acted too quickly and did not make the right decision. She explained that in reality, 
they could have made a more informed decision by testing out with the local media 
and the Police Federation to check what their view would be on this particular 
session. She suggested that more investigation was required in order to make an 
informed decision.
“Well we can have, we have close enough links through our own 
media team to have an off the record conversation, we could have 
done that to see, and i f  this was out there what would you think kind 
o f thing, we could have done that, and we didn’t, so I  suppose we 
didn’t make as informed a view as we could have done. ” [Participant 
O]
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"... we’d have tested the water in a proper way, rather than just the 
few o f us round the table, quickly, we could do it quickly, doesn’t have 
to take forever, just test that water, and use other stakeholders ’ views 
in terms o f making a decision. It would have been a better informed 
decision. ” [Participant O]
On the other hand, Karen feels affirmed in her gut feeling in this occasion. She stated 
that she should have been more persistent in her view in the discussions with the 
chief officers.
"/ mean it v\>as a lesson, it was a lesson for me. And Karen and I  have 
talked about it, her vzew is that she should have been more forcefid 
with her view, because they were convinced by me, and actually, she 
said, I  still felt it was wrong, and to come forward and say so really. ” 
[Participant O]
The learning in this incident is that in the future POB should take more time in 
considering how these things might be put across in publicity, and when they do 
have time, to use that time in order to run through the information themselves and 
also to check with the media. Additionally, as a future reference, the learning is that 
HR should be involved in the organisation of such events fi'om early on and play a 
more active part alongside these groups in order to make sure they don’t repeat the 
same mistake.
“I  think the learning really is about making sure we get in early, that 
we work alongside these diverse support groups... so we prevent 
shooting out, because it could have been so easily avoided, without 
really, necessarily, changing anything very much. ” [Participant P]
“I  think the greater learning is just to take a bit of, when you’ve got 
time, as we did, we had a couple o f days, to take that time. ” 
[Participant O]
In summary, in this case an email sent Force-wide announcing the prograrmne for 
the Health and Wellbeing Day initiated the decision process. This email led on to the 
intuiting (a) process. For Karen, the colour-matching session outlined in this 
programme didn’t sound right, and she had a strong gut feeling that this was going to 
create bad publicity for the organisation. In the interpreting (b) process, she 
expressed her feelings at the chief officers’ meeting and explained that this session 
was not appropriate for work. Contrary to Karen’s judgement, Lorraine’s intuiting
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(c) led her to argue that the chief officers ought to support this session interpreting
(d) her judgement that it was important in terms of empowering women to feel 
confident in a male dominant police world. In the integrating (e) process, Lorraine 
influenced everyone and it was agreed for this session to take place at the event. 
However, the news about POB women police officers ‘doing their colours’ quickly 
spread into the media. Through consultation with the Head of Communications the 
colour-matching session had been cancelled as a response to the damaging news in 
the media. This incident had negative impact on the reputation of the organisation, 
however the chief officers had not institutionalised fonmal procedures as a result of 
it. The support groups have been advised to consult with the HR Office in advance 
of doing anything in the name of the organisation.
This decision making process does not follow the 51 framework since the 
institutionalising process did not take place. With the two conflicting intuitions 
evident in this case, the model of organisational learning process emerges as 
presented in Figure 9.2.
This case was an ‘intuitive miss’ in that although Karen’s gut feelings were right she 
had been persuaded by LoiTaine’s argument that as the chief officers, they should be 
supporting the colour-matching session. It could be argued that if Karen had been 
more persistent in her view and cancelled this session in a timely manner, the 
negative consequences could have been avoided.
Figure 9.2 Intuitive Miss Case 2 Organisational Learning Process
Integrating
Intuiting
Initiating
Intuiting
Interpreting
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9.3 Case 3: Staff Relocation at POC
POC in general was considered to be a poor performer, nationally and regionally, 
and the senior officers were told by the chief officers at the Headquarters that they 
had to make 20% improvements within the next 18 months. This created a pressure 
environment from the top to the bottom of the organisation, resulting in a lot of 
stress in terms of sickness and time off due to the pressure being applied across all 
ranks within the organisation.
“The division’s under a lot o f pressure, we need to, it’s expected that 
we deliver results in a time line, and coidd we actually perceive that 
we can actually deliver it with M’hat we’ve got at the minute. ” 
[Participant W]
As an initiating factor, in November 2009, the SMT at POC became awaie of 
several issues in two of their police stations. These areas were ‘hot spots’ for crime 
and anti-social behaviour, and there was a perceived lack of the local police getting 
hold of and resolving the problems which were causing performance inefficiencies 
internally, and affecting the reputation of the organisation externally.
For instance in one of the ar eas, on several occasions the local police did not attend 
the public meetings which led to the local Councillor making damaging comments 
about the police and their lack of competence in doing cormmrnity engagement. This 
in turn was affecting the public view, whereby in a national survey about the 
confidence of residents in the police of this particular area, the local police scored 
extremely low and were virtually at the bottom of the ‘league’ in the whole country. 
This situation reflected the poor management by the Sergeant who was in charge of 
the police team in that particular- ar ea.
“When there’s a Councillor who’s kind o f standing up saying, "it’s 
absolutely disgraceful, the police in this area are rubbish, because 
they can’t even turn up to a public meeting”, that does tremendous 
harm to the views o f the public o f the police in that area. ” [Participant 
W]
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In the second area, the problem was flagged up when the Sergeant based there had 
an assessment on her ability to manage crime enquiries and the result came out very 
negatively.
"We were doing an accreditation process for each o f our Sergeants, 
which involves taking them through their crime management system, 
and reviewing how they are managing each o f their officer’s crimes, 
and when this process M>as on with this particular Sergeant, very 
quickly became clear that there was very little management at all, and 
jobs were going on for months without any intervention, they were 
sitting there, and not being looked at and so on... So there was an 
issue that was around welfare as well as actually needing somebody 
who can put up with things there. ” [Par ticipant S]
It became obvious to Chief Inspector Mike who was the second line manager of the 
two Sergeants concerned, that there needed to be a better management in place in 
these areas. The fact that the organisation was under a lot of pressure to deliver 
results in a short time meant that they didn’t have the time to actually address the 
problems with these Sergeants individually in order to resolve their issues -  instead a 
quick decision was needed.
"Have we got the time to actually sit down and actually address each 
individual who’s working there, and actually spend time to actually 
make it work, or do we need something a bit more quick time taking 
place, and that’s where it’s come up. ” [Participant W]
Mike had recently been promoted to his role as Chief Inspector, and previously as 
Inspector he had not had to deal with staffing issues. In the initial intuiting (a) 
process, his gut feeling was telling him that he needed to do something about this 
problem, however since he did not have much experience around such matters he 
was not quite sure about what to do.
"It’s been quite new to me, because I  got promoted in June to this 
role, so although I ’ve dealt with staffing issues. I ’ve not had to deal 
with anything quite like this before, because normally in my previous 
role as an Inspector Ijust get the kind of, the results o f management’s 
decisions about who is going where, etcetera. ” [Participant W]
He started the interpreting (b) process by bringing this issue up in one of the general 
senior management meetings, drawing the attention to these Sergeants’ poor 
management skills. Each of the senior officers knew a little about what was
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happening in those areas, and when they started to talk about it together, tlnough 
dialogue, they started getting a fuller picture of the situation.
The collective intuiting (c) process began within a few minutes of discussing the 
problem. The senior officers’ immediate reaction was that they needed to change 
something quickly in those areas. The collective intuitive judgement arormd the 
room was to move these particular Sergeants elsewhere where they could be 
provided with more support in terms of their development, whilst replacing them by 
other Sergeants who were known to be more capable of making a difference in those 
areas.
"In the senior management team, so Gavin, Neil, Roger and myself, 
we sat down, and so w>e kind o f felt there was a need, from our 
perspective, to he seen to be doing something to support, but also to 
address some o f the performance issues in terms o f how we ’re being 
perceived by the public, by not attending meetings, how we are kind o f 
perceived both internally and externally by the level o f crime and our 
apparent not getting a grip o f it, and M>e all felt, I  think, that the weak 
link that we needed to work on was the Sergeant, two o f the 
Sergeants. ” [Participant W]
"We had a view as a senior management team that we needed to 
change the management structure at /wo o f our police stations, 
because we felt that the Sergeants weren’t delivering what they should 
have been delivering, and that we felt that there M>ere other strong 
Sergeants on the Division who could step into that role and turn it 
round and make it a lot better. ” [Participant W]
"Our gut feeling was we needed to change something... we all kind o f 
sat round and said, yeah, that’s the right thing to do. ” [Participant W]
As the discussions continued, in the interpreting (d) process, the senior officers 
talked about the individual circumstances of these Sergeants and gave justification of 
what they thought would be the best action to take in order to deal with the situation 
effectively.
"With regards to the [POC North], the officer there had suffered 
bereavement in his family, and it had clearly had an impact, it can 
take individuals long periods o f time to get over that kind o f thing, 
and with it being such an intense area wo felt that somebody that had 
proven ability to be decisive, positive, innovative, and was a strong
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character as \\>ell is what was needed, and that maybe the guy that 
was there just needed a bit o f a break really. ” [Participant W]
“Well two things really, the one on [POC South] sat on a limb, the 
person that was performing the role she’s very quiet as an individual, 
and is not very confident at speaking publicly, and the PCs that work 
there are quite expeiienced, and they need strong management, 
otherwise they will take advantage o f that Supervisor. And we felt that 
the Sergeant who was there was too inexperienced, and lacked 
confidence to be able to confront performance in relation to the 
Police Constables that needed firm management, and lacked the 
confidence to actually manage public meetings. We didn’t have the 
resilience to be able to offer enough support, to make sure that 
somebody was there to kind o f pull her up, just there to support and 
actually ensure that those meetings run smoothly. ” [Participant W]
The senior officers considered several other Sergeants who would be suitable for the
change over, and also discussed about other alternatives that might be viable.
"... actually can we leave the individual in place there, and whereas 
probably did consider can we leave them in place with an action plan, 
and so. But personally I  did dismiss that relatively quickly, said no, 
we need to get her out and look for options in, so that alternative woa' 
fairly briefly examined, the options around that, then the options 
around who comes in there, I  think we probably looked at in more 
detail, and looked at a number o f other options, around well who is 
there available, who could go down there, and we did look at quite a 
few Sergeants, other Sergeants who could replace her. Probably 
didn’t do that in a structured way, like there’s this person, the pros 
and cons. ” [Participant S]
“We can’t afford to actually put somebody, another officer in there, 
moneywise, because we haven’t got the budget to do that, to support, 
so actually the only option w e’ve really got is actually to move him 
somewhere else, and swap him with somebody else, so the costs 
actually stay the same, so that’s how we got to where we were with 
the decision. ” [Participant W]
The senior officers involved HR Manager Amy in their discussions. Given her
knowledge of particular personalities within the organisation, she was well placed to
advise them in terms of who could be appointed to replace the two Sergeants.
“It was really a discussion, wasn’t it in Amy’s office, around now who 
could we send down there, and then I  think Amy, came up with well 
what about... ” [Participant S]
255
“The discussions that we had with her, hut the process probably did 
narrow dowm quite quickly into ‘ah~hah that sounds like a good 
idea! \ and quite intuitively go down that line. ” [Participant S]
Having considered a number of different alternatives, eventually the senior officers 
identified a number of Sergeants who they thought were well-motivated and 
effective in their roles, and therefore would be ideal candidates to improve the 
performance in those areas. Initially, there was disagreement within the group since 
one of the Chief Inspectors thought swapping Sergeants was not such a good idea as 
it would impact on the performance of other teams.
“I  think probably the first person to sort o f say, “hmm, not sure about 
this ” would have been Roger, because o f the impact on the i^esponse 
team. ” [Participant S]
"... I  think once it started to unravel a little bit, then there was more 
discussion, and then the last thing that this isn’t such a good idea, and 
then probably there was a divergence of, I  was probably still, up to 
quite a late stage, was still quite keen on saying, 'no I think we need 
to stick with this ’, and one by one other people were coming over, 7 
think this might be too much, more trouble than it’s worth’. ” 
[Participant S]
In the integrating (e) process, consensus was achieved amongst the majority of the 
team merubers and it was agreed that Chief Inspector Mike and Superintendent Neil 
would go and speak to all the Sergeants concerned to let them know about the 
management team’s decision in regard to moving them to other police stations.
“It was a plan that was in the extent o f well it’s not going to be just an 
ask, it’s going to be a very strong ask, in fact it’s going to be, i f  
possible, a kind o f tell them that that’s what we ’re going to be doing. ” 
[Participant W]
Firstly, they approached a Sergeant who initially seemed keen to do the swap, 
however the others were not quite enthusiastic about this plan. Mike and Neil spent 
several hours in conversations with the Sergeants over the following days to no 
avail; their attempts did not bring any satisfactory result as none of the Sergeants 
were willing to make this move for personal reasons.
“So within a space o f the Thursday, the Friday and the Saturday,
W6’d seen the three key individuals so, obviously having spoken to 
those three people, all that we thought was actually happening was
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that Nîcliy and Anne would be SM>apping, then the following week I  got 
back, having knocked out, and then middle o f last week we had a 
conversation, Roger had a conversation with Gary to see whether he 
would consider going to [South], for him to then say, no I ’m not going 
to do it, and then on the Friday, last week, I  went over to see Alan, 
who’s Nicky’s line manager, and then spent time with Nicky, and 
talked things through with her, and so by Friday afternoon last week 
that was it, job finished. So a lot o f work for actually no result really. ” 
[Pailicipant W]
The root of the problem was the fact that the senior officers did not involve or 
consult the individuals concerned during the decision making process, they just told 
them the management’s final decision and this was not taken well by these 
Sergeants.
“So we ended up kind o f leaving four people very, I  suppose, 
distressed to an extent, when what we were trying to do was just 
deliver something that gut feeling was telling us it’s the right thing to 
do. ” [Participant W]
Since the senior management’s efforts failed in trying to move the Sergeants to 
different stations, it became clear to the senior officers that they had to figur e out a 
way to develop these two Tow performing’ Sergeants as best they could in order to 
empower them to become effective in their current locations. It had been agreed with 
the Supervisors of these Sergeants to put an action plan in place with clear directions 
on what was required from them with strict deadlines, and it was agreed to keep 
monitoring them going forward.
“Actually what we’ve got to do now is we’ve got to work with the 
people that we’ve got, and just try and develop them as best we can. ” 
[Participant W]
“I  think Alan, the Local Commander, has given her some clear 
direction as to what he thinks that she should be doing, and I ’ve seen 
some communication between the two o f them that I  think is a lot 
more directed as to where she needs to be focussing her efforts. ” 
[Participant W]
In the aftermath of this incident, the senior officers felt that having asked several 
people who rejected their proposal to relocate, left them looking weak as a 
management team. The senior officers’ perception is that this created an impression 
within the organisation that it was acceptable to say “no” to senior management’s
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decisions, hence not only denting their reputation, but also potentially risking the 
organisation’s effectiveness in teiins of moving forward.
“Management reputation was, I  personally think, Neil might have a 
different view to me, but I  think it was harmed by it, certainly it 
harmed our standing. I  think overall, probably people perceive that 
we are quite a positive management team, and actually are looking to 
take things forward, but a positive management, maybe too positive 
really, that’s what might be the take on it. ” [Participant W]
“What it created a kind o f an impression perhaps that the 
management weren’t decisive in what they were doing, and that they 
weren’t consulting people, and letting people h^ow Mdmt was 
happening. So it was probably damaging to our reputation within the 
division. ” [Participant W]
“The implications are that i f  everybody knows that i f  managers ask 
you to do something and you can say no, then they’ll all say no, and it 
won’t happen. ” [Participant W]
As a result, in order to avoid this kind of negative experience in the future, in the 
institutionalising (f) process, the senior management established what is called a 
‘Talent Management Scheme’. This gives the opportunity to the officers who would 
actually want to develop and take on new challenges within the organisation to put 
themselves on this scheme. It would also provide the management a pool of officers 
who are willing to take on the challenges offered to them and not just simply refuse. 
Mike explains the rationale behind this scheme in detail:
“One o f the things that we’ve done is we’ve just come out o f the 
process which we ’re calling ‘Talent Management ’ and what that is, is 
that i f  you work in our division, and you actually see yourself as being 
somebody that is suitable for being promoted within the organisation 
and is prepared to actually be flexible and do something different, and 
go with what the organisation wants you to do, you actually put 
yourself up onto the Talent Management Scheme. So now i f  you look 
at that, and you think actually those two Sergeants over there would 
do a really good job over there, I  can now approach those two people 
fi'om the point o f view, thinking okay you’re on the Talent 
Management Scheme, you want to get promoted to the next rank, 
you’ve got competency and experience, what we ’d like you to do is 
w e’d like you to go over there and do that particular role. They will 
not then, well it’s unlikely then that they’ll turn around and say, well 
yeah I  don’t really want to do that, it's going to impact on my family 
life, or I ’d find it difficult getting to work i f  I  as to do that, or it cost 
me more money in petrol, or I  don’t really want that challenge.
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Because they’ve then put themselves in the situation whereby they 
want to get on, and they want the organisation to give them 
opportunities, where they can gather evidence and experience to be 
able to do that. ” [Paiticipant W]
Reflecting back on this experience, the senior officers recognised that the weakness 
in their plan was that they were mistaken in thinking that the Sergeants they saw 
suitable for relocation would also be willing to do so, which in reality was not the 
case.
“When you actually look back on it and say well actually M>hat was 
the weakness in that plan, the weakness in the plan was the fact that 
we kind o f made an assumption that people that were very productive 
who were very much behind the organisation in terms o f taking it 
forward, were pi^epared to be flexible to work with the organisation, 
and actually, also that they didn’t really hold a confidence as we 
would have hoped that they would have done. ” [Participant W]
“I f  the two people concerned were willing volunteers I  think it would 
have actually happened in the way that we originally envisaged, and 
it woidd have probably worked okay, I  mean certainly there would 
have been a little bit o f unhappiness in the first instance with regards 
to the two people involved, but I  think we coidd have worked through 
that, but it didn’t pan out for the reasons that I  said really. ” 
[Participant W]
This incident had been a learning experience particularly for Mike who had to bear 
the negative outcomes of his efforts. He stated that in a similar situation in the future 
he would approach this kind of matters differently. Mike explained that he would 
identify certain people who were willing to be developed in their roles and 
specifically look to mentor those people for upcoming opportunities. The learning 
for the senior officers was that in the future instead of just going with their gut 
feeling they would make sure that the relevant people were consulted properly in 
advance.
“I  guess the learning is, as much as it’s your gut instinct that you 
need to do something like that, just make sure you’ve crossed all your 
bridges, or made sure that you can actually deliver on it, before you 
actually commit to it, because the risk is that the management look 
weak. ” [Participant W]
“My decision making woidd be, unless I  knew that I  had somebody 
that would go and work wherever I  asked them to, I  wouldn’t do it the
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same way again. I ’d make sure I  had somebody first and I  wouldn ’t 
even consider what the post was going to be, but i f  I  thought, i f  I  got 
somebody in the organisation that was working here, that I  thought 
that was doing a cracking job and it was born out by evidence to 
support that. I ’d say to her ‘well what do you see yourself doing in the 
organisation ’, and I ’d look towards mentoring people myself in terms 
o f actually, you know, i f  thei^e’s an opportunity would you be 
interested, and actually then come back to them separately, and say 
'this might be coming up, would you be interested in it’. ” [Participant 
W]
In summary, two Sergeants’ poor management in two different policing areas 
initiated this decision process. Mike who initially became aware of this issue, 
through intuiting (a), had a gut feeling that something needed to be done in those 
particular areas where the public had low confidence in the police. In the 
interpreting (b) process, Mike brought up this matter at the SMT meeting leading to 
frirther intuiting (c) within the group. By interpreting (d) their collective intuitive 
judgement, it was decided to move these Sergeants to different locations where they 
would be provided with more support, and to replace them by other Sergeants who 
were known to be effective within the organisation, hi the integrating (e) process, 
the senior officers generated options in terms of finding suitable candidates to swap 
places with the Sergeants in question. Having made the decision within the SMT, the 
senior officers approached the Sergeants to tell them about the move they planned. 
However, the Sergeants refused the management’s decision, making the 
management team look weak in terms of not being able to implement their decisions. 
Additionally, this outcome also weakened the senior officers’ ability in improving 
the effectiveness of the organisation by attempting to strengthen the weak links 
within the organisation. As a result of this experience, the establishment of the 
Talent Management Scheme facilitated the institutionalising (f) process. This 
provided the opportunity to those officers who would like to advance within the 
organisation to put themselves on this scheme. It also assured the senior officers that 
those officers would be willing to do what the senior management requested from 
them. This decision making process follows the 51 fiamework and the emerging 
model is shown in Figure 9.3.
This case was an ‘intuitive miss’ for POC senior officers as their proposal to move 
Sergeants to different locations has not been effective. It appeared that the
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underlying problem was due to the lack of consultation and communication with the 
Sergeants concerned during the decision making process. It could be argued that if 
they made the decision in consultation with the individuals concerned then perhaps 
their plan would not have failed. Perhaps this negative outcome could have been 
avoided if they provided an opportunity for the Sergeants concerned to engage in the 
decision making process. Even though the Sergeants might still not be willing to 
make the move that the management team proposed, this problem would have been 
realised sooner and the senior officers would have been able to aiTange different 
alternatives.
Figure 9.3 Intuitive Miss Case 3 Organisational Learning Process
Initiating
Intuiting
Institutionalising
Interpreting
Integrating
9.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented the research findings emerging from the investigation of thr ee 
decision making processes at three police organisations. These cases were described 
by the participants as ‘intuitive misses’ as the decisions were based on intuitive 
judgements which led to ineffective outcomes for their respective organisations. 
Analysis of these cases from the perspective of the 41 organisational learning 
framework revealed the following findings:
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■ As in the case of the ‘intuitive hits’, there is an additional process of ‘initiating’ 
prior to the intuiting process which is evident in all three cases of ‘intuitive 
misses’.
■ As per ‘intuitive hits’, there is evidence of intuitions coming from personal 
experience, and appearing as gut feeling. In Case 1, there is also mention of 
intuiting as pattern matching and situation awareness, requiring low conscious 
effort and resulting in fast response. As in Case 2 of ‘intuitive hits’, it is also 
observed here in Case 2 and Case 3 that intuition acted as a warning sign leading 
to action.
■ There appear s to be a process of collective intuiting evident in Case 3 whereby 
the officers engaged in intuiting in the group, coming up with the same 
judgement on how they should deal with the situation.
■ It appears that there is a lack of analysing in all three cases. In Case 1, it appears 
that analysing process took place, however it was not a thorough investigation 
and the information gathered was inaccurate. In Case 2 and Case 3, there is no 
evidence of analysing, the decisions seem to be based solely on the intuitive 
judgements of the officers.
■ As per ‘intuitive hits’, it is evident in all ‘intuitive misses’ that interpreting 
involves sense making for one’s self and dialogue with others, and explanation of 
intuitive judgements by way of justifying the underlying rationale.
■ There appears to be various group decision making processes occurring in the 
integrating process. In addition to the ones observed in the ‘intuitive hits’, in 
‘intuitive misses’ as a result of the faihue, there appears to be an emphasis on 
taking accoimtability for the mistake and empowering the people involved. 
Another important factor which the officers seem to regard very highly is the 
reputation of the organisation. Accordingly, in all three cases the officers’ efforls 
appear' to be focused on repairing the situation as quickly as possible in order to 
minimise the damage on the organisation’s reputation.
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■ Contraiy to the original 41 framework, and in support of the findings in ‘intuitive 
hits’, it is evident that individual and group learning does not always get 
institutionalised. In Case 1 and Case 2, the officers did not develop formalised 
procedures as a result of these incidents. There appears to be a belief by the 
senior officers that the high profile of these incidents would have an impact on 
everyone in the organisation leading to implicit learning whereby nobody would 
want to repeat the same mistake again. On the other hand, in Case 3 as a result of 
their failed attempts the officers institutionalised their learning by developing a 
system which would prevent the negative outcomes of this incident happening in 
the fiiture.
■ In the cases of the ‘intuitive misses’ it is observed that the officers reflected on 
their respective decision making processes and noted what they would do 
differently in the future to avoid the negative outcomes of these incidents.
The implications of these findings are discussed in detail in Chapter 10.
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Chapter 10 Discussion of Findings of Study 2
10.0 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to discuss and synthesise the findings of Study 2, as 
analysed and presented in Chapter 8 (‘intuitive hits’) and Chapter 9 (‘intuitive 
misses’). The findings of this study build on and extend the original 41 model 
(Crossan et al, 1999) 'which was used as the underlying fiamework in this research. 
In light of the previous research on intuition in management, decision making and 
organisational learning, this chapter utilises key theoretical findings from the 
literature to discuss the conceptual foundation of the emerging findings in this 
research.
The discussion is presented in three main sections. The first section evaluates the 
organisational learning processes and the emerging sub-processes. The second 
section focuses on the role of intuition in managerial decision making. The final 
section summarises the findings from the research and concludes the chapter.
10.1 Organisational Learning Processes
Further to providing a rich description and analysis of the case studies of decision 
making and organisational learning processes in Chapters 8 and 9, this section aims 
to evaluate the findings and compare them to past reseai'ch. The following 
discussions are based on the key themes that emerged from the empirical data. As 
the objective of this research is to explore how organisations learn from their 
managers’ intuitions, this study focused on the feed forward organisational learning 
processes. Accordingly, the discussion is organised in a sequential way following the 
learning processes as proposed in the 51 framework (i.e. initiating, intuiting, 
interpreting, integrating, and institutionalising). Table 10.1 surmnarises the sub­
processes evident in the learning processes as presented in six case studies. Table
10.2 provides the definition of the sub-processes and gives an example of each from 
the data.
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Table 10.1 Sub-Processes of 51 Organisational Learning Framework
Intuitive Hits Intuitive Misses
OL Processes Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Initiating (lo)
■ External Drivers y y y y
■ hiternal Drivers y y y y y y
■ Hierarchy y
■ Uncertainty y y
■ Complexity y y
■ Time Pressure y y y y
Intuiting (Ii)
■ Analysing y y y y
■ Scanning y y y
■ Experience y y y y y y
■ Gut Feel y y y y y y
■ Professional y y
Judgement
■ Certitude y y
■ Subjective y y
" Speed y y
Interpreting (1%)
■ Dialogue y y y y y
■ Rationalising y y y y y y
■ Visualising y
Integrating (I3)
■ Generating Options y y y y
■ Negotiating y
■ Conflict y y y y
■ Consensus y y y y
■ Consulting y y y
■ Validating y
■ Involvement y y y y
■ Communicating y y y y
■ Empowering y y
■ Team Developing y
■ Influencing y y
■ Reputation y y y y
■ Values y
■ Credibility y
■ Accountability y
Institutionalising (I4)
■ Systematising y y y
■ Adjusting y y
Post-Decision
Processes
■ Reflecting y y y y y y
■ Learning y y y y y y
V shows which sub-processes are evident in each of the case studies.
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10.1.1 Initiating Process
As it has become evident in the analysis of all six cases, a significant finding in 
Study 2 of this research is that, there appears to be an additional process prior to the 
intuiting process which the researcher called the ‘initiating’ process (Iq). This 
process forms the decision context which acts as a trigger leading to the intuiting 
process.
The 41 framework has been used previously to explore organisational learning 
processes within different contexts (Zietsma et al, 2002; Crossan and Berdrow, 2003; 
Lawrence et al, 2005; Jones and Macpherson, 2006; Berson et al, 2006). To the best 
of the researcher’s knowledge, none of these studies has proposed an additional 
process leading to intuiting. Based on this novel finding, the original 41 framework is 
extended to incorporate this additional process to form a 51 framework.
Given that decision making is context specific, Salas et al (2010) asserted that the 
effectiveness of intuitive decision making will be determined by the decision 
enviromnent and the nature of the decision task. The authors also suggested that the 
characteristics of the decision maker (which they identified as expertise and 
individual differences in information processing styles) will also be influential in this 
regard. It should be noted that the analysis of the decision makers’ information 
processing styles was beyond the scope of Study 2 as the unit of analysis was the 
decision processes, not the decision malcers (individual differences in information 
processing styles have been examined in Study 1 of this research). However, the 
expertise characteristic of the decision makers were taken as granted given the 
participants’ extensive years of experience in the policing domain.
External and Internal Drivers
The data revealed that the initiating process involves external and/or internal 
circmnstances which set the context for the critical incident, and by coming to the 
attention of the decision maker, act as a trigger and drive the decision making 
process. Louis and Sutton (1991) identified three types of triggers which provoke the
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switching of cognitive gears from automatic to active thinking, that cause the actors 
to become consciously engaged in the situation. The first trigger event is when one 
experiences a situation as unusual, novel, imfarniliar or previously unknown (e.g. in 
‘intuitive hits’ Case 2, the email invitation for a dimier celebration was an unusual 
event for the Assistant Chief Constable which triggered him to act on this 
information. Similarly in ‘intuitive misses’ Case 2, the colour-matching session at 
the Health and Wellbeing Day seemed unusual for the HR Director). The second 
trigger event is when there is an unexpected failure or a disruption (e.g. in ‘intuitive 
misses’ Case 1, the failure of the drugs search by the operations team initiated 
decision making process by the SMT. Similarly in ‘intuitive misses’ Case 3, two 
Sergeants’ poor assessment of crime management came to the attention of the Chief 
Inspector, tiiggering him to respond to the situation). The third trigger event refers to 
deliberate initiatives in response to an internal or external request for an increased 
level of conscious attention (e.g. in ‘intuitive hits’ Case 3, the senior officers were 
given a Government directive to establish neighbourhood policing across the 
organisation. Similarly in ‘intuitive hits’ Case 1, the external demand for an effective 
police service and the poor organisational performance required POA to restructure 
their resource allocation).
Authority
Due to the hierarchical structure of police organisations in general, it is not 
surprising to find a strong influence of the authority figures on the decision process. 
For example in the case of POA, despite the internal and external demand, the chief 
officers were reluctant to allow the SMT to change the structur e of the organisation 
(i.e. ‘intuitive hits’ Case 1). Finkelstein (1992) refened to structural power which is 
based on foniral organisational structure and hierarchical authority. Accordingly, the 
greater the manager’s structmal power the greater his/her control over colleagues’ 
actions (Finkelstein, 1992). In the case of POA, whilst the SMT had the authority for 
the management of POA’s BCU, they were accountable to the chief officers (who 
are more senior in rank) in matters as significant as changing the organisational 
structure, therefore their approval was crucial. However, in this case it appears that 
the authority exercised by the chief officers has been a detrimental factor in the
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initiating process which slowed down the pace of decision making (Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois, 1988).
Uncertainty, Complexity, and Time Pressure
In the initiating process, it is obseiwed that the decision environment characterised by 
uncertainty, complexity, and time pressure influences a decision maker’s propensity 
to use intuition as a basis for a decision. These findings support previous reseaich 
suggesting that many managers use their gut feelings to assist their problem solving 
and decision making, especially under complex and uncertain conditions (Agor, 
1986; Khatii and Ng, 2000; Shapiro and Spence, 1997; Burke and Miller, 1999; 
Hayashi, 2001; Isenberg, 1984; Paiikh et al, 1994), in high-stakes tasks and under 
time pressure (Klein, 1997a; Lipshitz et al, 2001). In several cases uncertainty, 
consistent with Klein’s (1998) description, presented itself in the form of missing 
information, lack of knowledge and/or ambiguous information. Klein (1998) stated 
that since it is impossible to achieve himdred percent certainty, decision makers must 
be able to proceed without having the full understanding of the situation. There is 
evidence in the interview data that despite uncertainty the decision makers acted on 
the decision. This finding accentuates the importance of timing. Several participants 
claimed that in certain circumstances when time is limited to weigh up the pros and 
cons of the situation, it is more important to make any decision than no decision at 
all. Accordingly, the need for a quick decision in the face of uncertainties coupled 
with the complex nature of the situation combine to create a decision environment 
which triggers intuitive approach to decision making.
10.1.2 Intuiting Process
Having been triggered by the external and/or internal factors in the initiating process, 
the learning begins with the individuals in the intuiting process. Crossan et al (1999) 
provided insights into the role of the subconscious in this process; emerging 
evidence from the case studies suggests the presence of more deliberate and 
conscious processes taking place alongside intuiting. Additionally, in line with 
previous research (e.g. Hensman and Sadler-Smith, 2011), the data reveals certain
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characteristics of intuition which are discussed below in conceptual terms providing 
examples from the interviews.
Expertise and Affect
In the intuiting process all of the participants referred to intuition as coming from 
their past experiences, and appearing as a gut feeling in the form of judgement that 
felt right or wrong. Fuithennore, some participants used the term ‘professional 
judgement’ to refer to intuitive judgement (see Prietula and Simon, 1989; Hayashi, 
2001; Patton, 2003). It has been observed by the researcher that the terms intuition 
and gut feeling were used by the study participants interchangeably without the 
distinction of the expertise and feeling characteristics which ar e the most commonly 
noted in the literature on intuition. The expertise and affect divergence was partially 
addressed by Dutta and Crossan (2005) who distinguished between expert and 
entrepreneurial intuition. The former is consistent with Simon’s (1987: 63) assertion 
of intuition as “analyses frozen into habit” whereas the latter is consistent with 
Epstein’s (1998) notion of experiential processing which involves affect.
Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2004) suggested that intuition relies on both expertise 
(through explicit and implicit learning processes, manifested as subconscious 
decision heuristics) and feelings (manifested as affect associated with particular 
stirmrlus). The authors called these two notions as ‘ intuition-as-expertise’ and 
‘intuition-as-feeling’ respectively. Similarly, Miller and Ireland (2005) proposed that 
intuition can be conceptualised in two distinct ways: as ‘holistic hunch’ and as 
‘automated expertise’.
Simon (1987) also acknowledged this distinction by asserting that the intuition of the 
emotion-driven^ manager is very different from the intuition of the expert: the 
latter’s behaviour is the product of learning and experience, and is largely adaptive; 
whereas the former’s behavioru' is a response to more primitive urges and is more
 ^ Whilst it is not uncommon to find in the literature that the terms ‘emotion’ and ‘affect’ are used 
interchangeably (Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005) it is important to note that intuitions are affectively- 
charged judgements (Dane and Pratt, 2007), and this is different from emotions.
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often than not inappropriate. On the contrary, Damasio (1994) claimed that somatic 
markers play a crucial role in helping the decision maker filter various possibilities 
quickly, even though the conscious mind might not be aware of it.
In the interview data, there is evidence of intuitions as expertise and as gut feeling. 
For example in ‘intuitive hits’ Case 1 and Case 3, the senior officers’ intuitions were 
based on their expertise which the officers attributed to their prior learning and 
professional seniority. On the other hand, in ‘intuitive hits’ Case 2 and ‘intuitive 
misses’ Case 2, the senior officers’ irrtuitions appeared in the form of a strong 
affectively charged gut feeling which the officers described as stress or anxiety. In 
the latter two cases it is also observed that the gut feeling acted as a warning sign 
requiring the decision maker to respond to the situation. This finding supports 
research in neuroscience that the intuitive processes, manifesting themselves as 
automatic somatic alarm bells, provide feelings-based signals to the decision maker 
for or against a course of action (LeDoux, 1996; Darnasio, 1994).
Certitude
Whilst the participants were not able to fully explain what happens during the 
process of intuiting, they referred to several characteristics of intuition. For example, 
senior officers indicated the feeling of certitude in their intuitions (Shirley and 
Langan-Fox, 1996) commonly expressed by statements such as “zY felt righC or “zY 
was the right thing to c/o” constituting belief that their intuitions were correct 
(Shapiro and Spence, 1997) despite the inadequate information around the decision. 
Dane and Pratt (2007: 39) stated that the feeling of certitude which accompanies 
intuition may be due to its “affective and associative properties”.
Having high levels of confidence in their intuitions meant that sometimes the senior 
officers were taking a risk by following tlieir gut feeling (Slovic et al, 2002). For 
example in ‘intuitive hits’ Case 3, although the senior officers were provided with an 
advice docmnent on how to establish neighbomhood policing, they ignored this 
advice and trusted their intuitive judgement to create the organisation’s public 
engagement model. Whilst the outcome was positive, this was a gamble on their part
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and caii’ied a risk as they had no previous experience of what they were expected to 
deliver. Clearly, in the other two cases whereby the officers felt certain of their 
intuitions, they were misguided by their intuitions leading them to ‘intuitive misses”.
Speed
The participants also made reference to the speed of intuitive processing, the aspect 
of intuition which drew the most attention in the field of managerial decision making 
(Agor, 1986; Eisenhaidt, 1989, 1990; Bmke and Miller, 1999; Khatri and Ng, 2000; 
Klein, 2003). This was particularly evident in ‘intuitive hits’ Case 2 and ‘intuitive 
misses’ Case 1 when in both cases the officers had an affectively charged gut feeling 
about the situation wliich arose rapidly. Evidence suggests that nonconscious 
recognition occurs almost immediately upon engagement with relevant stimuli 
(Hensman and Sadler-Smith, 2011).
Subjective
Additionally, the senior officers emphasised the subjective nature of intuition by 
stating that the intuitive judgements they made were subjective on the basis of their 
accmnulated personal experiences and how they felt about the situation. Since 
intuitions ar e derived from tacit and explicit ways of learning (Dane and Pratt, 2007; 
Hogarth, 2001), giving rise to differences in subjective perceptions of people, the 
senior officers acknowledged that the quality and effectiveness of the decisions 
depended on the decision makers involved in the decision making process.
Nonconscious Processing
Miller and Ireland (2005) stated that intuitive decision makers cannot explain why 
they feel the way they do, or why they make the choices they make. This resonates 
with Epstein’s (2008: 29) claim that intuition involves “knowing without knowing 
how one knows”. Accordingly, whilst there is evidence of attributes of intuition 
(such as its speed and subjectivity, and being based in experience and attended by 
affect), a majority of the participants were not able to tell exactly what happens
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whilst they are intuiting. This supports the previous conceptualisation of intuition 
that it is a nonconscious process (Epstein, 1994; Hogai'th, 2001). In ‘intuitive hits’ 
Case 1, one of the Chief Inspectors attempted to describe his personal experience of 
intuiting:
“I  tend to go on gut feelings quite a lot.,, there‘s a lot o f numbers and 
stuff going through my head, it‘s like you can’t work it all out, and 
you wake up in the middle o f the night, and there it is, because your 
brain's processed it all. So yeah, there is a lot o f gut feeling...” 
[Paificipant E]
His explanation suggests that the process of intuiting occurs beyond conscious 
awareness, he is only aware of the outcome (i.e. intuitive judgement) as a result of 
intuiting (Dane and Pratt, 2007).
Collective Intuition
Whilst intuiting is an individual level process (i.e. the phenomenon is a personal and 
highly subjective experience), it has emerged from the analysis of the data that the 
officers also engaged in a collective intuiting process. Several authors stated that 
collective intuitions shared among senior managers are of great value to decision 
making, and may contribute to faster and more accurate reactions (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
1999; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) and facilitate collective learning processes 
(Sadler-Smith, 2008). Jett and Brown (2002) found that the development of 
collective intuition involves drawing advice and experience from other people rather 
than fr'om sources of explicit information, and making the tacit knowledge of 
individuals more explicit to the group. This helps the decision makers develop 
shared domain-related experiences that lead to collective intuition, problem solving, 
and organisational learning.
The evidence of collective intuitions in this study suggests that, the officers involved 
in the decision making had the same intuitive judgement as their colleagues on the 
situation they were dealing with. For example in ‘intuitive hits’ Case 2, the Assistant 
Chief Constable, the Chief Constable and the Finance Director all had the same 
intuitive judgement that the proposed dinner event ought to be cancelled. Also in
279
‘intuitive misses’ Case 3, the SMT collectively addressed the problem regarding the 
poor performing Sergeants, and had a collective intuition about how it should be 
resolved.
In an empirical study of intuitive team decision making, Kline (2005) foimd that the 
expert team developed strong shar ed mental models that caused them to intuitively 
understand an event in relation to prior events they have experienced together. 
Collectively understanding the event allows each team member to independently 
make an intuitive judgement that is the same as his/her teammates. In another study, 
Seifert and Hadida (2009) provided empirical evidence of the value of collective 
intuition; their results showed that reliance on more than one individual judgement 
may increase the predictive power of intuition.
Scanning
In the intuiting process, it appears that some decision makers engage in scanning to 
search for knowledge from external or internal sources in order to monitor the 
enviromnent and provide information to managers that would be useful in the 
decision process (Huber, 1991; Weick, 2001; Almeida, Phene and Grant, 2005).
Accordingly, for example in ‘intuitive hits’ Case 3, the senior officers of POC run 
reassmance pilots in order to find out how they could establish engagement with the 
public. The knowledge gained from these pilots fed into the senior officers’ intuiting 
process helping them to develop the organisation’s model for public engagement. 
Similarly in ‘intuitive hits’ Case 1, the senior officers looked at the resource 
allocation models of other police organisations similarly positioned to POA to realise 
that they needed to achieve lower numbers in neighbomhood policing teams.
Prietula and Simon (1989) suggested that by scamiing the environment, experts 
absorb and evaluate lai'ge quantities of information quickly, grasping the meaning of 
certain patterns of operations or activity. This explanation fits well with what 
happened in ‘intuitive misses’ Case 1. The police officer went to the address in 
question several times to check whether there is any activity that would coiToborate
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the intelligence, his intuitive judgement was that it looked like a drug dealer’s house. 
Consistent with the literatiue, this finding suggests that the officer’s intuition relied 
on the recognition of patterns on the basis of his previous experience of what a drug 
dealer’s house looked like (Klein, 1998; Crossan et al, 1999),
Kleysen and Dyck’s (2001) addition of ‘attending’ to the intuiting process represents 
scanning and searching that form the linkage between the environment and the 
organisation. The authors distinguished between the ‘passive’ sense of attending 
which is viewed as receiving information that triggers the evaluation and search of 
ideas, and the ‘active’ sense of attending which relates to learning that is derived 
from deliberate scanning and analytical process which may lead into or out of the 
intuiting process. In this respect, what the researcher called ‘scanning’ is akin to 
Kleysen and Dyck’s notion of active attending whereby the search for information is 
deliberate.
Analysing
As Simon (1987) asserted intuition is not a process that operates independently of 
analysis; rather the two processes aie essential complementary components of 
information processing (Epstein et al, 1996) and effective decision making 
(Damasio, 1994). In this respect -  drawing on the teiininology used in the dual­
process theories which form the conceptual foundation of this research -  the findings 
from the data suggest that there appeal's to be a process of analysing, to the extent of 
vaiying degrees in different circumstances, which take place either prior to, after, or 
in parallel with the intuiting process. In ‘intuitive hits’ Case 1, analysing occurred 
prior to intuiting whereby the failure of attempts to develop a resourcing formula 
solely based on analysis led to the intuiting process by the senior officers; in Case 2, 
analysing took place after the officer had a gut feeling about the situation by way of 
trying to gather more infoi'mation to back up his intuitive judgement; in Case 3, the 
senior officers employed their intuitive judgements alongside using analytical data. 
On the other hand, it appeal's that there was a lack of analysing in all thiee cases of 
‘intuitive misses’. Only in Case 1 it is observed that some analysing took place, 
however as it became apparent from the comments of the decision makers that this
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was less than what they would normally do under the same circumstances. 
Additionally, the information gathered was inaccuiate which was not realised due to 
the lack of analysis. It could be ai'gued that these factors combined biased the 
officer’s perception, who as fai* as he was concerned was attending a routine job, to 
make an incoiTect intuitive judgement, hence leading to the failure of the operation. 
In Case 2 and Case 3 there is no evidence of analysing, the decisions seem to be 
based solely on the intuitive judgements of the officers.
It is evident in the findings of this study that the participants actively used external 
and explicit somces of knowledge (some of which might result from the scanning of 
the environment) to analyse information. Kleysen and Dyck (2001: 5) stated that 
active attending “is definitely a more conscious and analytical process” whereby the 
authors refer to the active nature of scanning and searching. It is imperative to clarify 
that they do not present attending as a process of analysing. To distinguish between 
the notions of scanning and analysing, it should be noted that scanning refers to 
search for information whereas analysing refers to the conscious and deliberate 
processing of information. The resultant information fiom scanning may become a 
source for analysing and/or intuiting processes.
Contrary to what is proposed in the original 41 framework (i.e. intuitions being the 
only source for learning), the evidence in this reseaich points to the use of conscious 
and rational information processing (i.e. analysing) in parallel to nonconscious and 
experiential information processing (i.e. intuiting) to generate new ideas that would 
be explored and fed fbrwaid to the group and organisation levels.
10.1.3 Interpreting Process
Since intuiting is a tacit process it is important that the decision makers are able to 
interpret their intuitions in order to make sense of them. In this respect, Crossan et al 
(1999) drew attention to the importance of the use of language and metaphors in the 
inteipreting process. Tliree sub-processes have been identified in the intemew data 
which take place in the interpreting process: dialogue, visualising, and rationalising.
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Dialogue
Dialogue is viewed as an essential component of organisational learning and for 
building common understanding (Schein, 1993), Whilst the recognition of a pattern 
is an individual process, the inteipretation of the recognised patterns is contingent on 
the conversational process with others (Salas et al, 2010). Consistent with Crossan et 
al’s (1999) framework, in the interview data there is evidence that the tacitly held 
intuitions become explicit thiough development of language in conversation and 
dialogue.
The findings show that as the first step in trying to aiticulate and explain intuitive 
judgements, the participants engaged in dialogue thereby claiifying mental images 
and refining common language. In most cases, this dialogue took place with others 
involved in the decision making process through infoimal or formal chats, 
discussions or meetings thereby bridging the individual and group levels (Crossan et 
al, 1999). Whilst this seems to be the common practice, Crossan et al (1999) also 
stated that people can make sense of their intuitions tlii'ough an internal 
conversational process (i.e. ‘talking to one’s self). This is evident in ‘intuitive hits’ 
Case 2 and ‘intuitive misses’ Case 2 when the participants were involved in a ‘talk’ 
with themselves trying to interpret their gut feelings. As organisational learning 
involves group processes, it is necessary that this internal dialogue be externalised 
and shai'ed with others.
Visualising
Leonai’d and Sensiper (1998: 113) noted that the common element of knowing that 
results fiom tacit knowledge and intuition “is the inability of the knower to totally 
articulate all that he or she knows”. In this regai'd, various researchers suggested that 
images (including visual imagery) aie also important and equally useful in 
expressing intuitions (Crossan et al, 1999; Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005; Sadler- 
Smith and Shefy, 2007).
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It is observed in ‘intuitive hits’ Case 3 that when the Chief Superintendent was 
trying to explain his mental model of public engagement to the Chief Inspector, he 
illustrated the concept he had in his mind by drawing it on the board, and then the 
two senior officers engaged in inteipretation of this information thi ough dialogue. In 
support of the literature, this finding indicates that visual inteipretation helps 
articulation of intuitive judgements. In explaining how they interpreted their intuitive 
judgements the Chief Inspector noted the following:
'T think it’s the way people’s mind operates, some people’s mind 
operates best in the written word, and some people’s mind operates 
within the picture. Now I  operate better like Gavin, with the picture, i f  
I  can see things and I  can picture things on a single piece o f paper 
I ’m much more comfortable and then can remember. I t ’s 
understanding where the person who’s trying to tell you something is 
coming from then interpreting what that is, because that ’s what it’s 
all about. ” [Participant V]
The Chief Inspector’s comment above points to the potential significance of 
individual differences in information processing, and suggests that visualising versus 
verbalising is a cognitive style preference. Some people are better in articulating and 
some are better in visualising. Clearly, the fact that both of the senior officers were 
able to visualise their intuitive judgements led to an effective interpreting process, 
and enlianced understanding and dialogue between them.
Rationalising
It emerged fiom the interview data that in the interpreting process when the 
pai'ticipants shared their intuitive judgements they tried to justify the underlying 
rationale behind their intuitions. Various researchers asserted that justifications are 
post-hoc rationalisations of intuitive judgements (Wason and Evans, 1975; Evans 
and Wason, 1976) and individuals use moral reasoning as a post-hoc explanation and 
justification of their intuitions (Sonenshein, 2007). According to Weick (2001: 11) 
“justifications are compelling sources of meaning because they consist of socially 
acceptable reasons”, for this reason people attempt to make situations rationally 
accountable to themselves and others. Weick (1995) asserted that this post-hoc 
attribution can reflect individuals’ engagement in sense-making processes.
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In ‘intuitive hits’ Case 3, there is evidence that in order for the officers to influence 
the more senior officers regarding the model of public engagement, in the 
inteipreting process they had to post-rationalise their intuitions. One of the officers 
commented:
"... but i f  you are challenged about what is your rationale for making 
the decision part o f the culture o f this organisation means that it 
would be quite hard to turn around and say Ht just feels like the right 
thing to do '. ” [Participant T]
It is clear from this statement that intuitive judgements have to be rationalised and 
reasoned in a logical way in order to make them acceptable to others. This finding is 
supported by Garvin and Roberto (2001) who stated that reasoning is important in 
organisational contexts when arguments must persuade executives to authorise 
coui'ses of action.
10.1.4 Integrating Process
As the learning process moves to the group level, Crossan et al (1999) noted that 
language plays a critical role and is essential as a means of integrating ideas and 
negotiating actions with others. The 41 framework provides some insight in relation 
to the dynamics occmiing within the decision making group. Integral to this part of 
the learning process is the development of the ‘collective mind’ (Weick and Roberts, 
1993) and the dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). There appears to be 
various group decision making processes occurring in the integrating process as 
discussed below.
Generating Options, Negotiating, Conflict, Consensus, and Team Development
Bourgeois and Eisenliardt (1988) argued that when decisions are made in a group 
setting, the group’s decisions are likely to be influenced by social interaction among 
the various members of the decision making team. The interview data indicates that 
in the integrating process the senior officers generated several options and engaged 
in negotiating these options within the group. As part of this process, disagreement 
and conflict amongst the team members appear to be cormnon, however reaching
285
consensus seems to play a significant role in developing shared understanding and 
taking coherent action. In support of these findings, previous resear ch suggested that 
management teams whose members challenge one another’s thinking develop a 
more complete understanding of the choices, create a broader range of options and 
ultimately make effective decisions (Eisenliardt et al, 1997; Garvin and Roberto, 
2001; Roberto, 2004).
For example in ‘intuitive hits’ Case 1, it is evident that the Chief Inspectors gave the 
concept of the resource allocation model, based on their intuitive judgements, to two 
officers who were tasked to design options around that model. Wlien the options 
were presented to the Chief Inspectors they then negotiated these options with each 
other. In support of these results, Eisenhardt’s (1989) work found that in high- 
velocity enviromnents decision makers developed many alternatives but only 
broadly analysed them. Consistent with the findings, Crossan et al (1999) stated that 
as part of the integrating process, groups create a shared understanding of the 
situation and negotiate mutual adjustments to their actions. Edmondson et al (2003) 
suggested that central to the negotiating process are the interests of the involved 
decision makers. In the above mentioned case, it was evident that from time to time 
conflict arose among the three Chief Inspectors as they were all trying to be 
protective of their own divisions. However, in the end they achieved consensus by 
focusing on what would be the best for the organisation. This created a common 
interest for them to work towards to achieve the common goal. The senior team 
members also commented on the fact that having worked to a challenge as such 
brought them together as a team and developed them collectively.
The successful teams that Eisenhardt and colleagues (1997) studied showed similar 
characteristics. They appeared to consistently frame their decisions as collaborations 
rather than competition whereby it was for everyone’s interest to achieve the best 
solution for the collective. However, it should be noted that this does not necessarily 
imply homogenous thinking, but requires everyone to share a vision. As Roberto 
(2004: 1) described “consensus does not mean imanimity, widespread agreement on 
all facets of a decision or complete approval... Consensus does mean that people 
have agreed to co-operate in the implementation of a decision. They have accepted
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the final choice, though they may not be completely satisfied with it”. This notion is 
evident in ‘intuitive misses’ Case 2 whereby although the HR Director did not agree 
with the decision to go ahead with the colour-matching event, she accepted the chief 
officers group’s choice to do so.
Influencing and Credibility
It appears from the interviews that for ideas to be accepted, people need to be able to 
successfully persuade others of the idea’s viability for coordinated action to talce 
place. Following from the previous section, it is evident in ‘intuitive misses’ Case 2 
that the Assistant Chief Constable was able to persuade the HR Director to support 
the colour-matching event on the basis of her personal experience as a female senior 
officer, and as a result influenced the final decision at the chief officers group. 
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) suggested that management teams engage in 
political behaviour to influence the decision making and that ultimately the most 
powerfril among them determine decisions (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). It could 
also be argued that the Assistant Chief Constable’s intuitive judgement based on her 
personal experience accounted for a more credible justification to influence the rest 
of the team than the HR Director’s opposing judgement based on her affective gut 
feeling.
In another case, ‘intuitive hits’ Case 3, the Chief Superintendent was able to 
influence not only the SMT but also the external partners to deliver the change 
across the organisation, hence facilitating organisational learning. He attributed this 
ability to influence others to his personal credibility as an effective leader within and 
outside the organisation.
Consulting and Validating
The emerging evidence from the study suggests that not all the members of the SMT 
have to be involved collectively in the integrating process. Management team 
members and people outside the SMT are consulted based on their expertise of the 
subject, and may become involved to contribute to the decision making process
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(Roberto, 2003). This is in line with Eisenhardt’s (1989) finding that decision 
malcers obtain advice from one or more of the organisation’s most experienced 
executives whom they trust. This is observed in ‘intuitive hits’ Case 2, right after the 
Assistant Chief Constable had an intuitive judgement regarding the proposed dinner 
event, he consulted the Chief Constable and the Finance Director to get their 
professional advice on the situation. It has also become apparent that by approaching 
them with a foimed judgement, he was seeking to check what their intuitions told 
them in order to validate his own gut feeling.
Reputation, Empowering, Accountability, and Values
In the integrating process it is observed that several factors contribute to the decision 
making of the SMT. Particularly, reputation of the organisation emerged as a 
significant consideration which determined the actions of the management teams due 
to its impact on public’s perception of the performance of the police in general. This 
is evident in ‘intuitive hits’ Case 2 and ‘intuitive misses’ Case 2 whereby in both 
cases the decision to cancel the events were on the basis of not jeopardising the 
reputation of the organisation.
The role of the leadership is significant in trying to empower people and inspire 
commitment (Ai vedson, 1993), inflicting a sense of accountability that binds people 
to consequences (Tetlock, 1991). In ‘intuitive misses’ Case 1, it appeared that when 
the drugs search operation failed the SMT took immediate actions to recover the 
situation as quickly as possible in order to minimise the damage on the 
organisation’s reputation. The management team also took responsibility as an 
organisation for the mistake of the operations team and, instead of pimishing them, 
empowered the officers concerned on the basis of the values for ""doing the right 
thing for the right reasons within the culture o f the organisation''’ as one senior 
officer put it. Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggested that it is the manager’s 
perception of the situation with his/her own values which influences the manager’s 
decision making. It is observed in this case that management exercised discretion to 
learn from this incident and move on.
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Communicating and Involvement
According to Schein (1993) dialogue at the executive level is not enough for the 
organisational learning to occui\ The process of communicating across the 
hierar chical levels of the organisation requires further dialogue. In the case studies, 
there is evidence of coimnunication occurring to varying degrees within different 
organisations. As observed in ‘intuitive hits’ Case 1 and Case 3, the SMTs 
mentioned the difficulty they had experienced in selling their ideas to the grass roots 
and involving the members of the organisation to participate in the change process. 
This was mainly attributed by the team members to their lack of communicating the 
management team’s vision to the lower levels of the organisation, and involving 
them in the decision making process. A similar' situation is also obsei'ved in ‘intuitive 
misses’ Case 3 whereby the senior management’s efforts to relocate staff failed due 
to not involving the staff concerned in the decision making process.
These results suggest that for learning to move from group to organisation level, the 
Icnowledge held within the senior teams needs to be passed on to the lower levels of 
the organisation. It could be argued that it is the responsibility of the leadership to 
initiate integrating process of learning to evolve within the organisation. This could 
be facilitated by establishing a mechanism that enables individuals and groups to 
participate in the development of strategy, structures and procedures. Bass (1998) 
argued that when people understand where they fit into the larger pattern envisaged 
by the top management they are motivated to offer their ideas. In this respect, Vera 
and Crossan (2004) suggested various leadership styles which would be relevant to 
understanding the role of the leader in organisational learning.
10.1.5 Institutionalising Process
Institutionalising is a significant process of organisational learning. Having been 
integrated, the ideas must then be institutionalised in order to impact on the fiitur e of 
the organisation (Crossan and Berdrow, 2003). In this respect, learning has to be 
embedded within the organisation’s systems, structures, procedures, and routines “to 
ensure that cer-tain actions occur” (Crossan et al, 1999: 525).
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Systematising and Adjusting
Consistent with Crossan et al’s (1999) view, the interview data revealed that SMTs 
established formal procedures and embedded learning into the organisations’ 
systems in order to leverage and capitalise on individual and group knowledge. This 
is what the researcher called ‘systematising’ and is evident in three out of the six 
case studies. For example in ‘intuitive hits’ Case 1, in the restructuring of the 
organisation the senior officers, by use of their intuitive judgements, redesigned the 
resource allocation model, and gave clarity around the roles and functions withiir the 
divisions establishing consistent processes throughout the organisation. In ‘intuitive 
hits’ Case 3, the intuitive judgements of the senior officers were captured in the 
development of the model of engagement with the public and neighbourhood 
policing teams were established based on that model. It emerged from these two 
cases that as time went on the management teams assessed the institutionalised 
learning and assimilated new ideas leading to further adjusting of the embedded 
structures and procedures. In ‘intuitive misses’ Case 3, having failed in their 
attempts to relocate the Sergeants, the senior officers established the Talent 
Management Scheme to provide them with a pool of officers who would want to 
advance in their careers, and therefore would be more willing to take on the 
challenges offered by the management. It appeal's that the senior management 
deliberately put a system in place that would help them avoid a similar incident in 
the futiu'e. Interestingly, this is the only ‘intuitive misses’ case whereby the senior 
management institutionalised their learning from the critical incident.
The findings fiom the other cases revealed that individual and gi'oup leaining does 
not always get embedded within the organisation’s systems, structures and 
procedures. It is observed that in the remaining thiee cases no formalised procedures 
have been developed as a result of the leai'ning experiences, hence the 
institutionalising process has not occurred. In ‘intuitive hits’ Case 2, by acting early 
to cancel the dinner event, the chief officers were able to avoid potentially negative 
implications of this incident. In regard to not institutionalising this learning, the 
participants stated that they would not want to make a rule out of this incident to 
forbid proposal of such events, as in the futiu'e they might want to approve a similar
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event that would attract bad press. It appears that the chief officers made a conscious 
decision by not formalising this learning experience in order to not limit their fiiture 
actions. In relation to the other two cases, ‘intuitive misses’ Case 1 and Case 2, the 
outcomes of following intuitive judgements in making the decisions have been 
negative which jeopardised the reputation of the respective organisations. However, 
there appears to be a belief by the senior officers that the high profile of these 
incidents had an impact on everyone in the organisation leading to an implicit 
learning whereby nobody would want to repeat the same mistake again. As a result, 
no corrective actions have been taken in order to formally institutionalise this 
learning within the organisation.
In regard to these findings, it is argued that organisational learning is not complete 
until learning is embedded in the organisational memory (Ai'gyris and Schon, 1978; 
Huber, 1991; Crossan et al, 1999). If learning is not embedded in the organisation, it 
cannot be fed back to organisational members where it can have an impact on their 
performance and success. Without the process of institutionalising, organisations run 
the risk of failing to learn from their experiences (Wiseman, 2007). Previous 
research addressed the difference between learning from success and learning from 
failure (Bauniard and Starbuck, 2005; Cannon and Edmondson, 2005) suggesting 
that few organisations make effective use of failures for learning. The evidence 
indicates that learning from failure is a result of very conscious efforts by managers 
which suggests that organisations could avoid lar ge failures by paying more attention 
to small failures.
Drawing upon insights from Huber’s (1991) work, organisational memory is the 
means by which knowledge is stored for future use. It is argued that human 
components of organisational memories are often less than satisfactory due to 
inaccurate learning and incomplete recall (Kahneman et al, 1982). Additionally, 
learning which remains with individuals and groups runs the risk of being forgotten 
in time or leaving with people when they leave the organisation. For this reason, 
organisational knowledge about how to do things are stored in the form of standard 
operating procedures, routines, and scripts (March, 1991; Huber, 1991). This 
suggests that the SMTs are responsible for embedding knowledge gathered from
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individual’s intuitions at the organisation level for it to be recognised as an 
institution of the organisation and be accessible for reuse, and to influence future 
behavioiu's and actions.
10.2 Role of Intuition in Decision Maidng
The thorough investigation of the organisational learning processes provided insights 
into the role intuition plays in decision making. In this regar d, the compar ison of the 
‘intuitive hits’ and ‘intuitive misses’ revealed a significant finding which sheds some 
light on understanding what constitutes the effective use of intuitive judgements in 
managerial decision making (i.e. when does intuition ‘hit’ and when does it ‘miss’).
Baron (2004) stated that many factors determine the relative rate at which 
individuals experience hits, misses, and false alarms in any given situation. He 
asserted that some of these factors are physical and relate to the properties of the 
stimuli (i.e. the stronger the stimulus, the easier to be certain); some relate to the 
current state of the perceiver (e.g. fatigue, high/low motivation to malce conect 
determinations); and others involve the subjective criteria perceivers apply to the 
task.
The evidence emerged fiom this study suggests that what determines whether 
intuition will hit or miss is the decision maker’s involvement in analysing alongside 
intuiting. In the research data, it appears that in all three cases of ‘intuitive hits’ the 
senior officers engaged in deliberate analysis of information from external som ces. It 
seems that this occurred either before, after, or during the intuiting process to 
varying degrees depending on the availability of information and time to come up 
with a decision. On the other hand, analysis of ‘intuitive misses’ revealed decision 
making as a more complex trajectory whereby there appears to be lack of analysing 
in all three cases. As discussed earlier, only in Case 1 some analysing took place, 
however the information gathered was inadequate and inaccurate. In the other two 
cases there is no evidence of analysing taking place alongside intuiting.
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These findings indicate that the processes of intuiting and analysing complement one 
another in the making of effective decisions, a view consistent with the dual-process 
perspective (Stanovich and West, 2000; Epstein, 1994). In support of these results, 
Klein (2003) stated that neither analysis nor intuition alone is sufficient for effective 
decision making, and that decision makers can go wi'ong if they rely excessively or 
exclusively on intuition or analysis. Similarly, Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2004) 
suggested that executives might achieve a more balanced perspective by considering 
both rationality and intuition as complementary and mutually reinforcing 
components of a decision strategy. Patton (2003) asserted that how much of the 
added insight will be intuitive and how much of it will be the result of analysis is a 
mute question. Accordingly, whether intuition adds a small proportion of the 
beneficial impact or most of it is of little importance. The point is that developing 
habits which add to intuition and to better analysis of situations will improve 
decision making.
Crossan et al’s (1999) 41 framework suggests that intuitions are the only source of 
learning. The emerging evidence in this research points to the limits of this view by 
providing evidence that depending only on intuitive judgements to respond to critical 
incidents may prove fallible and lead the decision maker to ‘intuitive misses’. The 
research findings indicate that tire decision makers use analysing and intuiting 
together to generate ideas that would lead to effective decision making (i.e. ‘intuitive 
hits’). The ideas generated through intuiting and analysing will be explored at the 
individual level and be fed forward to the group and organisation levels. In this 
respect, these results suggest the incorporation of analysing into the intuiting process 
in order to acknowledge the presence of both information processing systems in 
effective decision making processes that would lead to organisational learning. In 
light of this argument the following fiamework of organisational learning is 
proposed (Figure 10.1).
293
Figure 10.1 51 Organisational Learning Framework
Context Individual Group Organisation
Context
Individual
Group
Organisation
Feed forward
Initiating
inniiting 
+ Analysing
Interpreting
Integrating
Institutionalising
In closing this section it seems inipoitant to emphasise that the process of 
institutionalising is clearly important for capitalising on the managers’ intuitions. For 
organisational learning to be complete, the successh.il implementation and 
embedding of the managers’ intuitive judgements is required. As discussed earlier, 
this will depend on the senior management’s conscious efforts to embed the learning 
into the organisation’s systems, structures, strategies and procedures making them a 
part of the routines of the organisational practices.
10.3 Conclusion
In summary, this research applied Crossan et al’s (1999) 41 framework of 
organisational learning to the processes of decision making at three police 
organisations. Following a rich synthesis and discussion of these organisational
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learning processes, this chapter draws a number of significant conclusions as
emerged from the findings of the reseai*ch.
■ There appears to be an additional process in the 41 organisational learning 
framework prior to the intuiting process, which the researcher named the 
‘initiating’ process. The basic premise of this finding is that decision making is 
context specific. Therefore, the nature of the situation triggers the information 
processing approach to decision making. The decision environment comprising 
factors such as complexity, uncerfainty, and time pressure call for an intuitive 
approach to decision making.
■ The evidence suggests that both expertise and affect are legitimate sources of 
intuitions. Additionally, the findings revealed that there is an element of scamiing 
in the intuiting process in search for information that would feed into the 
intuiting of the decision maker. It is evident that for effective decision making 
intuiting is complemented by use of analysing. The results suggest that both 
information processing systems working in parallel is likely to lead to an 
‘intuitive hit’, and the lack of analysing in the intuiting process is likely to lead to 
an ‘intuitive miss’.
■ The (intuiting) individual’s capability of verbal and/or visual interpretation 
appears to play a significant role in being able to articulate, or otherwise 
communicate, their intuitive judgements to themselves and to others in order to 
make sense of this tacit knowledge. It appears that in moving from individual to 
group level, people deliberately attempt to rationalise their intuitive judgements 
by providing justifications in order to malce them socially acceptable to others.
“ The findings suggest that the integrating process involves various group decision
making processes, and is influenced by the dynamics and interactions taking 
place within the SMTs. As in the previous process, dialogue seems to play an 
important role in group interactions such as communicating, negotiating, 
consulting, influencing, conflict, and consensus building in order to develop 
shared understanding leading to coordinated action. For the learning to be fully
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integrated, and move from group to organisation level, it appears imperative that 
the senior management communicates the ‘collective mind’ across the 
hierarchical levels of the organisation, and establishes mechanisms to involve the 
entire organisation in the decision making process.
Finally, the results of this study indicate that the establishment of formal 
systems, structures, and procedures facilitate the institutionalisation of leaining, 
however it is also revealed that not all individual and group learning is 
institutionalised on the organisation level. Particularly, there is convincing 
evidence that organisations fail to learn from their failures by not implementing 
conective actions to influence future success. For organisational learning to be 
frilly realised, there needs to be conscious effort on the part of the senior 
management to capitalise on their managers’ intuitions by embedding the 
knowledge into the routines of the organisational practices.
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Chapter 11 Conclusion
11.0 Introduction
This chapter concludes the thesis. It is organised in five sections: the first section 
summarises the research studies undertaken in this thesis; the second and third 
sections highlight the theoretical contributions and managerial implications 
respectively; the fourth section discusses the limitations of this resear ch; and finally 
the fifth section provides directions for future research.
11.1 Summary of Research
This thesis explored the role of intuitive judgement in collective decision making as 
it pertained to the organisational learning processes at tliree police organisations in 
the UK. In this respect, the thesis integrated three separate lines of research in 
management: intuition, decision malting, and organisational learning. Whilst 
organisational learning has been researched extensively in literature, the role of 
intuition in this process has not been investigated fully. Similarly, while much is 
known about the rational-analytical ways of Itnowing in decision making, relatively 
little research has been undertaken in relation to intuition and its role in decision 
malting. This research aimed to respond to the challenge to advancing knowledge 
and rmderstanding of this phenomenon, and its role in collective decision making and 
learning from the individual and organisational perspectives.
More specifically, the thesis addressed the following research questions:
RQl Are there individual differences in the use of intuitive (experiential) and 
analytical (rational) thinking (cognitive) styles amongst members of police 
organisations;
RQ2 Do senior managers use intuitive judgement in decision making, and under 
what circumstances do they use it;
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RQ3 How effective are intuitive judgements perceived to be (for example, when 
does intuition ‘hit’ and when does it ‘miss’?);
RQ4 Do ‘good’ and ‘bad’ intuitions become embedded within the organisation’s 
systems and structures, if so how, and what are the consequences;
RQ5 How does intuiting lead to organisational learning, and how can intuitions be 
capitalised upon as a source of organisational learning?
In an attempt to gain a deeper understanding of the role of intuitive judgement in 
managerial decision making a pilot study and two main studies were caiiied out. To 
address RQ 1, Study 1 employed the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI, Pacini 
and Epstein, 1999), a self-report inventory for measuring rational and experiential 
thinking styles, with the aim to explore the individual differences in intuitive and 
analytical information processing by police officers and police staff in their work, 
across different job levels and job types in two different organisations. The findings 
are highlighted below.
(1) Study 1 revealed that there was no gender difference in terms of the intuitive 
thinking style. This finding was in support of previous research claiming against the 
traditional belief that women are more intuitive than men. Additionally, and as 
anticipated, the police officers appeared to be more intuitive than police staff. 
However, there was lack of support to confirm that intuition is positively related to 
job level or experience. This result was surprising given the expertise-based view of 
intuition suggesting that senior managers are more intuitive than their less 
experienced and more junior colleagues; however, it is consistent with previous 
empirical findings. The study clearly showed that intuition is an important aspect of 
decision making in police work for both officers and staff.
To address RQ 2 to 5, Study 2 used the concepts of ‘intuitive hits’ and ‘intuitive 
misses’ as derived from the pilot study to investigate the intuitions of the SMTs at 
three police organisations. The ‘intuitive hits and misses’ typology is an analytical 
tool which was developed in the pilot study through the application of Flanagan’s 
(1954) CIT. In Study 2 a multi-case study approach was adopted. Crossan et al’s
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(1999) 41 model was employed as the underlying theoretical framework, combined 
with the method of CIT, to gather retrospective accounts from senior police officers 
of instances where intuitive judgement led to effective and ineffective organisational 
outcomes. In-depth data was collected based on semi-structuied focus group 
interviews with SMTs.
Study 2 provided a thorough investigation of six case studies into the role of intuition 
in collective decision making and learning from an organisational perspective. 
Particularly, this study successfrilly fulfilled its objective to provide answers to the 
questions that this research set out to explore in the senior management context of 
three police organisations. These are summarised below.
(2) It is clear from the findings of Study 2 that senior police management teams 
aclcnowledged and claimed their use of intuition in decision making under both 
strategic and operational contexts. It appeared that decision environment comprising 
factors such as complexity, uncertainty, and time pressure call for an intuitive 
approach to decision making.
(3) The comparison of ‘intuitive hits’ and ‘intuitive misses’ revealed what constitutes 
the effective use of intuitive judgement in managerial decision making. The results 
suggested that what determines whether intuition will ‘hit’ or ‘miss’ depends on the 
decision makers’ use of rational-analytical cognition alongside intuitive judgement. 
Whilst the ‘intuitive hits’ clearly showed the use of both information processing 
systems in parallel, this was not evident in the ‘intuitive misses’.
(4) Results of the research indicated that intuitions that feed into the senior 
managers’ decision making may become institutionalised by way of being embedded 
within the organisation’s systems, structures, procedures, and practices (two out of 
three ‘intuitive hits’ were institutionalised). When the learning is institutionalised, it 
becomes a par-t of the organisational routines. However, there is also evidence that 
some individual and group learning may not be institutionalised. The findings 
suggested that organisations fail to learn from their failures by not implementing 
corrective actions (two out of three ‘intuitive misses’ were not institutionalised), the
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consequence of which is that they potentially run the risk of making the same 
mistakes again in the future.
(5) The emerging evidence suggested that for intuitions to become a source of 
organisational learning depends on several factors: first, the intuiting individuals 
ought to be consciously awar e of their intuitions in order to captur e them; second, 
they need to be able to interpret their intuitive judgements in order to make sense of 
them, and to cormnunicate them explicitly to themselves and to others; third, for 
intuitions to be integrated, a collective understanding and conserrsus needs to be 
achieved within the decision making group and followed by coordinated action. The 
process of institutionalising appeared to be significant for capitalising on the 
managers’ intuitions. This required a conscious effort on the part of the senior 
management to embed learning into the organisation’s systems, structures, and 
strategies, and make them part of the routines of the organisation’s practices.
The research results are significant in that they provide new understandings and 
insights with a particular' emphasis on the ways in which the tacit knowledge that 
forms the basis for intuitions may be institutionalised within organisations ultimately 
leading to organisational lear'ning. The findings reveal that intuition acts as a catalyst 
for the organisational lear'ning process: it affects both individual and collective 
actions; it therefore has the potential to influence and inform not only individual 
learning but also collective interpretation, and the development of shared meaning 
and sense-making within an organisation.
The contribution of these findings to theory and practice of management is discussed 
in the following sections.
11.2 Theoretical Implications
This section highlights the significant contributions of this research to theory 
par'ticularly on intuition, decision making, and organisational learning literatures, and 
identifies several methodological contributions.
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11.2.1 Contributions to Intuition and Decision Making Literatures
Against the backcloth of research on the role of rational-analytical ways of knowing 
in decision making in management, relatively little is known about the way intuitive 
judgement manifests itself in organisations in general and in relation to learning in 
particular. In this respect, this research contributes to the theoretical development of 
the subject of intuition in management by integrating three streams of research -  
intuition, decision making, and organisational learning -  which have not been well- 
connected previously.
Furthermore, there appears to be a lack of research on decision making in the context 
of police management teams. The extant literature is mairrly concerned with the 
operational side of police work which takes place on the lower levels of the 
organisational hierarchy, however it does not inquire into the managerial decisions 
made in the SMTs. This gap in the literature represented an opportimity to provide 
new insights and understairding of the role of intuition in decision making in senior 
police management teams. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this study is 
the first to examine intuitive decision making in senior police management teams.
Intuition research has previously been based on individual level of analysis whereas 
the cunent research examined it at the individual as well as the collective level thus 
bridging these two levels of analysis. Therefore, the thesis contributes by studying 
collective intuitive decision making. The key findings relating to the characteristics 
of intuition are consistent with some of the previous theoretical and empirical 
conceptualisation of the subject. The investigation of intuitive decision making in the 
setting of the SMTs has revealed collective intuiting process taking place within 
groups. This finding provides a novel contribution to the theoretical underpinning of 
this phenomenon.
Previous research on managerial decision making has mainly focused on the success 
stories of senior managers showing only the up-side of the role of intuition in 
decision making. However, the current research explored both effective (i.e. 
successes) and ineffective (i.e. failures) decisions which were based on intuitive
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judgements. The investigation of ‘intuitive hits’ and ‘intuitive misses’ painted 
ai'guably a more realistic picture of the perceived effectiveness of intuition in the 
context of managerial decision making, and contributed significantly to oui' 
understanding of when it is likely to ‘hit’ and when it is likely to ‘miss’.
11.2.2 Contributions to Organisational Learning Literature
This reseai'ch adopted Crossan et al’s (1999) 41 model as the underlying framework 
to explore the organisational learning processes at three police organisations. This 
was chosen due to its explicit acknowledgement of the role of intuition in the 
organisational learning process. Crossan and Berdrow (2003) stated that fiiture 
research on the 41 would benefit from a contrast and comparison of patterns of 
learning across organisations in a comparative case study approach. In this respect, 
the ciment research responds to this call, and in doing so contributes to the 
organisational leai'ning literatuie in several ways as outlined below.
In pai'ticular, this research revealed several sub-processes within each of the 41 
leai'ning processes, and provided empirical support to the characteristics of the 
intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalising processes in relation to the 
dynamics affecting individual, group and organisation levels of learning. Previous 
research, albeit limited, focused on expanding the 41 model, however has not 
elaborated on the originally proposed processes in such great detail. As such, the 
current research presents a comprehensive study of the 41 framework and provides an 
enlianced understanding of the underlying foundations of these four processes.
Furthermore, this reseai'ch also contributes to the development of the 41 model as a 
conceptual framework. The findings revealed that there is an additional process of 
‘initiating’ which sets the decision context leading to the intuiting process. Dutta and 
Crossan (2005: 435) claimed in a later paper that Crossan et al (1999) acknowledge 
that there is an enviromnent or more accurately “stimuli” that influence individual 
and organisational learning, but this was not obvious in their discussion of the 
fiamework in the original paper, and it was certainly not integrated into their model. 
Additionally, and contrary to Crossan et al’s (1999) suggestion that intuitions are the
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only source of learning, the emerging evidence from this research indicated that there 
is an element of ‘analysing’ used alongside the intuiting process. This finding lends 
support to the dual-process perspective in that intuition and analysis should be 
treated as complementary processes necessary for effective decision making. As 
such, the findings of ‘initiating’ as an additional process prior to intuiting, and 
‘analysing’ alongside tire intuiting process present an important development on the 
original model.
As has been commented by previous researchers (e.g. Kleysen and Dyck, 2001), 
Crossan et al (1999) left room for further improvement of their framework by 
acknowledging, but not identifying, the feedback processes of organisational learning 
in their proposed model. Wliilst the cuiTent research only focused on the feed 
forward learning processes (i.e. from individual to organisation levels), it appears 
imperative for completeness’ sake that Kleysen and Dyck’s (2001) addition of 
‘encoding’ to represent feedback learning from organisation to group level, and 
‘enacting’ from group to individual level are recognised and thereby adopted. 
Another important addition on to the 41 model is by Jones and Macpherson (2006) 
who incorporated an inter-organisation level of learning, called the process of 
‘intertwining’. The introduction of this additional level, which reflects learning 
between organisations, is a significant step to broaden the conceptualisation of 
organisational learning. As a result, the amalgamation of these previous additions 
with the cuTTent findings of this resear ch provides a complete and enlianced picture 
of Crossan et al’s (1999) 41 framework, and thereby creates a 61 model of 
organisational learning (see Figure 11.1).
As presented in Figure 11.1 in the 61 framework organisational learning comprises 
six processes of initiating, intuiting, interpreting, integrating, institutionalising, and 
intertwining which take place over five levels: decision context (i.e. environment), 
individual, group, organisation, and inter-organisation.
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Figure 11.1 61 Organisational Learning Framework
Context Individual Group Organisation Inter-Organisation
Context
Individual
Group
Organisation
Inter-
Organisation
Feed forsvard
Initiating
Intuiting
+ Analysing
Interpreting
I
Enacting
#
Integrating
Encoding
Institutionalising
Intertwining
11.2.3 Methodological Contributions
In addition to the theoretical contributions as outlined above, this research also 
makes a number of methodological contributions. The majority of previous resear ch 
on intuitive decision making has been based on quantitative studies. The current 
research adopted a more comprehensive approach by employing both quantitative 
and qualitative methods, and particularly makes a significant contribution to the 
empirical investigation of intuition in management context by providing a major 
qualitative study of six decision making and organisational learning processes in 
senior police management teams.
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This reseai'ch also makes a novel contribution in terms of the research method 
applied. It employed Flanagan’s (1954) CIT in focus group interviev^s which, to the 
best of the researcher’s knowledge, is not well represented in existing literature.
Finally, the intuition-décision outcome typology has been developed through the 
application of the CIT in the pilot study of this reseai'ch, and the emerging concept of 
‘intuitive hits’ and ‘intuitive misses’ was employed in Study 2. This is a unique 
analytical tool for the investigation of effective and ineffective intuitive decision 
making processes.
11.3 Managerial Implications
Besides the academic community, this research is also relevant to the wider 
practitioner communities of the police authority and senior managers in general. 
Particularly for the police community, the overall potential impact of this research is 
significant in that the findings of the cunent research are intended to contribute to the 
development of a national decision making model that may assist police forces in the 
UK in integrating intuition into their strategic and operational decision processes (the 
latter is the subject of on-going research).
In light of the findings and conclusions of this study, a number of managerial 
implications are highlighted and practical recommendations are made for police and 
management practitioners.
■ The evidence suggests that intuition is an important aspect of decision making in 
police work both in lower levels and senior levels of the hierarchy. In this 
respect, it is promising that police officers in all levels of the organisation 
recognise the significance of, and employ their intuitive judgements in decision 
making. Clearly, there are many benefits of using intuitive judgements for police 
officers and managers, such that it can enhance the decision making by 
identifying similar patterns, which aids in the acceleration of the decision making 
process. Police organisations might usefully include intuition in their policies and 
procedures, and on training programmes.
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The findings suggest that intuition and analysis should be treated as 
complementaiy modes of information processing for effective decision making. 
The extent to which each is relevant or should be used depends on the 
circumstances as well as the decision maker’s level of experience and knowledge 
in the specific domain and context.
It is recommended that managers recognise intuiting as a valid way of 
information processing in decision making and problem solving, and not just see 
it as a mysterious phenomenon. Managers can develop habits to become aware of 
automatically appearing intuitive judgements; it is by paying conscious attention 
that they will be able to captuie their intuitions. However, they should be as 
aware of the perils of intuition as well as of its power.
Equally important is the managers’ ability to inteipret and malce sense of their 
intuitive judgements individually and collectively. Accordingly, tacitly held 
intuitions need to become explicit and openly communicated with others in order 
to interpret, share and use them. Evidence suggests that collective intuitions are 
also a potentially powerfiil resource, and strengthen the validity of and help to 
build individual intuitions. Therefore, managers should willingly voice their 
intuitive judgements in managerial decision making and encourage their team to 
do the same. In this way a ‘kind’ as opposed to ‘wicked’ environment for the 
learning of intuitions may be produced.
An up-side of intuitions is that they are difficult to imitate and hence a rar e and 
valuable source of competitive advantage for organisations. However, the down­
side of intuitions is that they aie tacitly held knowledge which is difficult to teach 
or transfer onto others. This indicates that when managers leave the organisation 
their knowledge and expertise also leaves with them. Therefore, for organisations 
to benefit from the intuitions of their senior managers it is imperative that 
intuitions are capitalised upon by being embedded in the organisation’s memory. 
This requires a conscious effort on the pai't of the senior management to formally 
institutionalise them within the organisation’s strategies, systems, and structuies.
306
11.4 Limitations of Research
Besides several significant contributions to theory and practice, this work also is 
subject to some limitations. As far as the first part of the research is concerned, the 
main drawback is in regard to the use of self-report measure employed in Study 1. At 
present, self-report measures are still the most commonly used method in studying 
individual differences in analysis and intuition. As a result, researchers are limited in 
terms of the available options for methods other than self-report inventories. 
However on the positive side, it should be noted that REI as a method represents a 
well established measure consistent with the dual-process view. Similarly in regard 
to Study 2, the qualitative data collected relied on self-report by participants thr ough 
interviews. One problem with this method is that retrospective accounts may be 
biased in several ways. For example, participants may use hindsight to rationalise the 
past. Furthermore, there can be problems to do with imperfect or inaccurate recall. 
These can be viewed as a limitation of this study. However, it could be argued that 
this effect is minimised in the focus group interviews due to the fact that this method 
of interviewing provides an open discussion enviromnent whereby the participants 
could reflect on each other’s accounts and shared experiences, hence aiding the 
accurate recall of events in discussion. However, the down-side of focus group 
interviews is that not all participants may feel comfortable to discuss issues in the 
presence of their colleagues. Additionally, while qualitative data collecting seems to 
be a promising tool for in-deptli studies, there is always the problem of subjective 
interpretation of the data which lies with the researcher.
At the beginning of the study the participants were informed of the definition of 
intuition and what it means in terms of the objectives of this study, and the researcher 
affirmed this understanding on the part of the participants. In this respect. Study 2 of 
this research presented what the participants described as ‘intuitive hits’ and 
‘intuitive misses’. Nevertheless, in relation to whether they were in fact intuitions or 
not, the potential limitation lies with different perceptions of people and their varying 
levels of rmderstanding of the phenomenon of interest. Furthermore, the case studies 
were based on what the participants chose to tell the researcher in semi-structured 
interviews. Whilst some of them chose decisions which were more strategic in
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nature, others preferred to talk about tactical or operational ones. It is also possible 
that some of them have not shar ed information to the same extent as the others due to 
confidentiality of information or time restriction.
The current research is solely focused on the police community, hence it is 
acknowledged that the generalisability of this study’s findings is context-specific and 
therefore may be restricted in its application to other domains. This is par'ticularly the 
case for Study 1 which examined the individual differences in information 
processing across different levels of police ranks and job types. On the other hand, 
although Study 2 is concer'ned with decision making processes in senior police 
management team context, the examples of decisions were more relevant to generic 
managerial issues rather than policing (e.g. the management of the BCU). Therefore, 
it would be argued that the underlying elements of the discussions and conclusions 
developed from this study would be relevant to and present in other organisations. To 
conclude, the overall intention was not to generalise the pattern of learning found at 
these police organisations, but to provide a generalisable framework that can be used 
to understand organisational leai'ning processes more widely.
11.5 Directions for Future Research
A future research agenda might build on the insights and contributions of this thesis. 
In this respect, thi'ee areas would appear to be promising for next steps of research to 
extend the boundaries of oui' understanding of the role of intuition from an individual 
and organisational perspective in relation to its manifestation in managerial decision 
making and organisational leaining.
As discussed in the limitations of this research, this work only focused on the 
decision making and organisational learning processes in the context of police 
organisations. Further research could address this limitation by replicating this 
research in other public and private organisations, or in different industrial settings. 
This would be important to imderstand whether the findings of the cunent resear ch 
are representative of the approach taken in organisational learning in general or only 
relevant within the context of this research. It could be taken even further by
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conducting a cross comparison of public and private organisations, or between 
industries. Cultural comparison of intuition in managerial decision making and 
organisational learning would also be particularly informative.
This resear ch only examined feed forward processes of organisational learning as 
proposed in Crossan et al’s (1999) 41 framework. Whilst limited conceptualisations 
have been developed in respect to feedback learning, there is a lack of empirical 
literature on this phenomenon. Crossan et al (1999) were not able to provide much 
insight into what they called feedback learning. In their original introduction of the 
41 framework, the authors suggested that feed forward and feedback represent the 
processes of exploration and exploitation respectively. However a decade later, 
Jansen, Vera and Crossan (2009) showed that both exploration and exploitation take 
place in both feed forward and feedback processes of learning. In this respect, there 
appeal's to be a lack of claiity in terms of what feedback and feed forward represent. 
It is imperative that this relationship is investigated thiough empirical research in 
order to advance oui' understanding of these processes, and also to empirically 
validate Kleysen and Dyck’s (2001) conceptual development of ‘encoding’ and 
‘enacting’ processes that represent feedback learning from organisation to group and 
group to individual levels.
In future, researchers could also try different methods other than relying on self- 
report teclmiques. For example, research could benefit from real-time direct 
observation of decision making and organisational learning processes. However, 
since organisational learning is a long term process, this would require longitudinal 
studies of probably a limited number of organisations. This represents a major 
challenge for researchers as these processes may occur' over long periods of time and 
may not take place within the confines of a series of SMT meetings. There is also the 
problem of observing intuitive aspect of decision making, which would nevertheless 
have to depend on the ar-ticulation and interpretation (i.e. self-repor't) of the 
par-ticipants.
To conclude, this thesis has provided a novel contribution to a significant subject in 
management. The current research was conducted in tlrr ee police organisations in the
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UK, as such the findings are not claimed to be representative in any manner. The 
findings do however provide insights that can form the foundation of future research 
into this important topic. It is the wish of the reseaicher that this contribution will be 
built upon by other researchers in order to further explore an important and over­
theorised but under-researched organisational phenomenon.
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Rational Experiential Inventory Items
Rationality Scale
I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something.
I am not that good at figuring out complicated problems.
I enjoy intellectual challenges.
I am not very good at solving problems that require cai'eful logical analysis.
I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking.
I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking.
Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity.
I am not a very analytical thinker.
Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points.
I prefer complex problems to simple problems.
Thinking haid and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction.
I don’t reason well under pressure.
I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people.
I have a logical mind.
I enjoy thinking in abstract terms.
I have no problem thinking things through carefully.
Using logic usually works well for me in frgiu'ing out problems in my life. 
Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good 
enough for me.
I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions.
Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me.
Expcrientiality Scale
I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.
I don’t have a very good sense of intuition.
Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. 
I believe in trusting my hunches.
Intuition can be a very usefril way to solve problems.
I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action.
I trust my initial feelings about people.
Wlren it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings.
If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes.
I don’t like situations in which I have to rely on intuition.
I think there are times when one should rely on one’s intuition.
I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings.
I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for important decisions.
I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions.
I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer.
I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitive. 
My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people’s.
I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions.
I can usually feel when a person is right or wr ong even if I can’t explain how I know. 
I suspect my hunches are inaccur ate as often as they are accur ate._____
Source: Pacini and Epstein, 1999
351
Appendix 3
Path Diagrams for Study 1
352
Model 1:
Expcrientiality and Rationality
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Model 2:
Experientiality, Rational Engagement, and Rational Ability
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Model 3:
Experientiality Positively-worded, Experientiality Negatively-
worded, and Rationality
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Model 4:
Experiential Engagement, Experiential Ability, Rational
Engagement, and Rational Ability
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Model 5:
Experientiality Positively-worded, Experientiality Negatively-
worded, Rational Engagement, and Rational Ability
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Interview Protocol for Pilot Study
Objective:
The aim of this reseai'ch is to explore senior managers’ experiences of intuition in 
order to find out whether they use intuitive judgement in their decision making, and 
if they do, what properties do they ascribe to intuition and what are the factors which 
influence its use?
Procedure:
Introduce myself.
Introduce the research project by providing a copy of the project summary.
Clai'ify confidentiality and code of ethics.
Ask interviewee’s permission to tape-record the interview.
Part 1: Demographic Details
1. What is your current position?
2. What are your major responsibilities in the organisation?
3. How long have you worked in your current position?
4. How long have you been in the top management team of your organisation?
5. How long have you worked for your cuiTent organisation?
6. How long have you worked in your industry?
7. What is your highest degree earned?
Part 2: Use of Intuition
1. Do you rely on intuitive judgement in making important decisions? If yes, to 
what extent?
2. What are the factors that influence the use of intuition in your decision making?
3. Under what circumstances do you use intuitive judgement in making strategic 
decisions?
4. Under what conditions do you feel that intuitive judgement is an effective means 
of making strategic decisions?
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Part 3: Investigation of Critical Incidents
1. Describe a critical/significant experience which led to a positive outcome, that is 
an example of a time when you used gut feel/intuition in making a strategic 
decision.
■ What were the events that led up to the critical incident?
■ What were the actions taken by you and/or other people involved?
■ What was the outcome of that incident?
2. Describe a critical/significant experience which led to a negative outcome, that is 
an example of a time when you used gut feel/intuition in making a strategic 
decision.
■ What were the events that led up to the critical incident?
■ What were the actions taken by you and/or other people involved?
■ What was the outcome of that incident?
Part 4: Further Comments
1. Do you have any fmlher comments?
2. Is there anyone else you would recommend me to contact who could contribute 
to this reseai'ch?
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Focus Group Interview Questions
Background of the Decision:
1. What was the background of the situation? What led up to it?
2. When did it happen?
3. Who were involved?
4. Did you have a similar previous experience or was it the first time that you 
encountered this kind of a situation?
Decision Making Process:
5. Tell me what happened. What did you do?
6. Who was the person to first raise their intuition about the situation? One person 
or more? Same intuition or different?
7. How were you initially aware of your intuition?
8. How did you make sense of yoiu intuition?
9. How did you communicate your intuition?
10. Who did you share your intuition with?
11. How did you develop a shar ed imderstanding of your intuition within the team? 
(i.e. how did you ‘sell’ youi’ intuition to the other team members?)
12. How did your team respond to it? Has anyone raised any objections or counter 
ar guments? What happened?
13. How did you feel about it? (i.e. did it ‘feel right’ or ‘feel wrong’?) Has anyone 
had any doubt about acting on their intuition? Explain why.
14. Did you generate different alternatives or consider other options? If yes, how 
much time did you spend researching alternatives?
15. How long did the process take from the initiation of the idea to the 
implementation of the decision?
Decision Outcome:
16. What was the outcome of this decision?
17. If positive outcome: what were the factors that made your decision successful? 
If negative outcome: why do you think your' intuition failed you in making the 
right decision?
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18. Have you developed any routine practices, procedures, systems or strategies 
across the organisation as a result of this experience? Explain what.
19. What were the consequences of employing your intuition in your- decision 
making? What effect did it have?
20. What if you didn’t use your' intuition? What would you have done differently? 
Wliat would have happened?
21. Wliat lear'ning did you get out of this experience?
Final comments:
22. Anything else of impor*tance that you would like to add?
23. Anything that we didn’t talk about that appears relevant?
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Appendix 6
Categorisation of ‘Intuitive Hits’ Thought Units 
Intuitive Hit Case 1 p. 365
Intuitive Hit Case 2 p. 386
Intuitive Hit Case 3 p. 395
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Intuitive Hit Case 1
1. INITIATING PROCESS
1.1 EXTERNAL DRIVERS
1. I think there was certainly an external element to that aroimd changes that were 
going on with the local council, new ways of working ar ound services coming 
together on police partnership and volunteering almost owning areas and then co­
locating potentially, and sharing their problems and working together as more of 
a collaborative team. [Participant C]
2. We needed to make sure that our lines of accountability were cogent and 
coterminous with the partners who are also charged with delivery of crime 
reduction. [Participant C]
3. In terms of the destructive nature of the environment that we created was also 
from external as well, but there were some issues that I would say were external 
and environmental. [Participant D]
4. What we saw was a change, a change in demand both internally and externally in 
the case that we needed to reengineer the way that we did business. We didn’t 
wake up one morning and say we’re going to do this. What we saw was the 
external influences that were impacting upon us. [Participant B]
5. Externally there is a drive from the government to deliver an effective and an 
efficient police service. There are a number of papers and government policies, 
there is a reducing bureaucracy paper... a national green paper that talks about 
delivering core standards to the policing, so a policing pledge and again this is 
about structuring our" services, so that we can deliver pure customer service, 
according to that policing pledge. [Participant C]
6. Around that conversation the government changed its view on how the police 
would be assessed and the single top down indicator is about the public 
confidence alongside the local authority, how we’re dealing with local crime and 
antisocial behaviour. [Participant C]
7. I think some national changes around neighbourhood policing as well. 
[Participant C]
1.2 INTERNAL DRIVERS
8. The County [BCU] had changed to a certain structure and there was a desire 
within the organisation to, for us, emulate that structure as best we could taking 
into the accoimt our local differences. [Participant A]
9. I think we knew we had to move towards the structure of the County BCU. 
[Participant A]
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10.1 think in 2008 David arrived in the BCU, the new BCU Commander, with John 
and myself, then there’s the Superintendents, and there was definitely an appetite 
by the tlnee of us to restructure to get some more efficiencies, performance 
benefit, highest quality service, customer delivery service to the public. 
[Participant C]
11.1 think certainly there were meetings vyith the wider management team and there 
was an event where they were asked to review for example are our existing 
sti'uctuies fit for puipose and some of those questions that drew the answers out 
led again to us knowing that we couldn’t just sit where we were with the status 
quo, there needed to be a change. [Participant C]
12. Along the way in addition to emulating the structuie within the County other 
critical decisions about how we apportion oui' resouices where we put them, what 
the management structure looks like, and quite significant business change in 
tenns of how we do om' business. [Participant A]
13. We’ve got the budget, but it’s not as if we have to produce so many tins of beans 
with it, its all about the performance figures and the satisfaction at the end of the 
day. So there is oui' staff and everything we’ve got to play with as we want and 
what we’re looking for is improved performance. [Participant E]
14. A year ago a response officer would have turned up to go to work, and there 
wouldn’t have been enough people in my world, so they would have ended up 
with the prisoners themselves, and somebody from a neighbouiing policing side 
would have moved across to the response team, and there was this merry-go- 
round, where everybody was doing somebody else’s instead of what they were 
trained in. [Participant E]
15. In terms of demand if you look at the crime figures, and then the number of calls, 
and how we manage calls, and then how we manage the resulting prisoners 
etcetera, there have to be processes and people made accountable for making sure 
that their ar ea of business was tip-top, and that probably wasn’t, well it wasn’t in 
place, and there was that blurring of roles. [Participant D]
16. Actually we could see the inefficiencies of how we were operating. [Participant 
A]
17. But when we put the staff in there to deliver that, there just were too many gaps 
in response, we weren’t getting out there, so yeah, it very much had to change. 
[Participant E]
18. We had times when staff workloads were extremely high, we had open control 
room incident logs, where we were due to be attending to take details of a 
particular' incident or crime stacking up, beyond a manageable level. So therefore 
the impact on satisfaction and confidence with the public would have been 
affected, anxiety was high, sickness levels were high, and actually we didn’t have 
clear' lines of accountability, so as a sort of rough kind of drive, back-drop to the 
change, and at the time performance delivery around crime reduction, detection 
and satisfaction were quite poor. [Participant C]
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19. In January 2008 it really did strike me that there was this divide between 
response policing and neighbourhood policing. And in terms of my job 
performance I would say that the duty inspectors and the response teams didn’t 
really feel or display any sense of ownership of performance at all. [Participant
A]
20.1 thirrk we all recognised the performance deficiencies and the leakage so I guess 
it almost became a fait d’accompli, we had to change. [Participant A]
21. It might have started as a bit of stalking horse but eventually it became a no 
brainer in the sense we couldn’t carry on the way we did. We weren’t managing 
the demand effectively as we ought to have been. [Participant A]
22. Based on the fixed mmibers that we had, the difficulty was that the uniforms 
were supposedly supposed to be on the streets, but what we couldn’t stop is the 
demand in terms of thefts, assaults, burglar ies, etcetera coming in, so those same 
individuals were then being called in investigating crimes, but then because of 
the volume of the neighborhood work and the response work, and how they 
were being directed, it was a question that then those crimes weren’t being 
investigated, our detection rates were going down. [Participant D]
23. We were imder an awful lot of scrutiny from the chief officer group, from the 
Police Authority around here, so that was a pressure environment in any case. 
[Participant D]
24. There was a lot of issues arormd performance from chief officer group. 
[Participant D]
25. The outcome was quite clear', what we needed to do, we all knew that based on 
those exteriral drivers, and the need to be coterminous in delivery, and structured, 
so that we could deliver more effectively with our partners, we needed to mirror 
their structures, and we needed to make sure that the areas, the four areas now of
[.....], were coterminous, but also had a sort of governance arrangement that
ensured that we got the best out of everybody there. [Participant C]
26. We had the vision of what it would look like, what they’d deliver and what 
they’d do. [Par'ticipant E]
1.3 HIERARCHY
27.1 think it may be worth noting that at the time all decisions were being made as 
well as the exter-nal one, inter-nally from Headquarters. [Participant D]
28. We were prevented from moving on our own from chief officer group. 
[Participant D]
29. The time line sort of stopped, whilst we were going through the scoping bit, we 
weren’t able to progress it quite as quickly as we would have liked, because there 
were barriers that had been put up at the chief officer level. [Participant C]
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30. We were very much tied into, we couldn’t make the decision ourselves because 
there needed to be an authority and go ahead from various internal senior officers 
and processes. So we couldn’t go with it as quickly as we’d like to. [Participant 
C]
31. We talked about it many times and we talked to people like [..... ] who was the
Assistant Chief Constable at the time and there was a reluctance to allow 
anybody to do anything as. I’ll say, radical as that because it had been tried 
before. [Participant B]
32. The centre. Headquarters, chief officers, needed to be satisfied and reassured that 
what we were doing was going to meet the needs of [the County], not just [the 
Borough], so that took some time for it to work tlrrough. [Participant C]
33. Even at that point it was still reluctance and refusal from Headquarters to say you 
can’t do this because of the issues about number of resources, the critical masses 
that we will need in certain places etc etc. [Participant B]
34. Eventually the flood gates were opened and we were allowed to do it. 
[Participant A]
35. Eventually got to a point where the Deputy Chief Constable just said “go for it”. 
[Participant A]
1.4 UNCERTAINTY
36.1 think part of it was there was a disparity between the HR computer function, 
say in the establishment of [POA], there was dispar ity between the real number, 
between the payroll number, the established number and the HR number, and 
nobody seemed to know the true answer between actually how many staff have 
we got. [Participant C]
37. The data which we had wasn’t joined up from the start, so what was incredibly 
frustrating was what our knowledge of what the numbers were, and what our 
belief was, and then what Headquarters were coming from. [Participant D]
38. So at the very begirming there were posts all over the place, and each of the Chief 
Inspectors thought they had a number of people under them, but they were 
double counting, so we needed to make sine that actually they had the right 
number to start with. [Participant H]
39. Going tlrrough a time when the police service doesn’t really know how to deliver 
what the government is asking it to deliver about confidence. [Participant C]
40. We’ve got to move forward, these officers have got to go somewhere, how do we 
do it. [Participant F]
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1.5 COMPLEXITY
4L So it was quite a complex environment I would suggest. [Participant D]
42. There was a lot of business processes, it wasn’t just a simple question of just 
saying 20 there, 60 there, 50 there, it’s all fixed, it was actually reengineering the 
machine. [Participant D]
43. There was obviously an awful lot of other work ar ound, as opposed to saying 20 
there, 50 there and 60 there. It was about the work allocation, defining 
functionality as well. [Participant D]
44.1 think it’s fair to say there is no magic formula in this. There is no logarithm you
can apply to policing that says this, [.....] town, you need to put X percent into
uniform policing, X percent into neighbourhood policing, X percent into CID, X 
percent into back office support and through applying that distribution of 
resources success is guaranteed. That formula does not exist. So you then really 
do have to rely upon intuition and professional judgement. [Participant A]
45. What we don’t have is a demand programme in real depth to say at this time you 
should have this number of staff because the demand is at its highest. [Participant 
C]
46. The challenge for these guys was to try and get the right balance based on that 
performance indicator but also the knowledge that you can heavily resource the 
community policing to deliver confidence but then when there’s a major crime 
and you haven’t got the right resource confidence would be lost in a different 
way. So it’s a real balance. [Participant C]
47. There is all sorts of balance, all types of risks and different areas of 
accountability because obviously we all got different areas of accountability and 
you put that in to it and then you add to the financial risks, and the hmnan 
resour ce risk in terms of communication, managing that change etc, etc, it was a 
very complex and intense period of our time I suppose. [Participant D]
48. If we put too many resources into the serious crime well the other stuff goes 
without, but if you don’t put enough and the serious offenders get away, and 
although there’s less offences there’s more of a high-profile impact. So three very 
different competing areas where we have to get the balance right. [Participant E]
49. So it’s that balance between the uniform world, outside, and picking up what 
needs to be doing, the preventative side, and stopping the crime happening in the 
first place and getting the balance right with the high volume that comes through 
and having enough people to deal with it and to monitor investigations through. 
[Participant E]
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1.6 TIME PRESSURE
50. Actually the BCU was in such a position we had to change and we had to change 
quickly. [Participant A]
51. There was this sense of ‘maflana’, you know, we will just wait for them to do it 
tomorrow then, and the growing frustration on our part, or on my part. 
[Participant A]
52. Then when the green light came on the sort of pace of change picked up and we 
were told, yeah, you can crack on with it now, and actually we needed to deliver 
it by X, so there was a very, very short time frame. [Participant C]
2. INTUITING PROCESS
2.1 ANALYSING
53. So in terms of when you talk about intuition and science we were looking at it 
two years ago saying actually we think it could look like this and providing we 
structure the sectors in such a size that we could justify the level of resoruces that 
we will put into them, that they would then become self-sufficient in being able 
to exist, deliver and they’d have the resilience that they needed. [Participant B]
54. In 2008, the latter part of 2008 two of my departments had gone through an 
analysis with workforce modernisation, and that was an external team who came 
in, analysed demand numbers and looked at the workforce. That goal was 
primarily around looking at changing the workforce in terms of its make-up, 
whether it’s going to be warranted staff, police officers, or police staff, civilian 
staff, trained to a certain level. So a lot of the work certainly within the 
intelligence rmit had already been complete, and that was a fait d’accompli in 
terms of the numbers and how that would actually look, and in terms of the 
reactive CID then again, in terms of general numbers, the demand profile, the 
amount of work that was required, and the levels of resour ce which was required 
was fairly wr apped up in that. [Participant D]
55. We then got into this analytical side as David said the various reports were done. 
If we would have wr itten it down two year s ago I don’t think it would have been 
significantly different to what we’ve ended up with. [Participant B]
56. You may recall we had a number of false starts. So recollection was Adam and 
Mark were supposed to go and visit other Forces and that happened to some 
degree. Sue was asked to write a paper outlining options and whilst it had a few 
ideas it didn’t really do us service and take us too much further forward. 
[Participant A]
57. We had brought in an external consultant with a view of finding the ‘Holy Grail’ 
in terms of what the resourcing formula looks like. [Participant A]
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58. We also had a consultancy finn, [.....], who were commissioned to do a piece of
work on the Force. It didn’t quite end up quite where it was supposed to go, to be 
kind. [Participant C]
59. [..... ] were tlien commissioned by the Deputy Chief Constable, to come in, to try
to rationalise those systems for the single version of the truth, I suppose, and then 
to, what we thought they were looking to then do was, having then validated 
what the proper established structure looked like and got all the systems talking 
to each other, was to then look at what’s the demand of policing across the 
organisation, and how can we allocate resource according to what we would have 
called the demand profile, so a demand curve. [Participant C]
60. So we expected them to do their consultancy, to provide a formula that could be 
applied to understanding your business, what are your business rules in terms of 
how you allocate, you now need to, based on this demand curve, consider 
reallocating resouice and changing your structures, that’s what we expected. 
[Participant C]
61. We had an outside firm come in and say, okay, we’re being tasked to look at the 
Force, and find the resouice foimula, and find the magic button that’s going to 
tell everybody how the whole force should look, and that just collapsed and 
faded. [Participant D]
62.1 think there’s also the consideration around the level of resourcing that David 
has talked about, and Tim has refeiTcd to the [external consultant’s] work, which 
was going to be the panacea. You know, how many people do you need in which 
ar ea, that piece of work was never ever delivered. [Participant B]
2.2 SCANNING
63. David amved then we’ve gone through a niunber of Force visits to various 
Command Units similarly positioned to [POA]. Again looking at models that 
they had. [Participant C]
64. We did themed visits up and down the country, looking at best practice, looking 
at how they’d structured themselves, and how they operated. [Participant C]
65. Inevitably there was going to be the point where we actually start looking what 
other Forces do around their neighbourhood policing teams, and realising that 
what we’re trying to achieve, no-one else was trying to achieve, well very few 
other forces were trying to achieve, and what we should be trying to achieve is 
actually a lower level of staffing in the neighbourhood policing teams. 
[Participant F]
2.3 PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENT
66. When the [consultancy firm] came to us they were there just at the point of all 
these discussions and they were asking us, “So what are yom business rules in 
terms of how you redistribute staff, and what is your rationale in terms of
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deploying X and Y and how have you decided that you can take from there and 
add to here for instance” and I think that’s really where you see the intuitive 
management. There is no magic equation, there is no magic formula and it’s 
relying upon experience and the imderstanding, finger in the air, but perhaps
more professional judgement of what’s needed to deliver policing in [..... ].
[Participant C]
67.1 think a lot of it was down to that, to the gut feeling at the end of the day in 
terms of that, and then I’d say professional judgement through one base or 
another, but it was also backed up in terms of professional judgement around 
supply and demand, etcetera, levels of staff and other things, so those things I 
suppose are, when you put them all together, there’s not a magic formula, it is 
about knowing that’s what I think, a lot of it was about that. [Participant D]
68.1 think from the touchlines one of the really, really interesting things was Robert 
uniform police, Andrew reactive investigation and intelligence, Peter volume 
crime management and custody arxiving at a model and a distribution of 
resour ces within that model in the absence of any real science that says you need 
to put so many people in there and so many people there. And I guess that’s 
where professional judgement, intuition and no secret the tensions of the merge 
in trying to come up with a model that is workable. [Participant A]
69. So I think again you take the snap-shot in time and you look at the resourcing 
you’ve got, you look at what the anticipated growth may be for the future and 
you come up with a plan for the best fit taking into account all those external 
considerations. [Participant B]
70.1 don’t think, although I sit on the resource forum as I said, I don’t think that will 
ever come up with a definitive X percent should be here, Y percent should be 
there, because I don’t think that exists, so it’s always going to have to be that 
personal view. [Participant F]
71.1 think as David said there is no formula, it was about looking at some data, so it 
wasn’t totally unscientific, but the reality was the data was basically looking at 
demand from logs, demand from crimes, so it wasn’t looking at every aspect 
because that formula is not there. And then ultimately it came down to, ok we 
have these areas here, business has areas, HR managers, etc, etc, and then ok how 
do we actually staff BCU to the processes and the structure we want and that’s 
where it became very, very difficult. [Participant D]
2.4 EXPERIENCE
72. Well how do you do that, well we’ve been doing the job, you know, that’s how 
many people you need for that, and all the science in the world, it actually 
wouldn’t put us far off. [Participant D]
73.1 thinlc it is based on intuition though, I mean we had [consultancy firm] come in 
and didn’t really tell us anything we didn’t know, and couldn’t take us any 
forward. [Participant E]
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74.1 thinlc it is intuitive, but there’s a lot about knowing your business. [Participant 
E]
75. In reality, we do know our business quite well, and can patch something, we 
might not get 100%, but it’s certainly up aiound the 80%, and the difficulty we 
have is analysing that last 20% really. [Participant E]
76.1 think there was intuition for the whole, it comes from something in the back of 
your mind, your experiences, and we’ve all got a certain amount of experience to 
stand up here. [Participant E]
77. So there are certain things where because of the level we operate at and the 
experience that we had, we actually look a lot more strategically at what the issue 
is rather than an officer at a grass roots level who is saying “tliis is a pain in the 
neck why have I got to do this” or conversely somebody saying “this is really 
good I’m really enjoying and we should do it”. [Participant B]
78. We can sit around the packed table here in the morning and things that crop up 
we can tliink “yeah that one’s going to bite us if we don’t sort it out”. And you 
can get some new member of staff come in or standing in for their inspector or 
sergeant or whatever, and they just don’t seem to grasp the significance of what’s 
happening so while we can go intuitively, “that one’s going to bite us, and here’s 
a list of things we need to put in around that to stop that happening”, we can see 
the more inexperienced members coming in and sitting down and going “yeah 
got that, don’t woiTy about it, it’s alright...” It’s not from experience. [Participant
E]
79. They did it all on their own experiences, because they knew their teams, so they 
would know which personality or which person would have the right skills per 
any paiticular role. [Participant H]
80. A lot of the intuition side of things was perhaps who you were actually going to 
put in what positions because you knew that you were choosing to spread the 
expertise then you had to make some quite painfiil decisions as to where people 
actually went. And I think a lot of that was perhaps the gut feeling, knowing the 
individuals, knowing their strengths, perhaps knowing their weaknesses and then 
balancing those out to make the team as strong as we possibly could but 
recognising there will be weaknesses within that team as well but perhaps your 
intuition has a part in that and deciding where you place your resources at the end 
of the day. [Participant I]
81. The division up of where those officers went was based around I think, the needs 
in various areas, and I think that probably, where there was an awful lot of 
intuition rather than hard fact as to where these individuals should go. 
[Participant F]
82. Inevitably we are a product of our learning and our experiences through the 
police service, the routes we have taken to the position we’re in now, and the
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positions, the other various roles we’ve had will affect those opinions and things. 
[Participant F]
83. The gut feeling comes probably tlnough om experience of previous models as 
well and what we see now is a variation on what’s been tried elsewhere, a 
variation of the model that we had in [POA] probably 5 years ago so we learned 
perhaps the errors of our ways its not a pure revelationaiy gut feeling moment 
where we suddenly redesigned this. We perhaps leaint and adjusted previous 
models, best practice from elsewhere around the country and tried then to shape 
and mould that towards the current change politically and environmentally in 
[POA]. [Par'ticipant C]
2.5 GUT FEEL
84.1 tend to go on gut feelings quite a lot, but the thing is that, really gut feeling, 
there’s a lot of nmnbers and stuff going through my head, it’s like you can’t work 
it all out, and you wake up in the middle of the night, and there it is, because your 
brain’s processed it all. So yeah, there is a lot of gut feeling, but a lot of that from 
previous experiences, and it’s like I say, knowing the business really, for where 
we’ve got to in the other little bits. [Participant E]
85. When you come down to basically what percentage of staff should be in what 
area of business, bearing in mind that the area of businesses all work together, 
and/or conflict each other in that sort of beautiful way, then there’s inevitably it’s 
going to have to come down to that person feels they need X, that person needs 
Y, that person feels they need Z, that means he get X-2, he gets Y-2 whatever it 
is, however it works, and that’s always got to happen. [Par'ticipant F]
86. The decisions we were making I think was an awful lot based on oiu intuition of 
what we feel is the right thing to do. [Participant F]
87. So an example would be the drugs team and the tasking team. Do we have a 
dr ugs problem, well that’s one of those areas where if you don’t police it and get 
loads of detections and anests well it could be undergr ound and nobody could be 
aware of it. So do we need a drugs team, well it was intuition telling us yes we 
did. [Par'ticipant E]
88. There are cer'tain key areas of policing where the gut feeling says yeah we need 
to do something about this. Because it may well not be about hard statistics in 
terms of performance, but we are in the public safety business, and if young 
people are becoming involved in dr-ugs and they go off the rails and that leads to 
an increasing in crime or it leads to a death, or it leads to dependency or it leads 
to all sorts of other things, those are tire things that a lot of the public will not see, 
do not see unless they are unfortunate enough to become involved in that through 
a family member or friend or whatever. [Par ticipant B]
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3. INTERPRETING PROCESS
3.1 DIALOGUE
89. Tim and I within a matter of weeks and months of me arriving, you came here six 
months before me, we were talking and saying it’s not fit for pui*pose, it didn’t 
feel what we needed it to do. [Participant B]
90. David came along a year after me and Tim and I were talking about it and then 
various conversations took place about what it would look like. [Participant B]
91. Certainly the Chief Inspectors and the Superintendents got together in a smoke- 
filled room and came up with a view of the world. [Participant A]
92. And I think that that perception was bom out the longer I stayed and the more we 
spoke, which is why to some degree, to a large degree, we said we’d deal with 
the way the Chief Inspector neighbourhood policing and the Chief Inspector 
uniform operations would come under one role to provide them with the same 
line management so -  perception, intuition call it what you will -  it’s certainly 
where I was. [Participant A]
93. So there’s all this debate that was going on about what should happen and what 
other departments we felt should be doing. [Participant D]
94. Wliere should we best be using that pool of officers, bearing in mind that they are 
all canying a workload, they’re all doing some work, now I think that was the 
discussion about what we should do with them, now inevitably that work that 
they’re doing has to go somewhere. [Participant F]
95. Wliere we had the debate around the section would be my sort of proactive 
section, which is the crime targeting team, and then formulating a drugs team, 
which in fact was new staff, that was probably where we got into more 
discussions around what was intuitive, what did it feel like, in terms of where we 
were, and how we could actually develop that. [Participant D]
96. So you have all these collective discussions and then ultimately it came down in 
terms of what’s right for the BCU in the whole, and we had to make something 
fit to be direct. [Participant D]
3.2 RATIONALISING
97. Now the easiest way logically to get confidence is to put miifonns on the street, I 
argue, the other side of the argument, which I’m sme Andrew and some ways 
Peter would have is, if we had the information that every single crime that was 
reported to us there was a detective who caught every baddie and brought to 
justice, that would give confidence. Unfortimately a lot of the detective end of the 
business isn’t necessarily as visible as the uniform end is, so there’s that, and 
what will always be slightly conflicting, my view is put uniforms out on the street
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and you should reduce the crime. That means you have less to detect. [Participant
F]
98. It’s actually that balance around why do you do it, why do you do it in the way 
you do it, what are the issues and the potential risks if you don’t do it, are there 
other issues in ternis of public safety, are there issues about organisational 
reputation, personal reputation, or there are some issues about personal liability, 
ultimately, and they are all things that I’d suggest are considered in some way 
shape or form, to some level or degree, in arriving those decisions. [Paiticipant
B]
4. INTEGRATING PROCESS
4.1 GENERATING OPTIONS
99. We had Edwai'd and Matthew, principally, an Inspector and a Sergeant who were 
tasked to go away and look at options which were then presented to this group. 
[Participant A]
100. I think we gave him the concept, and we left him to then continue to design 
options, present those options, and then work through the change management. 
[Participant C]
101. They took that on and developed and built on it and put a bit of science 
behind reasons for or against and come up with different options without 
crimching through the numbers. [Participant E]
102. I guess my recollection of the process would be that Matthew and Edward 
came up with some options. Tim and John and the managers kicked those around 
and I guess had some interesting discussions around what the numbers looked 
like in terms of how many bodies go into different pails of the business. 
[Participant A]
4.2 NEGOTIATING
103. We did a lot of horse-trading as it were between each other. I’ll have so-and- 
so, and need somebody with this skill set, where can I get them? Yom' skills, how 
good an investigator are you? Do you want to go and be a detective, are you 
going to make it realistically, no you’re not, well... [Participant E]
104. Because each of us had different demands, and it was just trying to reconcile 
those different demands, not just based on say numbers and input in terms of 
demand, and then okay, so that means you need that amount of people, because 
we’re going to cover this many sliifts, and this many hours. [Participant D]
105. There was no formula, so therefore, intuitively, people should be carrying ten 
crimes, but what crimes are they, etc, etc. [Participant D]
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106. I think what we actually did was sit down, well you and your five shifts 
covering it, “how in the start did you come up with your number”, I went “well, 
realistically to manage the work that I’ve got, realistically this is what I need”, 
and Robert was “well, move all those extra people off the beat teams, and what 
does he need”, so we came up with those numbers. [Participant E]
107. I think a lot of it is down to om* gut instinct. It was the throe of us hammering 
it thi'ough the process with Edward and Matthew but in reality we sat down 
between the three of us and hammered out, this is what we think, going on om' 
gut instinct and where we thought where we needed to be. [Participant E]
108. A lot of the time they can just come and say, “no, I need 10, why do you need 
10? I don’t know”, there’s no real, nothing really behind it so they need to come 
up with a proper case as to what they were going to use their 10 for, and why it 
would be better placed with them, as opposed to somebody else. [Participant H]
4.3 CONFLICT
109. We came at it from different angles we have different understanding of our 
own business areas, quite distinct business areas. Robert is a uniform police, 
there is a response, deal with what’s in front of you and move on, emergency 
response more or less, and that initial service. Andrew next to you got the serious 
crime intelligence so if something serious happens make sure there is enough 
resources in there to deal with that and get serious offenders through to court. 
I’ve got the more station-based processes whereby people coming through 
custody about 100-150 a week and they’ve got to go through there officially 
high-risk area, reported crime and the people pick up and do the volume 
interviews. [Participant E]
110. We have to work within parameters, and none of us wanted those parameters, 
we didn’t agree with it, none of us. [Participant E]
111. It was just, and it’s we had to, we don’t like that structure, we don’t want to 
go with it, we want to go with this, and got so far' down the line it was “no you’re 
not quite autocratic, we want four, and that’s what you’re doing”. [Participant E]
112. Robert wasn’t convinced, didn’t agree with the principle that the 
neighbourhood policing should reduce, and in reality I didn’t either. I’m not sure 
if you did. [Par'ticipant E]
113. So from my perspective, do I want to lose the uniform cops on the street, no I 
don’t, I don’t think you can, to this day. [Par'ticipant F]
114. What held us down was actually getting to a core of where we were and then 
really sort of building on that, and then thrashing it out, it was like this idea, this 
idea, so it’s still very much up in the air until the last minute, and then of course 
it was all changed altogether. [Participant D]
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115. We tried to do this on a meetings, on a weekly basis, to try and resolve it, 
because of that things changed, rumoui' and speculation and information was 
getting out along the division, so that was actually causing concern. As a result of 
that we thought we had agreement on one week, and next week new ideas came 
in which altered it to quite a large degree, or at least put us back to a decision or 
an argument which we’d had to, to go there. [Participant D]
116. I think it was an incredibly destructive process for us to go tlirough, in the 
way that we went through it, because it, it, we had some very long meetings, 
which were confrontational meetings between the thr*ee of us, and led to, 
inevitably, well saying “okay, one’s got the bare minimum, right, you’ve got to 
lose more”, and so inevitably that will push people into their position of, “okay, 
well I’m not my bare minimum. I’m not giving up anyone”. [Participant F]
117. So there is a lot of professional judgement going on around the discussions 
that did draw out the tension. [Participant C]
118. There are different views on the drugs team around the table. That’s probably 
one of those teams that ar e more on intuition than anything else. [Participant E]
119. I think we all agreed there was a need to change it was just what that change 
looked like. That’s where the tensions were. [Participant A]
120. It was challenging to get to a place where we felt we could all agree. 
[Participant A]
4.4 CONSENSUS
121. It was agreed what level of staff we felt were required in the areas to deliver 
properly. [Participant C]
122. I think colloquially from the consultation point of view it was raised and 
discussed at a number of different formns, different management teams. And on 
the whole I think the end product received really good support. [Participant H]
123. We went to the operational board, which is the meeting with all operational 
Inspectors I think they were sold the idea. [Participant F]
124. On the whole I think that the willing voices were hear d around the table and 
there was a real want for the change. [Participant H]
125. When we got to an answer that there was consensus on, I presented it to the 
Deputy Chief Constable, who gave it the nod and we got on with it. [Participant 
A]
4.5 TEAM DEVELOPING
126. From the rest of SMT, it’s built us as a stronger team because we have 
worked through a real challenge together. [Participant H]
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127. I guess apart form making a business decision, I think we gr ew as a team as 
well, as part of that journey. [Participant A]
128. Some of those things that it’s brought across identified weaknesses in areas, 
weaknesses in teams, which we’ve had to turn to build upon, a lot of difficulties 
as we discussed certainly with us as a team as well, in terms of how we do 
business. [Participant D]
4.6 COMMUNICATING
129. So we knew that probably the end game was always going to be to mirror our 
partner’s structure, but it was more aroimd getting to that point, and taking staff 
with us along the way, and communicating that effectively as such. [Participant
C]
130. So there’s lots of then scoping, consultation, communication to staff, 
stakeholder meetings, updates, focus groups, briefings to staff, as I say 
engagement and consultation and all those sort of change management principles, 
that were governed then through a meeting that I hold, and also our* Senior 
Management Team meeting, we sort of pulled that together ready to deliver it for 
this year. [Participant C]
131. Thr ough a variety of forums they did staff briefings, they circulated tilings 
electronically, they spoke with individual managers as well, and then engaged 
with individuals, but it seems that that didn’t work, it wasn’t quite enough, so it 
might have been that it was pitched at the ivrong level. [Participant H]
132. There were also other communication methods, we did some road shows with 
the BCU Commander, so David will have delivered a couple of road shows 
explaining what it was, and there were briefings at various meetings, so through 
the meeting structure, there would be a management meeting, which would catch 
all of the Inspectors and the police staff equivalent, there’s development days. 
Sergeant Development Days for Sergeants and their police staff equivalents, so it 
was quite heavily done, but it still wasn’t enough. [Participant H]
133. The other aspect of it was of course because, and this was after posting 
people into the areas, where they wouldn’t necessarily have wanted to go, was 
the disquiet about being posted there, so there were a lot, there were some 
unliappy people about where they’d been placed, and it was only because it 
wasn’t explained to them properly. [Participant H]
134. It became apparent that some of the other methods of communication needed 
to go around those blocks because the individuals themselves weren’t helping us. 
[Participant F]
135. The thing with that is there will never be enough communication, and we 
know that in helping manage change and to accommodate that, communication is 
absolutely vital. And I know that as a management team, and indeed as an
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individual, we don’t do enough communication. I think the other part of me 
would also say though that you will never please everyone. [Participant A]
I
136. I would accept that the consultation process was not as fulsome as it might 
have been, there are weaknesses in that, actually there are some strengths in that 
as well, because actually, we have a responsibility to exercise some leadership, 
and I can remember in the early days, when people heard about change, a number
of har'es were set ruiming and quite clearly we could have excited false |
expectation around what the new world will look like, and that could be equally i
challenging to manage in terms of disappointment if people don’t get what they '
want. [Participant A] j
4.7 INVOLVEMENT
I
I
137. There were opportunities, and actually a lot of the opportunities weren’t taken 
up, and staff didn’t necessarily engage in, we set up a consultation meeting, we 
set up a focus group, staff didn’t necessarily come voluntarily, when they did 
come, they just didn’t seem to engage, and you can, I suppose if David was here,
he’d say, “you can take a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink” and I i
suppose that would be the analogy really of what we did. [Participant C] |
138. I think there’s always a problem with trying to engage people and one of the j 
things that came out very early on sort of immediately after the changes took
place, people said well I didn’t know this, and I didn’t know that, and I didn’t 
know the other. But when you go back tlirough the root of communication, j
clearly you did. Whether you chose to listen, whether you chose to be involved is :
another thing altogether. [Participant F] |
139. There were individuals in that group who weren’t necessar ily as committed to
it or signed up to it as others and the end result is people they line managed were i
less well informed about the process of how it was going to work. So inevitably !
whether it was doubt or whether it was blockages in the process, but there were 
definite blockages in the process, that didn’t assist and help us put the change in 
place which meant there were some people at the grass roots level that didn’t
actually understand why it was all happening. [Participant F]
140. Obviously there were few that probably, necessarily, wouldn’t want the
change no matter what was put in front of them. [Participant H]
I
141. As part of that process we’ve been out rallying, banging drums and 
persuading people to participate, so my view would be, if we just left it to people 
to just take up yes or no, then I would suspect as John says, we’d probably 
struggle to get to 50%. [Participant A]
142. I thinlc for me there’s also something about knowing the organisation, and 
whilst this may be controversial, the workforce will say they want to be 
consulted, they want to be involved in the re-engineering, you know in designing 
the outcome, we all know ftom past experience that if you look to consult a 
himdred of them you maybe get 30% who’ll come back. [Participant B]
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143. Because we all know, we could consult everybody within this BCU and we 
wouldn’t get back, we’d be lucky to get 50% of people respond and as I say 
you’ll always get those people who will be negative. [Participant B]
144. This was rny dilemma with us banging the drum and roimding people up. The 
dilemma is do you force the people who really don’t want to have a comment, 
because they’re negative to place a negative comment, or do you actually 
encourage those who couldn’t be bothered who might actually be positive and I 
think that you’re more likely, again my gut feeling, is that you’re more likely to 
drag those that didn’t really want to get involved into it so therefore there may be 
a negative mindset when they fill out that survey. So actually we may well have 
shot ourselves in the foot. [Participant C]
145. We run focus groups and it will very much depend on the individuals or mix 
of individuals who you get in the room. So you can get the mad, the bad, and the 
sad who will just come in and throw stones, or you can get others who are more 
considered in terms of how they respond and react to the change. [Participant A]
146. You’ll always get, when you look at it, that cohort of people who want to be 
involved and want to drive in assisting that change, at the other end of the 
spectrum you’ll get those people who will criticise and complain and moan no 
mater what you actually do but they’ll never actually contribute to the process 
and then you’ve got a huge swathe in the middle. [Participant B]
5. INSTITUTIONALISING PROCESS
5.1 SYSTEMATISING
147. We couldn’t have just put numbers in place, it was also about re-engineering, 
making sure that there was consistent processes tlnoughout, to make sure that 
we’re then able to achieve success. [Participant D]
148. I think probably the most important thing we did was actually trying to give 
clarity around what the role was, and put those processes in place. [Participant D]
149. My view overall is that it’s been a success for the BCU, actually our business 
processes are standard now, they’re a lot more efficient, we actually can talk 
about posts and people confidently now. [Participant D]
150. I think it’s also been a success in that moving really to defining roles per 
accountability fr om Senior Management down in terms of what the roles are, so I 
thinlc there’s been a number of successes. [Participant D]
151. Neighbourhood policing teams now will consist of a beat manager, who’s a 
police officer, and one or more PCSOs, that Neighbourhood Policing Team is a 
common, that structure is cormnon tluoughout the majority of the Police Forces. 
[Par'ticipant F]
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152. By actually putting the neighbourhood policing team, making it smaller, but 
defining very tightly in terms of ivhat the role of those officers were, and 
knowing what the functions were, it actually enabled us, it’s helped moving that 
to deliver on what the Neighbourhood Policing Teams classically should define. 
[Par'ticipant D]
153. Now we’ve gone through that pain, we’ve agreed and come to, and ratified 
ideas about what works tlirough that, and what we need to do to malce this 
consistent, because what we can’t do, is get to a position whereby if we do need 
to make a significant change in the future is then start again, because a lot of the 
pressures and a lot of the issues was actually not having standard practices fi'om 
the start. [Participant D]
154. I suppose the main role for them was changing the boundaries between what 
was neighbourhood policing and then response policing. And they were at poles 
apart, and actually redesigning the operational sort of uniform policing side of the 
business so that they became geographically aligned teams, working with a clear 
line of accountability to their Police Inspector, their Sector Commander, so that 
was probably their biggest role, of changing that, redesigning the role profiles of 
the individuals working for those teams, making sure it was aligned to par-tner 
structures. [Participant C]
155. The Neighbourhood Policing Teams we agreed to adopt the same model as in 
the County BCU which was that each Neighbourhood Policing Team has one 
community beat manager who was a Constable and then one or more Police 
Cormnunity Support Officers who ai'e civilians according to the profile of that 
beat. [Participant A]
156. We reduced the numbers on the Neighbourhood Policing Teams because 
some beats had a community beat manager and then one or more community beat 
officers as well. We stripped out community beat officers and put them either 
into response or into the local crime team or crime management unit. [Participant 
A]
157. What this caused us to do was really try and nail down and define what work 
was going to be done in different departments, and so what we’d done in terms of 
the Neighbourhood Policing Teams originally, had asked them to do two or tlii'ee 
different frinctions within their core all, so it was actually just a massaging of 
figures. [Participant D]
158. From my point of view the success is that we now have an establisliment of 
our' staffing, fully signed off, and we know exactly where everybody is, so that 
was the thing that was missing in the very beginning, and now we’ve got it. 
[Participant H]
159. Having gone through the change... we’ve got the lowest crime allocation to 
staff that we’ve had generally at any point, we’ve got an effective crime 
management system that sort of weeds out crime, it also gives people scheduled 
appointments to come in and see us. [Participant C]
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5.2 ADJUSTING
160. Again there will be minor adjustments as thing goes, as people move to and 
from, we’ve got to keep on top of that, it’s a constant process. [Participant D]
161. New demands come in, new analysis, new issues arise, so for instance, in 
Peter’s world we’ve got to re-adjust and lose some capacity which we had in 
some proactive teams to support the custody, and just supply in a 24 horn basis 
support to the rest of the BCU wasn’t possible rmder the regime, so there has 
been some refinement, around that. [Participant D]
162. Peter came forward with some inbuilt issues which we put in place because 
certain staff were in Peter’s world so we had to reconsider some issues and some 
decisions and then we spread the load collectively by posting people in different 
places. So it wasn’t just one decision it was a continuous issue. [Participant D]
163. But if suddenly things were to change, you know current financial climate 
rrationally and internationally, if the Police Authority for example were to say 
“we are going to reduce the number of police officers”, I don’t think they will, 
but if they did, then again we would need to revisit that model because its based 
on foiu' sectors, and there is a big issue about capacity, resilience and self- 
sufficiency. Those are the sort of key considerations. [Participant B]
POST-DECISION PROCESSES
1. REFLECTING
164. I think we knew what the answers were before consultation. So the criticism, 
if you were going to look back would be, yeah, we communicated, we tried to 
consult, some might say we always knew what the answer was, so therefore it 
was a pointless exercise. [Par ticipant C]
165. There’s also not the engagement and the consultation necessarily to the right 
level of staff. I think we did consult we had a number of layers and nmnber of 
meetings but did we consult over what the outcome was going to look like? Or 
did we consult to communicate the change? I think we probably did the latter. 
[Participant C]
166. I think this is where it comes back to this question about consultation, do you 
consult with a view to building a model or do you consult as part of the 
commimication strategy to implement the change? [Participant B]
167. I think it’s quite clear that we didn’t really consult in the way that staff would 
have liked. Now you never, you won’t always please everybody. [Participant C]
168. So I’m sure that with reflection it could have been managed better in terms of 
the consultation, but don’t confuse this organisation with a democracy, because 
it’s not. [Participant A]
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169. We can look back in hindsight and say were we consulted sufficiently, did we 
have enough say about what that locality would look like, what the area would 
look like, the size of it, what neighbourhoods, what beats, it covered? I don’t 
think we did. We didn’t have that insight. [Participant C]
170. So to an extent I think we may have come up with a slightly different map 
that would have perhaps mirrored om policing needs greater. So our gut feeling 
wasn’t taken caie of there, we had to go with the map as it was drawn. 
[Participant C]
171. I think there’s elements of it now that were taken out of our' control. For 
instance the locations and the sectors we have had to come online with mirroring 
and supporting external structur'es that have already been put in place. 
[Par'ticipant C]
172. If we could go right back to the beginning of the whole thing I would 
challenge some of the parameters we had set for us at the beginning. Because 
you’ve got to start something on your' shift paper, when you start any form of 
restructure, and I would have liked to have challenged that. [Participant F]
173. And I think there’s almost an element, and I would have loved the situation 
where we had an arbitrator who said, Andrew, right, what do you want, why do 
you want it, Peter what do you want, why do you want, Robert, what do you want 
why do you want it. Right the answer is, Andrew you’re getting this, Peter you’re 
getting that, Robert you’re getting that, get out sort it out, and I feel we passed 
the point that we really needed that. [Participant F]
174. I think it would have been good to have moved faster, I don’t think we moved 
fast enough, we talked too much, and had too many fragmented meetings, and it 
would have been just nice to have got to where we got to faster, I think, it was 
too long. [Participant H]
175. I think the lack of data that we had available to us made it difficult, because 
there was the discussions around how many posts there actually were, and 
because, with any degree of certainty, as a force, we couldn’t say for sure this is 
what you’ve got, because it had been muddied over so many years of people 
saying they had what they didn’t have, that slowed it down. [Participant H]
176. It would have been nice to have really put a team into just getting that data 
first, in order to inform the decision making in there, which would have speeded 
it up ultimately. [Participant H]
2. LEARNING
177. So having now gone through the change, yeah we’ve got some lessons to 
learn. [Par'ticipant C]
178. When it came in the 1®^ of July we were still working through the work and 
the allocation process, and other processes which then have hindered the actual
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change progi'amme itself. So for me it would have been do that earlier on, write 
the time off, and get it complete, and don’t come out this room until it’s finished. 
[Participant D]
179. So for me, two things, get clarity in terms of reference to start, and secondly 
write time off, get away and deal with it, as opposed to just doing it every week, 
and then allowing those other things to fester or whatever. [Participant D]
180. In my mind it would have been far better to say right, a week, next Monday, 
we’re all going off, even if it’s to another police station, sit down, work it out, we 
come up witli a model, we get 80% of the way there, and then the arbitrator or 
line manager comes in and says okay what’s the 20% you can’t agree on, what 
are the reasons why you can’t agree, fine, fantastic, I will go and sort the 20%, 
and I will tell you what’s going to happen. [Participant F]
181. If I had the opportunity of changing things now I would take them, and I 
would do it differently, but we don’t have that opportunity now. I’d restructure 
the whole of this unit, but not in the way we did it here and now, it wasn’t on the 
agenda then, and it wouldn’t be on the agenda now, and I wouldn’t have based it 
roimd fom* sectors, but that’s how we have, we’ve had to do that better around
[.....] Borough Council, so that again there’s external things that are requiring us
to do this. Inevitably you start saying right we’ll have a restructure, you don’t 
start with a clear* blank bit of paper do you, you start with parameters around it, 
and some of those parameters I’d probably have challenged, if I knew that now, 
where we ar*e now. I’d probably have challenged some of those parameters a bit 
more at the time, where we are, the benefits we can see, yes there are some 
benefits, there are some big drawbacks. [Participant F]
182. The learning is consultation should mean consultation, it shouldn’t mean 
communication, and if true consultation is about understanding people’s needs 
and taking a view from that to help steer yoirr* options, then that’s what it should 
be, and therefore there should be a lot of effort placed in providing the right 
opportimity, the right environment, the right understanding of staff to engage in 
that. [Participant C]
183. That consultation didn’t necessarily happen in the right way, it’s one of the 
lessons that’s been learned from the review, is that earlier engagement might 
have been better to give people the opportunity to put forward their, or submit 
their case for wanting it. [Participant H]
184. Remembering and capturing what’s happened fr om this one, because so many 
times it’s probably been done before, within the organisation, but it’s that sharing 
of those lessons lear*ned that we don’t do very well, so we could see another 
department go through exactly the same thing, and it’s not until afterwards, and 
we say, oh yes, well we had exactly that, but it’s too late then, so sharing it 
earlier. [Participant H]
185. I think the communication, one aspect of it, although I’m not sure exactly 
what else we could do, but there’s something has to change, earlier HR 
engagement. [Participant H]
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Intuitive Hit Case 2
1. INITIATING PROCESS
1.1 INTERNAL DRIVERS
1. An email comes out without any, I wasn’t awaie of any sort of chain of command 
actually making that decision.., but an email went out to well over a hundred
people including partner agencies to invite them to an event at the [..... ] Hotel,
quite a prestigious event and venue in the [.....] town centre, on the 2"^
November, for this event, in the hope to see people there. [Participant N]
2. Richard picked up an email from the police planner, a middle-ranking middle 
manager, who was inviting everybody to a £14-16 a head celebration of the 
successfril police operation, that money not being collected from each individual 
attendee, but incorporated in our* overall budget. [Participant L]
3. I mean, on the receiving end of that, as I was, if you follow the clironology, 
Richard receives an email, because he was one of the people heavily involved in 
the operation, and therefore effectively he was on a guest list of people coming 
along to this event. [Participant L]
1.2 TIME PRESSURE
4. I thinlc timeliness is another key element, and I must go quote that downstairs, the 
timeliness thing, so there had to be a decision, I agree this was the right one, but 
no decision would have been worse. To left it kind of floating would have been 
worse, so timeliness was really important. [Participant O]
5. I think it’s a message for me, back to me, if you like, to remember what probably 
is important, and timing is critical here, I think. [Participant L]
6. And so the only question marks about that become the need to make a quick 
decision, because something like that you can’t just hang around for a week and 
decide what to do. [Participant Q]
2. INTUITING PROCESS
2.1 ANALYSING
7. So I checked up with the person who’d sent the email in the initial place, to get 
some more detail. [Participant N]
8. So as a result of that I checked with the person who sent the email out to find out 
what was the background. [Participant N]
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9. So I just did a little bit of checking and questioning around is this a standard, is 
this the kind of thing that noiinally happens, is this part of oui* kind of reward 
structure, if you like, for these type of events, just to kind of double-check it out. 
[Participant Q]
10. Exactly yeah, quite yeah, let’s go and do loads of research about what other 
police forces do at the end of conferences! [Participant Q]
11. The only kind of questions for me was then trying to unpick is tliis a normal 
practice? [Participant Q]
2.2 EXPERIENCE
12. My presumption would be that a more junior person in our operation who 
thought this was a good idea, and it’s a nice idea, but it’s not a very good idea, 
would be my view, but he’s probably thinking, speaking on his behalf, I want to 
recognise the good work that my people have done, and this is a way of saying 
thank you, which is quite a nice motivation, but naïve I think we’d say, won’t 
we? [Participant L]
13. But in some ways it was a fairly easy, instinctive one, probably coming, I think, 
from my role really. [Participant Q]
14.1 think we do know from that experience condensed into a few minutes 
conversation, that this decision, that event would have been played out time and 
time again over the next x months, or yeais. [Pailicipant L]
15.1 think, another factor is probably the experience of some of the people involved 
in that chain of decision and discussion. [Paifrcipant L]
16. Because, actually, I haven’t got a lot of experience around the police at [POB], so 
instinctively it would have been from my background an absolute no, we 
shouldn’t do this kind of thing. [Participant Q]
2.3 GUT FEEL
17. .. .which Richard, intuitively, felt was poor use of public funds, particularly in the 
context of recession and the economic challenges that we’re facing. [Participant 
L]
18. A niunber of people subsequently have expressed the concern that it didn’t feel 
right to them. [Participant N]
19. So an email came out, I was a recipient of the email, and for me the event just 
didn’t sound right. [Participant N]
20. Six months ago, a year* ago, I wouldn’t have felt the same way, so my intuition 
would have been different at that point in time, whereas today it doesn’t feel 
right. [Participant N]
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21. It came out as stress, is what he means. [Participant L]
2.4 CERTITUDE
22.1 think I was confident we were making the right decision, for all the reasons 
we’ve touched on. [Participant L]
23 .1 have no doubts about it at all, it was exactly the right thing to do. [Participant 
N]
24. Fmther I understood it was right to make, and certainly I didn’t go home thinking 
have I made the right decision. [Participant N]
25. Like Richard I was very confident it was the right thing to do, I did think it was a 
shame, and that’s, I think all the logic, all the responsibilities that go with the 
office and the public service, the public sector element to oirr* job, I think, 
confirm in my mind that it was the right decision. [Participant L]
2.5 SUBJECTIVE
26. Well I can see, I can still see it on an individual basis, but I think when you’ve 
got a group in together, when you’ve got over 10 years experience then that’s 
where the rub comes in, because we’re all coming from our* own individual sort 
of viewpoint. [Participant N]
2.6 SPEED
27. My immediate reaction and it was intuitive, was to say, and I don’t think I do this 
very often, but within two minutes of getting the information from Richard, I said 
“this can’t happen”. [Participant L]
28.1 think it saved a lot of time, didn’t it, because we didn’t spend a lot of time 
saying, right okay, let’s start working out the cost of benefits, it was actually just, 
it was speed wasn’t it? [Participant Q]
3. INTERPRETING PROCESS
3.1 RATIONALISING
29. Where I was coming from initially is that I’m looking out from this, and saying 
what is the view from outside, in terms of, if you speak to government, so I think 
in terms of the policing context we’re operating in, we’re very much considering 
that, that outside view, which probably not many organisations would always 
look at that view, they’re not going to be internally focussed, but oiu* decisions 
are looking at what’s the impact going to be, particulariy in, what they say a 
single top down target of public confidence and improved public confidence, so 
for me that was the big look and actually those considerations. [Participant N]
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30.1 suppose my thoughts were clear, it was going to be chaos, because I couldn’t 
see it rumiing with offering it out to them so somebody has to pay. [Participant 
N]
31. From my point of view, and it’s probably partly round the kind of role and the 
way I might approach this, is that if either the Chief or Richard had come to me, 
and my instinct probably would have been kind of no on it, and almost what 
reason would we have for doing it, you know, and actually what, what are 
benefits, and partly that’s, I suppose, it’s a little bit around my kind of role. 
[Participant Q]
32.1 think I heard Duncan say something about as you’re kind of holding the purse 
strings, and being sm*e and being really happy about everything you’re spending 
in the right way. So I kind of immediately had a natural reaction around why 
would we want to do this? [Participant Q]
33.1 think there’s also quite an interesting contrast around logical, what I’d call 
logical and emotional aspects to it, because there’s a logical one which is this is 
going to cost us £2000, which actually is evidently affordable in the grand 
scheme of the budget, not an awfril lot of money, or anything else like that, but an 
emotional one of public perception tied in with the Hotel where we’d been, had 
bad press the year before, and so it’s the balance between both emotional and 
logical decision making factors that come to play, and sometimes some come to 
the fore, and other times others do. [Participant M]
34.1 think if you go back to the public and try and give a logical explanation, to say 
this was only £2000, in a huge budget, it just doesn’t cany with them at all, 
because, to us, as individuals £2000 is a huge amount of money, and it’s difficult 
to differentiate what £2000 means to us as an individual and what £2000 means 
in a £250 million budget. [Participant M]
35. For the salce of a very, very small part of the budget we’ve, well why don’t we 
thank people, as James said it would have cost something to do an in-house 
catered event that you went on Friday, it would have cost something to produce 
and frame certificates to hand over to staff on this other event that we’ve talked 
about. It would have probably cost a couple of thousand in an overall budget with 
all that goes with it, an oppoitimity to thank the staff, well we do do that, and it 
does cost some money, and therefore just occasionally to do it in the environment 
of the conference itself, which included the [hotel], to have an opportunity to 
thank, not just om* own staff, but partners, and to engage with them in a relaxed 
enviromnent all sounds quite a nice thing to do. It’s just a shame I think that it’s 
absolute that, that we can’t do it. [Participant L]
36. An apology, but obviously the rationale behind it is that with all those issues that 
speak about public sector financing, knowing full well that as soon as that email 
goes out, is that we are not water tight as an organisation, but that could thinking 
be in the local media, so we’ve got to balance those consequences up really from 
it. [Paiticipant N]
389
4. INTEGRATING PROCESS
4.1 CONSULTING
37.1 immediately spoke to the Chief, and then we involved Brian in the decision 
making process, so that’s how it worked. [Participant N]
38. And so talked about well what happens next, what other options have we got, 
talked with the Chief and we brought Brian in, [Participant N]
39. However, I thought well we do have a Director of Finance here, who informally I 
consider to have almost the conscious of the organisation as part of Brian’s 
portfolio. I think we all should have that, but when it’s issues of money, and 
arguably, if you like, and this is over-simplifying Brian’s role, apologies for that 
Brian, but he holds the pur se strings to a certain extent, so therefore I thought that 
was, and he was here, so it was obvious I thought to get a very quick third 
opinion, that’s what it was. [Participant L]
40. [Richard] brought it to my attention, I brought in the Finance Director as well to 
get, there’s a whole indicator, two levels of a view, what’s his sort of conscious 
tell him financially, and I think between the thr ee of us, intuitively, in quick time, 
we said “this can’t happen”. [Participant L]
4.2 VALIDATING
41. Effectively Richard presented to me the issue in a, I think, correct, judgemental 
way, I mean you’d got a judgement in your mind. And I think I would say 
Richard was coming to me to confirm, endorse, rubber-stamp that decision, but I 
suppose I’d got an option, I could have said no I thinlc it’s alright, let it happen. 
[Participant L]
42. Potentially Richard’s looked at it and thought this doesn’t look right, gone to the 
Chief with his expert intuition after 10 years, saying you’re right, it doesn’t look 
right, and this is where we’re going to go with it. So you’ve got an inkling of 
intuition corning tlnough there, with a confirmation at this level. [Participant M]
43. Physically what we did is Richard got this email up on a big screen in his office, 
so I almost took Brian by the hand, we walked downstairs into Richard’s office, 
and physically looked at this message, and then looked at each other, and said, 
“no, this can’t happen”. [Participant L]
44. So I didn’t need a lot of persuading and that because it was almost presented to 
me as we’re not very sure about this, our instinct is not to do it, and almost just 
really kind of asking me for that kind of ftuther judgement confirmation, which 
in some ways was quite easy. [Participant Q]
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4.3 INVOLVEMENT
45.1 think it could have involved the whole group here if it had happened on, just 
before COMs, in fact if we went into the chief officers meetings, which is our 
weekly meeting. But it was sufficient that I saw that, it didn’t need anybody else 
to actually be involved in that decision making in the end, really. [Participant N]
4.4 CONSENSUS
46. We took a view, again round this table, in very quick time, that actually, even 
though we could justify every penny, we didn’t want the publicity, and didn’t 
want to be seen to be criticised last week, as it was a few months ago, and then 
almost ignore that criticism and still blandly, blithely go on ahead and have om* 
own little conference spending, what is perceived to be tax payers money on 
having a nice time. [Participant L]
47. So we made a decision that it wouldn’t happen in the format that had been 
described. [Participant L]
48.1 think the decision was absolutely right, but there ar*e other ways of saying tlianlc 
you. [Participant P]
49. So even though, and I’m completely in agreement that was the right decision in 
the right context. [Participant P]
4.5 GENERATING OPTIONS
50.1 think we were back to that individual, and said we’ll work up some options, so 
came back with the options, about five or six, and the best one, at that time, and I 
still support that is cancel the event. [Participant N]
51. So, I’m not sure if it was partly to try and help him save face, because he’d sent 
this message out, and also with a little bit of mischief in my mind, I think, I 
thought well if people want to still go to this event, let it happen, they can pay, 
out of their own pocket privately, knowing full well that that wouldn’t promote 
or create an event at the end of it all. [Participant L]
52. I’d obviously done some work through those options and sent, so it then come 
back no, and in fact it came back from the original decision maker, that having 
thought through all of that it’s probably best to cancel it completely. And so it’s 
almost passing that decision back. [Participant N]
53.1 mean we considered, one, that they pay, the attendees pay themselves, two, that
we actually go to a venue in [..... ] and just have a drink together, but then when
we talked ar ound, do you do that, could we do that in terms of the mix of people 
who’d be coming together, and so we, and another one which was even dodgier, I 
think, was to pass, pass it back to Group 4 Security, which is a private company, 
and ask them to pay. [Participant N]
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4.6 REPUTATION
54.1 seem to remember saying to Richard, because the irony for all of this is, it’s an 
extraordinary trivial event in the context of one a half million people who live in
[..... ], and who have policing services 24 hours a day, 365 days a year*, and which
we fund through the different gover*nment and other* grants, local and national, 
with a £260 million plus budget, and yet you’ve got thr*ee senior people here 
talking about what Richard said something that was going to cost, if pounds and 
pence of it was the only measure, £2000, an absolute drop in the ocean, but we’re 
talking about it, and we made those decisions, because I think we thought it 
wasn’t just a financial costing discussion we were having, it was all about 
reputation, the management, the efficient management, the responsible 
management of the force, of the organisation. [Participant L]
55. But I think his feelings would have been even worse if, and I’m imagining how 
he may have felt, I don’t know, his feelings would have been even worse if the 
public perception of the success of that big policing operation would have been 
dented almost damaged ineparably, if we’d gone ahead with this sort of event. It 
would then have rebounded and eked into, slipped into lots of other* things. 
[Participant L]
56. ... and then with the kind of damage limitation on it, so what, having safely kind 
of made this decision not to do it, and actirally then at the same time then create 
lots of bad feeling and adverse publicity etcetera. [Participant Q]
57. Yeah, and one bit I just had in ter*ms of the publicity is that, in my thinking was, 
if it goes ahead there will be bad publicity, I was confident, if it doesn’t go ahead, 
and if we are seen to cancel it, but there was some bad publicity that could follow 
as a consequence to that, inter*nally we may have a few staff who would feel 
imdervalued. [Participant L]
58.1 could anticipate foresee some newspaper ar*ticles saying that we were petty, or* 
didn’t reward our staff, or* even how dreadful that it got so close to happening, 
before somebody put a stop to it. [Par*ticipant L]
4.7 VALUES
59.1 was going to say because we went through that Serving [..... ], didn’t we, and
that output put us doing the right thing for the right reasons, it’s actually par*t of 
the hear*t of how we’re trying to do business, so regar dless of that, it’s the, doing 
the right thing that matters at the end of the day. [Pai*ticipant O]
60. It’s probably interesting though to mention the culture of the organisation though 
and what does saying ‘thank you’ mean. [Participant M]
61.1 think consistency is really important as well, so bringing it back to the values of 
the organisation, and the way we do business, so that we can always hang things 
on values, somewhere, whatever* it is you can unpick it down to that, and do the
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right thing for the right reasons, so consistency would be an important part for 
me. [Participant O]
POST-DECISION PROCESSES 
1. REFLECTING
62. But I think other elements from it is that it was proportionate, it was necessary, it 
was justified, which is how we sort of benchmar k a lot of our operations against 
human rights act in terms of those issues, so you could put it in that same context 
as well. [Participant N]
63. The fact that we’re all happy with the decision a week later, means that we’ve got 
confidence in using intuition. I’m not saying you’d then regret a week later 
because you think, well maybe I made a poor decision there, so it’s kind of, in 
some ways if you take it as a kind of confidence insur'ance point that our* intuition 
stands the test of time. [Par ticipant Q]
64.1 think Richard you said that 18 months ago you might have made a different 
decision, I like to think I wouldn’t have done, but I don’t know, life goes on, and 
there are other influences that you suddenly think, oh well that’s quite a nice 
thing to do, let’s just do it, but I think that learning to me is, it’s the sort of thing 
that comes and goes, it comes and goes. [Participant L]
65. For me I think it’s a reference, sort of shared point in time, where you say the 
decision is not exclusively a precedent, Karen’s point, that will stand the test of 
time. [Participant L]
2. LEARNING
66. We’re not malting a principle out of that, which is we’ll never spend any money, 
ever, as it were, on rewarding staff, or saying thank you, or, we’ll judge those on 
their merit kind of thing. Because my instincts would go against that as an 
oventding principle, I mean it’s more sensitive at the moment, that feels an 
extreme example, but there ar e other examples where spending a bit of money we 
might want to justify really, does attract negative publicity. [Participant P]
67.1 think Karen that’s what you were talking about, when you were saying this 
doesn’t mean that we won’t do any “thank you”s that cost money, or we won’t do 
any demonstrable acts, if that’s the right word, sort of, that show we value our 
staff and we value the work that they do. [Participant L]
68. But I think, Richard and I certainly had a conversation about Owen, the person 
on the receiving end of this decision, if you like, who also would be the person 
who had to really publically show that he’d been brought to book and had his 
decision completely reversed, so I think I remember asking Richard how does 
Owen feel about that, and I think you said that he learnt by the experience. 
[Participant L]
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69.1 think Owen has [learnt by the experience], and I know him very well, and he’s 
creative, he’s always looking at options to sort of learn on, and he recognises that 
if you’re going to make that decision today, he probably wouldn’t make the same 
one. [Participant N]
70.1 suppose the learning comes, for me, comes from now, here, in tenns of the 
amount of time we spend getting to discuss about how a decision is made, as I’m 
learning to think about that, not in terms of long times, but in terms of how I 
operate in tenns of fiitine decisions having to make. [Participant N]
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Intuitive Hit Case 3
1. INITIATING PROCESS
1.1 EXTERNAL DRIVERS
1. I think nationally we’d got crimes coming down, and the fear of crime wasn’t 
shifting, and it was well what do we need to do? [Par ticipant R]
2. I think it was a disconnect between communities and policing generically where 
communities thought crime was going up when actually crime was coming down, 
fear’ of crime was going up and there was a lack of engagement between 
commimities and policing, so how do you solve that connection. [Participant R]
3. Well I think it was kind of that balance between what was coming through in 
infonnation, even locally crime was coming down but everyone was feeling that 
crime was going up, so you’ve got a disconnection between the public and what 
actually we thought was happening on the ground, and a lot of our priorities at 
that time would have been things that were coming top down, so burglary, 
vehicle crime which are still important. But the public were saying, as is more 
evident now, what things really affect us are kids rurming tlrrough our gardens 
and smashing the windows and the alcohol on the streets. So it’s kind of 
changing our whole style of policing in a sense to kind of be more reflective of 
what was at that end. [Participant R]
4. I don’t know if we would have changed had the government not told us to 
change. And what I say is not us in this room but us the police service nationally. 
[Participant T]
5. Very much so, it was the government who brought the funding along and also the 
direction to say this is what you will do. [Paiticipant T]
6. Would we be policing to those standards had the government not told us to, and 
the simple answer is no. Not to those specific standards across the police service 
in England and Wales. So it was a government directive. [Participant T]
1.2 INTERNAL DRIVERS
7. I think it was about Clrristmas 2004 when the Chief Superintendent got me in a 
corridor and said you are delivering neighbourhood policing and I said what’s 
that and he said not quite sure, but it’s a national driver in essence of where we 
want to go as a Force. [Participant V]
8. What we’re doing is that many people at local area level have done 
neighbourhood policing before but I think it was the lack of structur e around it 
which was the issue, because you had pockets of work where people were getting 
into the community, be known to the commmiity, deal with community issues but 
it wasn’t consistently delivered across all the areas. [Participant V]
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9. We just had police, like beat managers, beat officers, so we had the foui’ beats in 
the city centre, and we had, effectively for those four officers it was quite 
difficult to actually maintain, to satisfy the policing of the day-time economy and 
the night-time economy, so we looked at how we managed the night-time 
economy, which wasn’t really very consistent, and there was no ownership of 
long-term problem solving. [Participant W]
10. In terms of neighbourhood policing across the division, and my instincts are that, 
it linlcs in with the demand that the division faces as well in that we are not 
responding to commrmity problems with any degree of urgency, so people will 
link that with things like antisocial behaviom* which is a key driver of negative 
issues. We ar e not responding to those jobs as quickly as we should do, so people 
that live on the area aren’t going to be happy with the service that they are 
receiving, so when we consult with them through national surveys they are not 
going to give a positive approach. [Participant W]
11.1 guess from an intuitive perspective, it was like, yeah on paper we’ve got a 
neighbourhood policing team for the city centre, but actually do I feel that they’re 
actually addressing all of the issues in the city centre, well no they’re not, 
because they’re only really focussing on the kind of day-time issues, and to an 
extent that’s what we’ve got on this division now, we’ve got a Neighbourhood
Policing Team for [..... ] South, which includes the town centre, but they are very
much focussed on problems ar’ound retail crime and people committing offences 
in the day time in the town centre, and I should never really see that ownership of 
the problems around the night-time, can be like violence, disorder, drunkenness, 
etcetera. [Participant W]
12. In terms of the drivers for the problem, which are largely around alcohol, they are 
the same, and until we can actually convince our problem solvers that that’s the 
key problem that we need to get a grip on, and actually to start doing some work 
on it, we will be continually going round the same cycle of going into, sending 
officers into the town and arresting people because they’re drunk, or assaulting 
people, putting them into the cell block, coming to work on a Satinday morning 
or a Sunday morning and finding that the cells are full with people, they get 
prosecuted, they go to court, they come back around the cycle again a bit later on, 
and we’ve got to find a way of breaking that cycle here. [Participant W]
13. We had a lot of officers that were responding to demand and just going around 
and recording crimes, and there wasn’t anybody actually out there doing some 
real street policing, actually challenging bad behaviour and arresting people, 
prosecuting people and putting us in a position where we could actually respond 
to some of those criticisms, but we weren’t actually tackling some of the 
problems. [Participant W]
14. At the time I was implementing it, the chief officer who was leading it, was very, 
very clear of this vision, this is what’s happening, this is where it’s going, there 
was no doubt about this officer, when he said, that’s what I’m doing, you are 
going to go there. [Participant R]
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15. There was a change board on the division chaired by the Divisional Commander 
at the time who kind of said these are the beats that we want to put in place. 
[Participant R]
16. We’re a hierarchical organisation, and the person at the top says we’re going to 
do it, then maybe can we turn around and say we’re not going to. [Participant T]
1.3 UNCERTAINTY
17.1 suppose almost a summary of it is that the government said you’ve got to 
deliver neighbourhood policing, but we’re not going to tell you how to do it, so 
that went out to the 43 forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland quite 
possibly, I don’t know. It was a case of this is a concept we want you to deliver, 
there is no rule book on how to deliver it, so you’ve got 43 approaches to 
delivering it. [Participant T]
18.1 don’t think there was a force lead at this point, there was kind of a vacuum of 
what does it mean to the force aspect of it... so it was just about trying to figure 
out what it actually meant to us as individuals. [Participant V]
19. So the first decisions were there without a lot of information, without a lot of 
guidance. It was kind of you interpret this national stuff in the way that you want 
to do it locally and find the best way of doing so. [Participant R]
1.4 COMPLEXITY
20. There were some key decisions to make right at the start which still keep getting 
revisited on, who are our communities, how do we find out what their views are, 
how do we prioritise the things that are important to them, what’s the best way to 
tackle those and then how do we tell them what we’ve done. That was kind of the 
concept of what we were being asked to look at, so if you look at where we 
started from, the decisions we had to make were how do you implement that, it’s 
quite a lot of infonnation, and then how do you roll that out across the 
organisations. [Participant R]
21. So the original decision was how do we create something tliat does this 
connection with the public, finds out who they are, goes to engage them 
effectively, then finds out what the problems are, tackles it and then kind of feeds 
it back to the community. [Participant R]
22. At that time we were probably very much of, we’d got beat teams but it wasn’t 
formalised, we determined what we tackled as an organisation, so this term 
‘responsive’, we’ve got to find out what the public want, that was probably less 
of a priority for us, than actually doing what came across and we thought as 
professionals. [Participant R]
23. We had to shift fiorn tasking oinselves to kind of trying to introduce a whole 
range of new demands, we’d not done engagement in a systematic way before, so 
we had to understand that, we had to create systems to capture it, and there was a
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whole range of different tilings, so it’s process changes, behaviour’ changes, 
political changes, because some of the politicians were sceptical locally of, is this 
going to work? [Participant R]
24. ...how do we improve that understanding of our communities, how do we 
improve engagement, how do we improve intelligence about what’s happening in 
those communities, and then how do we feed back to them. [Par-ticipant R]
25. So the real shift at that time, and it seems quite straightforward now, although 
we’re still working at it, was we’ll go out and ask the public what they think their 
issues are, and that was kind of, that point, was quite a big thing for us, because 
well how do they know, there’s all, there’s that professional egotism that perhaps 
comes into it. It was a big shift on behaviours and process really, because we had 
no mechanism, real mechanism to, on a regular basis, go and speak to the public. 
[Participant R]
26. So there is a range of different things, but it literally was a whole change of 
policing, being managing its own destiny, to saying to the public, you now tell 
us, and then how do we propose problem solving, which again wasn’t, still isn’t 
endemic on how you understand something, how you deconstruct it, work out 
where the key issues are on and then tackle it. [Participant R]
1.5 TIME PRESSURE
27. Because we didn’t have the time, it was like you’ve got this to implement, get it 
done. [Participant R]
28.1 thinlc if we’d have done that right at the start, we’d have started building on a 
strong foundation, but the timeliness of it, well it was made that we needed to do 
it quite quickly. [Participant R]
29. It was very much seen as, well this is the police initiative that you’re doing, as 
opposed to you’re consulting, but with the timescales it was important to make 
sure we’d got something on the gromid working that we could then build on the 
product. [Participant R]
2. INTUITING PROCESS
2.1 ANALYSING
30. Did I know the programme when I first arrived yes, did I have the confidence to 
get it all moving now, well no because I then thought tlnough rationally the 
consequences but I still knew that I wanted a team in place which is in place now. 
[Participant R]
31.1 think when you’ve got more time to think rationally through it, and to develop 
single bits of it, then it gets embedded even better. [Participant R]
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32. Because we don’t manage change by chance, so the intuition needed to be backed 
up with some change management. [Participant R]
33. There’d been a three year evaluation of a reassur ance pilot, so there’s some in the 
North East, and throughout, so there’s a wealth of academic research on 
confidence, engagement, reassurance, so it was based on valid, national, 
academic work. [Participant R]
2.2 SCANNING
34. There had been what we’d call ‘reassurance pilots’, so what would work in a 
community to reassine them we were tackling the fear of crime, and what that 
kind of star ted to show, dedicated teams, known to the public, delivery, problem 
solving, getting back to people, was actually a way forward, so that came out of 
the organisation. [Participant R]
35. When we first went to look at it, we actually go and look at the pilots, the two 
pilots that were running, and found them to be entirely different from one 
another, and so that kind of left us a little bit like, well okay, so you have kind of 
got the opportunity to work out what you think is the right way to go with this. 
[Participant W]
2.3 GUT FEEL
36. So first and foremost you have to thinlc to yourself is that right, for me is that 
right? I looked at it and thought yeah it is right. We are at the right stage so 
therefore you get the commitment, because if you are going to deliver something 
that way, or you are going to go tlnough any decision, you have to be 
comfortable in the decision you make. [Participant V]
37.1 think it’s about emotional decision. I mean, mine was, I didn’t actually give it a 
lot of thought aroimd that one, did it feel right, yeah it felt right. We were at the 
right place at the right time. Yeali it felt like we were at the right place at the right 
time. [Participant V]
38. Mike kind of thought, I need to do something different, this doesn’t feel right for 
my aiea. [Participant R]
39. So a lot of the delivery has been based upon the intuition of the people who 
happened to be working on it at that time, to say this is what I think it should look 
like. [Paificipant T]
2.4 EXPERIENCE
40. So the intuition within this example comes down to, well you’ve got to deliver 
something called neighbouiiiood policing but make it up as you go along, but in 
effect we’re going to trust you to come up with the best model of what you do 
based upon your experience. [Participant T]
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41. So there were things that came in right at the start that we knew from the context 
of the ar ea, that we knew from our experience of the communities as well and we 
knew from what probably oin levels of knowledge and oui’ engagement were so I 
had to kind of interact with the communities and also probably some of the levels 
our staff were at the time because this was a big change for them. [Par ticipant R]
42.1 think maybe everybody in here will have a model that they can apply to the 
decision making, and to some extent, whether or not you can go through it every 
time, because of some of the training that you’ve done, some of the jobs that 
you’ve actually worked on, but they’ll be in your thought process regardless, so 
that will link in with your intuition a lot of the time, [Par-ticipant W]
43. The good instinct is down to your experience and knowledge, your view of the 
future so you can react to it quickly rather than think “oh I’m not quite sure of 
this, I need time to think, have I got time?” [Par ticipant R]
44. Where the intuition then came later was having learned the lessons of 
community... So actually there is something about this being about 
neighbourhood management and not just neighbour hood policing. [Participant R]
45. But I’ll know in my own mind what’s right. I think that’s down to me and my 
experience across a broad range of issues. [Par ticipant V]
2.5 CERTITUDE
46. So again, I guess the intuition was a) we went for the difficult areas because we 
thought it would work, b) we kind of let free out in the community, and at a 
really busy time, we decided to almost commit professional suicide and say we’ll 
obstr-uct these officers and cany the risk, [Participant R]
47. We gambled and said, yeah, we need to go out and let tire public agree the 
priorities, because other areas in the country, they were kind of determining their 
own based on siu’veys, and Roger and myself we’re very clear we have to take a 
leap of faith, if we’re really going to get the responsiveness, the public have to 
have a say. [Pai’ticipant R]
48. Because in this decision I never had any self doubt, is that me or shall we just go 
for it and that’s what it is. [Participant V]
49.1 think with neighbomhood policing we knew it was the right thing to do. 
[Pai’ticipant R]
50. So neighbourhood policing, I think, it’s still, we still think we’re doing the right 
thing, we believe it’s the right thing, which is working through each time we 
develop it. [Par-ticipant R]
51. They ignored the advice because their intuition told them to do something 
different. [Participant T]
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52. We probably all make intuitive judgements, but what we’re actually talking about 
is having the moral fortitude and resilience to stand by the decision you make 
whether you rationalise that or not. Or maybe come up with a false rationalisation 
just to justify it but it’s about having the confidence to say yes I’m actually going 
to do it and then follow that thiougli. [Pai’ticipant T]
2.6 SUBJECTIVE
53. So the decisions that Roger and I made were quite arbitrary in the first place and 
what we thought would work in that context. [Participant R]
54. Because part of the cultuie again is that we provide advice documents a lot and 
then people because of this framework tuin aiound and say no I don’t think that’s 
right I’ll go and do something else. It can be counter productive within an 
organisation that if everybody is using their gut reaction, everybody’s gut can tell 
them to do something different and you’ll end up with non specific delivery. 
[Participant T]
55. If that intuitive decision is going to go wider, be it a burglary group, be it a 
change progi'amme, be it a working document on how things operate, without 
that the intuition is kind of very individualistic, and it sits with youi self and your 
credibility, unless you put the frameworks in, it will just stay in that one point 
and slirivel up at a point in time. [Participant R]
3. INTERPRETING PROCESS
3.1 VISUALISING
56. Gavin came along and because he wanted to be a Chief Superintendent he did
these charts in my office in [..... ] and it was a wonderfril thing to behold and it’s
a shame I didn’t digitally enhance it because it would have gone into the 
interviews! [Participant V]
57. I’ve drawn it on Roger’s board, I think it was a case of I read some of the 
research documents that were out there at the time, I think that’s what happened. 
A fair bit of much of what we do and then based on those research documents 
kind of try to make some sense of what it was out of that and then kind of drew 
that on Roger’s board. [Participant R]
58.1 drew it on the board for Roger, in one go, and Roger delivered it, and that was 
it. [Participant R]
59. So we had all this scribble on the board like that and around that and then what I 
had to do was I had to understand of a) what the organisation wanted and b) what
we could deliver in my small area of [..... ] and take that and deliver the picture
into some sort of reality and that’s where the process is started. [Participant V]
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60. There it was up on that board and then fundamentally he left it with me to 
interpret it using documents from Home Office. [Participant V]
61.1 think it’s the way people’s mind operates, some people’s mind operates best in 
the written word, and some people’s mind operates within the picture. Now I 
operate better like Gavin, with the picture, if I can see things and I can picture 
things on a single piece of paper I’m much more comfortable and then can 
remember. It’s understanding where the person who’s trying to tell you 
something is coming from then interpreting what that is, because that’s what it’s 
all about. [Participant V]
3.2 DIALOGUE
62. It started with who are our communities, and that’s what I need Roger to look at. 
Either you kind of break down this geographic ar ea into commimities because we 
can’t take all of it. So that was the first one and we kind of had a quick decision 
that it probably should go with the beat areas which was a smaller thing that was 
already in place, and how do we best engage and then we had a lot of discussions 
over how. [Par ticipant R]
63. Normally policing at that time what would happen is that people would phone 
with incidents for us to tackle and then we tackle it and we decide our priorities, 
this was kind of a big shift with regard to communities to say what it is you want 
to tackle. I think we had a lot of discussions about is it thr'ee priorities, is it two 
priorities. [Participant R]
64. So it literally was a 20 minute discussion of, this is what I think, Roger was, I get 
that, next time you come back and it was then we met every so often. In the first 
point we didn’t do any project management, it was like me coming back and 
going, how far have you got. This is where I’m at. And it’s only later when it was 
rolled out across the force, because I think we didn’t want to put a load of 
obstacles ar ound it, which was kind of let’s see how it takes us. [Parlicipant R]
3.3 RATIONALISING
65. So my instincts were that we needed a street team in the city centre and basically 
to achieve that it would have meant that everybody else would have to give up 
some resoiu'ces to achieve that. [Participant W]
66. My instincts were that we need to set up some kind of initiative whereby we can 
get to those jobs quickly, we can respond quickly so we can be in a position to 
make people feel better. So I guess the kind of instinct to this is that we need to 
change the way we manage the night time economy and we need to change the 
way we respond to local issues. [Participant W]
67. The way that the neighbomhood policing should work should be you should go 
tlrrough that process over a kind of three month period and then all the results of 
all your smveys and your str’eet surgeries should come into a meeting, which is 
for local people, local stakeholders to be involved with, where you actually
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determine what are important local issues within that community, where we can 
actually work together with partners, to make a difference to improve people’s 
standar d of life. [Participant W]
68. So it was around these are the public biggest areas that we could go to, this is the 
format of engagement, so we’ll have these meetings every six weeks I think we 
set at. At those meetings the public can tirrn up, we’ll listen to their priorities and 
then we’ll go and tackle them. Probably had no more than three because we tried 
to work out what we could manage without being overloaded, and again that was 
kind of just a feel for it more than anything and then what we’ll do is feed back to 
them at the next meeting. [Participant R]
69. So what we’ve said is that to ensure consistency, how’s that going to work, right 
well what we’re going to do is we’re going to try and identify critical areas 
within each of the beat areas, visit one of those streets, and put up another table 
that we call a street surgery, and what happens there is, you’ll identify a street, 
you go along to it two or thr ee days before you actually want to sort of have your 
street sirrgery, you’ll actually do a letter drop to every house on that street saying, 
on Wednesday night between 6 and 8 p.m. your local neighbourhood team will 
be down here, we’ll be really interested to come and see you on that night, to find 
out what issues ar'e important to you, here’s a survey that you might complete, 
just prior to coming along on the evening, so we can actually get a better feel for 
what those issues are, and we can collate them with everybody else, and you 
publish that and actually make it clear' that anybody else can come along to that, 
not just people on that pailicular street. What you then try and do is ensure that, 
as well as the police turning up on that night, you actually get the Council to timr 
up as well, so there may be a local Councillor or at least officers from the 
Council that can impact on local services. [Participant W]
70. Yom' intuition may be the starting point but then you are going to have to 
rationalise it, you are going to have to research it, you are going to have to be 
able to evidence it, or if you’re not going to be able to take other people witli you 
you’re not actually going be able to get support for it. [Participant U]
71. If you ar e challenged about what is your rationale for making the decision, part of 
the culture of this organisation means that it would be quite hard to turn around 
and say “it just feels like the right thing to do”. [Participant T]
72. But you know I think it was the logic that sold, you’ve got to translate gut 
instinct. [Par-ticipant R]
73. That’s the point I make that I think it would be very difficult for any one of us to 
turn aroimd and say “well I am doing this just because it feels like the right thing 
to do”, with no rationalisation at all because if you didn’t you know... [Participant 
T]
74. Because I was trying to sell it to people that wanted to change it themselves, and 
it was the logic that kind of, to start with fiorn my intuition and making sense of
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it, it was the logic that sold it to Roger and I had to use the same logic internally. 
[Participant R]
75. It’s very hard, and maybe within the business that we operate it might be the gut 
reaction but that the nature of our business means that you then have to 
rationalise it and appraise it against an acceptable risk to say what is the risk if 
this goes wrong, because in our business if something goes wrong, particularly in 
the fast time stuff the consequences can literally be death. [Participant T]
76. To be able to sell it I think you have to deconstruct why you’re doing it if you’ve 
not got the credibility or you are kind of a couple of years ahead of making sense 
of stuff and not taking people with you. [Participant R]
77. Because we’ve got so many checks and balances within an organisational 
structure that I think with these things you may have the intuitive feeling about 
something and well, I think that’s right, but there’s so many checks and balances 
that you end up getting almost potentially self justification so the rationalisation 
supports what you think anyway or challenges it. [Participant S]
78. The test for me is the policy log. How many of your policy logs just go “because 
it felt like the right thing to do”? We have a process for any critical incidents or 
investigations. I’m making this decision now and then you rationalise as to why 
you are doing it. [Participant S]
79. Yeah but which comes first do you think. The issue being is that you make that 
instant judgement if you want to call that and then what you do is, in many cases, 
search for rationale around that and so when we talk about that judgment time 
issues there we are perhaps giving ourselves too much credence. What we are 
saying is this is what we are going to do, now rationalise it. [Participant V]
4. INTEGRATING PROCESS
4.1 INVOLVEMENT
80. Well I mean I wasn’t really, my involvement came later on, as part of the 
implementation process. Well supporting the implementation processes, but 
being required to provide and deal with information in support of the process that 
was being influenced by other people. [Participant U]
4.2 CONSULTING
81. We’ve discussed things and put it forward and checked it out with each other and 
the person who kind of put it forward as in policing our* original start was kind of 
intuitive and this is what we are doing, we’re going to move it on, but as it got 
negotiated through the organisation, ofiier people chipped in and said this is how 
we’ve done it, this is how it works, then it morphed into something that became 
probably still based in what we originally came up with but morphed into this 
intelligence par t of it now. [Par ticipant R]
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82. We literally picked up the model fiom the City, put it to the centre, got a 
representative from each team and said this is the model we need to implement. 
So what’s your intuition? [Participant R]
83. We managed to get somebody from County Coimcil for neighbourhood 
management to work with us in the team, so we were understanding things 
differently we went to kind of local politicians, presented it to communities, 
tlnough similar' points of contact, so there was a fair bit of consultation, probably 
could have been an awful lot more. [Participant R]
84. So I developed a discussion document that’s going round to canvas views of all 
my colleagues as to whether they think my intuition if you like about what we 
should be doing is right. So hopefully what will happen with that is, it will be 
modified depending on what people’s views are. [Par-ticipant W]
4.3 INFLUENCING
85. As then I got moved to HQ to be the change manager to deliver it across the 
organisation I had to move fr om some of the beats that we made quite quickly to 
actually to get them to agree to that beat I need to try and change it a little bit, 
still staying with the original ethos that we had, but as it kind of became broader 
and more people involved who couldn’t actually be pushed into it by drawing a 
picture, had to do it differently. [Par-ticipant R]
86. We managed to persuade local community workers to help us do the meetings, 
because some communities weren’t ready to engage with the police at that time, 
so they did it on our behalf, and that was another kind of leap of faith for them, as 
much for us. [Participant R]
87.1 think persuading some politicians that it was important to get to the wider- 
community to find tlieir issues, rather than having to just come through dedicated 
things, so there were structures in place, but they weren’t probably as inclusive as 
they could have been. [Participant R]
88.1 think you had to sell it to your beat teams so don’t underestimate. [Participant
R]
89. You’ve actually got to get people to want to own it and mind it, because actually 
it’s more of a collaboratively team thing that you are talking about in a social 
context. [Participant R]
90.1 think the difference is around communication, because if you’ve got a rapid 
time intuitive decision that you are making then you get people to comply with it 
through discipline and through the fact that you are accountable for it because it 
is a fast time intuitive decision. If you are making a slow time business decision 
and looking at it intuitively, actually that’s not enough on its own because you 
need to take people with you, you need to win hearts and minds, to put it crudely. 
[Participant U]
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91. With the command structure that we have, whilst we sit in a team context, there 
is a hierarchy to that team context, so you are still sat in a team but you have still 
got to take people with you, but actually if they are not going to come with you 
because you are the accoimtable person, they are still going to come anyway 
ai’en’t they. This is the decision I am doing, it’s non-negotiable, I agree with the 
information I’m going to do it. [Participant R]
92. There was a long process of getting buy-in fiom upwards as well as at the same 
rank in the organisation. But ultimately people could see the benefits of what was 
being suggested. [Participant W]
4.4 CREDIBILITY
93. The other interesting thing is whether people will follow it because they’ve got to 
have confidence in the leadership. [Participant V]
94. One issue is a leap of faith, and that if you have a leap of faith, other people have 
got to have faith in you that you are making the right leap. And so you can have 
all the intuitive decisions you like, if you are seen as an idiot, people will not... 
[Participant V]
95. So I think the communication will only work thus far if it is a leap of faith as far 
as personal leadership can extend it. [Participant T]
96. It’s based on their experience of you about whether you led them well. 
[Participant V]
97. The person I actually sold it to was my Sergeant, and bear in mind at the time
he’d got something like 19-20 years in and all at [..... ] where I was, and I’d got
something like 20 odd year s in and we weren’t bright eyed so if we went out to 
oin beat teams and said this is good, they just said “okay”. [Participant V]
4.5 COMMUNICATING
98. The key bit in terms of intuitive leadership is if it’s not connected with good 
communication then it can fail. Because you can’t make the comrection where 
you’ve gone with your intuition into actually why you need to do it in the first 
place and that’s what we ended up doing a lot with trying to talk to people about 
why. [Participant R]
99.1 think that the biggest difficulty is about communication, getting people to 
understand what it’s actually about. [Participant W]
4.6 CONFLICT
100. We’ve got people in posts that actually not everybody’s bought into the idea 
of community engagement, and actually identifying local priorities and working 
to them. [Participant W]
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101. Wlien you look across the whole of the organisation, there aren’t that many 
people that have actually got that degree of vision about what it all means, and 
even though we’ve spent a lot of time and effort in trying to communicate that. 
[Participant W]
5. INSTITUTIONALISING PROCESS
5.1 SYSTEMATISING
102. We have neighbourhood teams across the whole county now, if you were 
looking right now, almost following the same procedure that we started with after 
20 minutes, even the national level is not far off that 20 minute chat. [Participant
R]
103. Those standards have been set, and they’ve been set nationally now, through 
the pledge, everyone’s kind of coming into line with each other around what 
we’re delivering. [Participant W]
104. We have engagement strategies, we have neighborhood policing plans, we 
have web sites, we have computer packages, to look at problem solving, we have 
regular processes ar ound the inter communities, types of poster that can go out, 
everything is regularised now. [Participant R]
105. The policing pledge has evolved out of kind of what we’re doing on 
neighbourhood policing, and what was called a Quality Service Commitment, so 
they’ve kind of come together to equal the policing pledge. [Participant R]
106. The policing teams I think is one of the big investments that’s been made, and 
yeah, they’re starting to say, well what are we now getting for it, and we want 
consistency across the country. [Participant R]
107. It’s the longevity of it, if it’s seen to work then it becomes part of corporate 
business, so I’m sure that there are things that Roger and Gavin developed that 
have become part of accepted corporate business. [Participant T]
108. So we set up a street team in the City centre, which was three Sergeants and 
18 Constables, in addition to the fom* Constables that were the neighbourhood 
beat managers for that area, and we devised a shift pattern that meant that they 
worked at all the critical times of the week, to sort of cater for the fact that it is a 
24 hour place, so we had some ownership of both day-time and night-time 
problems, but actually delivering that set up was quite challenging because it 
meant that I needed to increase my establishment to achieve that. [Participant W]
109. We developed a street team within the City centre that became the core of our 
neighbourhood policing and helped us to engage but also to be positive around 
enforcement. [Participant W]
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110. It was a case of this is how we’re going to have to engage, so that was kind of 
part of the model, do you know your community, secondly it was this is how 
you’re going to make the decisions, and how you’re going to make all the 
priorities. It was kind of that, they would have a public meeting, having done 
engagement, and the community would be invited. [Participant R]
111. So what we’ve said is if we can do that on every one of oui' beats, once a 
month, that’s over 400 engagement events per year, which we’re going to be 
doing as a standard. [Participant W]
112. What is happening is that each beat, and we’ve got 36 across this division, is 
expected to have one official engagement event per month which goes onto the 
website, so that members of the public can see when they can actually engage 
with their neighboiu'hood teams, so part of the pledge sort of commitment really. 
[Participant W]
113. We just this week gone to the stage where our' priorities are now going onto 
our' force IT system, so if somebody rings in to report a particular incident that is 
one of our priorities, then they’ll start flagging up within our" control room so we 
can send resources out, at the right time, and again the final bit of that equation is 
they’ll aim, hopefully to be attended within an hour, that’s the first thing. But we 
can then start to produce some performance figures to the public to say how 
many of those incidents we actually got to within the horn, and those, the 
policing priorities that we’ve identified, they go onto our website as well, and our' 
beat teams, so the beat managers and PCSOs they’re responsible for ensur'ing 
that, a) the priority goes on there, but b) what are we doing about that priority 
that goes on there, and then finally, well what have we actually done about it, so 
that people ar e updated. [Par ticipant W]
114. Big, big work and lots of people are involved in at the moment actually 
driving that along, so that actually all those different stages will get put together, 
so that if you or I lived on an area and wanted to find out what was happening 
about local issues, we should be able to log on to our local police, our' local beat, 
the local problems, actually okay what have they done about it, and actually if I 
want to go and talk to the beat managers, how do I find them. I’ll find them by 
doing this. [Par ticipant W]
5.2 ADJUSTING
115. The question to ask is, if it was intuitively right in 2005, is it intuitively right 
now? Why are we still having to work really hard at getting embedding, and I 
thinlc if you look at when a decision didn’t work, we still think the decision was 
right, but it’s such a behaviour' change, that you have to reinforce with process 
changes, and I think that’s what we’re still working at, at the moment, got to get 
the right people, got to get the right processes to reinforce the behaviour, so we 
are working still really hard embedding neighbourhood policing, and we’re kind 
of four years down the line. [Par ticipant R]
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116. Still being reviewed but its actually going thiough a series of changes and it 
has been embedded but it still keeps getting looked at and reviewed at the 
moment. [Participant R]
117. Now in tenns of almost as a stage review if you look at project managing it 
you’ve had the policing pledge, this came out in sort of last year* and we are 
working to it now which is sort of putting some performance measuiement 
around it mainly for the first time there was some specific direction from central 
government on what we should have really been working to achieve over the last 
few years. [Participant T]
118. What we’re saying here is, as we made the decision to implement, in that area 
did it make a difference to people’s lives, it did, but then as time’s gone on, the 
context changed, and people want different things from it, so the goal’s shifted 
again, so the decision to implement it was right, intuitively it’s now got to keep 
corning. [Participant R]
119. It’s kind of an evolving intuition, in a business sense, because how do we 
know, how do we change it again, to keep up with the new context. [Participant
R]
120. You’ve got to keep interpreting the ffrture, even if you’ve gone with one 
decision or one model, say, if everything’s changing, how do I keep it up to date, 
and I thinlc that’s probably where we need to kind of keep relooking at, how do 
we continually evolve this, keep looking at it, and understanding the context to 
agree with it, so the models will be right, but we’ve got to keep kind of refining 
it, to tailor it to the context. [Participant R]
121. Do our communities feel confident in what we do, do they feel engaged with 
what we do, and there’s still the time to do, but the actual decision, in terms of 
should we do it, or should we not do it, yes, did we put people on the groimd, yes. 
Has it made a difference in the short term, yes, is it finished yet, and is it still 
where we want to be, well no, and there’s still some work to do on that. 
[Participant R]
122. Has neighbourhood policing made a big improvement, yes it is a big 
contributing factor. Are the expectations different now, well yes, they are, so 
you’ve got to keep refining it. [Participant R]
123. We’ve now got a problem solving co-ordinator who’s looking at the process, 
and the nuts and bolts, we’re meeting with a company to look at social 
marketing, so our messages are different, the way they go across, we’ve now got 
somebody who’s auditing all of the way that we do tire pledge, so that we get a 
reality check on what the public see on the ground, we’re really looking at how 
we tackle anti-social behaviour", because that’s one of the real kind of quality of 
life issues, so our whole effort at the moment is around that, we’re doing problem 
solving training from our offices, we’re developing them in terms of the powers 
that they can use to support the public, we’re putting resources into the areas that 
have got the biggest risks, and we’ve got a whole communication plan at the
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moment that’s stalling to say this is who we are, and this is what we can do for 
you. [Paiticipant R]
124. Probably the application of it needs to keep evolving, but the basics are 
probably still relevant. [Participant R]
125. I mean things have changed, when neighbouihood policing came in, not 
everything came in at the same time, so for instance your website, with all your 
contact details and youi’ websites and publishing all of your priorities, that wasn’t 
there straightaway, but that’s something that’s evolved as we’ve moved forward, 
but now there’s a lot more emphasis on actually making sure that it’s right, it’s 
kept up to date, and that it reflects everything that’s needed from the pledge, so 
there’s, we’re going through a quite an intense period at the moment of revisiting 
stuff to make sure that everything is as it should be. [Participant W]
126. But we’re kind of working thiough it, and it’s all being revisited as we go 
through the kind of preparations for the next sort of county inspection, and I think 
officers aie now staiting to get more focus on what’s actually expected from 
them. [Participant W]
127. It’s very sophisticated now, and we’re using more technology, and it’s 
evolved in and places have used Facebook and everything else, well it wasn’t 
there in 2005. [Participant R]
128. There was some mapping going on and certainly we had to increase 
supervision levels, because during this whole process we were then given 
PCSOs, and when we looked at the span of control between a Sergeant and what 
was a small beat team, you’ve then got a Sergeant and 10 PCs and 10 PCSOs, 
which is imachievable. So there was definitely structiual changes, and people 
changes we had to make, and we look at what we’d invested in the communities 
pre-2005, and what we’ve invested now, it’s a different situation. [Participant R]
POST-DECISION PROCESSES
1. REFLECTING
129. What this did to us I think was to make us stop looking at our navel and look 
out to the world. [Paiticipant V]
130. This has been a move away from focusing on crime to quality of life matters. 
So it’s similar' to the policing pledge that we are dealing with at the moment. 
[Participant T]
131. Became more outward facing. I think we became more focussed on those 
priorities. [Participant R]
132. I think we’ve changed the way [POC] police in some fundamental 
understanding of it. We’ve tinned it from internal to external, and listening to
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different audiences, because Mike’s audience is different, you see, to mine, it 
appeal’s different, we’ve broadly set this organisation to look outwards, rather 
than continue to look inwaids. [Paiticipant V]
133. The fact that we meet every six weeks to determine tluee priorities which is 
what we started with that is maintaining engagement, and ai’ound problem 
solving, it’s still at the centre, so we weren’t fai* off on the intuitive bit. 
[Paiticipant R]
134. My observation is that as we’ve started getting more into a performance 
culture that some people feel a little bit challenged by where you’ve got the 
pledge, and the pledge reinforces all the good things aiound neighbourhood 
policing, all the things that should be there, but when you actually start looking at 
it on a micro detail, on a beat level, you find that there’s lots of areas where 
we’ve not done everything in as much detail as perhaps we ought to have done. 
[Paiticipant W]
135. 1 think if you look at our satisfaction figures, they’re continually increasing, 
but that’s overall effort, when we come into contact, if you look at some of the 
feedback that we get, there are pockets of good practice, if you look overall, in 
terms of confidence, then it’s not a success in this area, if you look in terms of 
nationally, yes there is a steady increase, but it’s probably not delivered across 
the board yet what it intended to do. [Participant R]
136. 1 think we’ve now seen when lots of different things come together, and 
neighbourhood policing is just one part of it, when good investigation, good 
communications, good pai'tnerships are working, confidence increases, so if it 
was designed around confidence there’s still a way to go. [Participant R]
137. 1 think then it’s another process, and we’ve brought a lot of complexity in, 
but really simply, do you know your area, do you engage effectively, do you 
identify key issues, do you tackle it, and do you tell them that you’ve done it, but 
we’ve never really got that fully embedded, so 1 think the behaviour change 
didn’t happen, and probably we’ve got some people who don’t feel comfortable 
in this move, and the second bit of the processes and our constant leadership, 1 
mean consistency in leadership to make it happen, they’re the bits that I thinlc aie 
missing. [Participant R]
138. 1 think it’s also had a huge impact on our staffing, because if you look at the 
organisation people migrate to certain roles for certain reasons, and people that 
have migrated into the beat manager role, didn’t necessarily envisage 
neighbourhood policing being round the comer, and some of the expectations 
that that would place on them was, as beat managers, and 1 think we’re still 
recovering from that to an extent. [Participant W]
139. 1 think it was initially a good imderstanding of the requirement, applying it to 
constructs, and having some freedom and buy-in at the start. I think if we’re 
being constrained, maybe it would be more difficult. [Participant R]
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2. LEARNING
140. I think we probably would have had a wholesale selection process for it, 
rather than trying to build on people who were already there, so again it would 
have been a selection, de-selection process, saying have you got the skills sets to 
deliver what’s important. [Participant R]
141. I think if we were going to go back in time, I think the gut was baiely 
internal, and we did it initially very much within policing, I think if we were 
going to go back and look at it again, it’s all about context at the time, means 
we’d probably try to bring wider agencies on earlier than we did, so it became 
very much a neighbouihood provision completely, rather than by communities. 
So with hindsight, and that wasn’t generally in the wider context at that time, 
making a partnership, maybe that’s the bit that if we went back and rationally re­
looked at it, with hindsight, then that would have been the difference. [Participant
R]
142. On the Force level, I think if I’d had more time, we could have spent more 
time being consultative, and getting partners with us, but equally partners weren’t 
ready at that time. [Paiticipant R]
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Appendix 7
Categorisation of ‘Intuitive Misses’ Thought Units 
Intuitive Miss Case 1 p. 414
Intuitive Miss Case 2 p. 430
Intuitive Miss Case 3 p. 442
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Intuitive Miss Case 1
1. INITIATING PROCESS
1.1 EXTERNAL DRIVERS
1. Most of the infomiation comes through various routes. The majority of this sort 
of information will come from a member of the public phoning up. [Participant 
F]
2. We were getting information that comes in through various sources, so, for 
example, if an officer stops somebody on the street, and they tell them the 
information, they’ll submit a form which will then put that information onto our* 
systems, likewise if somebody were to ring Crime Stoppers, or ring into the 
police anonymously and pass that information. [Participant J]
3. So there was a nmnber of reports from different sources, that the people who 
were using this address were selling heroin and crack fiorn the address. This 
intelligence was coming in from January. [Participant J]
4. January until about April time the intelligence was coming through about the 
person who lived at the address, not specifically about the address, and it was a 
lady who was living at the address who was letting all these people come in and 
sell drugs from there. So the intelligence was coming in that she was actively 
having people roimd to her house, and that drugs were being sold from the 
premises. [Participant J]
5. There were various bits saying this person is linked to the address, this person is 
linked to the address, these people were stopped a couple of weeks ago, and gave 
their home address as this address, and one of the pieces of information was that, 
to prevent police gaining access to the address, the occupant had barricaded the 
fiont door with a washing machine. [Participant J]
6. Up until the end of April, there was intelligence that this address is, well not this 
address, that the people that we believed were linked to this address were actively 
selling drugs, and it was only a matter of maybe two weeks prior to our wanant 
being executed that somebody had given it as their home address when they were 
stopped by the police. [Participant J]
7. So the infoimation that we were going on was, some of it was from January, and 
some of it was fr om the end of April, but it was continuous, do you know what I 
mean, there had never been a natural break in the intelligence, it had been 
consistently coming in that the people linked to that address, the people who 
were our* subjects that day, were dealing drugs. [Par*ticipant J]
8. So yeah there was lots of different types of intelligence that were coming 
tlirough, and we type in the address that we were going to go to, and all this
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intelligence pings up, and there was a lot of it, and it was ranging from January 
until a matter of weeks before the warrant was executed. [Paiticipant J]
9. More than one report came in from more than one soui'ce and the providence of 
the intelligence was good, a lot of the intelligence that was coming in was fr om 
sources that have been previously sort of tried and tested as it were, by the police. 
[Paiticipant K]
10. None of the intelligence reports actually said that the address was the address that 
we cairied out the wanant at, but the assmnptions were made, because that had 
previously been her address, that was her last known address on all of our 
intelligence systems, and also that it was, people had their cars registered, 
contacts of hers, linked to her, associates of hers had their cai's registered to that 
address. Just a couple of weeks prior to the warrant being executed, somebody 
who was linlced to her was stopped by the police and gave that as his home 
address. So the infoimation was coming in that the people who we thought were 
linked to that address were selling drugs in the, sort of in and around the town 
centre. [Participant J]
1.2 INTERNAL DRIVERS
11. Wliat we do is we get the information and that week we were doing a week of 
action, so we were cairying out loads of search wairants, and we had some 
proactive operations in and aiound the town centre and stuff. We asked for a 
number of addresses that we should target, tluough our intelligence unit here at 
the police station, and that address was one of the ones that we were given to 
tai’get. [Participant J]
12. As far as we knew, as an organisation, because there’s eiTors as to how the 
intelligence has been submitted sometimes, as far as we knew the address that we 
were going to was going to be housing the people we were looking for. 
[Participant J]
2. INTUITING PROCESS
2.1 ANALYSING
13. We get intelligence about someone dealing drugs at a certain address, we will 
then look into that, with a view to corroborating that evidence because there’s 
always the feai*, that I decide I don’t like you, and I phone up the police and say, 
you’re dealing drugs, so we will always look to coiToborate the evidence, so that 
means otherwise we’re looking to get the same evidence from different sources, 
or indeed we will use oui’ own intelligence systems, go and gather our own 
intelligence to say, yes, that person is dealing drugs. So we end up with a 
situation at this address, we laiow there’s someone dealing drugs there. 
[Participant F]
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14. Any information coming in we start grading that information, even if we have A1 
fantastic infoimation that we’re really sure was true, we would still look to 
coiToborate that evidence. We will still look for evidence or information from 
another source, another route. [Participant F]
15. You’re in this world trying to get at least two systems of making sure that we’ve 
got the right address, the right people, saying in this house people are dealing 
drugs. [Participant F]
16. And with warrants as well, in most cases, you have to have more than one piece 
of intelligence. So in January, yes, there was some intelligence that said, there’s 
potentially drug dealing from this address. In most cases that isn’t enough for us 
to go to a Magistrate and say, “somebody, somewhere has said there’s drug 
dealing, I want to go and smash that person’s front door in, and look for drugs”. 
No, they wouldn’t give it to you, so you have to coiToborate the intelligence. 
[Participant K]
17. Intelligence comes from various sources as well, it could be a scorned girlfr iend 
has phoned up and said that he’s drug dealing from the house, you won’t action 
that intelligence, through fear that it could be false, it needs to be corroborated, 
which is why it took from January to when the warrant was executed to 
coiToborate the intelligence. [Participant K]
18. Well it was checked, we weren’t anal with it, maybe we should have been. 
[Participant K]
19. If we were that anal with every single job that we did, we would never do 
anything, we’d never achieve anything, you wouldn’t, you haven’t got time to do 
it. [Participant K]
20. No, there were less [checks] caiTied out on this than there would have been. 
Yeah, normally, at the very least you check who’s paying the Coimcil Tax, and 
whether anyone from that address is claiming benefits. [Participant J]
21. It would have just taken a couple of phone calls probably to check with, if they 
were claiming any benefits, if they’re on for sort of housing allowance, we could 
have done checks as to who’s paying the Council Tax at the property, and things 
like that, but in this case, because we were given a batch of addresses to do in a 
Week of Action, those things weren’t done. [Participant J]
22. So sometimes you haven’t got time to make the checks, sometimes there’s too 
many checks, sometimes you assimie other people have made the checks, and it 
just went unchecked sort of thing. [Participant J]
23.1 think the issue here is one of proportionality, if you did all the checks you could 
possibly do, we’d never do any warrants, because we’d be doing checks all the 
time. [Participant A]
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24. There is tliis thing about proportionality here, whereby actually if you build in 
too much in terms of risk prevention, or whatever, you actually don’t do 
anything, do you, because you become to some degree paralysed. [Participant A]
25. Do you know, if you build that check-list, where do you stop, it’s really difficult, 
isn’t it, because it could be just such a hugely bureaucratic process that, as I say, 
you spend all your time managing a process as opposed to taking action. 
[Participant A]
26. We had source information in relation to the address that we did, which is why, 
another reason why we did the warrant, and didn’t just cany on corroborating. 
[Participant K]
2.2 SCANNING
27.1 went with my colleague prior to the wanant, had a look at the fr ont, I wanted to 
see is there a washing machine there, I couldn’t see through, it was a completely 
solid UP VC door, I can’t see through, I had a look at the back wall, looked into 
the kitchen, to me it looked a state, there was a pram there, I was aware that the 
subject of the wanant had a young child, the kitchen looked a mess to me, I 
thought I’m happy with this. [Participant K]
28. We were looking for, on this, is there any activity at the address, are they there, 
what’s the best time to hit that door, what, when are we going to execute the 
wan ant, the warrant is valid for a month. [Participant K]
29. People had gone, we’d been sending people up, we didn’t just go that morning 
and do it. There was, a couple of days before someone had gone and had a walk 
past in plain clothes, a week or so before someone had gone and had a walk past 
in plain clothes, curtains were always closed, garden was a mess. [Participant J]
30. It’s just I’m going, in my head. I’ve got this address, this is the address that I’m 
going to hit on a drugs wari’ant, so I’m just looking to conoborate what I’ve been 
told is, I’m to expect inside, and from what I looked at it, in my mind it 
corroborated it. [Participant K]
31. Yeah, you lorow, it’s not a nice address with the curtains drawn and flowers on 
the window sill, and, yeah, it looks like a drugs address, I’ll be happy with that. 
[Participant K]
32. That’s part of what we were doing with this, is it right to hit it this morning, if it’s 
not, then we’ll go elsewhere, if the curtains were open, and we couldn’t see 
anyone, there was no vehicles anywhere, there’s no sign of life anywhere, maybe 
we wouldn’t have done it. But from what we could see, the curtains were drawn, 
[Participant K]
33.1 live with my partner and little baby, are the curtains always drawn, no they’re 
not, during the day they’re open and all the sun’s coming through. Is it normal to 
have your curtains closed 24/7,1 don’t think so, is it normal for a drug dealer to
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have your curtains closed 24/7, yes. If you live in a home, as I said my partner’s 
very clean, and the kitchen is mint all the time, this, the one that we looked at 
wasn’t, it looked a mess, and there’s a baby’s pram there, that conoborates, yeah, 
I know that the subject of the wanant has got a baby so, everything looked 
correct from my experience with the drugs side of things. [Participant K]
2.3 GUT FEEL
34. You said already that your gut feeling was that you went past the house, the 
kitchen looks like a mess, the ciu'tains are always closed, gut feeling is that house 
is being used by drug dealers. [Participant J]
35. So your gut feeling was that there was nothing wrong, and we should carry on 
and do it. [Participant J]
36.1 guess the other interesting thing, the intuitive piece for this with me as well is 
about how we reacted to Steve, there was, intuitively we all felt, I think we 
needed to do more with the media, but also in terms of how you respond to the 
individual members of staff concerned, their personal reputations. [Participant A]
37.1 mean you could write it down and rationalise why you’ve come to that 
conclusion, but a lot of it is about gut feeling and intuition in terms of how you 
react. [Participant A]
38.1 think that, on a number of different levels there, we exercised gut feeling in 
terms of how we responded to it, so there was the external management of the 
media and reputation, there was also the internal management of the staff 
concerned. [Participant A]
2.4 PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENT
39. People who make decisions, based upon the information available to them at that 
time, there has to be professional judgement in that, doesn’t it, yeah, now if that 
judgement is made, but you could not possibly have laiown all this, then we can 
live with that. [Participant A]
40. Now again sometimes where your* information is incomplete you do have to rely 
upon your intuition, don’t you, in terms of professional judgement, and I thinlc 
that’s what we were talking about before, whereby my own personal experience 
is that when I’ve gone against my gut instincts I’ve invariably been wrong, or 
could have done a better job. [Participant A]
2.5 EXPERIENCE
41. We do a lot of these, we’ve done a lot since, we’ve got a lot of success. 
[Participant K]
42. People live how they live, don’t they, but we go into enough addresses that are 
used by drug addicts, and more often than not drug addicts will keep their
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curtains closed, and more often than not, drug addicts maybe don’t do their 
washing up, and they’ve got rubbish strewn all over the kitchen, and from what 
these guys saw when they did the little recce’s on the address, that’s what it 
looked like, [Participant J]
43. We do a lot of these warrants, it’s bread and butter for us, isn’t it, and it’s not an 
issue potentially, we weren’t as cautious and as worried about it, because it’s our 
bread and butter, isn’t it, might do a drugs wanant, so you can, if required, you 
could brief a drugs wanant in the car on the way to, right we’re going to go to 
tliis address. I’ll do the door, you go in first, we’re looking for him, you know 
you can do things on the go. [Participant K]
2.6 SPEED
44. It’s a gut feeling, the second, the second we got into the house, my gut feeling 
was that, I saw the bloke that was there, my gut feeling the second we got into the 
house is “oh my God, it’s either the wiong address or the people aren’t here 
anymore”, the second we got in. [Participant J]
45. When I got inside, it’s pretty instant, wrong address. [Participant K]
46.1 knew the subjects that we were looking for at the wanant. The girl who was the 
main subject of the warrant, I know her personally, I’ve dealt with her a number 
of times, and I knew straight away that they were the wrong people. [Participant
J]
47. Within minutes of us going in there in the first place, I’ve said, “wrong people, 
get out of the house”. [Paiticipant J]
3. INTERPRETING PROCESS
3.1 DIALOGUE
48.1 sort of I had to speak to a few people, but it was on like an informal basis, it 
was a meeting that I would have been at anyway, I spoke to one of the 
Superintendents about what we’d done, how, what had happened, and wrote, and 
then since then I’ve been liaising with Superintendents, writing reports and what 
we’d done and stuff. [Participant J]
49. The only involvement that I had that day was that I spoke to the Duty Inspector 
that day, about what was going to go into the newspaper, what input we were 
going to give into the bungling cops story, so that we had some sort of apology in 
there, and so that he was briefed, so that he knew what to say when the press 
rang. [Participant J]
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3.2 RATIONALISING
50. But if you’re out, you’ve got to be out there, and if you put 20 doors in on drugs 
waiTants, and you get all the acting to do, if you get one wrong, you get one 
wrong, if we stayed in the office, and hid behind our desks our whole careers we 
wouldn’t make any mistakes, because you don’t put yourself in a position to, if 
you don’t go out on the streets you’re not going to get assaulted are you, so I’m 
happy with what we did, and I’d do it again, and we have done it again, no 
mistakes. [Participant K]
51. ...you can’t go in and say, just because there’s a young couple and a baby, you 
can’t say, well there’s no way that this can be linked to drugs, because 
unfoi'tunately so many people out there will, with babies, will sell drugs. 
[Participant J]
52. Until we know exactly that it’s definitely the wr'ong address, we have to treat 
everything as if it was the right address, so that’s what we did. [Participant J]
53.1 didn’t feel guilty at any point, because everything that we’d done was right, and 
I’ll stand by tlrat, to my grave, everything we did was right. [Participant K]
54. The intelligence was right, we were right to put in both the doors, we were right 
to handcuff those people, and we did, I think we did everything by the book. 
[Participant K]
55.1 wouldn’t say it went wrong, the wanant, the execution of the warrant was 
perfect, the entry into the address was quick, the address was secured quickly, 
two persons in the address who we did not know at that point were detained and 
handcuffed, as per you would on a drugs wanant, the wanant went well, it was 
unsuccessful in that no drugs were found, and that the occupants that we were 
after, and the subjects of that warrant weren’t there. The warrant was executed 
spot on, as it should be, text book, and I was very happy with how the wanant 
was executed, it was just an unsuccessful war rant. [Par ticipant K]
56. But that has to be calculated by the fact that they’ve acted in a way that is 
reasonable, proportionate and responsible and within the law, so it’s not quite 
carte blanche, because if, you know, as long as you can demonstrate your 
thinking and your rationale, that’s fine, but if you’ve actually gone two and two 
and come back five, hmm, that’s not good, is it, that needs to be debriefed, 
understood, and responded to. [Participant A]
57.1 don’t thinlc that Steve gambled with our reputation, he did what he thought was 
the right thing, okay, in an ideal world he should have made some more checks, 
before he left the police station to execute the wanant, and that’s the learning for 
him, but he didn’t gamble with our* reputation, and as I say he’s done many, 
many warrants and produced some excellent results. [Participant A]
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58. Ultimately, going back to Steve’s position, at the time, of deciding to do that 
wanant, his belief was he was doing the right thing, at the time he went tlnongh 
that door, his belief was he was doing the right thing. [Participant F]
59. They don’t know the truth, do they, we can’t say to them, actually people who 
are paid to give the police information are telling us that, as far as they were 
aware, it was still the right address. [Participant J]
60. Steve is that active he will have done loads of these, loads and loads of them, on 
this occasion he got it wrong, so from my side of it is should I take Steve out in 
the back yard and shoot him for his mistake, no. Yes, he’s made a mistake, yes he 
will have leanit from it, and I know him well enough as an individual that he 
definitely will have learnt from it, because he was that upset by getting it wr ong. 
[Participant F]
61. If Steve had been a sloppy individual who was renowned for continually making 
mistakes, then actually the response could have been different in terms of the 
outcome, it could have been, you know, this is it, you’ve gone a step too far now, 
there will be some form of sanction, whether that be a written warning or 
whatever. [Participant A]
62. If Steve had come up and said, look. I’m just too busy, I didn’t have the time to 
do this, or had been disingenuous in explaining what happened, then I think my 
reaction to him would have been different, around well actually you need to 
make the time because this is important. But he tlnew himself on his sword 
straight away, recognised the eri'or he had made, and the seriousness of the error 
he had made. [Participant A]
63. Clearly it never occurred to him that the guy might have moved out, now you 
have to try and decipher for your own mind whether that was a reasonable 
assumption or not, or was that a reckless omission on his part. I guess we’ll never 
know the answer to that question. [Participant A]
64. But when people are working with the best of intentions with a hearf felt 
motivation in terms of the right thing to do and they make a mistake then I think 
it’s the responsibility of the management to exercise discretion. And take the 
lessons learned from that and move on, rather than, if people have been reckless 
or gambled with our reputation I think that’s a different scenario and probably a 
different outcome for the officer. [Participant A]
65. Knowing the individuals, their pimishment of themselves for getting it wrong 
will be probably far* more than anything I could do to them, and was it right for 
us to have taken them through a discipline, or taken any form of sanction against 
them, when in actual fact, in the cold light of day what they’re trying to do is do 
their job to the best of their ability, and the pair of them normally do get it right. 
[Participant F]
66. But that’s an intuitive response, isn’t it, because strictly speaking there is a 
neglect of duty which could have resulted in more formal sanctions in terms of
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misconduct, but you make a value judgement, don’t you, in terms of the 
individuals concerned, their personal reputations, their productivity, and how 
they do business, and recognising that they ai e 99.9% of the time highly effective 
people, you make that intuitive assessment. [Paiticipant A]
67. If we’d been disproportionate in om* response, in terms of how we managed 
Steve, why would people want to choose to take the path that he has in terms of 
his proactivity, they become risk averse, don’t they, in that climate of feai*. 
[Participant A]
68. So if we start being seen to act against someone who’s made decisions for the 
right reasons, with the right intentions, although it was wr ong, we would really 
start getting ourselves in trouble, in the fact that our police officers have to make 
decisions, today, everyday. [Participant F]
69. If we had been disproportionate in our response, then the risk is people will 
become risk averse, and be not prepared to go that extra mile, so Steve responded 
to the intelligence, got the wanant, and on this occasion went wrong, but on 
many, many other occasions it’s gone very, very well, and he’s got excellent 
results, yeah, now for someone who’s maybe sort of ambivalent, or sat on the 
fence, could say, CMst he took a risk there, he got it wrong, look what happened 
to him, why would I want to put myself in that situation. [Participant A]
70. If we were to be more draconian or authoritarian in our response, actually would 
you be prepared to take a risk or to put yourself out on a limb if you thought that 
if it went wrong for no fault of yom* own you’ll be in trouble. If you made the 
same mistakes time and time again then that obviously would be a different 
matter. [Participant A]
71. Because he is a high-performing individual, if you are recognised as being 
someone who is hard working, who works hard and tries hard and seeks to 
deliver, we all make mistakes, don’t we, and therefore m terms of valuing each 
other we won’t persecute people in a way that is not helpful, not constructive, or 
whatever. [Participant A]
4. INTEGRATING PROCESS
4.1 INVOLVEMENT
72.1 was involved in the aftermath of it, and the fact that I knew nothing about it 
imtil it had happened, I knew when it had gone wrong, and to be honest my 
biggest involvement was sorting out the compensation for their door, which then 
became quite an issue. [Participant F]
73. A lot of the part of the begiiming of it, we weren’t aware of, a lot of the 
intelligence coming in, the information that they got, the decision to actually 
expand that information, and the decision to execute that warrant, at that stage I 
was totally unaware of all this going on, as I’m sure the boss was, he didn’t
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know, it’s only when it had gone wrong for this one warrant out of however 
many that were going on that week came to light at whoops! [Participant F]
4.2 CONSENSUS
74.1 had a conversation about this with John, the Superintendent, and that was the 
conclusion we came to independently but agreed. [Participant A]
75. Jolin actually took a grip with this situation he briefed me what he was doing, 
then I agreed with his course of action. So there was that conversation, not 
written down but that was that conversation about how we would resolve it. 
[Participant A]
4.3 ACCOUNTABILITY
76. The Superintendent became involved, and he and I spoke and our approach was 
we’ve just got to say sorry, and accept we got it wrong, do what we can for the 
family, and move on. [Participant A]
77. We’ve got it wrong, we’re sorry, we get it more times right than we get it wrong, 
and offered the apology, being ernpathetic towards the people as well as offer 
reassurance to the broader community. [Participant A]
78. This isn’t me passing blame, because it’s still the organisation’s fault, it doesn’t 
matter whether it’s Steve’s fault, whether it’s my fault, whether it’s the 
intelligence unit’s fault, it’s still the organisation’s fault. [Participant J]
79. But we can’t, we can’t, in the press all we can do is say we apologise, we made a 
mistake, we can’t say, actually, and reveal our tactics of how we do things, we 
have to just hold our hands up and say we made a mistake, which essentially we 
did, even though we did the right thing. [Participant J]
80. At the end of the day we got it wrong, put our* hands up and accept we got it 
wrong. [Participant F]
81. It’s a genuine honest unfortunate error, it is a bad word, but that’s what it was. 
[Participant K]
82. Intuitively the right thing to do was just say, we’re really, really sorry, we got it 
wrong, we’ll do what we can to put it right. [Participant A]
83. Sadly on a very few occasions we do get it wrong. Sometimes that’s human error, 
sometimes that’s just sloppiness and not checking the information. [Participant 
A]
84.1 think that, in this particular case, it was just as much a systemic failure as it was 
an individual failure. [Participant A]
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85. So ideally before going ont to execute the waiTant they would have done last 
minute checks just to check who was living in the house, and that didn’t happen. 
So to my mind I would categorise that just as much as about a systems failure, as 
it was the failiue of any individual. [Par ticipant A]
86. Okay we get it wrong, and to be able to sit there, internally and externally and 
say I’m soiTy I got that wrong, this is what I was thinking about at the time. This 
particular instance, there’s very little we can say, okay, yes we weren’t under any 
time pressure, yes there was something historically here that probably justified 
the warTant, and any action the police officers took, why didn’t we make those 
checks immediately before, etcetera, before we actually did the wanant, 
imfortunately we didn’t. [Participant F]
87. The bottom line is we made a mistake, and we needed to do something to put that 
mistake back, and therefore I was disappointed that when I read that article we 
hadn’t put more into it in terms of acknowledging the mistake. [Participant A]
88. We were engaged locally with it, with John and myself, but the point is if it 
doesn’t feel like it’s being done spontaneously, sometimes it doesn’t carry the 
same weight, so we were coming along 24 hours after the event, ideally when 
that article was published, it should have been Superintendent John, or Cliief 
Superintendent David, or Chief Inspector Robert said, we got it wrong, we’re 
really, really sorry, [Participant A]
4.4 EMPOWERING
89. We encourage our officers to be proactive, and if they get good intelligence 
which they believe to be acciuate, then to action that intelligence, and if that 
means go and get a drugs warrant and go out and execute the wanant, do it. 
[Participant A]
90. We empower and entrust our* people to do that, yeah, which I think is the right 
thing to do, and when you’ve got a highly motivated individual, such as Steve, 
who’s got a good track record, you want, you encourage your people to be 
successful, so there is this delegation and it really is empowerment, trusting om* 
people to go and do a good job. [Participant A]
91. Part of my response was, okay we’ll learn from this, but come on Steve, you’re a 
good guy, you’ve made a mistake, you learn from it, move on. [Participant A]
92. They knew they’d done wrong, but it was just as much about building them up 
and encouraging them to respond to it, so they take the learning but move on, 
rather than just dwell on the mistake. [Participant A]
93. Eri'ors such as that are important in that we need to learn from them, and Steve 
gave me every reason to believe that it had been a hard won lesson for him, in 
terms of where he was with that emotionally, and I think it was that that made me 
realise, okay we acknowledged the error, but now you’ve got to pick yourself up
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and carry on, and cany on doing the good things, because you are valued and 
you’re a good member of staff. [Participant A]
94. If you look at our values, one is about respect, another’s about trust, and we talk 
about, in oui* values we give examples of what that, because I think it’s easy, you 
may take respect to mean one thing I may take it to mean another, trust. So we 
went a step further when we built our values where we also gave examples of 
what we believe those values stand for, so trust, having faith in each other, and 
the behaviours, empowering individuals to deliver, so we trusted Steve to do that. 
Giving people space to grow and take risks, well we gave them that space, and on 
this occasion he got it wrong, but that didn’t necessarily mean that he lost our 
trust, the message was learn from it and move on. [Participant A]
95.1 mean we want our staff to be imiovative, to have flar e, to be proactive and to 
work in support of their cormnunities and protect, people from harm. And fr om 
time to time sadly we will make mistakes. It’s important that if people do make 
mistakes and they honestly made mistakes that we learn from them and we move 
on. [Participant A]
96. So I think that we can’t, if we had a climate of fear and a risk averse culture, I 
think that would be a bad place to be, and we have to encourage and support om* 
people in making challenging and difficult decisions. [Participant A]
4.5 REPUTATION
97. Actually this particular* team are a high performing team, who have been very 
successful, one officer in particular, Steve, very motivated, really, really good 
cop, and he goes out and on this occasion got it wrong. [Participant A]
98. As far as I’m aware it was the first time for* Steve that he’d got it wrong, and as I 
say that was more about a systemic failure than Steve being a bad cop. 
[Participant A]
99.1 mean Steve is, and both of them actually are very good officers. [Par*ticipant F]
100. So for me it is very much coming back to the values, because I mean I think, 
in terms of our culture, who are our heroes, who do we tell the stories of, so 
Steve would very much be in that category of being one of our heroes, because 
he is proactive, he is effective, he is capable, and he gets results, and so by 
putting him forward as being one of our heroes, you would encourage other 
people to emulate his successes. [Participant A]
101. I thinlc we all have personal reputations, don’t we? And I think that either 
consciously or subconsciously that will play a factor in terms of how you 
respond. So if you’ve got an officer who is known to be hard working, who is 
known to be industrious, who is known to be very proactive and committed then I 
think that your natural bias will be to be in support of that individual. Perversely 
if you’ve got an officer who is not known for their productivity, not known for 
their competence I thinlc that would intuitively provoke a different emotional
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response in terms of how you manage with that incident. So like it or not we all 
have personal reputations which go with us. Whether that’s fair who knows. But 
that’s the fact of life. [Participant A]
102. Quite rightly so, a young couple with a baby, cops burst in, they’re 
handcuffed, and tlien the realisation we’ve got it wrong, so it is hugely damaging, 
it’s huge, it is impactive, and it’s not a good place to be, and somehow we need 
to recover that in teiins of regaining people’s trust and confidence, and of course 
they will tell their family, they told their story in the newspaper, everyone who 
bought The Advertiser knew about it, and it was on the local radio as well, so 
things like that can dent public confidence. [Paiticipant A]
103. I think there’s always, with this sort of incident you always have an issue that 
we can upset the confidence of the public, and whenever we have bad press of 
any sort there’s always, it will always impact upon the confidence of the public. 
[Participant F]
104. Well it is nerves, because obviously it’s damaging to your reputation. We 
were front page of the paper the next day, not the fact that we had a drug dealer 
in within an horn* after that. [Paiticipant K]
105. I think, just on one day in the town centre we stop-checked like 80 people 
who are known to the police, we did some really, really good PR, positive 
neighbourhood policing team work, that week, and the only thing that anybody in 
the community found out about is the warrant that went wrong, that hit the front 
page of the newspaper, it had massive implications, confidence in the police, 
everyone’s thinking what a bunch of idiots, the police have gone thiough the 
wrong door. [Participant J]
106. Yeah it was negative because if you read the front page of the press, that said, 
police went thiough the wrong door, that’s what you believe, the police didn’t go 
through the wrong door. [Participant K]
POST-DECISION PROCESSES
1. REFLECTING
107. Therefore thanlcfrilly this is one of those once in a blue moon events, as 
opposed to something, if it happened all the time I would be really, really 
anxious, and we would be putting in place more stringent checks and balances 
before people went out executing warrants. [Participant A]
108. I think that we could, and should have done more at the point of impact in 
terms of recovering the situation. [Participant A]
109. Will we make mistakes about warrants in the future, yes we will, in an ideal 
world of course we wouldn’t, of course we’d get it right, but unfortunately this 
sort of thing will happen again, I have no doubt. [Par ticipant F]
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110. If someone says black is black, maybe we should question that, and we 
should have questioned that this, thiee people are operating from this address, she 
lives at this address, well does she, we haven’t questioned what the intelligence 
unit have said to us, we haven’t questioned what our system has said, maybe we 
should have. [Participant K]
111. The checks and balances, in an ideal world, should have been done, before it 
went to the waiTant, and it didn’t happen... Steve would have done more checks 
and realised that the person he was looking for had moved out of the property, 
and therefore we wouldn’t have executed the warrant. [Participant A]
112. We’ve said, just tell us a handfiil of addr esses, and we’ll carry out warrants at 
all of them, maybe rightly or wr ongly we assumed that the intelligence unit, prior 
to giving us a pack of information, saying right this is for this address, this is for 
this address, had carried out those checks, so we didn’t carry them out ourselves, 
maybe it was because of the amount of them that we had that it would have been 
too time consiuning to carry out all of the checks. [Participant J]
113. The thing that I find difficult to justify is we had plenty of time to look at it 
and get it right. [Participant F]
114. The information as far* as we know was accurate and correct, but we executed 
the warrant too late, during that period of time these people moved away. 
[Participant F]
115. In actual fact, if we had done that days earlier it would have been the right 
warrant in the right place at the right time, because we had that delay it was 
totally wr ong. [Participant F]
116. So I tliink the learning and the values pieces around people who work hard 
and try hard are valued, trusted and respected, and if you make a mistake, that’s 
very regrettable but we need to learn fiorn it and move on. [Participant A]
117. At the right address, where everything was right, it was still a mistake, 
because there were a few checks that went imdone, and potentially we could have 
avoided going tlirough that door on the morning that we did. [Participant J]
118. In that time, basically the people who were dealing drugs had moved out of 
the address, obviously we didn’t know they’d moved out, which is where the last 
minute checks would have been great, and then the new family moved in, and 
obviously then we executed the warrant with the new family having moved in, 
you know, yes, I can see how it happened, I can see how we could have avoided 
it. [Participant F]
119. So I think it was right and proper that we supported them with the caveat that 
we talce the lessons learned and we move on. [Participant A]
120. Although I’ll stand by what we did, I think we did enough, and it was 
imfortunate. [Participant K]
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121. Because there were so many of them, and this is why I think the error came. 
[Participant J]
2. LEARNING
122. So we, within the organisation, I think there is an element of yes, we have to 
leain as individuals within the organisation, and make sure that we put the 
systems in place to try and prevent it happening again. [Par ticipant F]
123. No I wouldn’t say we’ve soi*t of reformulated the way we do our business, no 
we haven’t. Is virtually everyone within the BCU awar e of this incident, yes they 
are. Is there an element of making sure that before a warrant is signed off, it 
should go tlnough an inspector who verifies the information is there. So there are 
instructions issued arormd making sure that we got the information was up-to- 
date and relevant, and so before you sign this, you can go and apply for this 
warTant, is this information current, and relevant. [Participant F]
124. So it becomes a common sense point, which if  you’re going to execute a 
warTant, you need to actually make sine that it’s cuiTent. [Participant F]
125. So there’s an element, two sides of that I would say, there’s the learning 
which is a bit of an instruction ar ormd, before we sign war rants inspectors make 
sm*e you’ve got the information right, it’s crurent, it’s up-to-date, and we did that 
sort of instruction level, but then there’s a, I suppose a level of imderstanding 
within the organisation that wasn’t hammered home, but I’m confident there is a 
slightly unusual form of learning, if that makes sense. [Participant F]
126. Well we have made it clear* to our staff that if you are going to do warrants 
you need to make absolutely certain you know who lives at that address. Because 
we don’t want to repeat this mistake in the friture. [Par*ticipant A]
127. I would say that the learning for me is that, as a supervisor I won’t, I won’t let
the warrants be done without the checks now. [Participant J]
128. But you laiow, it’s not necessarily down to the individual officers, it’s maybe 
for* me to liaise with the intelligence unit, find out what checks have been done, 
etcetera, and yeah, the learning for me is massive that we check everything 
before we go in, because maybe for me it’s had more impact on me, because I’m 
the one who’s had to write all the reports, and go to all the meetings and stuff like 
that. [Participant J]
129. Potentially if you have time to do every single possible check that you can on 
the address. [Par*ticipant K]
130. Don’t take the press with you! [Par*ticipant K]
131. [the press] can’t be trusted. [Participant K]
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132. Completely back stabbed us in this case, and the people of the press are very, 
very disappointed about that, because we used to take them on a lot of stuff, and 
we used to give them loads of really good stories, and they almost ruined a little 
bit of a relationship with us now, because we’re too nervous to take them with us 
as a result of what happened on that. [Participant J]
133. It’s not the best move, didn’t do that, and we’ll do our checks next time. 
[Participant J]
134. Never again will I invite the press to come along on a warrant with us, if we 
go to a warrant and it’s positive, I will then get out my phone and ring the press, 
and say come and have a look at this, but never again will I invite them to come 
along. [Participant J]
135. Wliat I would say is yes, this is a very well known incident, in around people 
within this division who ar*e executing warrants, not all of them are, as I said, are 
as conscientious or as good as Steve, but all of them will be very well aware of 
the repercussions this had for the organisation, and would seek to avoid what’s 
happened with this. [Participant F]
136. My view with that would be our responsibility of the management is to, okay 
you may be too honest, but what are you doing to make sur*e we don’t make the 
same mistake again. That’s the learning for me, and so I’m sure that that will 
have dawned on Steve now that before he goes out, just make that last check. 
[Participant A]
137. This sort of incident flies aroimd the BCU, everybody knows about this, 
because we’ve got it wrong, it’s embarTassing, people don’t like to be involved in 
it, and everybody learns from it, and this flew roimd the BCU like wildfire. 
[Participant F]
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Intuitive Miss Case 2
1. INITATING PROCESS
1.1 INTERNAL DRIVERS
1. There was a series of these conferences. This particulai* event should have been 
done in conjunction with HR, but unfortunately that liaison did not effectively 
take place. [Participant P]
2. Advance in their enthusiasm rushed ahead and came up with lots of things and 
publicised things before they had talked to us about that, and that was a problem, 
and that partly led to the problem that we got. [Participant P]
3. I think they just got cairied away with themselves, and forgot, I think, to check 
in, because they also forgot to check with us about the budget, they’re supposed 
to apply for the budget before spending money, so there’s another example there, 
where they’d, in their enthusiasm, got carried away. [Participant P]
4. The first I knew of this, sort of live issue, was seeing tluough my own email 
system, or somebody showing me. It had been publicised across the Force, the 
programme for the day, and that was the first I knew of, that this, what the 
programme was. It was issued very late in the day, it was a very poor piece of 
paper really, it wasn’t a proper programme, I think they were in a bit of rush, and 
that was the first I’d heard of it, and it had then gone Force-wide. [Paiticipant P]
5. I mean my PA put it in front of me because she was horrified, she said you need 
to look at this. [Participant P]
6. Well you see, right, my memory is that it was towaids the end of a week that this 
thing came across my desk and I thought, oh no, oh dear, as it were, and put those 
things in motion. [Participant P]
7. In a way we kind of gave them quite a bit of free rein about getting themselves 
going, and a bit of self detennination, although I would say, within that, we were 
already begimiing to feel like some of that freedom, sometimes meant they were 
kind of doing things that perhaps hadn’t been properly thought through, or the 
consequences hadn’t been properly thought through, or sometimes crossing over 
with other people. [Participant P]
2. INTUITING PROCESS
2.1 EXPERIENCE
8. I thinlc sat upon the fact that I know, I know obviously from personal experience, 
and I’m very involved, thioughout my career in the issues of female police
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officers, they aie very much alive... so in that sense yeah, I was basing that on 
experience, and previous experience along the years. [Participant O]
9. It was, kind of had two sorts of intuition there, because for me I felt, fr om my 
own professional backgromid it’s really important that we do this kind of thing, 
it’s really important that female staff understand this kind of thing, yes we might 
be taking a risk arormd it, but we ought to be doing it. [Participant O]
2.2 GUT FEEL
10.1 was honified, I was horrified, and I said oh no, and I hit my forehead like you 
do, and I said that’s awful, that’s an honest... that was my gut reaction, oh no, we 
shot ourselves in the foot, when I saw the bit that said about having your colour 
profiles done, I was quite dismayed at tlie general layout of the thing, but I 
immediately spotted that pai'ticulai* thing, and just the way the whole programme 
was set out, in my view was not appropriate, and I felt embaiTassed about it, if 
I’m honest. [Participant P]
11. ... so I just felt, on those grounds, and my instincts told me that this was going to 
create adverse publicity and give it a bad name. [Paiticipant P]
12. Anyhow she had an anxiety about this one paiticular session on colours, and 
about how it might come across, that we’d be seen as what on eaith are police 
doing working out what coloui* suits them, just get on and do some policing kind 
of thing, in terms of how they come across maybe in the press, or in the public 
eye. [Paiticipant O]
13. She had real anxiety about it, and it transpires she was right, but a couple of 
others shared her anxiety. [Participant O]
14. Yes. Yeah, they just, well they saw it in a different way, they saw how it could be 
perceived, and they were uncomfortable with it. [Participant O]
3. INTERPRETING PROCESS
3.1 DIALOGUE
15. Because that was my reaction, and I was feeding that back, and taking that up, I 
think I asked somebody to take that, that’s right, my Head of Pay Policy and 
Performance, I said to her, look at this, this isn’t right, because it’s her job to co­
ordinate and work with those staff at the group, she absolutely agreed with me, 
she was going to go away and talk to Mary about it. [Participant P]
16.1 spoke to my Head of Pay Policy and Performance, and then shortly after that, 
because the person that I was mentioning that is in my team, that also sits on the 
Advance Board, and she was on leave, and so when she came back fr om leave a 
few days later I sat her down and said, what, how, what involvement had she had 
in this, had she seen it, and that was when I learnt that she’d not been able to go
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to that meeting, and she was as disappointed as I was that that had gone ahead, 
and had she been at the meeting she’d have cautioned them to sort of not put it 
out in that way. [Participant P]
17. So I remember talking to some of my immediate people and then within a few 
days of that it was briefly mentioned at oui* chief officers meeting the first time, 
which is probably, I guess Lorraine would remember that, it’s probably the first 
time it had come across her radar. [Participant P]
18.1 remember we spoke about it on the Monday at chief officers’, and I said to 
them. I’m really concerned that this isn’t the right thing, and I’m taking this up 
with Maiy. [Participant P]
19. Something had come up under the press element that prompted us to talk about it, 
and I remember saying I have some concerns about this, particularly that colour 
thing, I don’t think that’s a helpful thing, and I’ve asked my people to go and talk 
to them about it. [Participant P]
20. This was just mentioned in passing really, I mean it was over in a few minutes, it 
wasn’t an agenda item even, it was just a, it had come up, I think, we get some 
regular reports fiom the communications people, and I think there was something 
in their little reports that prompted us to mention it. [Participant P]
21. Well bearing in mind there was very little discussion at the senior team, and all it 
was left with there was that I was concerned about it, and that I would ask my 
head of PPP to speak to Mary, but at that point it seemed as if the thing was a 
done deal, and it was more about giving feedback for the futme, than having to 
do something. [Participant P]
22.1 think that was probably just less than a fortnight before the event. Yes, that was 
the Monday, I said to Chief, but that was before I realised we were going to hit 
the national press, that I wouldn’t be smprised if we got some adverse publicity 
about it, and then by the middle of that week, the Wednesday, which I think is 
only a week or ten days before the actual event, all that adverse publicity hit us. 
[Participant P]
23. The Chief Constable didn’t really express a view, because he said, what do 
people think, Kai'en and Tom were very cleai* to say, we don’t think this should 
go ahead, this will be seen as the wrong thing to be associated with for [POB], it 
will be seen as just vanity and frippery and nonsense, and what on earth are we 
doing that for, kind of thing. [Pai ticipant O]
24. Well it was my view that it was a good thing to do, that it would be a good thing 
to support. We were discussing it in tenns of whether we should support and 
allow this to happen, it was the week before, so should this go ahead, and it was 
my view that it should. [Paiticipant O]
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3.2 RATIONALISING
25.1 absolutely see why women police officers need to feel that they can be women, 
and not dress like men, not be men, actually be a woman and be successful and 
be in the police. You don’t have to kind of just tuin yourself into a bloke. 
[Participant O]
26. So I said no, this is really important that they should do this, it’s very important 
tliat they should, but it’s not about oh do I look, does my bum look big in this, it’s 
actually do I present well, do I look professional, do I feel competent and 
confident, so I said let it run. [Participant O]
27.1 know that how people present, especially when you’re looking to go into some 
areas of policing like the CID, which is very under-represented by women, the 
culture is very strong around having to conform, and there are lots of great people 
who aie looking to break that. But the reality is that when you’re looking at it 
from the outside in, you see people, largely white people, largely male people, 
looking like a certain way, and actually that’s not the only way to succeed. It was 
about trying to kind of challenge those stereotypes. [Participant O]
28. It’s really around presentation, when you’re not in your uniform, and of course 
that’s very much linked to self confidence, you have a sense of how you feel, and 
of course in a male dominated environment that’s really important. So it was 
about how they project, how they present in the work place. [Participant O]
29. Because I feel really strongly, and felt really strongly about women being women 
in policing, and not tinning into men, and this is one way of helping them feel 
empowered to do that, and I am the only female police officer in the chief officer 
team, there aren’t many very senior police officer women in the country, and so I 
do kind of speak up on these things, and that’s the reason. [Participant O]
30.1 thought it was inappropriate, it didn’t look professional, it didn’t make the 
connections between, it could have potentially made some comiection, but it 
didn’t attempt to make the connections between work and having your* colours 
done, it looked like a jolly, and I tliink that creates a bad reputation, poor 
reputation for those sorts of events where they aie about supporting women at 
work. [Participant P]
31. That was how I felt about it, I know when we got to chief officers at that point 
there was a kind of, well is this so terrible, having people having their colours 
done, and I could probably have lived with it, if it had been explained as par t of 
helping women be more confident to present themselves in formal meetings or 
something. I think I personally would still have thought that was not the right 
thing to do, because I think that’s a personal thing, not a work thing. [Participant
P]
32. But in my mind it was perfectly appropriate to do something around women’s 
health, but to bill that as gynaecology, and it was the way it was presented, and it 
wasn’t presented as professional. It didn’t give the reasons why those things
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would be appropriate and relevant to talk about in the work place, it wasn’t 
connected to the work place enough, it was too much about, it was straying 
across, for me, a personal/professional boundaiy there. [Participant P]
33.1 mean I would have preferred not to have had a coloui* session, but even I could 
have lived with having a colour session that was probably, properly positioned 
and described as, and relevant to work, or in some way I could even have lived 
with that, even though my preference would have been for it not to have been in 
there. [Paiticipant P]
34. No, I thought having a talk on gynaecology might be a bit of an issue, and it, for 
me, I think I would draw the line, I would say that it’s not appropriate as part of a 
professional work conference to have your colours done, you know what I mean 
by that, don’t you? I mean somebody give you some advice on what colour suits 
youi* skin etcetera, that feels to me like that’s a personal thing, not a work thing. 
[Participant P]
35. As a female professional I was embarrassed, as the HR Director, I could see that 
we hadn’t followed proper protocols, tlrat this wasn’t properly positioned as an 
event, and as a diversity self support group, which we have some responsibility 
for supporting, and we were providing the money for. [Pai ticipant P]
36. They were important for me as a woman in the organisation, and I felt 
embaiTassed, and almost to the point where I felt it was difficult to put my name 
to support Advance, if they were going to show us up like that, if I can explain it 
like that. [Participant P]
4. INTEGRATING PROCESS
4.1 CONFLICT
37. ...and then Karen said, this will be seen wiongly, and this will be portrayed 
wi'ongly. I’m not saying I don’t agree with you, this will be portrayed wrongly 
and therefore it will damage us. [Participant 6]
38. It didn’t get a lot of airing, but if my memory serves, I think there was sort of, 
Lorraine and James were sort of looking a bit quizzical as to why I was 
concerned about the issue, bearing in mind at this point it hadn’t created any kind 
of furore. [Participant P]
39. There was a little bit of, I don’t see what the problem with that is, from Lonaine, 
and possibly fiom James as well, I think, but that was to my mind that was kind 
of a bit of difference of view there, and that was where it was left, and at that 
point it didn’t matter so much, because it, we didn’t know it was going to blow 
up so badly. [Paiticipant P]
40.1 think the Chief came in, as he often does, and kind of gave a sort of balanced 
view, but agreed with me that it didn’t look good, hadn’t been done as well as it
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could be, and it didn’t give itself a good press, a good airing, I can’t remember 
what other people said at the meeting, if I’m honest. I remember Lorraine and 
James being sort of probably on the side of saying there’s no haiin in it, I thinlc 
the Chief was probably a bit more with me, but being a bit sort of balanced, and 
not wanting, I think that’s right, he summed up about not wanting to discourage 
Mary and Advance, not to be too hard on them, which was fair enough. 
[Participant P]
4.2 GENERATING OPTIONS
41. In fact Mary said that to me, shall we cancel the whole day, and I said, well really 
wouldn’t want to do that, at this stage, but I think that would have been an over­
reaction to media criticism, and the Wellbeing Day has a valid part to play, that 
we are keen to support and encourage Advance, and the work that it’s doing, so it 
would, to have cancelled their day would have been quite a negative step, I didn’t 
think the situation warmnted that really. [Participant P]
42. We did discuss whether we should cancel the whole event, but felt that was going 
a bit far and we didn’t need to do that, and we’d followed through that media 
strategy, and it did have absolutely the right response, I think. [Participant P]
43. Well we considered pulling the event altogether, we considered removing two of 
those things. In the end we decided only to remove one of those things, so no, I 
think we did think through quite a few, those were the options, we did think 
through those. We did consider cancelling the whole day. [Participant P]
44.1 didn’t seriously consider pulling the whole event for any length of time, 
although that was an option we briefly considered, it was more about the fact that 
I didn’t want, that would have seemed quite a drastic step and I didn’t want to 
cause sort of damage and withdraw something, that would seem quite a drastic 
step really, so that wasn’t a serious consideration, although we did look at it 
quickly as an option. [Participant P]
4.3 INFLUENCING
45.1 managed to convince my colleagues to go with it, whereas actually their feeling 
is the right one. [Participant 0]
46. At the time they were persuaded by my kind of contrary argument really, but they 
were, they understood why Mary suggested it, they imderstood the motivation 
being a right motivation once we talked about it, but they were concerned about 
how it would be perceived. [Par ticipant O]
47. So I explained why it was important, that it wasn’t just about frippery, it was 
really, it was about presentation and confidence, and they said, oh right’o, and 
they got it, they understood where I was coming from, and they said, in that case, 
fine, but they, their disquiet was very real for them, and as it was they were right, 
and I was wr ong in terms of how it was received. [Participant O]
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4.4 REPUTATION
48.1 just thought that was an ‘ouch’ factor within the force. Of course the next thing 
that happened is that in very short order, which happens to us quite a lot, this got 
into the media, so the next thing I knew is I had the Head of Media 
Communications coming up and showing me some really damaging publicity, 
national publicity, about this, and as the press does, kind of twisting it in the 
worst possible way, but kind of, I don’t know if I’ve got it to hand, but kind of 
women sort of having a jolly really, and a freebie, and having their colours done 
at the expense, and what relevance was that to the policing on the streets, and just 
all the worst things. [Participant P]
49. And then it went in the national press, no it went in the national press before the 
event. Yeah, it went in the national press before, so we pulled it before the event 
took place. But the damage was done. [Participant O]
50. Anyway big mistalce, national press, horrendous, and so it got in the national 
press, we don’t know how. I mean we know that everything internal is leaked in 
an organisation, but anyhow it got into the press, and it was portrayed exactly as 
Kaien had thought that the police aie out there wondering about what colour of 
eyeliner to wear, and what on earth aie they doing, it’s all nonsense, in the Daily 
Mail, kind of Daily Express view of the world, sadly. [Paiticipant 0]
51. It made national press over a couple of days in the newspapers, and it was things 
like, women police choosing which coloui' scaif to where, which was, it was 
really having a go at us ai'oimd why ai'en’t you out there catching buiglars, why 
aren’t you, why have you got time to do this, the age old criticism that comes our 
way. So those aie the kind of comments, and of course what that then focused on 
was all the negative bits about women in policing, about how they’re all 
swanning about being airy-fairy and not actually getting on with it, so it kind of, 
it back-fired really. [Paiticipant O]
52. The concern had been more about what was in the public domain. [Participant P]
53. So I was quite clear I wanted it to go ahead, and then it was more about damage 
limitation, making the best of it, and trying to, the priority became damping down 
the media fuiore, which was getting out of hand, and people were getting, 
misunderstanding and misinterpreting everything, in an exaggerated sort of way. 
[Participant P]
54. It was a question of wisdom, of whether it was the right thing to be seen to be 
doing, it was about perception, which in our world is very important. [Paiticipant 
O]
55. Actually there wasn’t anything wrong at all in what was being proposed, it was 
very sensible for very sensible reasons, but it was the risk of our reputation, it 
was the risk about how it would be taken, and it was taken out of context, and it 
did damage us, only for a couple of days, people soon forget. [Participant O]
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56. Because reputation is all for us, policing is so much about reputation, not for its 
own sake, but there’s a really strong evidence, we know, that if people have trust 
in their police, they have confidence in their own community, they see that, they 
feel good about their local police they feel good about where they live, and if 
they feel good about where they live, then they feel much more empowered to 
solve their own problems. [Participant O]
57. So our reputation is really important in order to make people feel safe. Have the 
real, there’s a link between the perception and policing, and so we guard that 
reputation really, really caiefiilly, and sometimes we have to bm*n it, we know 
that we take the hit for things that are nothing to do with us, for the greater good, 
that’s what happens in a democracy, that’s fine, and we take that hit with our 
eyes open, but this was an own goal really that we didn’t need to score against 
ourselves. [Participant O]
58.1 know we caused embarrassment to Mary, who is a fantastic senior leader, and 
we caused her embarrassment, for her to be in the national press like that is really 
poor, and I know that would hmt her as an individual. [Participant O]
59. So yeali, people were hurt by that, because a lot of people had put a lot of work 
into it, for a start, I think people were embarrassed, because nobody likes a scene, 
and they were [POB], and it was a ridiculous thing, that was the, what on earth 
are they playing at down there, kind of attitude in the national press, so nobody 
liked that, and lots of people felt that ernbanassment throughout the organisation. 
[Participant O]
4.5 CONSULTING
60. So at that point his [Head of Media Communications] advice to me was, what 
was our immediate strategy, his advice to me was, we should remove the colour' 
thing, and say, look because there were all sorts of blogs going on by then, and 
people saying this is teri'ible and disgraceful, and getting cari'ied away, we should 
remove the colour thing, and possibly the gynaecology thing, because that had 
also received some adverse publicity... and that, actually that proved to be an 
excellent strategy, it, the press problem died down... we got some, actually in the 
context, quite positive reporting, that we’d reflected on the comments that we’d 
had and decided that wasn’t tire appropriate use of tax payers’ money type of 
thing. [Participant P]
61.1 was given the advice about how to get the media storm dying down, and I took 
that advice which was to agree that we would remove the colour session, and that 
we would write, we’d produce a press statement sort of saying that in response to 
public opinion, as it were, we’d thought better of it, and that, we defended 
ourselves, but we did say, on this occasion, in view of public comments, we’ve 
decided to withdraw that particular session. [Participant P]
62. So I spoke to her on the phone, and we talked about how best she might do that, 
and I emailed her some, I got this advice, some ideas and some advice through
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from the Head of Communications, and I emailed that tluough to her. [Par ticipant
P]
4.6 COMMUNICATING
63. So anyway, we made national press over a couple of days, and we pulled it, we 
pulled that particular part of the event, and we had to do some kind of putting 
plasters over the wounds, and put some press statements out and explain. 
[Participant O]
64.1 think we then had to spend a lot of time sorting it out, mopping it up, doing that 
communication, doing the press statements, we just had to do a lot of reparation, 
which we could have done without. [Participant O]
65. That media strategy, I mean we deployed that within 24 horns, you’ve got to be 
very fast on these things. [Participant P]
66. We put out a press statement, very quickly, along the lines, like I said, of sort of 
positively about why we are supporting Health and Wellbeing Day, and how 
appropriate it is for us to be doing that for women at work, but in view of public 
comments and opinion we would withdraw the colom' session. We made some 
points about it wasn’t a great waste of tax-payers’ money, but in the light of 
comments we would withdraw that session. [Participant P]
67. The police officers, the police or colleagues who were officers and staff who 
were involved in it were really hurt actually, because they genuinely didn’t see 
what they were doing was wrong, and they weren’t doing anything wrong, and so 
it was really difficult to try and explain, and Karen and Mary led on this, try and 
explain to colleagues why we’re stopping doing something, when we also agree 
there’s nothing wr*ong with it. [Participant O]
68. So I think the key, which Karen was very careful about, was to explain, to at least 
explain why we were doing what we were doing, and people can take their own 
ending from that. [Participant O]
69. Wliat I did was I asked the Head of Cormmmications to produce some advice for 
Mary, who is the Head of Advance, for her to cormmrnicate it internally. 
[Participant P]
70. But we didn’t feel a Force-wide email was the right thing to do, so I left it to her 
to communicate to her members the outcome of that, in the best way she saw fit. 
[Participant P]
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POST-DECISION PROCESSES
1. REFLECTING
71. Well we can have, we have close enough links tluough our o'wn media team to 
have an off the record conversation, we could have done that to see, and if this 
was out there what would you think kind of thing, we could have done that, and 
we didn’t, so I suppose we didn’t make as informed a view as we could have 
done. [Participant O]
72. Kind of what I’ve hinted at already, about taking more time, being aware of how 
vulnerable we are, I knew it anyway, but it reinforced how vulnerable we are. 
[Participant O]
73. It was my judgement that wasn’t appropriate to stop it at that point, and it was 
more about learning the lessons and giving feedback and making sure in the 
flitine we prevented that kind of thing. [Participant P]
74.1 mean it was a lesson, it was a lesson for me. And Karen and I have talked about 
it, her view is that she should have been more forceful with her view, because 
they were convinced by me, and actually she said “I still felt it was wrong”, and 
to come forward and say so really. [Participant O]
75. If it had been in the right place at the right time that would never have gone out 
in the way that it did, and caused the problem that it did. [Participant P]
76. The consequences were we made a decision too quickly. [Participant O]
77. So it was about, the learning was really about avoiding this in the future, and I 
thinlc the learning for me was also about what seemed at the time a slightly bold 
media strategy -  which, I know, on the day, when I mentioned it to James, he sort 
of didn’t, it wouldn’t have been his choice as a strategy -  paid off. So I think that 
there is a moment, I don’t think I’ve ever quite done that before, there are 
occasions where you roll over and say, yep, you’re right, and we’re going to 
change in response, and that went down very well. [Participant P]
78.1 think, I mean I think we were damned if we did it and damned if we didn’t 
actually, for it to have been leaked in the first place, some staff must have been 
uncomfortable with it, otherwise they wouldn’t have leaked it, so by pulling it we 
pleased some, and by also pulling it we displeased others. [Participant O]
2. LEARNING
79. Like I said, something like the Black Police Association, the Christian Police 
Association, all the different groupings that represent different minorities and 
diverse groups we fund them, it’s a very small amount, a few hundred pounds 
just to do admin and run a couple of events, that kind of thing, and they entirely 
have their own governance, they’re entirely down to themselves. But when 
they’re doing things in the name of [POB], then we need to just check in and
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Karen put a system in place, about why we check in with what they’re doing and 
make sure it sits with oui* values, and is seen to sit with our values. [Participant 
O]
80. Well procedures might be overstating it, but I have made it very clear to the Head 
of Advance that I would wish her to work with HR and to give us advance sight 
of drafts of conferences and proposed content of conferences before they go out. 
And I’ve also asked my Head of PPP to make sure there’s more proactive 
communication about that, so my expectation is that there wouldn’t be a repeat of 
that, and that there would be an opportunity to review the content of future 
conferences before an ill considered and ill worded email goes out across the 
Force. [Participant P]
81. It was only when the media storm blew up that we had to take sort of further 
action, and you know, part of the result of that has been an agreement that those 
agendas for conferences will be shared and checked with us, as it were, before 
they’re publicised, as indeed requiring, requesting a budget, because after the 
event, or about a day before the event, we got a bill for over £2000 which hadn’t 
been properly requested. [Participant P]
82. And the upshot was to make sure that, they’re entirely ftee to do what they like, 
but they do do things in our name, and we need to get that, just have that 
checking sometimes, that we’re happy. [Participant O]
83. It’s a mistake, we make sure we don’t repeat the mistake, we learn ft'orn it, and 
we put in place the things that mean we don’t make the same mistake again. 
[Participant P]
84. Well I learnt that my instincts were right on this occasion, so I sort of feel sort of 
affirmed in that. [Participant P]
85. But one thing that would have been helpful, with hindsight, and we’ll make sure 
happens again, is that any kind of event like that is just run through, we have a 
health and wellbeing bunch, there are people there who can just check. 
[Participant O]
86.1 mean I’ve reflected since, and Karen and I have spoken, would I have done 
anything differently? I think I might have looked, well I would, I hope if it ever 
comes up again I’d know anyway, but in a similar circmnstance there are two 
things, one is just to hell with it, and do it anyway, because if we worry about 
everything that people said about us, we might not do anything, so part of it is to 
say well, crack on anyway and risk it. But the other side, we would have done a 
little bit of testing out, we could have done some testing out with local media 
and, because they might have already known, someone might have already told 
them by then, there’s all sorts of ways that they find things out. [Participant O]
87. We would have had this conversation to the press, we would have probably 
spoken to the Police Federation, perhaps Unison to say what’s your feeling on 
this, we’d have tested the water in a proper way, rather than just the few of us
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round the table, so done some proper, quickly, we could do it quickly, doesn’t 
have to take forever, just test that water, and use other stalceholder’s views in 
terms of making a decision. It would have been a better informed decision. 
[Participant O]
88.1 think the greater learning is just to take a bit of, when you’ve got time, as we 
did, we had a couple of days, to take that time. [Participant O]
89. We should make sure in the futme we took a bit more time in considering how 
these things were put across in publicity information. [Participant P]
90.1 think the learning really is about making srue we get in early, that we work 
alongside these diverse support groups, so we prevent shooting out, because it 
could have been so easily avoided, without really necessarily changing anything 
very much. [Participant P]
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Intuitive Miss Case 3
1. INITIATING PROCESS
1.1 EXTERNAL DRIVERS
1. In [..... ] in the police survey, which is a national survey about confidence, the
confidence of [..... ] residents in the police and the Council to deal with issues
like anti-social behaviour is virtually the bottom of the coimtry, and if we are 
allowing ourselves not to attend meetings, and the local Councillor is going to 
stand up and say “you’re absolutely rubbish”, then that’s not going to raise 
confidence in terms of what the public think about us. [Participant W]
2. Wlien there’s a Coimcillor who’s kind of standing up saying, “it’s absolutely 
disgraceful, the police in this area aie rubbish, because they can’t even turn up to 
a public meeting”, that does tremendous hami to the views of the public of the 
police in that area. [Participant W]
1.2 INTERNAL DRIVERS
3. The individual concerned also had an assessment on her ability to manage crime 
enquiries, and it came out very negatively. [Participant W]
4. It was a relatively quick decision, which was prompted by the assessment of their 
management of crime, I think that’s what, where the conversation first came 
about. [Participant W]
5. One of the areas was what we call a hot spot for crime, in terms of we had very 
high crime levels, high levels of anti social behaviour' and there was a perceived 
lack of the local police getting hold of the problem, and doing something about it, 
just a general feeling that the sort of Inspector level in the area was very 
committed, and was doing or trying to do their best job possible, but then they 
weren’t necessarily being fully supported by one of their Sergeants, who was sort 
of sat underneath them. [Participant W]
6. In the other instance there was one of the police scenaiios whereby a quite 
important ar ea in terms of a local Councillor who has actually got the community 
safety portfolio lead for the whole of the county, had actually turned up at a 
public meeting, two public meetings, and the local police hadn’t turned up, when 
they should have been there, and it was kind of like, well why has that happened, 
there’s obviously a breakdown here. [Participant W]
7. But there was a number of issues that were starting to be flagged up with the 
Local Area Commanders on the South as well, why didn’t we attend this 
meeting, did we not know about it, you know, it’s not acceptable, and then there 
was another one we didn’t attend, and it was like well, you know that you’re 
under the spotlight, you know we’ve got these meetings and we’re still not 
attending. [Paiticipant W]
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8. I guess my suspicion is that some of the meetings that we didn’t attend, was 
because we didn’t have the confidence to deal with the Councillor who might 
have been a little bit difficult with the police. [Participant W]
9. It’s kind of the role of the management of the neighborhood, Local Area 
Command to actually deliver on neighbourhood policing in terms of crime 
reduction, and pait of that is actually making sure that the PCs aie doing what 
they should be doing, so are we attending the meetings that we should be 
attending, are we doing community engagement, have we reviewed the crime in 
an area, and have we got a problem solving plan in place for reducing that, does 
it involve partners in that process. And when you kind of face, looking at it 
thinking we’re not doing what we should be doing here, we need to do something 
about it. [Participant W]
10. There’s a reorganisation within the division taking place, and it involves 
transferring some roles over, back to Sergeant from a central fimction, and the 
individual Sergeants are being assessed as to their competency, and the issue with
the [.....] South one was flagged up by us just reviewing the results of those
competency sessions. [Participant W]
11. We were doing an accreditation process for each of our Sergeants, which 
involves taking them thiough their crime management system, and reviewing 
how they are managing each of their officer’s crimes, and when this process was 
on with this particular Sergeant, very quickly became clear that there was very 
little management at all, and jobs were going on for months without any 
intervention, they were sitting there, and not being looked at and so on, and when 
this individual was telling us about this, she was initially a little bit defensive, 
and then broke down in teais, and it was a, “I can’t cope without a bit of support” 
and so on. So there was an issue that was around welfaie as well as actually 
needing somebody who can put up with things there. [Participant S]
12. There was all sorts of negative feedback about the guy at [..... ] North aiound his
management of crime, and that was one where everyone around the table was 
like, we all know you can do it, in fact even the guy that did the assessment said I 
know you can do it, but it’s obvious that you’re not doing it, so why isn’t he 
doing it, well there’s issues ai’oimd coping with bereavement and that’s the 
reason why he’s not doing it, well we need to thinlc about how we can be 
supportive. [Participant W]
13. There’s still a lot of issues, and I think there’s a lot of people quite stressed in our 
organisation at the minute, because there is a lot of pressure being applied across 
all ranks of the organisation. [Participant W]
14. Just really because nationally and regionally we’re considered as being poor 
performers and that we need to improve a lot, and I think there’s a lot of people 
cannot necessarily get their heads ai ormd that. [Participant W]
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15. The view of the organisation is everything that we do, we could do better. So you 
could ai'gue that everything that we do is not as successftil as we’d have liked it 
to have been. [Participant W]
16. Because we are, we’re told we’ve got to make 20% improvements within the 
next 18 months and people are kind of thinking, we’re under a lot of pressure 
already, so where does it end, and actually I think that it is a big issue on this area 
at the minute, it’s individual personal stress levels, and we get more typical stuff 
in with that in terms of sickness and time off. [Participant W]
1.3 TIME PRESSURE
17. The Division’s under a lot of pressure, we need to, it’s expected that we deliver 
results in a time line, and could we actually perceive that we can actually deliver 
it with what we’ve got at the minute. [Participant W]
18. Have we got the time to actually sit down and actually address each individual 
who’s working there, and actually spend time to actually make it work, or do we 
need something a bit more quick time taking place, and that’s where it’s come 
up. [Participant W]
2. INTUITING PROCESS
2.1 GUT FEEL
19.1 guess a lot of the things is that we all have a gut feeling about stuff within the 
police, about how we should be going about doing it. [Participant W]
20. The gut feeling ar ound the room was actually we thinlc someone needs to change. 
[Participant W]
21. Our' gut feeling was we needed to change something, we all kind of sat round and 
said, yeah, that’s the right thing to do, right, we’ll approach that person, that 
person, and that person. [Participant W]
2.2 EXPERIENCE
22. It’s been quite new to me, because I got promoted in June to this role, so 
although I’ve dealt with staffing issues. I’ve not had to deal with anything quite 
like this before, because normally in my previous role as an Inspector I just get 
the kind of, the results of management’s decisions about who is going where, 
etcetera. [Participant W]
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3. INTERPRETING PROCESS
3.1 DIALOGUE
23. We sort of sat around the table and it was like we really need to do something 
about this. [Participant W]
24. Each of us knew a little bit about what’s happening in that area, and the moment 
you talk together, it’s a sort of, you get a fuller picture. [Participant W]
25. As in the Senior Management Team, so Gavin, Neil, Roger and myself, we sat 
down, and so we kind of felt there was a need, from our perspective, to be seen to 
be doing something to support, but also to address some of the performance 
issues in terms of how we’re being perceived by the public, by not attending 
meetings, how we are kind of perceived both internally and externally by the 
level of crime and om* apparent not getting a grip of it, and we all felt, I think, 
that the weak link that we needed to work on was the Sergeant, two of the 
Sergeants. [Participant W]
26. That’s not saying that everybody else working there was perfect, but it was kind 
of like what can we do, how can we make a difference. [Participant W]
27. It was really a discussion, wasn’t it in Amy’s office, around now who could we 
send down there, and then I think Amy, came up with well what about... 
[Participant S]
28. The discussions that we had with her, but the process probably did narrow down 
quite quickly into “ah-hah that sounds like a good idea!”, and quite intuitively go 
down that line. [Participant S]
29. We think the right thing to do is to actually make some changes. And I think we 
all kind of left the room with, okay well that’s what needs to happen. [Participant 
W]
3.2 RATIONALISING
30. So we ended up kind of leaving four people very, I suppose, distressed to an 
extent, when what we were trying to do was just deliver something that gut 
feeling was telling us it’s the right thing to do. [Participant W]
31. With regards to the [.....] North, the officer there had suffered bereavement in his
family, and it had clearly had an impact, it can take individuals long periods of 
time to get over that kind of thing, and with it being such an intense area we felt 
that somebody that had proven ability to be decisive, positive, innovative, and 
was a strong character as well is what was needed, and that maybe the guy that 
was there just needed a bit of a break really. [Participant W]
32. Well two things really, the one on [.....] South sat on a limb, the person that was
performing the role she’s very quiet as an individual, and is not very confident at
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speaking publicly, and the PCs that work there aie quite experienced, and they 
need strong management, otherwise they will take advantage of that Supervisor, 
and we felt that the Sergeant who was there was too inexperienced, and lacked 
confidence to be able to confront perfomiance in relation to the Police Constables 
that needed firm management, and lacked the confidence to actually manage 
public meetings, and we didn’t have the resilience to be able to offer enough 
support, to make sure that somebody was there to kind of pull her up, just there to 
support and actually ensure that those meetings run smoothly. [Paiticipant W]
33. We wanted to change her to response, because we felt that it would be, at least 
she was partly around managing staff, and managing the workloads of staff, and 
you’ve always got staffing issues with people anyway, but the issues of that are 
more about who is going to which job, and actually how aie they dealing with 
that job, which you have to manage as a neighbouihood Sergeant, but as a 
neighbourhood Sergeant you also have to manage how you’re going to engage 
with the community, what ai'e the local policing priorities, how aie we doing 
problem solving in terms of actually reducing crime, so you’ve got a much 
broader spectrum. [Participant W]
34. So our kind of thoughts were, if we can move her to a role where she had to focus 
on less things, that would increase her confidence in dealing with them, and then 
she could probably come back to doing a neighbomhood role a little bit later on. 
[Participant W]
35. We had a view as a senior management team that we needed to change the 
management structure at two of our police stations, because we felt that the 
Sergeants weren’t delivering what they should have been delivering, and that we 
felt that there were other strong Sergeants on the Division who could step into 
that role and tuin it round and make it a lot better. [Paificipant W]
4. INTEGRATING PROCESS
4.1 GENERATING OPTIONS
36. Well we actually, I think we talked about every Sergeant who was on the 
division, didn’t we, as to who might be suitable, how it might work, I mean, we 
were actually looking at whether there was any ability to bring a third Sergeant
into [..... ] North at the time, but we had to consider budgetary implications, and
that kind of ruled it out, at tliat time, and then we considered bringing another 
Constable in to assist with the kind of management of the area, and that’s actually 
the route we’ve actually gone down. [Participant W]
37. In terms of the alternatives, I think we probably did briefly discuss the officers in
terms of [.....] South, about can we leave the individual in place with an action
plan and so on, I think to be fair it was a fairly short discussion. Five minutes 
maybe on it, but it was really a case of well can we afford to leave that individual 
in place where we’ve got this, this and this and we know we haven’t really got 
the time to make a change on this. [Paiticipant S]
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38. Well should we be doing this, and then at that stage it was well are there any 
other options, and probably the two of you then sort of came in with other 
options, which the next one was aiound the other Sergeant, and the other 
Sergeant going down. [Participant S]
39,1 know it was a case of, well actually if we can’t have thiee Sergeants working 
there then can we ensine that we’ve got two strong Sergeants that can take it 
forward. [Paiticipant W]
40. We reflected on the fact that one of the Sergeants had actually, not long before, 
asked to move to another area, for personal issues, and we kind of thought 
actually, they’re going to stick up for it, it’s like, well actually if we could get 
that Sergeant over there that’s really well motivated and is really effective to 
come into that role, and then probably the guy who is already in the post, because 
of his kind of family circumstances might be alright with moving elsewhere, that 
will strengthen one of those areas up. And then on the other area it was a case of 
well this person is working in an aiea that doesn’t have a lot of, it’s a bit out on a 
limb that aiea is, it’s away from this main station, so there wasn’t a lot of mutual 
support for that officer, if they got challenges in terms of their supervisory skills, 
and they need support, not a lot of people to offer that support, so it was kind of,
okay, well if we move her across to [..... ], where there’s lots of other staff,
supervisor to support her, and there’s another Sergeant here who is actually well 
motivated, who wants to get on the accelerator promotional scheme, we’ll move 
her across there, we’ll have the best of both worlds. Well that was our plan. 
[Participant W]
41. My sort of reaction was well I don’t think he’ll go for it, but okay, ask the 
question. I still favoin the original option, so I’ll reserve that and well my 
favourite option is tliis, but let’s look at the other. [Participant S]
42. And for me that, so very heavily should have pulled us towards, actually can we 
leave the individual in place there, and whereas probably did consider can we 
leave them in place with an action plan, and so. But personally I did dismiss that 
relatively quickly, said no, we need to get her out and look for options in, so that 
alternative was fairly briefly examined, the options around that, then the options 
around who comes in there, I think we probably looked at in more detail, and 
looked at a number of other options, around well who is there available, who 
could go down there, and we did look at quite a few Sergeants, other Sergeants 
who could replace her. Probably didn’t do that in a structured way, like there’s 
this person, the pros and cons. [Participant S]
43. We can’t afford to actually put somebody, another officer in there, moneywise, 
because we haven’t got the budget to do that, to support, so actually the only 
option we’ve really got is actually to move him somewhere else, and swap him 
with somebody else, so the costs actually stay the same, so that’s how we got to 
where we were with the decision. [Participant W]
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4.2 CONFLICT
44. The Chief Inspector, but he was aware of the discussions, I think once it started 
to unr avel a little bit, then there was more discussion, and then the last thing that 
this isn’t such a good idea, and then probably there was a divergence of, I was 
probably still, up to quite a late stage, was still quite keen on saying, “no I think 
we need to stick with this”, and one by one other people were coming over, “I 
think this might be too much, more trouble than it’s worth”. [Participant S]
45.1 think probably the first person to sort of say, “hmrn, not sur e about this” would 
have been Roger, because of the impact on the response team. [Participant S]
46. Yeah, so he sort of came up with a, “well not sine about these”, and this is a 
decision first, probably then some discussions with yourself [Mike], and then I 
think you started to waiver, would that be right? [Participant S]
4.3 CONSENSUS
47. So ultimately we, I agreed with Neil, that we would actually, that I would go and 
speak to Nicky, sit down with her, and actually talk through what the issues that I 
thought she’d got, and how she could actually address those. [Participant W]
48. At that point it was, I think there was a reasonable consensus. [Participant S]
4.4 COMMUNICATING
49. It was a plan that was in the extent of well it’s not going to be just an ask, it’s 
going to be a very strong ask, in fact it’s going to be, if possible, a kind of tell 
them that that’s what we’re going to be doing. [Participant W]
50. We approached the Sergeant fiom over here in [.....], and spoke to her initially,
and she said, oh yeah. I’d be keen to do that. So we’re thinking, right, okay, 
that’s it sorted. [Participant W]
51. Neil on Saturday spent about an hour with Nicky, and she got quite upset with 
him, and they went through it, and then we obviously get the feedback fiom 
Anne that she now didn’t really want to do it. I mean after we’d had the 
conversation, I think it was on a Wednesday, we had the conversation the 
Wednesday afternoon. I’d arranged to see Anne on the Friday afternoon because 
she’d been on a com’se that week, and on the Thursday I’ve actually gone over to 
see Charles, to say Charles would you be interested in this one, if it was 
available, and he said no, and so that kind of wrote that one off in my book. 
[Participant W]
52. The next day Neil had been over to see Nicky personally, again we all thought, 
we kind of felt we needed to do things face-to-face, because otherwise you 
haven’t got the credibility as a management team. [Participant W]
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53. So within a space of the Thursday, the Friday and the Satiu'day, we’d seen the 
three key individuals so, obviously having spoken to those three people, all that 
we thought was actually happening was that Nicky and Anne would be swapping, 
then the following week I got back, having knocked out, and then middle of last 
week we had a conversation, Roger had a conversation with Gary to see whether
he would consider going to [..... ] South, for him to then say, no I’m not going to
do it, and then on the Friday, last week, I went over to see Alan, who’s Nicky’s 
line manager, and then spent time with Nicky, and talk things through with her, 
and so by Friday afternoon last week that was it, job finished. So a lot of work for 
actually no result really. [Participant W]
54. Myself and Roger then had a conversation, said, right, well actually what is it 
that’s stopping him ft'orn going over there, is it about increased costs in terms of 
travelling, because if it is we could probably give him a bonus payment that will 
actually reassme him that actually it wasn’t going to cost him any more, but 
anyway we approached him and spoke to him about it, and he really didn’t want 
to do it, and became quite upset about it actually. [Participant W]
55. So I don’t therefore need to tell him about this, because why involve him in a 
conversation that he doesn’t need to know about, but somehow those two people 
ended up speaking to each other, and the one who potentially might have moved, 
he obviously was quite aimoyed by the fact that we’d been talking about moving 
him without involving him in that conversation, so I then had to have a difficult 
conversation with him to explain what had happened. [Participant W]
4.5 REPUTATION
56. Management reputation was, I personally think, Neil might have a different view 
to me, but I think it was harmed by it, cerlainly it harmed our standing, I think 
overall, probably people perceive that we are quite a positive management team, 
and actually are looking to take things forward, but a positive management, 
maybe too positive really, that’s what might be the take on it. [Participant W]
57. What it created was a kind of an impression perhaps that the management 
weren’t decisive in what they were doing, and that they weren’t consulting 
people, and letting people know what was happening. So it was probably 
damaging to our reputation within the Division. [Participant W]
58. Well where do we go now, we’ve already asked two people, who both said no, 
we’ve actually asked three people, when you talk about both those roles, and 
they’ve said no, they’re our' kind of three top candidates, if we keep asking more 
people and we keep getting a no, it’s going to just make us look really weak as a 
management team. [Par'ticipant W]
59. It kind of required a lot of recovery, on oiu' part, afterwards, in terms of trying to, 
we ended up not moving either of these two Sergeants that we originally intended 
to. [Participant W]
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60. The implications are that if everybody knows that if managers ask you to do 
something and you can say no, then they’ll all say no, and it won’t happen. 
[Participant W]
4.6 EMPOWERING
61. Actually what we’ve got to do now, is we’ve got to work with the people that 
we’ve got, and just tr y and develop them as best we can. [Participant W]
62. So on Friday of last week I went over there, sat round with her boss and herself, 
and had a long chat and agreed what kind of action plan would be put in place, 
and give some clear direction on what was required, hi January, she should be 
having another meeting with one of our Inspectors who’s doing the accreditation. 
[Participant W]
63.1 spoke to the Local Commander, and he’d sort of come round, by this time, and 
said, look I’ve been working with her, and I think that I can put an action plan 
and I think I could actually turn her performance round, and I’m confident, so 
there it was kind of like, okay. [Participant W]
64.1 think Alan, the Local Commander, has given her some clear direction as to 
what he thinks that she should be doing, and I’ve seen some communication 
between the two of them that I think is a lot more directed as to where she needs 
to be focussing her efforts. [Participant W]
5. INSTITUTIONALISING PROCESS
5.1 SYSTEMATISING
65. We identified issues with the crime management, so there would have been some 
direction fiom Local Area Commanders, rather than ourselves in relation to 
individual performance, and there was an expectation that each Inspector has a 
monthly meeting with their Sergeants to discuss performance issues, as I sit down 
with the Inspectors on a monthly basis. [Participant W]
66. One of the things that we’ve done is we’ve just come out of the process which 
we’re calling Talent Management and what that is, is that if you work in oin 
division, and you actually see yourself as being somebody that is suitable for 
being promoted within the organisation and is prepared to actually be flexible 
and do something different, and go with what the organisation wants you to do, 
you actually put yoiu’self up onto the Talent Management Scheme, so now if you 
look at that, and you think actually those two Sergeants over there would do a 
really good job over there, I can now approach those two people from the point 
of view, thinldng okay you’re on the Talent Management Scheme, you want to 
get promoted to the next rank, you’ve got competency and experience, what we’d 
like you to do is we’d like you to go over there and do that particular' role. They 
will not then, well it’s unlikely then that they’ll turn around and say, well yeah I 
don’t really want to do that, it’s going to impact on my family life, or I’d find it
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difficult getting to work if I was to do that, or it cost me more money in petrol, or 
I don’t really want that challenge. Because they’ve then put themselves in the 
situation whereby they want to get on, and they want the organisation to give 
them opportimities, where they can gather evidence and experience to be able to 
do that. [Paiticipant W]
67. We’ve started now this, oui' Talent Management Scheme up, and one of oui' kind 
of hopes with that is that it gives me a pool of officers who, if I get a problem 
where I need to do something about it quite quickly, I will have a willing 
volunteer, which would make it a lot easier. [Participant W]
68. Well we’ll have the review in January and we should have the Talent 
Management Scheme in process by then, whereby we have got individuals that 
actually want to be developed, and to take on new roles within the organisation, 
so my expectation will be that, when I ask somebody if they’ll do it, they’ll 
actually say yes. [Paiticipant W]
POST-DECISION PROCESSES
1. REFLECTING
69. When you actually look back on it and say well actually what was the weakness 
in that plan, the weakness in the plan was the fact that we kind of made an 
assumption that people that were very productive who were very much behind 
the organisation in tenns of taking it forward, were prepared to be flexible to 
work with the organisation, and actually, also that they didn’t really hold a 
confidence as we would have hoped that they would have done. [Par'ticipant W]
70.1 just see it that way, but that was the kind of the thinking, and I still feel, to this 
day, that if those two people had been moved to those particular' roles they would 
have been the right people to have there. [Participant W]
71. If the two people concerned were willing volunteers I think it would have 
actually happened in the way that we originally envisaged, and it would have 
probably worked okay, I mean certainly there would have been a little bit of 
unhappiness in the first instance with regards to the two people involved, but I 
think we could have worked through that, but it didn’t pan out for the reasons 
that I said really. [Par'ticipant W]
72.1 still thinlc it would be the right thing to do in terms of those individuals, 
unfortunately tliose individuals didn’t see it that way. [Participant W]
73. But it’s kind of, it is an ongoing process, and I think people can see that actually 
there ar e still changes taking place every day, sometimes there can be a bit of a 
hiccup, this is a bit of a hiccup in my estimation, but ultimately we will make 
some progress and standards will improve. [Participant W]
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74. It’s a really strange concept for me, because in my own experience of the 
organisation, been in the organisation for 17 years, and whenever I’ve been asked 
to do a job, I always say yes, I will do it, and it’s quite alien to me to actually find 
people that are so reluctant to actually change within the organisation. Especially 
people that you perceive as being people that want to get on within the 
organisation, and maybe that’s just me applying my own standards to other 
people incorxectly, but it is just, it’s really quite unusual, in my experience. 
[Participant W]
2. LEARNING
75... .and I still think it was the right thing to do, but actually having thought through 
the process now, I would do it a different way, hence now we’ve got a different 
plan in mind for how we deliver future changes on those sort of lines, so, I think, 
I mean I guess that’s as simple as it is really. [Participant W]
76.1 guess the learning is, as much as it’s your gut instinct that you need to do 
something like that, just make sure you’ve crossed all your bridges, or made sure 
that you can actually deliver on it, before you actually commit to it, because the 
risk is that the management look weak. [Participant W]
77. My decision making would be, imless I knew that I had somebody that would go 
and work wherever I asked them to, I wouldn’t do it the same way again. I’d 
make sure I had somebody first and I wouldn’t even consider what the post was 
going to be, but if I thought, if I got somebody in the organisation that was 
working here, that I thought that was doing a cracking job and it was born out by 
evidence to support that. I’d say to her “well what do you see yourself doing in 
the organisation”, and I’d look towards mentoring people myself, in terms of 
actually, you know, if there’s an opportimity would you be interested, and 
actually then come back to them separately, and say “this might be coming up, 
would you be interested in it”. [Participant W]
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